Axis Teamwork .

Thanks for a great topic, Wiltsy!

It is only a matter of speculation, now, as to how much better tha Axis war effort might have performed with better co-operation on all fronts.

I think the Italians were more than willing to achieve a better co-operative effort. It's a mistake to assume that the German government took the Italians very seriously at all. I think this was based more on their wartime experience as enemies. Carporetto was a watershed moment for Italian/German relations. Rommel's 'Pour Le Merite' was awarded for his part in this battle, and Rommel's dreadfully outnumbered forces managed a mighty coup, taking a major mountain position for hardly any cost at all. The Italians surrendered willingly in 1917, just as they were to do in the Western Desert. But, I cannot bring myself to see it from any but an Italian perspective. Better equipment could and should have been provided by Germany. The Regia Aeronautica could have been given real teeth. The Regia Marina suffered from lack of Radar sets, (which the Germans could easily have furnished), and the fuel allocations from Berlin were not enough to allow the Italians to conduct meaningful operations for a majority of their service time in the Med.

Rommel must share a greater portion of the blame for this. He consistently blamed the Italians for failure to protect his reinforcement and supply lines, when the greater majority of troops and stores that were sent to Rommel did, in fact, reach their destination. This must have irritated the Italians to no end, especially when Rommel praised them publicly, then rubbished them to Hitler. Rommel, of course, was too conceited as a commander to cop anything from the Italians, (or for that matter, anyone else), with a smile. His relations with Italian senior offices reflect more than a smidgin of his post-Carporetto opinion. It is not surprising, therefore, that Rommel's attitude to the Italian High Command actually mirrored his own relationship with the German General Staff, of which he, Rommel, was NOT a graduate of their college, and had none of the 'like-mindedness' that this training provided, Tannenburg is a classic example of what the General Staff could achieve with General Staff officer all trained at the same facility. Rommel's Desert Campaign is a classic example of a commander who not only ignored advice from his superiors, but actually to doing the opposite of what they intended. Rommel proved in Normandy that he couldn't get along with his cohort officers either, so we must look at what happened in the Med with the Italians as having more to it than met the eye at the time.

It's comical to look at the Nazi war effort and realise that, within their three services, co-operation was abysmal, so it's really no surprise to see something similar with their allies as well.

FINLAND- Co-operative ventures here were set back by three issues...Firstly, this was very much a backwater theater, and isolated, too. Germany would very much have like to cram Finland with troops, but air-lifts can only bring in so much, and with Hango, Finland's port facilities were not much chop either.
Secondly, it's difficult for the Finns to run their own objectives AND be co-operative when the Finns had little interest in grabbing Russian territory. Reluctant they were to even enter Leningrad. This was from pure fear of post-war Russian policy. It also says an awful lot about the cognitive capabilities of Mannerhiem and his advisors. They probably felt that German victory in Russia was not a very likely scenario, which limited their own enthusiasm for the 'Continuation War', forcing policy from their perspective to be extremely limited in scope.
Thirdly, Finland had already suffered far too many casualties for a military force of their size. Serious campaigning in Russia would have required much more equipment and men than the Finns could possibly provide.

HUNGARY- The late charge of the Fascist 'Arrowcross' movement indicates that hUNGARIAN efforts under Admiral Nicholas Horthy were suplicative and half-hearted. Far too many Hungarian soldiers perished on the Ost-Front for lack of modern equipment. More economic co-operation was needed, but Hungary under Horthy might not have been trusted very much at all by Berlin. In 1941, it was geography that determined Hungarian attitudes, and the strong Fascist movement within their country. If Horthy had been kicked out much earlier, Berlin may well have supplied the Hungarians with some of what they needed. By the time 'Arrowcross' staged their coup, it was already too late to affect the course of Hungarian war.

 

The idea of co-operation should start at the top - although there was disagreement in strategy between the British and Americans, there was an excellent procedure for arguing through the differences and coming up with an agreed strategy. This was never the case with the Axis powers. Just look at how often Hitler and Mussolini started their own campaign without (even deliberately in some cases) informing the other one.

If there had been genuine co-operation between the Finns and Germans at the top level then I would expect that they would have co-operated in taking Leningrad but I believe that the Fins stopped short for their own political reasons.


The British and Americans had the advantage of language certainly - although you should not dismiss the negative effect of the difference in military culture.


The other advantage was that Britain knew from its experience with France what not to do it. Just look at the position of Lord Gort in the chain of command - Gamelin, George then Billotte and then finally Lord Gort.

Any number of liaison officers could not make up for this and remember communication was by land-line thanks to French nervousness about radio communication.

The remedy of inter-lacing American-British- American- British commanders as far down as realistically possible in the command chain great assistance co-operation.

 

In the Winter War the soviet casualties varied. Initially Mannerheim estimated 200.000 soviets having been KIA/died/MIA, the German intelligence estimated 275.000 and the soviets' (Molotov's) own statement (lie) was 49.000. Every new reserch in Russia has increased this figure. Now it is 150.000 (Andrei Saharov). I have no doubt, that this figure will continue to rise, although we will never be sure. Every level in the red army tried to lie their own casualties downwards in the fear of punishment for poor performance...

In addition there were (according to the Russians) 265.000 medical casualties (189.000 wounded, 58.000 ill and 18.000 frostbitten) and 5.000 POW. Personally I agree with them, who see these figures far too small and estimate the real figure for wounded to be somewhere 300.000-500.000.

The Finnish real casualties in the Winter War were 26.000 soldiers KIA/died/MIA and 1.000 civilians. In addition there were 43.600 soldiers wounded and 1.000 POW. Molotov claimed that "at least 60.000 Finns died and 250.000 were wounded..."

In the Continuation War the red army casualties were 300.000 dead (prof. Yuri Kilin), 385.000 wounded and 64.000 POW. Figures do NOT include the casualties of the navy and the air force.

The Finnish total casualties were 63.200 dead soldiers and 1.100 civilians, 158.000 wounded and 3.500 POW.

About the teamwork:

The Finns were disappointed of the poor performance of the German armed forces in the Finnish theatre for most part of the war. The Germans were not used to fight in the forests/swamps without proper roads nor did't have the essential survival know-how for operating in the cold climate.

Also the different objectives of the war didn't help the co-operation. E.g. the Finns didn't get involved with the Leningrad siege, didn't continue their attack south from the Syväri/Svir River nor continue their attack towards the strategic Murmansk railway at Sorokka/Byelomorsk, although Germany was pushing Finland for all those operations.

On the other hand it would have been impossible for Finland to protect herself or continue the war without the arms, ammunition and food shipments from Germany. The best example of the Finnish-German co-operation was in the summer 1944, when the valuable German aid helped Finland to stop all soviet attacks. The flight detachment Kuhlmey effectively doubled the strength of the Finnish air force for the crucial time.

 

Thankyou for the vote of confidence Volga,even though I can't type alot,I try to ask questions where you guys hopefully give it a thought and respond.4th.

 

I don't think one can make too many direct comparisons between the Anglo-American alliance the the Axis powers. This is because on the Axis side there was all the differences of military strength, military cultures and national objectives. Germany's military strength was far superior to any of its allies so a partnership of equals was unlikely. However, there was cooperation between Germany and its allies, but it was different than the Anglo-American alliance because it had to be. It was cooperation and teamwork but it was a different sort of cooperation and teamwork.

With the Italians, supposedly the German-Italian forces in the Med were under Commando-Supremo with Hitler and Mussolini sort of overseeing the whole thing. Later, when this arrangement was floundering, Kesselring was sent in, not only as over-all commander of German forces in the Med, but also as Hitler and OKW's personal rep. He dealt with Mussolini and the Commando Supremo. He was able to get a large measure of cooperation going because he was an Italiophile and spoke the language. As far as Germany providing oil and aircraft to the Italians, I do believe some Italian aircraft used Daimler-Benz engines, but at that time Germany wasn't building enough aircraft for its own use, much less enough to supply the Regia Aeronautica. The same thing goes for fuel oil. Rommel was probably not as much a problem in his alliance than Monty was in the US/UK relationship and I believe his main problem was the lack of fighting capability of the Italian army. I'm sure most of us understand the Italian weakness. Besides a horrible command structure and poor weaponry, Mussolini's government couldn't really energize the Italians for a major war.


Germany did provide aircraft to the Romanian AF and from some things I've read, they did pretty well with them. Romanian ground forces however were never as effective as the German ones and could not be relied on to provide the same results. Like the Italian army, the Romanian army had some good units but many others were pretty poor.

I've never heard of the Germans wanting to "cram Finland with troops". The German forces there were designed to bolster the Finns and provide a limited offensive capability. However, this area was mostly arctic wilderness so there was no way to supply large numbers of troops in that area. German forces had to be retrained in alpine warfare techniques before they were effective in Finland. There was a offensive, I believe, but it only went a short distance before the Soviets were able to reinforce the area and for most of the time the fighting was fairly static until late 1944. However, they did tie down Soviet forces so I feel this partnership was a plus for Germany.

Before I end this, a word or two on the Anglo-American partnership. I feel that much of the success that was achieved here was due to a rather unknown American general by the name Fox Connor. He mentored Marshal, Eisenhower and even Patton. His dictum was that it was always best to fight wars with Allies, but ALWAYS with a unified command. He had been a staff officer to Pershing and saw the problems in WW1. That meant that the Americans insisted on a unified command structure and got it. It also helped that both countries had a general unity of purpose (Defeat Germany!) and their citizens had been steeled for a hard war. However, the main problems in the Atlantic Alliance were some of the same ones that plagued the Axis. There was a some difference in post-war national objectives and also serious friction between some commanders in the two armies due to feelings of superiority over the other. Also, as the war progressed the UK became weaker while the USA became the much stronger and dominant partner which caused a certain amount of problems in the relationship.

 

Excellent point on General Fox Connor "harolds", Eisenhower described serving under him in Panama as a "graduate school" in military strategy and logistics. Probably the biggest "rift" in the western alliance was between Admiral King of the USN and all things British. It took some time to get him to "toe the line" and swallow his personal anglophobia for the common good.

 

Hey guys,I'd have to agree with Clint,I've never quite understood Admiral king either.You have to "get on"with your allies.Another thread may be needed,however.! Cheers,4th.

 

Actually this brings up the best example of how not to do.

Prior to Sid bou Zid and Kasserine (which were essentially one battle), Rommel had already been sacked by Commando Supremo (but to retire at a time of his convenience).

Von Arnim, the Prussian aristo, and Rommel detested each other. Having defeated the Americans at Sidi bou Zid, von Arnim used every excuse to delay handing back 10th Panzer to Rommel for the next push, Kasserine and beyond to Bone.

Meantime Rommel had a received an order from Commando Supremo to attack Thala and Tebessa (Rommel tore his hair - the idiots!)

Kesselring arrives at von Arnhim's HQ and suspects that 10th panzer is being hoarded and demands von Arnhim pass it back to Rommel - visits Rommel and tells him to ignore Commando Supremo.

Later with Rommel withdrawing from Kasserine, von Arnim (without Rommel's permission - he was nominally his boss) flies off to Rome and gets Commando Supremo's and Kesselring's permission for Operation Oxhead.

Rommel was dumbfounded "the nincompoops" and his opposite number Ambrosio was equally astonished since von Arnim had just called off the attack on Mejez e Bab.

 

It was and is always a problem to be a Officer in the German Army without having roots somewhere in aristocratic families or families with a long Army background! Such officers had always the problems to be seen as non worthy or 2nd class officers. Extremely in WW2 where the complete OKH was made of old style officers with their old style thinking. The qualitty of the man hasen´t played a role, it was more important to be out of the right stable, no matter how dumb you are. Others had been jealous to this officers and always tried to discredit them. This was the case with Rommel and others too! And during my time at the Army it was very similar. We had some officers which were much dumber than 30 feets of a shitty track across the fields and we had really great NCO´s, but this stupid officers never listened to their NCO´s. The Commando Supremo was to me a good sample of incompetence and ignorance, much more worse than the OKW.

 

My favorite saying on unity of command is from Napoleon; he said he would rather entrust command of an army to one bad general than two good ones.

 

This is a summarization from Wolf T. Zoepf's book "Seven Days in January". Zoepf was a member of the 6th SS Gebirgsjager Division. Most of the book has to do with the author's experience in the Nordwind operation in January of '45. However, 6thSS GJ Div spent most of its history in Finland and the first part of the book was about the fighting in Finland. Zoepf also had some things to say about German-Finnish cooperation. The pertinent passages are too long to quote here, so I am summarizing his comments.

1. German-Finnish cooperation started well before Operation BARBAROSSA. German troops entered Finland in September of 1940.

2. At the outbreak of hostilities, Finland's leaders wanted to remain neutral so both Finnish and German forces abstained from hostilities until the Soviets started bombing Finnish towns, at which time war was declared and both German and Finnish forces commenced hostilities on July 10th.

3. Several offensive operations were undertaken by the Finns and Germans which gained much of the ground taken by the Soviets, but failed to cut the Murmansk railroad. There was no central command for this front, with each army agreeing to, and coordinating their efforts in tandem. This was because the Finnish government wanted to be somewhat separate from the Germans and not be seen as one of the Axis. However, they wanted German troops and help also, so they were trying to play it both ways.

4. After one last push in 1941 the Finnish general, Hjalmar Siilsvuo said his troops had taken too many casualties to continue the offensive. After the war the Germans learned that the Finnish government had received a strongly worded communique from the USA stating that they should not push toward the Murmansk Railroad. If they did, they would be considered part of the Axis and treated accordingly after the war. It seems it was implied that it was okay to take back the territory stolen by the Kremlin and to protect their country.

5. Thereafter, the Finns stayed on the defensive but did resort to counter-attacks on Soviet offensives. The Germans conformed to this (mostly) but did mount hit and run attacks on the Murmansk railroad.


6. Cooperation and coordination was done from the General Staff level down to almost company levels. However, only the 6th GJ Div was under Finnish control and no Finnish units were under German command.

 

(some new corrections in bold)

Thanks for the interest and the summarization. However some corrections and additions need to be made.

1. The co-operation in the form of Germany supplying Finland started well before "Barbarossa". Germany also started to give Finland hints of a possible attack and made telling questions of Finland's attitudes and capabilities. No actual mutual plans were made until just before the "Barbarossa" and even then only on the basis "IF the SU attacks Finland" - although this was very likely to happen if the war between Germany and the SU would break out.

2. German troops did NOT "enter" Finland as such in Sep 1940. Germany had been granted (only) a permission to move her troops to/from Northern Norway through Finland and those troop movements started then. The SU had blackmailed similar permission from Finland BEFORE that to supply her 30.000-strong force in Hanko (close to Helsinki). However most of the German troop movements to/from Northern Norway went through neutral Sweden!

The German troops which were to stay in Finland started to enter only from 5th June 1941.

The first German troops in Finland to start their attack towards Murmansk was the Gebirgs AK "Norwegen" (2. and 3. Gebirgs divisions with only two regiments each) in the farthest north. That attack started 28th June 1941.

The German XXXVI AK started her attack on 1st July with 169. Division and SS-Kampfgruppe "Nord" (=8-9.000 men, later SS-Division "Nord" and 6. SS-Gebirgs-Division "Nord").

Finnish III AK (6th and 3rd divisions) was technicly under the command of German AOK "Norwegen" (Later AOK "Lappland" and 20. Gebirgs-Armee) from 15th June 1941 until March 1942 (6th div.) and early 1944 (3rd div). However her commander Major-General Siilasvuo had strict orders from Mannerheim to only obey orders approved by him. This (counter-)attack started 1st July, 6th division further subordinated (technicly) to the German XXXVI AK.

Finnish separate 14th Division started her (counter-)attack on 3rd July.

The Finnish main (counter-)attack north of Lake Laatokka/Ladoga started 10th July. On the Karelian Isthmus the Finnish attack started only 1st of August.

6. See above. The poorly trained SS-Kampfgruppe "Nord" (later 6. SS-Gebirgs-Division "Nord") failed in her first attack attempt. She was then subordinated (only time ever, when a German SS-division was subordinated to a non-German command!) under the Finnish III AK, which was advancing. This subordination lasted until early 1944.

The German 163rd Division "Engelbrecht" was transferred to Finland (fully armed through Sweden) after the outbreak of war. She was subordinated to the Finnish Karelian army until May 1942.

The Finnish 3rd brigade was subordinated to the German XXXVI AK as a reserve from early 1944 to 9th June 1944.

When the Soviet "4th strategic strike" against Finland started 10th June 1944, to help Finland came at the end of June the German 122. Division "Greif" and the 303rd Assault Gun Brigade, together with the flight detachment "Kuhlmey". They were subordinated under the Finnish command and left Finland when the situation had been stabilized.