Ambassador Grew sent Pearl Harbor attack warning

I jut recently read Edwin Layton's book, "And I Was There". Layton repeatedly points out that Kimmel (and Short) were denied certain information pertaining to the progress, or lack thereof, in the negotiations between Washington and the Japanese ambassador. Layton claims that had Kimmel known just how bad these negotiations were going, he would have realized that an attack was imminent. John Costello, the British historian who wrote a volume about the Pacific War, has also written articles claiming essentially the same thing.

Layton's brief seems to be that Kimmel somehow would have intuited that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor had he only known that the attack was going to happen within a certain time period. This does not seem a logical argument to me. Kimmel's job was to be ready for an attack at any time, not just when it was judged to be most likely. Certainly an astute reader of the newspapers in early December, 1941, could have predicted a possible Japanese attack within days. The war warnings received from Stark were enough, I would think, to cause a person of average intelligence to onclude that an attack was very likely within the next few days.

To me, it seems that Kimmel's failure was much more the inability to imagine a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor specifically, even though he must have known it was entirely within the realm of technical possibility. Kimmel was not alone in this; Washington was so focused on the known Japanese preparations for an attack on Malaya, that they seemed to completely forget the possibility of such an attack. However, it must be said that Washington had a lot more to worry about than just Pearl Harbor, while Kimmel's duties began and ended with Pearl Harbor.

I do agree that Washington's abrupt change of policy regarding the Philippines left Short short of patrol aircraft; the 35 B-17's, sent to MacArthur, in hindsight, could have been put to much better use on Oahu. But it does seem true, as well, that neither Kimmel nor Short made the best use of the patrol aircraft they did have.

What always fascinated me about the Pearl Harbor attack was the contrast between Halsey's and Kimmel's apparent attitude. When Halsey took the Enterprise task force to reinforce Wake, his orders left no doubt what would happen if the task force encountered Japanese forces. Halsey's guns were manned, his CAP flew fully armed, and his scouts carried 500-pound bombs. Kimmel, on the other hand, seemed to think we were still at peace and never gave his officers and men any reason to believe it would be anything but business as usual; to me, THAT was his most significant failing.

 

Wake was, less so for Midway, but within days the Indians were going to be "in the fort". Interestingly, Halsey's orders about being on a war footing were issued as they left Pearl, a considerable distance from either Wake or Midway. My dad was a pilot in Enterprise's scouting squadron, and said the crew wasn't all that surprised, knowing Halsey, but they wondered if they would encounter any Japanese.

 

Yes I agree, it would be "disturbingly stupid". This is why I keep saying,
I don't believe there was a conspiracy. I don't believe such a vast
conspriracy, could have been kept quiet, after the PH disaster took place.
I also don't believe a sitting US President would do such a thing.

 

I didn't know, believing in conspiracy was a profession. I guess if you can
write books and make money, you could call it a profession.

Here is my understanding, of some of the thinking at this time, both in PH and Washington. The Japs were busy initiating Southwest Pacific operations, to get the oil and other natural resources, needed for their war machine, this was something they had to do. Otherwise, they would
run out of oil and other strategic resources. So, it was felt at the time, this would be their priority.

US Naval Intelligence and the War Department did not believe Japan was capable of attacking in Southwest Asia and launching a major operation, like the PH attack, so far to the east, all at the same time.

The ruse the Japs used, leaving the radio equipment near Japan and
broadcasting fake signals, fooled US intelligence, again both in PH and
Washington. US Naval Intelligence, told Kimmel they were tracking the
the Jap carriers and they were still near home waters. A commander
needs to be able, at least to some degree, to rely on the info given him.

In addition, and most decisively, the US and Great Britain underestimated the quality and ability of Japanese pilots, aircraft, and carriers operations.

Yes commanders should also be ready, for the unexpected as well. But
these under estimations, took place in both PH and Washingto DC!

 

First of all, I will state categorically, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANY CONSPIRACY AMONG US GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO DENY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL, OR THAT THE US CARRIERS WERE DELIBERATELY REMOVED FROM THE SCENE.

However, my father was aboard the Enterprise as an SBD pilot at that time and his impression as later conveyed to me, was that Halsey was deadly serious and would have undoubtedly launched an immediate attack on any Japanese vessels encountered. Whether or not Halsey thought such an encounter likely is entirely conjectural.

 

Maybe he was, maybe he wasn't, as I said, that is entirely conjectural.

You are correct about my dad; he flew his aircraft off while the Enterprise was still at sea. That was SOP at the time, so the air group could continue practicing flight operations while their carrier was docked for refit and replenishment. As for feeling threatened, the agreement was that while at Pearl Harbor, the Navy's ships were to be protected by the Army's aircraft and AAA. In any case, the Enterprise was only five or six hour's steaming when the strike craft were flown off; that is a very small window of opportunity for any attackers. If necessary, the air group could be quickly re-embarked in only a couple of hours. It's my opinion that, whether he was worried or not, Halsey was willing to take such a small risk in the interest of operational expediency.

 

Not be rude, but it was you who asserted knowledge of what Halsey was thinking at the time. Unless you present some evidence that he expressed his thoughts to someone else, or in writing, then Halsey's exact state of mind is most certainly conjectural. Or do you claim to be a mind reader among your many other talents?

Yes, which is why the act of flying off his strike aircraft is not a reliable guide to what Halsey may, or may not, have been thinking.

 

I have; Halsey made no comments on what his state of mind was regarding the likelihood of being attacked near Pearl Harbor.

You seem to think you are the only person who has bothered to read the documents which relate to Pearl Harbor.

 

Odd, I almost asked you the same thing in my last post.

 

Neither one of you seems to suffer fools lightly and recently most who have challenged you fit in that category. Looks to me like you kind of got in the habit of responding in that fashion.

 

I think it's important to realize also that most American naval commanders didn't believe PH was a target was because they seriously did not believe the japanese could pull it off. Most admirals were tied to naval doctrine that told them that such a major undertaking so far from base would end in disaster.
IOW they didn't think we could do it so they sure as heck didn't think the Japanese could do. The IJN was held in low regard by most Americans before PH.