Arnhem 60th

G'day

The lift of Browning to Groesbeek was in my opinion pure PR for Browning. The old chap didn't want to miss the "fun" and be "in on the game". As Commander he could make these discision and win himself a medal "fighting jerry" if he could find one that was willing to fight. The fact of being left out of the fighting too long in Britain, he was afaid not doing any fighting at all. Not good for your carreer. The feeling of "the war will be over before christmas" must have clouded his mind in finding the right priority's.

Popski

 

Or what if the British had elected to fight into Arnhem on a single battalion advance with Frost leading the way... Instead of the wide three battalion abreast advance.

Or Frost's remark that if they had known of the Panzers he could have tailored his equipment better... More A/T capability.

Anybody read the article on communication at Arnhem in this months military illustrated???

 

Martin,

My entire transport reallocation proposal is a wishful cherry picking exercise with the benefit of hindsight Oh how I wish Browning/Urquhart had had a crystal ball.

Admittedly, it would be inconceivable to leave any of those units out on the first day.

- The recce coup de main was a critical element of the plan given the distant DZs/LZs.

- The two batteries were deemed necessary to provide immediate artillery support to each of the infantry brigades.

- The necessity of establishing RASC logistics on the first day was also reasonable given the Arnhem part of the op being the furthest and last to be relieved.

Frost's success on the southern route might also be considered very much a matter of luck. An insubstantial force of well placed mgs in the brickworks on the south bank could have brought that advance to a untimely halt, as the poor South Staffs found out during the disasterous Tuesday assault towards the museum.

It was also reasonable to split the 1st Parachute Brigade into a 3 battalion approach to the bridge thus splitting the risk of being stopped into three.

I think RB's emphasis of two drops on the first day, has to be the only realistic change to the plan that might have brought success (And if only Brereton and the RAF had had more faith in their flak softening operations at Arnhem and Deelen, so that they might have chosen closer DZs).

Apart from the distant DZs/LZs, the inherent weakness of the plan must be the availability of only 1 brigade to go for the bridge on the first day. For all the criticisms of the US airborne plan, getting the maximum infantry assault force on the ground was their top priority (And only choice given the dispersed nature of their objectives).

One last gripe about transport allocations. Why did the US Airborne insist on using Wacos instead of Horsas? They had halve the carrying capacity of Horsas and thus required twice the number of tows to bring in an equivalent amount of men and equipment (tows which were badly needed at Arnhem). The use of Wacos also flies in the face of the advantages of glider units i.e. landing whole platoon size units/guns n tows intact thus reducing the reorg times.

I hope you all have a wonderful time at the Anniversary commemoration. Please let the vets know that we thank them for their sacrifice and will never forget. I know that we at least will never take our freedoms that were bought at such a terrible cost for granted.

All the best.

Peter

[ 13. September 2004, 10:49 PM: Message edited by: PeterJ ]

 

Hi Peter

Yes - I've studied Arnhem for years now and in my view it really always comes back to the Plan - too rushed, too lacking in contingencies, too many holes ( eg tactical air support ).

Still one of WWIIs greatest battles.

Sorry you won't be there. My Dad and I will be meeting up with Niall Cherry and yes, of course, we will be honouring all the veterans whose last big commemoration this will be.