Alternate N. African/Middle Eastern Front, WWII

Alternate N. African/Middle Eastern Front, WWII

I've recently been reading a book a friend gave to me about alternate war scenarios written by military historians. In one part, John Keegan writes about an alternate "southern front" in which instead of Germany invading the Soviet Union as it did, it instead massively reinforces its positions in North Africa and sweeps eastward toward the Suez Canal. He also writes that Germany could mount a seaborne invasion of Syria/Lebanon from Greece, or go overland through Turkey (causing war in the process).

In this scenario, I've changed things up a bit.

1) The Germans send a large number of divisions to North Africa in the wake of their successful Balkans campaign. Perhaps 50 divisions, compared to around 100 that took part in the opening thrust of Barbarossa. From Tunisia, 15 divisions under, say, von Runstedt reinforce Vichy French North Africa and Franco is induced to allow German personnel and armament at the Strait of Gibraltar and close it to British shipping and pre-empting Torch.

2) After sealing up the western Mediterranean, Rommel sweeps eastward with 35 divisions from Libya, breaking through British defenses in Egypt and overrunning the Suez Canal. It is either closed to British shipping, or alternatively, destroyed.

3) The closure of the Mediterranean to British / Allied naval forces allows the Germans to achieve supremacy in the Mediterranean, effectively turning it into a German lake.

4) Note: this is getting a bit more speculative.

In the next campaigning season, German forces cross invade the Middle East proper, sweeping into Palestine, Arabia, and perhaps a sea route into Syria / Lebanon. Alternatively, if Turkey was sufficiently induced to come around to the German side, through say territorial promises in oil rich areas of northern Iraq and Syria (all of the Kurdish areas, at least) they could go overland. The seaboard of the Levant is administered as German / Italian protectorates, Rashid Ali is a puppet ruler in a rump Iraq, and the Saudis switch from British to German patronage. The British empire is in a sense severed, with fighting continuing in the Gulf region between German and GOI forces.

Meanwhile Germany retains 100+ divisions in Europe to check any possible Soviet designs. The German successes in 1941 during the Southern Front Campaign persuade Turkey to join the Axis and Spain to adopt a belligerent neutrality more favorable to the Germans than was historically the case.

 

Reposting as my first reply got misteriously lost ....

The "Southern strategy" has already been discussed multiple times for example here
http://www.ww2f.com/what-if/12090-how-hitler-could-have-won.html

Don't worry about "getting speculative" this if what what-ifs are all about, just expect to be shot at if you can't bring some proof your scenarios were possible and not pure fantasy .

My personal opinion is that there is little advantage in adding some 1000 Km of poor Balkan and Turkish railways to the axis supply lines if the objective is the Caucasus.

Before the opening of an oveland route through the Balkans logistics would limit the German force in Africa to around 10 divisions or even less, that should be enough to take Suez as the British simply don't have the troops to send in late 1940. I'm assuming a Winter 1940 attack that follows up on the Italian advance to Sidi Barrani so with Tobruk and Bardia ports at full efficiency to support the advance and the bulk of the British home for fear of an invasion that was still a possibility until Barbarossa.

Syria is Vichy French so if not exactly German controlled not hostile, once they loose Suez the British can either pull back to Sudan or risk being cut off in Palestine, if they abandon Palestine there are no British bases East of a very isolated Malta so the Easter Med is an axis lake, long range air attacks from Sudan against shipping in the Med is not realistic.
Even Sudan is not sure to last, it's closed in between Italian controlled Somalia/Ethiopia and axis controlled Egypt though the British can safely try to hold there as they control the Red Sea.

A continuation of the southern strategy hinges on Tukey joining the Axis, if they do it's possible to imagine an attack fom the Turks with German support is going to distract a substantial number of soviet troops, the Turk army was large, but if you look at the terrain it's not going to be a Blitzkrieg!! If Turkey don't join protecting a line in hostile territories trough the Balkans and Turkey is going to require a huge number of troops Germany can ill afford.
Without Turkey there is no advantage in going further than Palestine, Syria and Iraq have little or no value, the Iraq oilfields, even if captured intact, would be impossible to exploit though dening them to the allies may be useful and there's nothing else of interest there unless a need to contest Iran arises.
An alternative posssibility, if Turkey will not commit, is that once the Royal Navy has been forced to retreat beyond the Suez canal (if it stays in the eastern Med it will eventually be destroyed by axis airpower), supplies can be shipped from a railhead at Trieste to the South USSR coast. This would still involve some tricky negotiation with the Turks and possibly the "sale" of some Italian escorts to the Rumanian fleet before the war with the the USSR starts so they can legally cross the Dardanelles. The additional supply tonnage will greatly help army Group South that historically most suffered from bottlenecks in the rail system.

IMO Malta and Gibraltar are best left alone, Malta is best left to the Italians, with only force H to worry about they may manage a successful landing once it's been reduced by isolation, and the cost of taking Gibraltar, unless Franco can be persuaded to do it with little German help, is too high.

So on a strategic scale on the down size for the axis:
- Germany commits substantial air forces and about 3 corps of troops in addition to Italian forces already in Africa. These forces will not be available for Barbarossa except for some air units that may be able to pull back and reorganize.
- Italy looses a dozen or so escort ships (most logical would be Spica class) that go to Rumania.
- They have a lot of additional territory to control and defend but it doesn't have a openly hostile population so no guerrilla.

On the plus side:
- There is no longer a Med front to eat up resources, Sudan is the only "contact point" and is too lacking in logistic infrastructure for any side to make a major effort there.
- The pro-allied Yougoslavia coup is now unlikely with no British in the Eastern Med so the 3 corps and supplies sent to in Africa are more than compensated by having no need for a Balkan campaign.
- There is a possibility to ship supplies to Army Group South once it reaches the Black sea coast.
- If Turkey joins the Axis a couple of well supported mountain corps in the Caucasus can be a big headache for the Soviets, so we will probably see the Italian Alpini used for what they were trained for. Anything much larger would be hard to supply.
- The southern Lend Lease route trough Iran is not as easy to setup as it historically was, with axis forces positioned to move to axis friendly Syria and Iraq on short notice it will require more effort to set it up as the allies will need to plan for a German supported resistance. Churchill is unlikely to let Stalin (that has troops to spare) occupy Iran by himself so the route may have to wait until substantial US or British troops are available for a joint effort and that may well be as late as 1942.

But in the end it will not change much, when the Western allies regain a strategic offensive capability in late 1942 they are still more likely to go for Morocco than Egypt or Sudan. And I really don't like to think about what the Grand Mufti given a free hand would have done in Palesine.

 

Very interesting. What was the name of this book you mentioned??

I think if the Germans had their way at Gibraltar, it would of definitely made securing/destroying the Suez more feasible. Having done this it would of effectively played the British out of the game, and as you've said, turn the Med. into a German pond.
Any counter threat from the Commonwealth launched from say South Africa, Aussie but more likely India would of been a high risk, little benefit affair.

Only Op. Torch would cause any discomfort, but owning the Med. and concentrating just on a western front, probably would of tipped the odds to the German side.

I think when German forces started moving through and to the SE of Turkey, alarm bells would of been ringing in the Russian camp

I've always felt that when the North African campaign ended it really exposed the Reich's soft underbelly. The Allies didn't miss their chance, and exploited it to the fullest.
Husky, Avalanche, Dragoon...
The decay that ended the war had set in

 

your initial move of the mass of german rundstedt commanded divisions.. is this before or after closing the med at gib.. you mention that first..so i presume med still open and brits are doing a do or die on this massive troop movement accross the med?

 

How exactly do the Germans get them there? Magic carpet? They walk? Swim? Because they sure are not going by ship. The Germans lack anywhere near the shipping capacity to send that large a force to North Afirca. The Italians do too and certainly are not going to tie up the entirety of what they do have to try and ship them there.
Then there is the problem of supplying them. In Tunisia, the Germans could and did supply about the equivalent of 7 divisions. At the Alamein position they could supply roughly one. Yes, they had more there but, all were receiving a fraction of what they required. That is why they sat for weeks trying to build up enough supplies for a few days offensive.

Franco entering the war (allowing the Germans passage would almost certainly result in this on the part of Britain) gives the Germans another headache. They now have almost 2000 new miles of coast to defend. Another question is what about Portugal?

Entering Vichy territory in North Africa will only drive them into the Allies hands. The French will fight just as they historically did. But, unlike their resistance that lasted just a few days and was generally half-hearted versus the Americans, against the Germans they will fight. The reminants of the French fleet will almost certainly end up in British hands too.

Worse yet, now the Germans have even more coast to defend and the US could still make landings in North Africa on the Atlantic coast just as they historically did.

And how do the Germans supply 35 divisions when they can't even supply 10 in North Africa? They lack the shipping. They lack the construction engineers. They lack the logistical planning ability. They have no navy to support what little shipping they do have. So, how do they manage this?

Putting the logistical problems aside, how do the Germans now defend this huge new area of land mass they have over run? They aren't suddenly going to get a navy. That will take years, decades to build. They aren't suddenly going to get huge new numbers of merchant ships either. The British and US (if they are in the war) already planned for the worst. They are now basing in the southern end of the Persian Gulf and at Massawa instead. They have navies. They have shipping. They have construction engineers capable of building massive works. They just keep fighting. Now, just as in Russia the Germans find themselves at the end of a broken logistical network they can't fix and can't maintain losing too many men and too much equipment. Just as in Russia they are losing the war because they overstretched and didn't have the necessary logistical and engineering capacity to make their military work strategically.

Like the above isn't.....

And how do they manage this feat? Star Trek transporters? They still don't have a navy. They still don't have the necessary shipping. Most of the area you are talking about is nearly roadless and railroad free. The Germans can't build decent roads and railroads over hundreds of miles to support their troops. They lack the engineers and supplies for that. So, how do their troops get the supplies they need? Magic?

Its all fun and fuzzy bunnies to talk about how this or that could happen based on military equipment availability. But, without the mundane knowledge of logistics and engineering the reality is it doesn't matter how many men and tanks you have if you can't supply them and get them into battle. The Germans seemingly forgot that part too, just like you.

 

Due to the logistics involved, I see an offensive after Barbarossa historically occurred, likely in autumn or winter 1941. The obvious route would be Messina/Palermo to Tripoli and Tunisia, utilizing the Strait of Sicily where the Axis can maintain air superiority to protect their shipping as was historically the case. Most of the supply problem you describe was historically was a result of the demands of the Eastern Front, which doesn't exist at this point in the scenario.

The Axis forces first move west across friendly Vichy French North Africa and build airbases to attain air supremacy over the Alboran Sea, thus bottling up British naval forces and shipping at Gibraltar. If Gibraltar can be effectively neutralized, the ports of southern France come into play and open the entire western Med to Axis shipping, instead of them having to rely primarily on waters around Sicily to move their forces. Ground forces are then built up in northwest Africa to prepare to take Gibraltar, with Spain's acquiesence.

Spanish entry into the war on the side of the Axis does mount a number of problems for the Germans. I agree that it's better at the very least a facade of Spanish neutrality to be maintained. German movements across their territory are officially carried out in violation of their neutrality, under formal protest, while in reality in acquiesence while maintaining an air of plausible deniability.

With the western Med closed to the British and open to the Axis, the logistics for the transport and supply of a larger force to head eastward from Libya toward the Suez becomes more feasible.

Historical evidence to support your point is extremely weak, if practically non-existent. The Vichy administration in Algeria even implemented German-style racial policies and constructed concentration camps of their own accord. If Petain says "let the Germans build airbases and transport ground forces across Algeria", I don't think there would be any resistance.

By using primarily air and ground forces to close the western Mediterranean to British shipping, the British are restricted primarily to Egypt, with the rest of the Med open to the Axis. It's not so much an issue of having a strong navy in the Med as it is eliminating the other guy's.

Even in 1942 the Axis were able to neutralize Malta, maintain air supremacy in the waters around Sicily and and transport large numbers of men and materiel across the Strait of Sicily. For the western thrust, my scenario is based on what the Axis were actually able to pull off in 42. The logistical capability existed then, and presumably a year earlier would have been even more favorable. Neutralizing Malta and asserting air supremacy over the waters around Sicily will go a long way toward eliminating Axis shipping losses in the interim while fanning westward to threaten that of the British.

The numbers posted on the map are overestimates. They could probably pull it off with a hell of alot less, perhaps a panzer corps west and a panzer army east.

BTW, there's no need to make it personal. It's just a forum discussion.

 

Ironduke, the question remains; what do the Axis powers gain by taking this territory? There is no known oil in the area (mid-east still out of reach), no food, little fiber (Egyptian cotton perhaps), no raw materials in mineral wealth.

Why spend the effort? Taking square kilometers/miles means next to nothing if it costs more than it rewards.

 

Ironduke, good for you for sticking to your guns, and for providing answers to the (slightly aggressive) questions. I think their are definite and obvious flaws to your proposition, but i still feel sealing up of the southern flank extremely important to the Germans. As Clint wisely pointed out, theres not many resources to be won, but just the territory gains would be what is won. Or, the strategic position is what is won, just think of what would be lost by the Allies, supply wise, strategically and tactically...

Of course an invasion could still be launched, but the air sumpremacy would nullify it. I'm not saying the Allies could'nt over run it but it would surely be a chore to overcome, Overlord scale almost.

 

Certainly strategic...And a wholesale blow to British morale

 

About the "non-importance" of the Mediterranean in WW II see the excellent post od Brndirt 1 (Clint ) in the What If Section:Yes or no Germans take Gibraltar

 

The Axis lost around 15% of the supplies sent to North Africa in total due to losses in transit, but that wasn't their main logistical problem.
The main logistical problem was that none of the ports near to the fighting could handle large amounts of supplies, so the German's had to transport the supplies over a 1000 miles by road (No railway). Each division in North Africa needed 10 times the motor transport a division in Russia had.
The reason why after El Alamein and the Torch landings the German's were able to send vast amounts of troops and equipment to North Africa was due to the fact that the Allied advance reduced the logistical difficulties of getting the supplies to the front-line.

It should be noted that just before the German's got involved in the fighting a senior general was sent to assess the situation in regards of what would be required. The general reported back that the maximum number of divisions that could be adequately supplied on any attack on Egypt was 3.

 

Another point is the Italian cargo fleet was near its limit. It, in theory, had the capacity to send the supply and men ordered to Africa, but there was not much more capacity. As little as a 20% increase in cargo for Africa would have probablly been beyond the capability of the cargo fleet.

Adding Tunis & Bizerte to the Axis ports solves nothing since there was no railroad connection from those to Tripoli, so the demand for automobile transport and all its ineffciencies for long haul transport would be compounded.

If Turkey can be drawn in as a active Axis ally then its railroads could be used to sustain a Axis army attacking through Syria or Mesopotamia. that would have some sucesses until Allied air strikes and commandos cut the thin rail network enough times to collapse that transport system.

 

If they can make it to northwestern Algeria (I see no reason why they could not), and establish airbases, they bottle up British shipping at the Strait of Gibraltar by establishing air supremacy over the western Med. This eases the logistics problems by bringing additional shipping and the ports of southern France into play.

I think people have a misconception that French North Africa lacks rail transport. This may be true for Libya, but in fact Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco had rail spanning from Tunis through Algiers, Constantine, and Fez to Tangiers. So, on the contrary, there was in fact an excellent rail system in French North Africa.

Attached is a map illustrating the railway system in French North Africa circa 1935.

As for Axis forces heading east toward the Suez, the logistical situation is much less favorable than northwest Africa, but could be made be more favorable by closing the western Med first thus making it more friendly to Axis shipping while pinning the Brits down in Egypt.

 

Let's reverse the question. Historically, what did the Axis lose by failing to secure the Mediterranean? If you ask me, a hell of alot. They lost over 1 million personnel in the North African campaign, Italy was knocked out of the war, Germany was forced to divert men and materiel and fight the Allies in Italy, and so on. Historically, winning in the Mediterranean also had the effect of vastly improving Allied military and logistical capabilities, whereas for the first few years of the war all British shipping was forced to go around the Cape.

 

1) Your map is demonstrating that there is no connection between Tunis and Tripoli ;thus I don't see the utility for the Germans to use the railways of Algeria to send supplies to Egypt
2)What the map is not showing is the capacity of the Algerian railways
3)Most important:the railway between Tripoli and Alexandria was practical non existent:the locomotives,waggons...had to come from Italy;coal:from Germany . If (probably ) you don't believe me :look at Axis History Forum:the War in North Africa :there are a lot of posts about the railway system in North Africa .
4)About the utility of Turkey joining the Axis(or the Allies ):Turkey beying an underdevelopped country,the allies would have to build a modern Turkisg army;the Germans:they had to send troops and supplies trough the Balkan,over the Dardanelles and trough the Turkish desert on a primitive railway with a capacity of ....0,OOO

 

Supporting the failed Italian Campaign was the largest mistake, not expending the error would have been to the German's advantage. There is nothing to gain in the area, and only material losses to be made. If they had allowed the Italians to fail on their own, and NOT done more than support the Italian boot and Siciliy they would have been better off. As W. Churchill said when informed that the Italians had allied themselves with Germany officially (paraphrasing); "That is only fair, we had them last time." There is nothing in that theater which is an advantage to control. No food, no fuel, no fiber, no minerals, also the Med. is so narrow (north-south) that it could just as easily been closed to allied commercial traffic from there as it was historically.

The bulk of Commercial British shipping from the Indian ocean and the Pacific, as well as most Soviet/China bound Lend/Lease shipping from America's east coast went around the Cape throughout the entire war, not just the first few years. In the final stage of 1945 some L/L aid was shipped through the Med. to ports in the Black Sea, but only for the last few months of the ETO and into Sept. 1945 when all L/L to the USSR was halted on the 20th.

 

Never claimed there was a rail link between Tunis and Tripoli. As far hauling east, they'll have to do it the old-fashioned way, whether they're able to do it by ship using Tripoli or Benghazi.

Anyways, by the time this scenario starts there was a rail line between Tobruk and El Alamein, built in rather short order. Benghazi is equidistant from Tobruk. I don't see any insurmountable problems that given a bit of time couldn't be solved.

 

What British shipping ?
Apart from one or two high priority convoys in early 1940, all the supplies for the British Commonwealth forces in the North African Campaign went around Southern Africa and up to the Red Sea.

But its going in the opposite direction to where the Allies are.... It may confuse them but it doesn't threaten them.

Closing the Western Med doesn't alter a thing, the British still get their supplies, it just means that the Axis forces now had to find the men and supplies to fight the French forces based in their colonies in North Africa, and when that's done they have to supply the troops needed to garrison all this extra territory

 

If there was a dedicated effort into it, I would think the Germans could perhaps supply 400,000 men at most in North Africa. The presence of a large amount of Panzer regiments could lead to a quick victory over the British on the Road to Alexandria (The British werent strong until sometime after Rommel's victories)

Perhaps even they would advance down the Nile stopping at the North of the Sudan; because there was extremely poor infrastructure in the Sudanese desert which decreased the likelyhood of a British invasion.




Vichy was in no position to reject an intervention in Algeria, they would let German and Italian divisions move into Morocco no doubt; Gibraltar could be taken by day and night artillery bombardment lasting a few weeks. Same case with Malta, except in real life the Italians weren't ballsy enough to land.

With a German Morroco holding tight to the straights, the British need the longer route permanantly to supply Africa. As well as no more Aircraft for defending Malta.

So the British may be out of the way for perhaps a year or two before they can counter Egypt and the Germans and Italians now have a Turkey shoot at the Western middle east.

 

More or less agree but I see little point in going West or actually invading even Vichy Syria. The Germans need to play a subtle game that keeps Vichy France, Spain and Turkey friendly otherwise the need to garrison huge territories offsets by far any gains made in Africa. This means Gibraltar is out of reach, Malta with Alex gone is impossible to resupply and can be taken with a limited effort.

The British are likely to do something rash, the need to break the "gentleman's agreement" between Cunningham and the French admiral when the Brits have to pull back from Alex is one possibility, a second Mers-el-Krbir like episode is likely to swing French pubblic opinion if properly exploited by the German propaganda. I think the Germans can count on the British angering the French into giving support to axis forces that want to interfere with the cape route, if the U-Boats can resupply at Casablanca the already thinly stretched Royal Navy will have even more problems up to US entry.

The Med objectives for the Axis are limited, the goal is to shake the British Empire not conquest of resource poor territories that will then need huge forces to protect, Sudan would be the ideal barrier if not for the obvious Italian wish to link with Ethiopia.

Even if the Italians manage to hold onto Ethiopia I believe the counteroffensive will come in Morocco with a Torch like landing, the trade off there for the Germans is whether taking out the allied forward base at Gibraltar, that played key role in Torch, is worth loosing the French or Spannish support. Torch with a panzer corps likely to rapidly come to French assistance is a very different proposition from the historical one, the Atlantic segment is not much affected unless the Germans manage to convince Vichy to rebase the Toulon fleet there but the North African one is a lot harder and without it an offensive overland through the roadless desert will tax even allied logistics.