Battle for Luzon, Philippines

Here is a good read on how and possibly why MacArthur chose the strategy he did. In many ways "brilliant' and in many ways common sense leading to a brilliant outcome.

Chapter 7: The Philippines: Strategic Objective

""General MacArthur had driven past Finschhafen and had penetrated the enemy's New Guinea defenses to a depth of over 300 miles. The strategy of his advance was briefly outlined in a memorandum to the War Department. " This advance," he stated, " is along a decisive operational axis that drives a wedge into the [Japanese defense] perimeter toward a central core-the Philippines-that dominates all aerial and shipping lanes employed by the enemy for his current reinforcement and maintenance program. . . ."[SUP]4[/SUP] The establishment of Allied forces in the Philippines would not only cut Japan's communications with the islands on which she was dependent for the means to run her war machine, but would also provide an ideal base from which to prepare the final blows

[168]​

[HR][/HR]

against Tokyo itself.​

General MacArthur continued his analysis with an appraisal of the various approaches to the Philippines. He considered that an attack from the Southeast Asia Command would be frontal in nature, pushing the Japanese back upon successive lines of defense which they could readily keep supplied. " A major effort along this line of action," he concluded, " is undesirable both tactically and logistically." An attack across the Pacific would also have to be delivered against a position organized in great depth. It would have to be supported entirely by carrier-based aircraft as opposed to land-based air cover, and it would not sufficiently cut the enemy's lines of communication nor seriously curtail his war potential.[SUP]5[/SUP]

A drive from the Southwest Pacific Area, on the other hand, possessed several advantages which General MacArthur explained as follows:

The attack from the Southwest Pacific Area departs from a base that is closest to the objective and advances against the most lightly organized portion of the enemy's defenses, effecting a decisive penetration. It is the only plan that permits an effective combination of land, sea and air power. The advance can be made by a combination of airborne and seaborne operations, always supported by the full power of land-based aviation and assisted by the fleet operating in the open reaches of the Pacific. A penetration of the defensive perimeter along this line results in by-passing heavily defended areas of great extent that will fall, practically of their own weight, to mopping-up operations with a minimum of loss.[SUP]6


[/SUP]

​

 

If you can't find it at HyperWar or CMH it probably didn't happen :

The first attack on Okinawa was made by Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force, operating as part of the Third Fleet, in the preliminary operations for the landings on Leyte. Nine carriers, 5 fast battleships, 8 escort carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 3 antiaircraft cruisers, and 58 destroyers arrived off Okinawa early on 10 October. Admiral Mitscher made every effort to achieve surprise. The force followed the track of bad weather caused by a typhoon moving toward Okinawa from the southeast. A smaller force of cruisers and destroyers made a diversionary attack on Marcus Island, 1,500 miles to the east, in such a way as to simulate a large force. Aircraft based on the Marianas intensified attacks on Iwo Jima, to hamper searches from that direction, and flew interdiction patrols ahead of the Third Fleet forces. ...... "Okinawa was not assaulted again until 1945, when carrier planes raided the Ryukyu and Sakashima Islands on 3 and 4 January during a heavy attack on Formosa by the Fast Carrier Task Force."
>>> During February and March 1945, aircraft based in the Southwest Pacific and in the Marianas made almost daily runs over the Ryukyus and adjacent waters. Army and Navy search planes and patrol bombers hunted the waters for Japanese shipping and helped to isolate Okinawa by destroying cargo vessels, luggers, and other craft plying between Okinawa and outlying areas. One or two bombers flying high over Okinawa became so familiar a sight to the Japa�nese that they called it the "regular run" and dispensed with air raid alarms.5 During March American submarines also tightened the shipping blockade around the Ryukyus.<<<<<<


Chapter II: Invasion Of The Ryukyus

 

Good point
Here's is a good link for Task Force 58 with a list of ships.

OPERATION ICEBERG

 

Seems to me I remember reading that B-29's (XX group)? were bombing Okinawa from Chinese bases in late 1944?

 

I still haven't seen much compelling evidence for a campaign north from Australia. We seem to have fought a WWI war there because that's what MacArthur knew. Going straight for Japan, isolating it, and pounding them into submission would have been far cheaper, IMHO.

 

Thanks Guys, I found this which is most likely what I was thinking about. Thought B-29's from China had been in on this: I also thought I remembered the XX's B-29's may have bombed during recce's in October of 44.

Wave after wave of carrier planes swept over Okinawa shortly after dawn of 10 October. The first strikes bombed, rocketed, and strafed airfields at Yontan, Kadena, le Shima, and Naha. Later waves made intensive attacks on shipping, installations, harbor facilities, and similar targets. The attack con-

[44] ​

[HR][/HR]tinued throughout the day. Many enemy aircraft were caught on the ground, dispersed and revetted, but only a few in the air. A fighter-bomber from the Bunker Hill dropped a bomb between two midget submarines moored side by side. Other islands in the Ryukyus were reconnoitered and attacked, including Kume, Miyako, Amami-O, Tokuno, and Minami.
....................................

During February and March 1945, aircraft based in the Southwest Pacific and in the Marianas made almost daily runs over the Ryukyus and adjacent waters. Army and Navy search planes and patrol bombers hunted the waters for Japanese shipping and helped to isolate Okinawa by destroying cargo vessels, luggers, and other craft plying between Okinawa and outlying areas. One or two bombers flying high over Okinawa became so familiar a sight to the Japa�nese that they called it the "regular run" and dispensed with air raid alarms.5 During March American submarines also tightened the shipping blockade around the Ryukyus.

Chapter II: Invasion Of The Ryukyus

 

I've felt the same way but wonder what would have happened to Australia if we had. I think the time taking the direct route to Japan would have allowed a larger build up in the South West Pacific Area and the possibility of counter-strikes from there.