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Battle off Samar

Discussion in 'Naval Warfare in the Pacific' started by bronk7, Jul 18, 2013.

  1. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    what should Kurita have done to get maximum damage to as many US forces as possible!!!
     
  2. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    One idea comes from the most effective element of Kurita's force, the heavy cruiser column which swept around to the east of Taffy 3. Although they closed in and inflicted heavy damage, they could not win the battle all by themselves. The CVEs continually turned away to starboard, eventually describing a rough half-circle. Meanwhile the cruisers, while trying to close the range, were also trying to keep their midships and after turrets on target. It was almost like a racetrack, with the cruisers in the outside lane; this is why 34-knot cruisers were unable to catch 19-knot escort carriers.

    What the Japanese needed was someone to engage on the opposite side, west or starboard. The closest they came was with Destroyer Squadron 10, Yahagi and four DDs, which were moving into position to cut off the CVEs' escape and launch torpedos but allowed themselves to be deterred by the crippled USS Johnston.

    So here is my suggestion: the battleships and one destroyer squadron carry on southward, towards their assigned objective of Leyte Gulf, and between Taffy 3 and Samar, while the faster cruisers and the other destroyer squadron sweep around the eastern, ocean flank much as they did. The CVEs would be trapped between the two faster Japanese forces; before long one or both should reach a suitable position for torpedo attack.

    I would keep Destroyer Squadron 2, Noshiro + 7, with the battleships, for screening and to more evenly distribute the force's torpedo assets, and have Yahagi + 4 with the heavy cruisers, which also had their own torpedos.

    One more thing Kurita needed to do was motivate his destroyers and their commanders. The Japanese DDs were remarkably unenterprising, made little contribution to the battle, and failed to screen their heavy ships against torpedo attack. It's astonishing that thirteen ships including two light cruisers failed to prevent three American DDs from launching torpedos at Kumano, Yamato, and the rest.
     
    USMCPrice and gtblackwell like this.
  3. Gromit801

    Gromit801 Member

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    A plan of attack would have worked wonders. Kurita called for a general attack, leaving everyone to pretty much attack as they wished.
     
  4. merdiolu

    merdiolu Member

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    Another admiral other than timid Kurita should have been commanding Japanese Central Task Force. An admiral who straightened out his mission priorities straight. The wholepoint of SHO-2 plan was to force US Navy at decisive battle. If that was not possible then to gain some kind of local success or at worst to make maximum damage to US Fleet whatever the cost. Kurita threw all these mission objectives away and set out a new one : Saving his vessels from further damage hence ending the battle when Taffy-3 was driven away and MacArthur's landing transports were defenseless. And he retreated.

    Not that that this kind of timidity was not a new one at Japanese Imperial Navy. Admiral Mikawa also did not attack at American landing fleet standing defenseless after he won a smashing victory against US Navy at Battle of Savo Island in August 1942. Instead he retreated because of his irrational fear of US carrier borne air attacks in daylight.
     
  5. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    Mikawa at Savo had no way of knowing the American carriers were withdrawing. What he knew was that carrier planes had been active during daylight hours on the 8th, and he had no reason to think they would not be on the 9th.

    Nor did he know the composition of our surface forces, or what proportion of them he had knocked out, although he knew he had done considerable damage. In fact there were still one heavy and two light cruisers and twelve destroyers, not counting the two pickets. They were in several groups, an advantage for Mikawa, but it wasn't just a matter of slaughtering helpless transports.

    Assuming he did get to attack the transports, some of the damaged ships might have sunk in shallow water or run themselves aground, where much of their cargo could still be unloaded.

    Getting back to Samar, MacArthur's transports were not undefended either. There was a discussion on this recently, including an excellent chart which demonstrates that Oldendorf's battle line, even while firing down Surigao Strait, was never out of position to cover the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf.

    http://www.ww2f.com/topic/50367-leyte-gulf-refought/
     

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