Battle of Leyte Gulf

Being Oct 23, 2004 and the 60 year anniversary of this battle I have been going thru some of my book and magazine articles the covered parts of this battle and have had my curiosity piqued in a few areas.
The first of which is the skirmish between the submarines Dace and Darter with Kurita's Center Force moving through the Palawan Passage. Why did Kurita not use a destroyer screen in the vanguard of his force while transiting an obvious choke point that is the perfect spot for a submarine ambush. I know that the Japanese doctrine called for using submarines to attack warships so this should have been something that Kurita had expected. Instead he heads through with his flagship a heavy cruiser, the heavy cruiser Myoko and a light cruiser, Noshiro in the lead. His destroyers were on his flanks which while protecting against a flank attack left the entire frontal area open. For submarines to attempt a flank attack in the narrow waters of the passage with Palawan on Kurita's starboard side, and an area on the charts marked as "Dangerous Ground" on Kurita's port side would have been tantamount to asking for their boats to have run aground or sunk just after making their attacks. Lt. Cmdr. Thomas Cutler(ret), in his book "The Battle of Leyte Gulf" even has a quote from Kurita's diary in which he considered his formation "an alert formation against submarines." While this may have been true in open waters it certainly was not the case in the narrow confines of the Palawan Passage.
Now, after the skirmish in which the Darter and Dace succeed in sinking the heavy cruisers Atago (Kurita's flagship) and Maya while heavily damaging the heavy cruiser Takao, Kurita makes what I percieve to be his next error in judgement. Given his initial orders, which basically made this an all out, last ditch effort for the Japanese Navy, why did Kurita detail 2 destroyers to escort the damaged Takao back to Brunei? Prior to his departure from Brunei, Kurita himself had asked "Would it not be shameful to have our fleet remain intact while our nation perishes?" thus acknowledging that the loss of units due to battle was to be expected and even an honorable death in the eyes of the Japanese culture. Yet Kurita, after suffering a very damaging submarine attack and with at least two more days before he plans on attacking the Leyte landings to go, deprives his force of 15% of his destroyers and antisubbmarine units. In my mind while this is the benevolent course of action in order to ensure the survival of his sailors on board the Takao it is completely at odds with Japanese culture. Did Kurita after years of war finally loose his warrior ethos or is this simply an error in the judgement of a man tired from years of command and battle?

 

Well, good question. I can't really answer it, but I can reccomend a relevant book called.The end of the Japanese navy, by Masanori Ito. He mentioned the poor use of submarines as one of the reasons for japans naval defeat. Should've been used against tranports, especially Guadalcanal ones. Hit the enemy on his way to the battle area. Sorry, I've gone off topic. He also mentioned the long lance "wakeless" torpedo had 4 times the range of US or Brit torpedoes. Bigger payload as well. The fact that major Japanese ships did not get radar til 44 was a big another big factor. He pulls no punches, does mention mistakes by Japanese naval commanders.

The copy I have was printed in 65 by Macfadden books.

 

Actually, I have that book, the only thing is that it is still in my "to be read stack". I have a paperback edition printed by Jove in 1982.
A quick glance gave only a cursory view of the skirmish in the Palawan Passage. However I had read in other publications regarding the long reach and the warhead capacity of the 24" Japanese Long Lance torpedo. A few of the books I have read suggested that the warrior ethos, samurai tradition if you will, dictated that it would be less than honorable to use a warship like a submarine to attack a non-warship like an oiler or supply transport. This is just another example of the difference in the Japanese philosophy of waging war from that used by the allies during the war.

 

The Japanese had many problems with their naval technologies and doctrines that often are not readily apparent.
First, submarine defense / ASW formations was mentioned in this thread. The Japanese greatly under-rated the submarine as an offensive threat. Their own ASW capacity was limited. Their sonar systems were the rough equivalent of early war Allied ones and really never got better than that. Most of their destroyers had a limited fit of depth charge systems. Usually, this amounted to 2 Y guns and a rack or two on the stern. This compares badly with US or British practice of 6 K guns (3 per side) and two racks minimum. The British often went with 4 K guns per side.
One reason Kurta may have chosen the formation he was in was more for defense against PT boats and desroyers than submarines. In Japanese doctrine a primary role for submarines was scouting. They were rarely used in restricted waters so, by Japanese thinking the submarine threat would be perceived as minimal.
Even given a more 'German' submarine doctrine the Japanese would have eventually faced the same fate the Germans had befall them in the Atlantic. On the whole, it wouldn't have made that much difference, especially when you consider how much larger the Pacific is and, how much more room for maneuver the US had in routing convoys to various destinations.
On the Long Lance, the most common version had a 44,000 yard range and could make speeds up to 45 knots. This is somewhere between double and triple the best Allied torpedos of the war. The Japanese had an excellent torpedo doctrine and could reload their tubes on most ships for a second salvo while underway in a matter of a few minutes. This reload capacity was something Allied ships lacked.
On radar, the Japanese were handicapped more by limitations in manufacturing capacity than technology. By the end of 1943 they had surpassed the Germans at sea in radar and ESW technologies. Their 2 Go 2 Gata 4 Kai set surpassed anything the Germans produced in quantity as a fire control set (it's the two horn radar set seen on many surface ships).
They had search radars on larger ships as early as the end of 1942 but, there was never enough to go around. They also lacked the integration that a CIC system brought to US ships as well as the capacity to link radar inputs directly into their fire control systems. Both of these restrict the value radar has for the Japanese.
Another doctrinal shortcomming was in carrier operations. The Japanese doctrine was much poorer in terms of CAP control and usage. It also resulted in a slower cycle time for strike operations. At every carrier battle in the Pacific it cost them heavily.
By 1944 when it came down to a gun fight, the US was holding all the cards really. At Surigao Straight the Yamashiro never even knew what US BB's were firing on her or from where. She was blown out of the water at over 35,000 yards range.
The Japanese penchant for mulitple small fleets carrying out complex strategies, like the Midway operation, generally ended up as defeats in detail. This type of strategy at sea just didn't work and the Japanese never really adapted to the changing character of the Pacific war. That was probably their biggest failing.

 

First of all let me start by saying that TA's post made me go back to Cutler's book (The Battle of Leyte Gulf) to check what I had printed in my original post and low and behold I found that I had made a mistake and posted some bad information. It was not Kurita's diary that the quote. "an alert formation against submarines" came from in reference to Kurita's Center Force disposition in the Palawan Passage. This quote came from the diary of VAdm Ugaki who was commanding BatDiv 1 containing the Yamato, Musashi and Nagato as part of Kurita's force.
Second - the weapons systems information posted was extremely enlightening. This is an area in which my knowledge is extremely lacking, so I greatly appreciate that.
Third - TA, you state "In Japanese doctrine a primary role for submarines was scouting. They were rarely used in restricted waters so, by Japanese thinking the submarine threat would be perceived as minimal." This seems to be contrary to even Japanese philosophy from before the war. While Prange in "At Dawn We Slept" gives the primary role of the Japanese subs at Pearl Harbor as an scouting/intel role there are also subs who's job it was to sink US warships trying to escape from the Harbor. Paul Dull in "A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1941-1945" shows where the pre-war plan for the Japanese was to use their large fleet subs (the I-class sub) as weapons of attrition to whittle away ships from the US fleet as it made its way toward the Philippines in preparation for the Great Decisive Battle. An example of this can be seen in the I-168's sinking of the USS Yorktown (CV-5) and the USS Hammann (DD-412)at Midway. Also a quick cursory reading of a section in Masanori Ito's "The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy" in which he laments that greatest cause of failure of the Japanese submarine force in the war was their gradual diversion from offensive to defensive assignments. He shows where their subs started life in the role of attriting US warships and moved to scouting duties and eventually relegated to supply ship duties for bypassed outposts toward the end of the war.

 

I think they even used subs for supply at Guadalcanal. The other problem for them was that there were just not enough subs to go around. They didn't make near as many as Germany.

 

Guadalcanal seems to be a microcosm of the way the war went for Japan in the way their submarines were used. At the beginning, specifically on September 15, the I-19 fired 6 Model 95 torpedoes from a range of only 1000 yards. Two of these ripped into the USS Wasp (CV-7) and sunk her, one torpedo hit the USS O'Brien (DD-415). WHile the O'Brien was able to make it back to Espiritu Santo she would later sink due to damage sustained by the torpedo hit. And finally one torpedo hit the USS North Carolina (BB-55) causing damage below the waterline but due to skillful handling and even more skillful damage control she was able to maintain her place in the formation.
By mid-November with the Cactus airforce becoming more and more dominant, the Japanese took to relying on submarines to resupply their beleaguered army. A clear example of the Japanese going from an offensive posture that their submarines were constructed for to a defensive posture such as resupplying troops that could not otherwise be supplied.

 

Guadalcanal isn't really a good example of Japanese use of submarines for supply. As to numbers, the Japanese built several hundred submarines particularly, their 2nd class types (Kaitokuchu) like the R0's and late war Sentakasho (fast small type) Ha's. They didn't build as many of the larger fleet type submarines (these displace about half again to double what German boats did) Sensuikan Kadai and Junsen types simply because these were expensive, long term builds compared to the second class boats (which compare with the German Type VII).
At Guadalcanal, the Japanese supply line was maintained by a combination of destroyer delivered supplies and gross wastage in merchant shipping. The later was usually simply run aground and emptied as best as the troops could manage. On the whole, the Japanese supply attempts at Guadalcanal were ill-conceived and poorly carried out.

 

Guadalcanal isn't really a good example of Japanese use of submarines for supply. As to numbers, the Japanese built several hundred submarines particularly, their 2nd class types (Kaitokuchu) like the R0's and late war Sentakasho (fast small type) Ha's. They didn't build as many of the larger fleet type submarines (these displace about half again to double what German boats did) Sensuikan Kadai and Junsen types simply because these were expensive, long term builds compared to the second class boats (which compare with the German Type VII).
At Guadalcanal, the Japanese supply line was maintained by a combination of destroyer delivered supplies and gross wastage in merchant shipping. The later was usually simply run aground and emptied as best as the troops could manage. On the whole, the Japanese supply attempts at Guadalcanal were ill-conceived and poorly carried out. [/QUOTE]

While Guadalcanal wasn't the best example of the Japanese using submarines to resupply their troops during the war toward the end of that campaign they did nevertheless make a number of resupply runs before Operation "Ke" which had the Tokyo Express (in which destroyers acted as transports) made runs to evacuate what remained of the Japanese Army from Guadalcanal.
I believe I remember either reading a book or maybe even one your earlier posts that the Japanese had modified one of their large "I" class fleet boats to carry 2 or 3 naval patrol bombers with the original intent to attempt a bombing of the Panama Canal close to the beginning of hostilities with the hopes of closing it so that the US could not transfer forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific without making the long trip around South America.

 

According to Mr Ito, Japan had 64 submarines in Dec 41, & in the course of the war she built an additional 126, for a combined total of 190.

Nuther good book on the pacific is called. 70.000 to one. About a P-38 pilot that spent nearly 9 months on an island with 70.000 Japanese troops. He learned the native language real quick.

 

Easily the most decisive, as well as the most important, battle in the Pacific Theater.

The Japanese Navy was completely decimated by the end of the battle. Virtually all aircraft carriers lay on the bottom of the ocean (one exception being the Shinano, but that one wouldn't last very long either.)

Leyte Gulf is where the Japanese lost the war for good. Without the means to defend themselves by sea, the Japanese were helpless as U.S. ships could travel, unconfronted, through the waters of the Pacific.

And things just went down hill from there for the Japanese.

To read an article about it, check this out:

http://www.journalofhistory.com/Battles/leyte_gulf/leyte_gulf.htm

Heck, if you're interested, sign up on my online forum, and throw in a couple of posts. I've got politics, military history of the United States and the world... all natures of wars... all kinds of fun stuff.

 

The Japanese after Leyte Gulf still had 4 CV's(Amagi, Junyo, Katsuragi, Unryu), 3 CVL's (Hosho, Ryuho, and Shinyo) and 2 CVE's (Kaiyo and Unyo). Also they had the hybrid battleship/carriers Ise and Hyuga although these ships never really could have operated as carriers. They had a couple of battleships left along with 8 heavy cruisers, 9 light cruisers and over 50 destroyers. You are correct in the sense that as a force capable of taking on the combined US, British, Australian and Dutch fleets in the Pacific and Indian Oceans they were essentially finished. This was mainly due to the fact that Japan could no longer consistantly supply these ships with enough oil for them to sortie and they did not have the capability to supply their remaining carriers with planes and pilots capable of conducting carriers operations (again due to lack of fuel in order to train their pilots).