Armor vs Firepower

Another massive can of worms just arrived for you, squire. They're piling up and beginning to smell a bit funny.

 

OK, here is how I tried to solve the problem. I did it in a what-if scenario for a notional Allied army in the Normandy campaign, but still.

1. Armored units in the armored divisions are fully equipped with Shermans carrying 17-pdr or 76mm guns, in as much as breakthrough and tank-v-tank combat is their main function. This involves some sacrifice of HE effectiveness, but each unit has at least a platoon of CS tanks with 105mm howitzers and the division has a generous allotment of SP guns (Priests and Sextons) for more HE. Cromwells (including some with 6-pdr) are available for recce with a regiment of TDs in the divisional artillery.

2. Armored units supporting infantry divisions are equipped primarily with 75mm gun tanks (Shermans and Churchills) with an allotment of Fireflies in the Sherman units and 6-pdr marks in the Churchill units for dealing with enemy armor when and if encountered. There are Cromwells for recce and also a regiment of TDs in the divisional artillery.

Of course in the real world the Allied did not have enough 76mm or 17 pdr Shermans in June 44 to do 1), but 2) is fairly close to what they actually did for their whole armored force. I realize that these solutions are not ideal, but pending the arrival of true 'capital tanks' in 1945 (Pershing and Centurion) you have to work out a compromise.

 

I feel it important to note that the German armored force had its flaws, too. We have heard a lot about the Tiger here, but only a small number were ever available at any one time and many German armored formations had none. The PzKw IV was much the most numerous German tank, and even a Sherman with the 75mm could cope with a Panzer IV much of the time. According to Buckley, Stugs were very important and dangerous to Allied armor, but an SP with a gun in a fixed-traverse mounting is obviously less versatile than a tank. Some of the German armored units in Normandy were still using the Panzer III (albeit in small numbers), and some French tanks were also used (if mainly for security and infantry support). Nor was other equipment uniform. The Panzer Lehr division had some Soviet howitzers in its artillery regiment--good pieces, but posing problems of maintenance and supply. And equipment is not the whole story either. I have read comments by Von Geyr about his divisions, and he was far from satisfied with all of them as far as training, tactics, and leadership went. All was not perfect on the other side of the hill.

 

Mr Von Poop, you brought a huge smile to my face, and really made my evening. Thanks!

 

there are a number of threads here that go into this in some detail.

 

This is quite true. Last year, in the middle of the CS tank/3in howitzer chase on AHF and ww2talk, I came across a website that was nothing but extracts of all the ordnance, armour penetration, effectiveness of terrain and cover tests that the british Army carried out during the war...

And one of the strange things I discovered was that the "lethal radius" for the 3in howitzer shell as fired by the Churchill MkI and various CS tanks was....19 yards.

Just below it, for comparison, was a number of other HE rounds....including that famously weak HE round for the 6pdr gun, and its "lethal radius" was...16 yards!

Just nine feet difference.

Now - either the 6pdr HE round was better than most people think....or the 3in howitzer shell was crap!

 

By my calculations that's a leatha area of ~800 sq yards for the 6pdr and a bit over 1100 sq yards for the 3" howitzer. Almost 50% more area.

 

Two observations:-

1. The primary role of tanks was NOT to engage other tanks., The majority of engagements of Allied armour in Normandy were with infantry or anti tank weapons. The 75mm Sherman had a better HE round and was vbery capabile of dealing with these targets,

2. You have forgotten the RA anti tank Regiments, and US TD Battalions. The M10 Wolverine and 17 Pdr Achillies were good tank destroyers, as were the M36 and M18.

 

Yes - area....but from the POV of the poor soldier inside that area, its the radius I.E. the closeness to any burst - that's in the forefront of his mind And how far the shell fragments and shrapnel will fly outwards from that point. He's not thinking of Pi....except in the sense of not wanting to bite the dust!

Think of what three yards...just nine feet...looks like on the ground - as the difference between an excellent chance of dying - or a good chance of living.

 

But a commander is concerned with how many of his people are in the blast radii and area becomes a huge consideration there.

 

Is he? Or is he concerned more with how many men will survive the artillery/mortar barrage...that's sure to come down? He's concerned with what happens next, and whether he will have enough men left to deal with it. He should be concerned with how many will live, not how many will die. His ability to change what's coming down on him/them in any given situation is at a minimum - except perhaps to tell them to run! What he can do is ensure his men have done their best with respects to cover and protection.

What's the war film that has the quote that runs something like "a commander who worries more about the lives of his men should just go home"?

 

How many will live vs how many will die are simply two sides of the same coin. Likewise how many are able to continue afterwards vs how many aren't. The same holds for the other side as well. Given the greater effectiveness of first rounds in an artillery barrage this may be even more important.

 

I don't see where I forgot anything. I know and have noted in previous posts (if you check them) that engaging enemy infantry and AT guns was very common for Allied tanks. Nonetheless, if your armor does break through then it can expect to encounter the enemy's armored reserve, and in that case the requirements will be somewhat different. (Not totally so, of course.) I proposed a solution that would concentrate the tanks with HV guns in armored divisions for breakthrough and exploitation, while the tank/armored brigades supporting the infantry would have a higher proportion of the MV 75mm gun. My solution is a fantasy scheme, anyhow; in spring '44 the Allies didn't yet have enough 76mm and 17 pdr vehicles to do that, so they spread them across the whole armored force. And I certainly did not forget the RA and US tank destroyer units; if you check above, you will see that I allotted a full regiment of TDs to both armored and infantry units. The US army actually did have enough TD units to do so. The British didn't have that many TD's, but every AT regiment got some troops or batteries equipped with M10s or Archers.

 

I thought that the theory was you used infantry to break the line then tanks to exploit.

 

To a soldier maybe....but not to a commander...because HE has different duties and responsibilities. To him, soldiers are what he has, what he uses to achieve those - therefore the numbers surviving to carry out those objectives are more important to him than the number who die.

Originally....it was infantry supported by tanks that broke the line, then faster tanks or other vehicles would carry on through/exploit..

Then it came tanks supported by infantry...

Meanwhile, infantry were becoming "faster" and more protected, so they would increasingly be right up there with the exploiting tanks.

 

like GS, you made me chuckle today which after a long hard day is something I needed

 

You use both in both roles, really, as Phylo says, but the mix varies. Primarily infantry with armor in support to break the line, then primarily armor with armored infantry supporting to exploit. The key is the all-arms team:infantry, armor, and artillery. The precise composition of the team is tailored to the mission, and none of the combat arms can do the job without help from the others.

 

I'm with lwd. 9 feet difference is huge!

Because it's not just 3 yards or 9 feet. It's 9 feet larger radius.

That's actually 18 feet in Diameter. The margin of error in aiming just got a whole lot smaller.

Or, if you want to cover a line (say blast a copse of woods 80 yards across), you only have to fire two shells to cover the same area, whereas the 6-pounder needs three shots to cover the same line, with a subsequent saving of time, therefore exposing your men to less danger.

 

what about the Panthers added to the mix??

 

yes,...I double this...the tanks' mobility advantage...the Israelis did this