Alternate N. African/Middle Eastern Front, WWII

I feel a slightly larger DAK (2 Panzer, 2 Light [motorized] divisions) plus the Italian Mechanized corps under Rommel's command could have reached Alexandria if it was done in late 1940 or early 1941. Malta would need to be taken, and significant air assets deployed to offset the relatively small land force. The Italian Infantry should be left behind, and only moved up to guard captured ports.

I have read in the forum and elsewhere that the Axis supply loss rate was anywhere between 15% and 50%. I wish I knew which is accurate because it does make a difference. What prevents the Axis from building rail transport lines in North Africa? Why could they not build artificial harbors as the allies did in Normandy?

Germany did not have to conquer all of Egypt to present Britain a wagon load of headaches. The oppertunities for promoting unrest and insurrection are quite real. Such a senario could set back British (Allied) military operations for up to 6 months or even a year. All well worth the cost.

What about the US? If Hitler sleeps in on Dec. 11th 1941, there is no German DoW on the US and therefor no Torch in the fall of 1942, or at least not so soon.

The elegance of an 'Southern Strategy' instead of a Operation Barbarossa is that Britain, even with the aid of a committed US, is still not strong enough to force a direct confrontation of German power so long as it's army remains intact and uncommitted to any other (Russian) front.

 

You are uderestimating the case, the Southern strategy may be war winning. If Germany goes after the British Empire rather than the British Isles, the whole war changes. FDR will have more trouble to "sell" the defence of the British Empire to the US public for one. If there is oil in Iraq to be had the whole strategic situation changes. The Germans may even get Stalin to fight the British over Iran with a "second Ribbentrop-Molotov" pact ......

Even after the late 1940 partial demobilization Germany has a huge superiority in land forces over the Commonwealth, if they can get them to battle in a situation with roughly equivalent logistical issues they will be very hard to stop. But I was not thiking of "southern strategy" instead of Barbarossa rather more of going after the Empire immediately instead of attempting the Battle of Britain. I think they will need to have PAA rather than DAK from the start, two full motorized corps and an infantry one are closer to the required force levels, the offensive probably cannot start before October due to the need to acclimatize (and develop sand filters!) but it will still trump Compass by a couple of months.

 

If Suez is lost the Germans either have Indain Ocean (or Red Sea if you prefer) coast to defend or the British can land in Egypt or Sinai. If the Germans go further east landing on the in Kuwait or nearby Iraq or Saudi Arabia can threaten their supply lines as well.

 

In this context "Indian Ocean" means Somalia, not the South coast of Egypt on the Red Sea that is reasonably easy to bottle up. If the Axis prevents the fall of Italian Somalia the British are hurting badly, U-Boats in the Indian Ocean are going to really stretch the RN escort requirements.

A landing on a coast with no decent port and poor land routes, those in Sinai are mostly East-West, is not going to worry the Germans that much. The build up and expansion is going to be so slow the Germans have all the time to react. They can probably reinforce faster than the Commonwealth forces can and, with a safe route to Alex, keep more troops in supply in Egypt than the Commonwealth can supply from a beachead. If you assume the Germans have the equivalent of a a Panzer corps in the Alexandria area, the other one of the original two is headed for Kirkurk, the invasion needs to be fairly strong to avoid being thrown back by the already in Africa troops. Any half harted attempt would make Leros and Dieppe look like allied victories.
The 1941 Luftwaffe is a big threat to an invasion fleet that cannot rely on ground based air cover. Even in 1943 the landing site selection in Italy was dictated by the sigle engined fighter's range.

But the main point is that the Germans have a lot more troops than the Commonwealth in 1940-41, even after Barbarossa the available forces are roughly equal, to win the Commonwealth needs a logistic advantage like it enjoyed in Egypt, historically when they advanced to Libya, putting themseves on a logistical par, they were qucky pushed back, only with a massive input of US equipment were they able to overcome the logistical constraints.

 

Is it? Especially if the canal is closed?

That's far from clear. Somalia has a pretty big coast and is open to invasion and there aren't any good land or sea connections to it for the axis. Trying to hold on to Somalia and close the Red Sea creates even longer axis lines in areas that are difficult to support and relativly easy to invade.

But what do the Germans do if the British land at Aquaba and/or at the entrance to the Red sea? One former threatens the supply lines to the offence and if the Germans commit to it can they still defend Egypt. The other opens the Red sea and allows for invasions as far north as Suez. Then there's the potential for long range desert group like missions against a very vulnerable supply line both before and after.

But the British have carriers and can establish bases ashore in a fair number of places that would require considerable effort for the Germans to reach. Indeed if they take Somalia then they have them pretty much in hand. Historically Somalia was in British hands well before Barbarosa was launched. It's not clear to me that the axis have the time to prevent this in this scenario.

They may have more troops but can they support more troops in North Africa and the Mideast than the British? Indeed they will need to support a lot more troops if they try for Iran and Iraq.

 

With RN gone, the Italians could have supplied Rommel's advance from Suez to Turkey with their ships. Not too difficult really, since there is virtually nobody there to stop Rommel in the first place. Once Turkey joins the Axis or is defeated, then Germany has a land supply route through Constantinople and the naval supply questions are moot. The supply logistics issues you describe are not mundane but are definitely a clearable hurdle for an army now looking to win a war. A simple fleet of trucks and the Turkish railroad solves that problem.

 

The length of the coast is not that relevant as long as the British can't achieve air superiority and create a strong invasion force. A couple of carriers with obsolescent fighters are not going to do the trick. IMO the British cannot land and supply a stronger force than the Germans in the area. They Commonwealth has the equivalent of less than 10 divisions in the theater, not enough to worry the Germans under smilar logistical constraints. They can hold on to southern Iraq and Sudan if they don't overcommit as they willl have the logistical upper hand there but diverting troops to the conquest of Somalia may well overstretch them. In Northern Iraq the contestants are on similar logistical footing, as the British have no air transport capability because bomber command is hugging all the big planes. In Sinai or along the Nile valley the Germans would actually have a logistical advantage, the trip trough Mediterranean ports is much shorter than round the Cape and the land routes are bad for everybody.

The potential is there but they would be suicide missions in Iraq and Sirya where the local population is hostile. If spotted the planes will make short work of LRDG type units.

If they attack in September/October they do, the troops used for the Somalia campaign would be committed, and probably destroyed, in North Africa. There are not that many carriers available and this is not Force H that can redeploy to the Atlantic in hours, any carrier committed to the Red Sea is out of the picture for the Atlantic where they are badly needed in case the German fleet sorties.

In North Africa with the British pushing supplies through the canal to Alexandria and a rail line from Alex to the border no but the British don't have more troops than the Gemans can supply in 1940 so the better logistics cannot be exploited. In the Middle East, after closing the canal, with all the good Mediterranean ports available and the British having to go overland from the Red Sea yes. On the Red Sea Coast and in the Nile valley the capabilities are roughly equal, with the Germans having a probable advantage on the Nile and the Commonwealth in the Red Sea if they manage to knock out Somalia. But operations in Somalia are a logistical nightmare for everybody, if the Germans setup an air bridge, the Italians did send some supplies by air historically, an invasion is unlikely to succeed. The strategic situation is that the Comonwealth troops available are not that much much larger than the German airmobile forces.

 

about the land supply route through Constantinople:
a simple fleet of trucks:and how would that simple(!) fleet of trucks go to Turkey ?
the Turkish railroads :do you have any idea of the transport capacity of the Turkish railroads?
and,let's not talk about the Turkish roads

 

Why is the RN gone?

Using what ports?

Turkey wasn't interested in joining the Axis and defeating her might have been easier said than done. If the Turks are willing to keep fighting after the fall of their capital you may be talking about an extensive campaign.

 

I am sorry gentlemen, but niether Spain or Turkey are going to join the Axis under any realistic scenario. The only way they join is if they are attacked by the Allies/Soviets first as Finland was, otherwise they wisely remain nuetral in the war.

History is the culprit, Spain is still recovering from its civil war and Franco is more concerned about solidifying his control in a still divided country. Turkey only a generation before went from being a weak empire to becoming a weak nation. What they can gain comes nowhere near what they stand to lose in a general conflict.

They correctly understand that their military's can offer nothing to the Axis cause. Only their lines of communications (roads and railroads) are of value. Spain could not defend its borders and Turkey could do so with extreme difficulty. They both would need a massive infusion of modern equipment and supplies, which Germany cannot provide, to have any chance to be militarily effective.

So they join the Axis only if attacked by the Allies/Soviet Union, which they will not do, or only at a point when Germany is about to win anyway, and are then not needed or usefull

 

The RN is gone once Egypt and Suez fall to Rommel. The Italians are then clear to sail in eastern med.

Alexandria, Port Said, Cairo, carry more than enough capacity to supply Rommel's advance to Beirut.

Turkey might become interested in joining the Axis with Rommel at its gate. Once Suez falls and RN evacuates eastern med, pro axis politics changes with regard to the Balkans and Turkey. Nevertheless, should Turkey choose to put up a fight, it's not unreasonable to anticipate that it might resemble Denmark's gallant 10 minute stand before surrendering. Casas belli? Fait Accompli? One of the two, the dictionary is in the den. But, you get my drift.

 

Oh come on now.
If the Germans could supply a major offensive against the Russians to the Donetz Basin, then they could supply a minor offensive through Constantinople into Anatolia, especially with help from the Axis minor neighbors who had no love for the Turks. Rommel linking up from Syria would then create a very good force with which to flank Russia in its southern sector.

But then again, this just serves to illustrate why Turkey would have no will to fight this battle in the first place.

 

Let's look at another case: 6th Army at Stalingrad. In this case AGS started their offensive with a single rail line terminating at Stalio. This is about 350 miles from Stalingrad. 6th Army rapidly approached Stalingrad and was soon in heavy combat there. Between Stalino and Stalingrad all supplies had to come forward by truck or wagon.
Using a Grosstransportraum unit along with 6th Army stripping off most of its own tactical transport the Germans were meeting about 80% of their supply requirement initially. This quickly began to fall as the trucks, driving along rutted unimproved dirt roads, began to breakdown ever more quickly.
The Luftwaffe in southern Russia switched from air support and air superiority missions to flying transport missions to support 6th Army as the supply situation grew more desperate. This is before the Russian counterattack even occured.

In North Africa the same problem is in place only excerbated. Not only is Rommel at the end of a much longer supply line, but his supply base at Tripoli is incapable of fully handling the necessary level of supply. The port of Tripoli could handle about two-thirds of German requirements at Alamein. The Germans got the French to allow unloading at Bizerte to help with this.

Now, suddenly, the Germans become logistical geniuses. They can haul the needed supplies across Turkey or along unimproved dirt roads hundreds or thousands of miles to supply their army as it marches across the Middle East. It isn't going to happen.
The British will demolition many, if not every port reducing its capacity just as happened at Bengazi and Tobruk, among other places. With the ports largely inoperable and no way to really clear or repair them the Germans would find that they couldn't supply any sizable force by land or sea.
Add to this the near total lack of own (ie German) naval forces and shipping in the Mediterrainian to make things worse. The Italians? Mussolini insisted on running a "parallel war." That is he only made shipping available to the Germans on the basis of unused room for Italian supplies or on a cost plus basis. That is, the Germans payed Italy to ship their goods.
A port could be rendered useless to either nation simply by sinking a few blockships at strategic points within the harbor and a general demolition of the piers and dockyard equipment. Both the Germans and Italians nearly completely lacked the capacity the US and Britain showed, and had, for clearing and repairing such facilities.
So, let's say Alexandra does fall. The port is demolished and Britain moves to other ports likely with Massawa becoming of importance. The US and Britain by mid 1942 had largely cleared that port of wrecks and gotten it functioning despite the Italians sinking over a dozen vessels to block it along with carrying out demolitions of the port facilities.

The Mediterrainian theater requires naval power for the Axis to be able to really have stratigic mobility. But, with their lack of fuel and a recalcitrant Italian navy, it is very unlikely that they could translate their situation into one where that mobility was reality.

 

The RN can still sail into the Eastern Med and at the very least will have subs there.

And how long do you think it will take for the Axis to get them back in operation? Certainly the British aren't going to leave them intact. You might look at how long it took the allies to get Brest back into operation and the comparative equipment and people they had to do so.

 

Cherbourg opened 90 days after it was taken. But, the US harbor and salvage crews had several excellently equipped salvage ships available, several lift ships, a number of pontoons and, other equipment for this operation... none of which would be available to the Germans at Alexandra. Le Havre proved more of a challenge as it was a tidal harbor and required more repairs to the locks between the inner and outer harbors.
Naples was opened less than 30 days after it fell and within 6 months was handling more shipping than it could prewar.
All this was due to the US and Britain having lots of naval salvage assets, a number of companies skilled in this work and, the trained manpower and equipment to make it happen. The Germans simply don't have anything equal to this.

 

With RN out of the way and air superiority, one might conceive that the Axis would be able to clear a harbor sufficiently enough to unload supplies. I suspect under this scenario the Italians would find it within themselves to help with a renewed sense of confidence. I mean its not as if the Italian Navy and merchant marine were 3rd rate.

What I'm getting here is the argument that Germany and Italy were completely inept. That they neither had the material nor the willpower or ingenuity to repair a road. That maintenance of a truck was impossible. That repairing a dock and clearing a harbor was something only the British and Americans were really capable of. I'm sorry I must disagree. It was German scientists that developed the atomic bomb. You might find considerable argument as to the sophistication and culture of the Italian people, but I can assure you they knew how to repair a road (or build a battleship).

No. Supply and maintenance problems usually occur under enemy fire. In this scenario Egypt has been taken and RN run out of the eastern Med. I'm not buying the argument that those clever Brits destroy the Port of Alexandria, Port Said, Port of Cairo, (and Beirut too?) beyond anybody's capacity to repair (except the Brits and Americans), while at the same time evacuating that area of the world with all their possessions and ships. I can buy the argument that there will be delays incurred in Axis ship supply directly to Egypt because of sabotage, etc....but that's about it.

 

That's rather a strawman. The problem is it took the US and Britain months to clear ports that in some cases weren't all that badly wrecked and they had more trained engeneers and more specialised equipment to do so.

Another strawman.

Yet another. The problems with truck repair suffered by the axis were multifold. They could and indeed did repair trucks. However they were hindered by the following:
1) Low reliability vehicles to start with.
2) No standarization: Which leads to
a) no or little specialised training on specfic vehicle types
b) logistics issues with spare parts ie getting the right parts to the right vehicles.
3) Lack of spare parts: this also has different components
a) The Germans appear to have not put as much effort into assuring spares as the US did. I'm not sure about the Italians.
b) The lack of standardization requires even more spare parts per vehicle.
c) The use of many confiscated vehicles, especially those of foreign make meant that few if any spares were available for them and the source of said spares was not always under axis control.
Note that most if not all the above throw additional load on the log system.

Yet another strawman. It's not the capability that's in question. Indeed even the US and British weren't able to clear throughly wrecked ports quickly. Why should you expect the axis powers who had less material and manpower devoted to the task to do so?

Flat out wrong.

That's when they are most apparent but the problems often occur well behind the lines. When you are talking axis armies in WWII this indeed is usually the case.

That's good because no one has made that arguement. However you might look at how long it took them to say get Tobruk back to full operational status. They can do it it's just not going to be quick. It isn't going to be quick for the British or Americans either but it would likely be quicker.

All in all one of the most impressive strings of strawmen I've ever seen in a single post.

 

I agree that sabotage may delay usage of Egyptian ports (the major port being Alexandria of course), but it will not prevent it, because the Italian fleet and German air will own those waters right into the Red Sea. I think its foolish to believe that the Axis would never have the capability to clear the harbors suffiently enough to receive direct ship supply.

If this is the mainstay of your argument against Rommel pushing on to Beirut, then in my opinion you've lost the argument. (friendly and respectful ) But, I have to say that.

I would hope that we would discuss the ramifications of Axis control of Egypt and Suez, and what the possible next move would be by both sides. I guess what I'm hearing is that if that would have happened, then Rommel goes no further no matter what simply because the Germans and Italians were too inept to clear a harbor. With that, I disagree.

 

Well, let's just say the Germans developed the first guided missile system, the first effective jet fighter, and yes their research did very well go a long way to the development of the atomic bomb. I will qualify that one because you caught me in a dramatic moment.

 

No one said that they will never have it but will they have it in time to be useful? Based on other cases you are looking at a clearing time of months and likely a year or more. In the mean time Just keeping the forces in Egypt supplied is destroying their motor pool.

Take a look at: Transporting munitions: a history of transporting munitions and its relevance to aerospace expeditionary forces - page 5 | Air Force Journal of Logistics
Here's a quote:

Now this is as you will note discussing Barbarossa rather than North Africa but in many ways the situation is worse in North Africa. For one water needs to be supplied as well and there isn't much of it locally available. Also note that the distance from say Tobruk to Cairo is over 700 km acording to google map and that's there closest significant port. Bengahzi is approaching if not over 1,000 km and Tunis proably double that.