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Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Discussion in 'War in the Pacific' started by USMCPrice, Jan 22, 2012.

  1. steverodgers801

    steverodgers801 Member

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    due to the fact that there are only recon aircraft outside of Java there is no need for air support on south Borneo and what few TB the Dutch have in Java are very short ranged. I would suggest have Div 3 support the landings in South Malaysia. and then they can go south as a group to hit Soerbaja. My proposal is to land at the vey south east tip of Malaysia and seize the approaches to Singapore. Due to the fact we can capture the water supply with out actually crossing into the Singapore means we can force a quick seige. Cutting off all those commonwealth units will also quickly destroy the morale of the British forcing I hope a quick surrender. The majority of the defending units are Indian. Since we are not hitting the Phillipines we can use the 48th div which is a very strong unit and still invade from the north to prevent the commonwealth unith from trying to breakthrough the trap. We do have some fighters that can provide cover for landings and once we seize the northern landing zones we can fly in land based oscars for more support.
     
  2. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    The Yusen S has an 18 knot top speed and 14 knot cruise speed. Virtually all movement will be at cruise spped because that is the most efficient for ship movement. You also avoid the ship damage associated with long periods spent at top speed (hull and machinery damage). As I stated earlier our most efficient tanker, the Tonan Whaler has a max speed of 15knots, a cruise speed of 13 knots, and a payload of 15350t of liquid cargo and an additional 2170t of dry cargo. I have a computed efficiency factor included on the spreadsheet, but the easiest way to illustrate would be to use an actual convoy route, to demonstrate the fuel usage. Cam Ranh Bay in Indo-China to Kagoshima Japan is approximately 1760 nautical miles. The Tonan Whaler could move the 15350 tons of fuel or oil that distance on 224.84 tons of fuel or 68.27 tons fuel/oil transported the distance per ton of fuel used. If I exclude AO (Fleet Oilers) which are more valuable for keeping the fleet supplied than for simple transportation of fuel/oil. We have two types with comparable top speed/cruise speed with the Yusen S. The Type N-TL and the Type 1-TL. The Type N-TL has a top speed of 19 knts and a cruise speed of 15 knts, it has a carry capacity of 12800 tons fuel/oil and would take 288.2 tons of fuel to make the same voyage. Fuel/oil moved per ton expended would be 44.41 tons. The Type 1-TL 18 knots top speed and cruise speed of 14 knots, it has a carry capacity of 11600 tons of fuel/oil and would expend 279.84 ton of fuel, moving 41.45 tons of fuel/oil per ton expended.
    For the majority of our convoy operations the two types (Yusen S/Tonan Whaler) could operate together because they will be sailing at cruise speed (14/13) knots, which is a fast convoy. Most types have a cruise speed in the 7-10 knot range. My concern with the 16.5 knot escorts was not that they couldn't keep up, because they too have a 14 knot cruise speed. It is that they don't have the speed to rejoin the convoy if they break off to engage a contact. They also lack the speed to rapidly shift position in relation to the convoy if a contact is made.
     
  3. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    I concur with adding Shokaku and Zuikaku to Kido Butai for the Malaya operation. As you all know, I have never been an advocate of this scheme; but if we do it we should do it with maximum combat power, to ensure prompt success and minimize the risk of loss to ourselves and particularly to the carrier force.

    As mikebatzel noted, historically these were Carrier Division 5; 3 and 4 comprised mainly seaplane carriers and the smaller flattops. S and Z, commissioned in August and September 1941, were the 5th division chronologically, but functionally (or in WITP) it might make more sense to call them 3.

    We don't currently have bases at Singora or Pattani, but we expect to seize them promptly and have aircraft operating there within a few days, as soon as ground crew, equipment, and supplies can be landed. I agree the first priority should be fighters. This presumes that we carry out the landing operations there in addition to the landing near Singapore.

    Since we are not attacking the Philippines, we can use the Tainan air group who have trained to get maximum range from their A6Ms; they will have to be redeployed from Taiwan. They can escort bomber missions from Saigon to Singapore, about an 8-hour flight, i.e. once a day; they cannot maintain any sort of presence over the landing area.

    Cam Ranh Bay is probably the best staging point for major forces. I assume the landing force will proceed at best speed after the carriers so as to make the landing as soon as possible. It appears that the British are deploying capital ships to Singapore, so I suggest attaching all four Kongo class ships to Kido Butai and Battleship Division 1 (Nagato, Mutsu) to the covering force for the invasion.

    We should be able to promptly secure key points on the northwest coast of Borneo.

    Obviously the emphasis on Malaya means delaying our conquest of the eastern East Indies, but we might make a start at seizing a few key points. Even against weak opposition, we should not press too far too quickly with small forces of our own; as steve says, the Dutch could still get a lucky hit. We could use forces based on Palau to conduct the first phase of operations I had proposed a while back, securing Halmahera/Morotai (which I believe are undefended), Manado, and Tarakan. By virtue of not invading the Philippines, we should have sufficient troops and amphibious shipping; I had also thought of using some of our armed merchant cruisers, which are essentially passenger-cargo ships. We can use Ryujo and Zuiho as the covering force and our seaplane carriers for direct support; this should be sufficient against the Dutch BUT we have a potential exposure if the Americans intervene.

    There is an obvious advantage in getting our East Indian operations underway. We also wish to secure points like Balikpapen before the Dutch can sabotage those facilities. Taking Tarakan will enable us to fly aircraft in from Indochina to support the next phase of operations. On the other hand we might actually create a situation in which the small American naval and air forces in the Philippines could strike an effective blow. I ask the opinions of the council as to whether we should attempt this operation.
     
  4. mikebatzel

    mikebatzel Dreadnaught

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    Damn, your right. I looked at the map too quickly. The map I looked at is for 8 December and already shows Siam (Thailand) as having surrendered.
     
  5. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    I'm not totally sure, even a couple of squadrons though would prove a tremendous asset for escorting the land based bombers on air raids against Singapore. The biggest choke point is engines, several aircraft use the HA-35. I would support temporarily suspending production of less critical types until we can get additional engine production up to speed. Stopping production of the DB-601 and converting those factories over will greatly assist during the early portion of the campaign, but probably will not have much effect pre X-day. As for pilots, I would favor co-locating a navy squadron equipped with the A6M and an experienced Army fighter squadron. They can help familiarize the army pilots with the airframe and allow the army pilots some flight time. As aircraft become available they will be fed into the squadron until it is fully equippped. Two months should be sufficient time for a highly experienced, skilled pilot to become proficient with the aircraft. I am sure we can pump out 24 more aircraft in two months. Probably closer to 50 if I were to guess. I will have the manufacturing plants of the appropriate airframe to shift personnel and add an additional shift to speed the process. They will also be given priority for the specific raw materials required. We should quickly be able to take over most of our required fighter sorties with the KI-43 once we have begun to seize airfields.

    That was it's historical designation and the one Symphonic Poet was using when he was developing a fleet organization plan (he posted it in the Imperial War Room for discussion). I had already produced an organizational set up and we were communicating by e-mail and planned to consolidate/coordinate the two, but he started a new job and it severely curtailed the time he could devote to the project. I really look forward to him being able to return to what he was doing because he was a tremendous asset, and a great guy, but real life comes first! So I just used the designation from my chart because that's what I have saved on my computer.
    For the second part of the point there is method to my madness. I chose to use the two least experienced fleet carriers south of Borneo because enemy air capability is less there. The Dutch aircrews are less skilled than the British, they are few in number and flying obselete aircraft. I was planning to use the three CVL's there also, but in a seperate task force, more for support. My intent was for Shokaku/Zuikaku to hit airfields and fly airsupport for the initial invasion, and temporarily linger near the Makasar Strait until the landings had been effected and any surface ship response dealt with. They would also serve to protect the invasion forces from a sortie by surface forces of the Americans out of the Philipines. I would not keep them there past the end of D+1 then they need to return to Truk to standby in case the US responds with it's carriers. I wanted enough power to deal with any potential response. Even unlikely ones.


    Carronade wrote:
    Depending upon how things progress no more than a couple of days. We should be able between naval and land based air be able to hit most of the British airfield and destroy most of their aircraft on our initial strikes. Long range land based bombers should be able to keep the airfields out of action and we should seize some on the first day to move additional air assets in to. Once the beachheads are established I'd like to keep Kido Butai on the north east side of the operations, closer to Indo-China. There they can strike enemy surface forces sent to disrupt the landings. By the end of the second day we should be able to retire it for re-arming and re-fueling and head it for Truk. there to join Shokaku and Zuikaku, to await any potential US response.

    Mikebatzel wrote:
    Yes, we should be able to shift our air assets forward rather quickly. This is pretty much the way I envision the operation. I would think the carriers should only be tied up a couple of days, before they can be released.

    I concur and also think a submarine force in the Straits of Malacca in order to prevent the escape of British naval forces or reinforcements from the Indian Ocean would be a good idea.
     
  6. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    There are only 560 infantry at Palembang and quite a few support troops. A parachute battalion dropped in and two SNLF battalions landed in the manner you mentioned should be sufficient to take the position. An additional regiment should be held in operational reserve. Batavia to the south has aircraft stationed and should be hit by an airstrike. (21 x
    Martin 139WH3 bombers and 12 x B339D fighters). We have a number of old Momi class destroyers, many converted to Patrol boats and further converted to carry and land 150 SNLF troops. We can use eight of them to land two battalions.

    [​IMG]
    Martin 139WH3

    [​IMG]
    Brewster B339 D
    At Bandoeng the allies have
    7 x CW22 Falcons
    [​IMG]

    Curtis Wright CW22 Falcon.


    Djambi has only 48 infantry stationed there, a company landed by submarine should suffice to take that location.


    These two locations are protected only by some service troops, no infantry. A good battalion should be able to seize both easily.

    I would like to encourage the members of the council to "brainstorm" and see if there is any way possible to seize this objective. If we do land troops by submarine, we could reinforce them with an airborne drop, if we can seize Kota Bharu and it's airfield, quickly. Unfortunately it is one of the more heavily defended of our initial objectives.

    See above
     
  7. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    I agree with most of the points you make, but would like to discuss the issue of armament again. I agree as far as convoy protection a detected sub is rendered relatively ineffective if there is an adequate escort force. Numbers do increase detection potential. However, I think because of the US's potential for building large numbers of submarines, we have to be able to inflict some measure of attrition on them. If not eventually we will be overwhelmed by sheer numbers. An escort with 1/3 more depth charge throwers and an additional stern chute/DC rack will produce a more effective pattern and increase the likelyhood that we will damage or sink the submarine. More important than the submarines themselves we will have eleminated a veteran crew. Your very valid points has caused me to reconsider which way to strike the proper balance. One important factor in sinking a submarine is an aggresive and persistent escort vessel commander. While replying to the Prime Ministers question about the Tonan Whaler (with your comments in mind) and what problems a 16.5 knot escort might have with escorting a high speed convoy, I considered another possible solution to how to we could structure our escort forces. What if we settled upon 7 escorts as the minimum escort force for a large convoy. Use a Type C or D escort as the convoy escort leader, augment them with two Type G (Ukuru class) and four Type F (C/D class escort). In case of the contact the four Type F's remain with the convoy and provide protection as they increase speed and exit the area of contact. The Type C or D escort and the two Type G's move to engage the contact and remain on station as long as necesary. They have a stronger ASW armament and a better chance to "kill" the contact and the speed to catch back up to the convoy once the issue is resolved. If so we need to constuct our escorts at a ratio of 4 Type F/2 Type G/1 Type C or D, I think this is probably not a bad ratio to initially set up our production plan.


    An interesting aside, you made the statement, "basically the same detection capability, including the Type 1 eyeball."
    Well, game device number 1765 Visual Search, detection device.
     
  8. steverodgers801

    steverodgers801 Member

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    If you want to seize North sumatra I would not recommend trying due to the fact we would have to go past Singapore. We may be able to convince the leader of Sumatra to surrender all troops there, but we will have to wait to secure Singapore. The base of Kendari is perfect for a air base, we can quickly seize it including support troops and fly in planes or have them included in the invasion force. Tarakan and Balikpappan both have good shore defences. Tarakan has to be assaulted directly, Balikpappan can be attacked from a undefended landing zone to the north.
     
  9. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    The issue of convoy escorts is too important for us not to fully thrash out our thoughts. What we elect to do now will have a very great importance to our future options. First allow me to offer some observations from someone not an expert in the area.

    The comment has been made that Great Britain employ slow speed trawler class vessals to great effect and that we could or should do so as well. I feel we must remember that we are comparing 'apples to oranges' here to some respect. First the North Atlantic offers a rather more extreme sea conditions on a regular basis than most of our routes, espcially our most important one carrying oil. This makes the task of a submarine much more difficult to simply sight a target let alone effect a strike on same.

    The second point concerns the wealth of targets the British have to protect. They have their considerable merchant fleet, the merchant fleet of the over-run allied nations, the American merchant fleet and even considerable numbers of nuetral shipping willing to go into harms way for a profit. Add to the the shipbuilding of the British Empire, the USA and to some extent nuetral nations and you have a great deal of tonnage. To be blunt Britain can sustain losses that will cripple us.

    There is much we can learn from her example, but not all lessons are applicable to our situation. Trawler class ships can be of use in port defence, choke points (with some support) and in convoy's between North China/Korea and the Home Islands, but to use them on our long, exposed and most vital routes seem unwise.

    Admiral Karornada is correct however that much of our existing merchant fleet is slow (8 to 10 knot cruising speed) and could be well served by a 16 knot escort. Col. Bobimoto is also correct that all future builds and as much of the remainder of the merchant fleet (11-13 knot cruising speed) seem to need a 19 knot escort.

    We also seem to be at an impass reguarding our over all strategy in countering enemy submarines. Deterence vs. prosecution, or keeping them too far away to have good shots over actual destruction of submarine and crew. Both have merit, but bottom line we simply must ensure our cargo ships reach port safely, nothing more.

    Deterence seems an easier goal to achieve than that of sinking so many enemy subs they give up, at least in the short term. I hate split decisions, but our situation seems to call for it.

    Our slow speed merchant hulls are a finite number, so the number of 16 knot escorts needed to provide deterence is also finite. Our numbers of high speed merchant hulls should expand (hopefully) so our need for 19 knot escorts is unknown as yet.

    I would be willing to support a two teir program. Build enough 16 knot escorts to adequately cover our slow convoys. Once we reach this number, stop and convert this production line to 19 knot escorts. Concurrently produce 19 knot escorts for our high speed convoys and hunter killer groups. Not ideal, but perhaps the most cost effective.

    I would also favor the weeding out of our slowest merchant hulls (under 8 knots) and scrapping them for the reclaimed steel to be used on either escorts or fast merchants. Not all at once, but when convienent. Doing so with our heavily damaged slow transports (8 to 10 knots) might also be worthwhile rather than repairing them.
     
  10. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    I don't think we have much of a divergence on antisubmarine strategy. Convoy is the primary means both for protecting our shipping and bringing about contact between submarines and our ASW forces. When contact is made, we would detach 2 or more escorts to prosecute the submarine to the finish. If the strength of a convoy escort scares a sub off from trying to attack, that's fine too (does that happen in WITP?) but unless our enemies are remarkably unenterprising I expect they will give us plenty of opportunities.

    I've always agreed that a proportion of fast escorts are needed, but I think there's value in a proportion of economy ships to make up numbers. I'm not so sure the number of depth charges or shells in a salvo is necessarily the key factor. Successful prosecution of a sub is just as likely to involve multiple attacks by multiple ships maintaining contact over several hours or a full day, possibly until the sub's batteries or air supply are exhausted.

    Let's not tear our hair out over the exact proportion. For one thing we can adjust it as the war and our merchant construction program progress. At most we're talking about one escort more or less per convoy.

    We have a useful starting inventory of older destroyers like the Momi and Minekaze classes for the fast escort/flagship role. I would oppose using new-construction destroyers (C or D type) for rear-area convoy duty. There may be a need for them in areas closer to the front lines where we also face surface or air threats.

    I'm skeptical about scrapping functional merchant ships during wartime, unless age or damage makes them truly not worth keeping or repairing.
     
  11. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    There are also other assets such as two CL's at Palembang. Secondly, the aircraft carrier group south of Borneo is "insurance" in case the United States decides to intervene. I think the possibility is remote, but must be planned for.

    The closer we get to Singapore itself, the more exposed our amphibious transport forces are to enemy surface intervention. It also gives us less reaction space if the British manage to launch an airstrike against our forces. The bulk of British/Commonwealth airpower is in Singapore. I intend to destroy it on the ground or keep the airfields in inoperable condition, but we must always plan for the worst. I personally wouldn't land much south of Kota Bharu. I'd like to keep our carriers north of this location in order to make them less vulnerable, while still allowing them to hit counter-invasion forces with airstrikes. As for Soerbaja we need to hit it to temporarily suppress it, but I wouldn't make it a target for the initial phase unless we have some excess forces once the requested assets are allocated for the initial objectives. I also don't want, what I termed, Carrier Division 3, in the restricted waters of the area any longer than necessary. We have to support the Palembang assault, maybe one airstrike, then di-di out through the Makassar Straight to stand by to intercept potential American intervention (again I feel it unlikely). When we do go after Soerbaja, I'd land at Batavia or Merak and drive south against it, supported by light tanks and land based air.
     
  12. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    I've already mentioned that having to get past Singapore is the big handicap in getting at Medan. While we will need to take Northern Sumatra, eventually, Medan, is the only pressing target because of the oil and refinery facilities. If we can take and hold Medan, once we grab a foothold at Palembang we can move north up Sumatra and get Djambi and releive the forces at Medan. The Dutch are relatively weak and an experienced unit could fairly easily hold until relieved. Initial supply and reinforcement could be flown in from bases seized on the Malay peninsula. I'd guess they would need to only hold two days, three days at most.

    Tarakan has the stronger defenses, IMHO. It can be taken by landing at Tandjoe and moving north.
     
  13. steverodgers801

    steverodgers801 Member

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    we should also be prepared to adjust. Since there are different conditions we should not bestuck in a one solution fits all
     
  14. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    Very true. As Von Clausewitz said, "No campaign plan survives first contact with the enemy". That is why we plan for possible eventualities, must remain flexable once operations commence and have adequate reserve forces/assets, especially logistical assets. Detailed planning, wargamed and adequately critiqued plans, and adequate preparation, give the best chance of a successful operation. I agree one solution does not fit all, and do think thus far the Council has examined and adopted/or discarded many "out of the box" concepts and solutions.

    I personally feel that the only bad question or objection is the one not expressed. Anything that forces us to justify or more fully examine, adjust, discard or validate our plan, assists us in making the proper choices and assists in avoiding self-delusion.
     
  15. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    Agreed.

    Agreed. All aspects are not directly applicable, but the underlying principle behind why they use a certain tactic should remain valid. We just need to adjust for our specific situation.


    Carronade wrote:

    I think the Admiral and I are in full agreement here. And yes Admiral, depending upon the aggressiveness and skill of the submarine skipper, it can cause them to decide not to attack.

    Agreed, and Germany lacks the shipbuilding capacity to produce and deploy the numbers of submarines the US can potentially deploy against us. Then again, the Atlantic is a mere bathtub in comparison to the Pacific.

    I don't think our thinking is as far apart as it appears sir. I believe that while our discussion appears to be focussed on certain aspects, it's because we want to make sure we get it right from the "get-go". We are all planning on a comprehensive ASW defense. Detection will probably be our most effective tool. A detected submarine is an ineffective submarine. When we find them we need to kill or damage them whenever possible. The two methods are not exclusive to themselves , but are to be used in conjunction and coordination, by our ships and aircraft. The mining of choke points, hunter-killer ASW task forces, high speed through high risk areas. All will be tools for us to use.

    I fully agree with the bolded statement, I believe I had earlier suggested we establish an ASW school for training aggressive, persistant escort commanders. Persistance is the most important aspect, regardless of the vessel involved. It's not the key factor, but more ASW devices that can be employed on each pass just raises your chances of getting a hit. Just like rate of fire increases the chances of a hit by an AA gun.

    Agreed.

    Deterence is easier, but we can do both. The submarines will come seeking our shipping, so escorting the shipping is the best way to find them. We have to detect them to kill them. Aircraft patrolling the shipping routes or choke points, hunter-killer teams moving along the convoy route preceeding the convoys and the convoy escorts themselves will allow us plenty of opportunity to kill them, and if we are unsuccessful we at least suppress them and protect our merchant ships. There is no need for a split decision sir.

    True, but as Carronade stated, we can adjust our escort program as we adjust our merchant building program. The smaller, slower escorts do have their place, it's just we have a lot of them now and need more high high speed, high efficiency ships at the present. This can and probably will change over time.


    I think Carronade and I have come to an acceptable, initial build ratio. He is correct, we can adjust it when necessary.



    They have their uses also, I'd use them in high risk areas, often towards the front, where the loss of the larger cargo and more valuable ship would have a greater negative effect on us. Say we need to get 7000t of cargo to a forward base. We could send 1 Yusen S and if attacked lose a valuable ship and all the cargo and leave the combat troops unsupplied. Or we could send three slow, small 2300t capacity ships lose one and it doesn't really hurt us, we lose an unimportant ship, 2300t of cargo and at least 4600t of supplies get through to support the troops. Don't scrap them, use them where loss is probable and we won't be badly hurt.
     
  16. steverodgers801

    steverodgers801 Member

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    In real life, im not sure the game is capable, we should have regional commanders with assets under their command to cover he various areas.
     
  17. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    I trhought that's what we were planning on doing?
     
  18. steverodgers801

    steverodgers801 Member

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    I want sure if this was a premade or if we were making our own.
    Another idea is we can make convoys priroities, so that the higher the value the motre the protection
     
  19. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    I anm glad that you and the Admiral have come to an acceptable agreement reguarding the composition of our escort forces. As always I will retain the privilege of saying I told you so should the occasion arise. :)

    Recalling our earlier debate the general consensus seemed to be not to employ convoy's in a widespread manner until the need manifest's itself in order to maximize the delivery of strategic goods. Further that we would construct convoy escorts in limited numbers initially for much the same reason, So as to undertake as much Naval construction as possible.

    As a civilian I make no claim to be a grand strategic thinker, but the axiom 'train as you would fight and fight as you were trained' speaks to me in a profound manner.

    It is all in well to plan on sinking enemy subs almost as quickly as they raise their periscope's, saying is not the same as doing.

    It is my understanding, barring a lucky opening shot, it takes two to 3 escorts working together for many hours to force a sub to the serface or to get a effective kill at depth, or it seems from the data available from our German compatriots. It takes time to train merchant captains to form and sail in convoys, time to train escort captains to use their ships effectively, and time to assemble enough escorts to have enough escorts to convoy and hunt down enemy subs.

    Initially it may be all we can do to provide enough escorts to provide an element of deterence, till we have enough that we could either split off a number of ships escorting, without leaving the convoy vunerable, or vector in a H-K group. (Historicaly true for the allies)

    Your example on transports has merits, but drawbacks as well. Three small ships probably means risking twice the number of merchant seamen, (do we have a functional limit in this?) twice the fuel consumption, (definite limits here) present an increased challenge to our escorting these ships to the most exposed positions (three slow ships over 1 faster one) [unless you are suggesting we not offer any escort]. In a way this seems like we are just doing all we can to ensure the result we don't want.

    Just an opinion.
     
  20. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    Mr. Prime Minister,

    Now that we all seem to be in general agreement on our objectives in the SRA and there have been no objections made to the overall general strategic outline, we need to get down to operational planning. General Terauchi Hisaichi(steverodgers801) is correct when he suggests we
    .

    We already have our organizational command assignments as to our areas of responsibility in the overall war. What we need to do now is assign responsibilities for our specific upcoming operations.

    Since Admiral Rikanaga is temporarily absent, and until Naval Minister Yamamoto can arrive from Eta Jima, I'd like you to step in and serve as our naval chief. We need to break down the operation into it's component parts and assign commanders and allow them to decide what they can do and how to do it.

    I would suggest Admiral Karonada for command of the naval forces involved in the Malaya/Singapore/North Borneo area. General Nishio will command the IJA land forces. Overall command will rest with the naval commander until such a time as we have well established our forces ashore. Once, this is accomplished the Admiral is free to continue naval operations as he see's fit and as the situation dictates, but will withdraw back to Truk and stand in readiness to meet any potential US intervention.
    Admiral Michizane would then have command of operations in Eastern and Souther Borneo, and the Palembang operation. Once, he is confident that he has gained a position where he can release certain major naval units to return to Truk and rejoin our naval forces standing by to protect against an American counter-stroke. The Admiral will also be in command of his own land forces, primarily composed of SNLF units, but augmented by those IJA units he considers necessary to achieve his objectives. He will remain in the area and bypass or secure enemy positions on Borneo, and Sumatra, and further locations as the General Staff may dictate depending upon the level of success our initial opperations have. As soon as practical he should be returned to Truk with his SNLF units and any new units that are by then ready, reconstitue his fleet and in conjunction with Admiral Karonada begin seizing British territories in the South Pacific region so that we may form a defensive perimeter in case of American declaration of war against us.
    General Terauchi is currently our commander of JEF-Indo China. I would like him to immediately begin preparing troops and stockpiling supplies for a movement of our troops to the border with Thailand. He should then begin negotiations with Thai officials to secure their acquiescence to the movement of our troops into and through their territory and the use of bases located within their country. Failure to secure and agreement could result in his being ordered to seize the country militarily. Intimidation and the promise of giving the Thai government additional territory seized from Burma, should however suffice. He should then position his troops in such a manner as to avoid detection by Commonwealth forces, but allow him to quickly strike at Birma once hostilities are initiated.
    Prior to this he should be prepared to attack Malaya if Britain, pre-emptively initiates hostilities before we launch our offensive.

    Questions or modifications please.
     

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