Biggest Market Garden Mistake

There were almost innumerable mistakes in the planning of Market Garden, and everything that could go wrong did go wrong.
Although most of the blame is [rightly] put on Monty, the Americans get their share also, insisting on being dropped in division strength, with the inevitable result of DZs relatively far from their objectives, 82nd distant from the Nijmegen bridge, 101st distant from the Son bridge [which the Germans then blew in their faces, requiring the British XXX Corps to bring up bridging equipment...more delays].
But I suggest, subject of this thread, that the biggest mistake was Horrocks [a good man] agreeing to drive up one road.
Take a look at the below map, actually from Horrocks' autobiography "Corps Commander".
Horrocks in fact drove north from Hechtel in Belgium, just that one road.
But observe another great road from Gheel in Belgium, also leading to Nijmegen.
And observe yet another great road from Hechtel driving northeast through the western tip of the Reichswald before converging on Nijmegen.
I suggest Horrocks included that map as a mea culpa, conceding he had alternatives the might have changed everything.
With XXX Corps on all three roads, the Germans would have been unable to concentrate as they did.
[Apologies, I've tried uploading the image both as PNG and JPG but in neither case does it display.]

 

Interesting point, but even if attacking on multiple axes was feasible, I would not call it the biggest mistake (more in a moment). Dispersing one's strength is not necessarily a formula for success. Each of those routes had bridges which would need to be secured; would you suggest spreading the airborne to cover them all? The Germans would presumably react just as quickly to improvise defenses or destroy bridges as they did on the historical route.

I think the fundamental problem was the refusal to directly assault the bridges at the outset, as had been done at Pegasus Bridge in Normandy. Colonel Chatterton, commander of the British Glider Pilot Regiment, suggested and offered to lead such a landing on the Arnhem highway bridge but was turned down. The bridges were obvious objectives, not to mention that Germans might need them for their own operations. It was foolish to expect to find them intact and undefended hours after the airborne landings.

Could the bridges have been secured? There's not much of a data base on direct assaults on bridges, but what there is is favorable. Pegasus Bridge of course. The Primosole Bridge in Sicily was captured, although it was subsequently lost. The one bridge attacked at the outset of M-G, at Grave by a company of paratroopers from the 82nd, was taken intact. Even attacking several hours after landing, about half the M-G bridges were taken. Two key bridges, Son and the Arnhem railroad bridge, were blown up just as the airborne forces approached; the British actually saw a German on the railroad bridge apparently fixing charges. With the usual caveat that nothing is certain, it seems likely that the bridges could have been secured at the outset. This was truly a case where a company in the right place at the right time would have been worth more than a brigade trying to get there a few hours too late.

What would it mean if all the bridges were secured at the outset? Historically, Guards Armoured Division arrived at Son about 1715 on Sept 18, the second day, and had to wait some twelve hours while a Bailey bridge was installed. In our scenario, they would continue advancing through the 101st sector. They might halt for the night, but they would probably send reconnaissance units onward, which would discover that the road for the next ten miles, to the 82nd's position, was clear. They might send a command/liaison party to meet with Gavin and staff and plan the next day's operations. The march would resume at daylight, and by midmorning on the 19th, the armour would be ready to advance from Nijmegen to Arnhem. At his point there were few German tanks or guns in the "island", so they would likely reach Arnhem before long and find the bridges in British hands. The railroad bridge might be particularly useful to link up with 1 Airbourne Division

So why wasn't it done? The main reason was the not unreasonable desire to secure the landing zones. German attacks could be expected to develop within a few hours of the initial landings, and even a few companies detached to secure bridges might be sorely missed. The remedy was another measure which was suggested during the planning process, including by Montgomery - landing a second wave on the first day. I doubt it would be possible to stage and fly a second glider lift, but planes carrying paratroopers could probably have managed a second trip, as could their escorting fighters and fighter-bombers.

The American divisions brought in all their parachute infantry in one lift, using 904 C-47s, and this is what I would envision splitting, with approximately 500 planes in the first lift and 400 in the second, to allow for combat or operational losses. This would free up 400 planes to bring in most of each division's glider regiment on the first lift, some of which would attack the bridges and the remainder reinforce the landing zones. There would be slightly fewer troops on the landing zones initially, but by the time German attacks got going, all the American paratroopers would be in place, plus the glidermen.

A British Parachute Brigade used 126 C-47s. The initial assault included a further 19 for divisional units, total 145; so allowing for losses there should be enough to bring in 4 Para Brigade on the second lift.

Day 2 would be much as it was. With 4 Para already on the ground, the Polish Brigade could come in. All of the infantry and most of the artillery, vehicles, etc. would be on the ground. On day 3, the planes and crews which had done double on day 1 could stand down; no one would fly more than three missions in three days.

 

....biggest mistake was thinking it was going to be a parade and the Germans would not be that big of a deal = biggest mistake = wishful thinking

 

I certainly agree that failure of American airborne to secure all necessary bridges as expeditiously as possible was a major factor, and I believe you and I agree that the Americans dropping relatively far from their objectives was the cause of their delay. I less agree that the rationale in centralizing the two DZs was to "secure the landing zones". As you note, it is SOP for military to concentrate forces, but in the particular case of the Market airborne assault, time not concentration was the most critical factor, and too much time was lost moving [on foot] from the divisional DZs to the objectives.
As for Horrocks splitting his forces, I must note that Horrocks himself, in "Corps Commander", muses that a wider initial assault would have achieved much better results.
Look at those black lines on the map I attached, from Horrocks' book.
Those black lines would have been all over southern Holland had Horrocks taken the three routes that I see on Horrocks own map.
And, of course, some of the most spectacular military successes in history, Cannae and Chancellorsville, were accomplished by splitting forces.

 

There was insufficient logistical lift to support more than the XXX Corps single-division attack and the similar supporting attacks on either flank by VIII and XII Corps, both of which quickly petered out as resources were directed to keeping XXX Corps going. Even the attachment of the12th AG lift for the 82d and 101st did not help much, partly due to the the singular mistake of loading ammunition for the 105mm Howitzer M2A1 instead of the correct 105mm Howitzer M3 used by the airborne. There simply wasn't enough resources to conduct a large ground element in GARDEN while simultaneously supporting, the similar, but successful single-division II Canadian Corps operations against the Channel ports - WELLHIT kicked off the same days as MARKET-GARDEN.

The selection of DZs and especially the 82d emphasis on the Groesbeek heights and defending against a counterattack from the east rather than seizing the Nijmegen bridges was due to Browning's insistence and interference. The decision not to do a coup de main against the Arnhem bridge was a decision by the RAF. The decision to employ the woefully inexperienced - and as it turned out somewhat incompetent - I British Airborne Corps rather than the equally inexperienced, but competent XVIII US Airborne Corps was political.

Urquhart as commander of the 1st Airborne proved to be a poor example of the British "old boy network" method of choosing senior commanders. While brave, he had zero experience in planning or executing airborne operations and made many poor choices before and during the battle, but at least he was not as destructive as Browning, who was both incompetent and a sycophantic empire-builder.

I strongly recommend Bill Buckingham's exhaustive new look at the planning and execution of MARKET-GARDEN.

 

So, in your opinion, Horrocks had no alternative but to drive his entire Corps up a single two lane road?
When his own map shows that he had two additional roads to carry his forces?

 

....I would think if they could've used those other roads, they would have ..that's just basic tactical sense

 

[Reading from an unpublished 2001 PhD thesis of Roger Cirillo, Cranfield University, page 350-351:]
Horrocks' 30 Corps Operation Instruction No. 23 Operation "COMET" outlined the crucial ground linkup to 1 Airborne Corps:
30 Corps will advance to and secure a bridgehead over the RHINE in the area WEST of incl NIJMEGEN and dominate the area to the NORTH.
Horrocks' plan stated that using two armored divisions, an infantry division, and an armored brigade,
30 Corps will advance with Guards Armd Div right, 11 Armd Div left. 50(N) Div move forward by bounds on 11 Armd Div Route. [PRO, WO 171-341, 30 Corps Operation Instruction No. 23 Operation "COMET", 6 Sep44.
Horrocks' corps would have some 800 tanks and, with all arms and services included, approximately 100,000 men. For this force, he designated two axes of advance, "Club" and "Diamond." Club Route, the Corps' right avenue and the track for Guards Armoured, would later bear an ominous tale: It followed the main road from Mech-Gheel-Arendonk-Eindhoven-St.Oderode-Nijmegen-Arnhem-Apeldorn. The 11th Armoured's "Diamond" Route began after a trip from Antwerp to pick up the road from Tillburg-Hertogenbosch-Zaltbommel-Tiel-Renkum-Ede. Within two days of the order's issuance and with the stiffening of resistance, Horrocks shifted 50th Division to "Diamond" with the 11th Armoured to trail Guards Armoured up the Corps "Centre-line."
[Continuing at page 421:]
Under COMET, Horrocks had two mutually supporting armored divisions in the advance; now [under Garden] he had one, with the flank corps each having an armored division.
[Thus, the COMET plan made use of the west road that I note in my original post above. The GARDEN plan shifts all forces to the center road.]

 

Much criticism of Op Market Garden is Monday Morning Quarterbacking

Op Market Garden can't be explained in rational terms.

It makes most sense using the alternative military doctrine that is a military counter culture. Its the world of SNAFU, FUBAR and Murphy's Laws of Combat.
I had a go at interpreting Op Market Garden on post #4 on this thread.
New Mission Verbs
Please note that there is extensive use of profanity. Do not follow the link if you are easily offended by the err "military adjective".
If you wonder about the Emperor Mong as the dark side of British military ethos read more here The Emperor Mongs Pronouncements
I dare say he has appeared to US Servicemen as well...

 

The Gheel-Tilburg road was outside the XXX Corps zone. The Hechtel-Reichswald road was outside the XXX Corps zone. So no, he did not have two additional roads to carry his forces.

The Hechtel-Nijmegen road was in the XXX Corps zone...and started with a bridgehead across the Meuse-Escaut Canal..."Joe's Bridge", which was critical. No bridges across the M-E on the other roads.

 

I understood there were the 9th af 10th ss-panzerdivisions regrouping in the vicinity of Arnhem although the Allied considered the German forces weak. Was there some mistake about the German forces faced?

 

The big mistake was in appreciating the fight left in the Germans, not how many or where. A week earlier and German moral was at rock bottom with everyone heading for the Reich. By 17th September German will had recovered.

 

Roads are allocated to zones so that mutually supporting forces, or at least mutually active forces, can move forward without interfering with each other.
No forces moved on the two additional roads shown on the map in Horrocks own autobiography.
COMET was originally predicated on using the second road that I read on the map.
Someone, not Horrocks, changed COMET into GARDEN and took the second road away from Horrocks.
Given that the history shows moving up one road was the most significant factor slowing British land forces, whoever made the change made a grievous mistake.

 

Well, yes, but Market Garden was a "failure", see de Guingand on "The World At War" episode "Pincers", where he says "I hate the term glorious failure but it was a failure of sorts".
Can it only be "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" to ask if errors in planning were made that were causal of the failure?
I have offered two observations, one on the American decision to drop in division strength away from their objectives [and of course the British at Oosterbeck were much worse in that regard], two on the British decision to force all land forces on one road where the original COMET plan clearly supposes the use of at least a second road.
If neither of those observations were causal of the failure, if both of those observations are "Monday Morning Quarterbacking", then should we conclude that no plan could have succeeded?

 

why did they shift to the center ?

 

Cirillo's PhD thesis does not offer an explanation, only that COMET used two roads and GARDEN used one.
There are many possible explanations, e.g., don't spread the airborne too thin, but as far as I can tell, nothing in writing.

 

Sure, but the roads don't do much good if they are missing bridges or bridgeheads across them where bridges could be erected. XXX Corps attacked via the Joe's Bridge bridgehead because, well, it was there and in British hands.

The zone of advance designated for 2d British Army was also pretty narrow, because each of the three corps could only support two divisions. VIII Corps and XII Corps initial role in MG was to cross the M-E to support the flanks of XXX Corps, but first they had to cross the canal and establish bridges, which proved difficult against the increased German resistance...they did not get far and there is no reason to suppose XXX Corps would have gotten any further.

I would have to check, but yes, no XXX Corps units did...they were in the VIII and XII Corps zones.

COMET was five days out of date when MG planning began, which was an eternity in terms of operational planning in late August and early September 1944.

Yep, Bimbo with Monty's assistance, because the COMET plan was no longer relavent to the situation of 10-11 September, when the MG plan was formulated. Of course, the MG plan was also no longer fully relevant when executed on 17 September. That was the fundamental problem with linked airborne-ground operations, they took too long to plan and execute.

To paraphrase an old saw, I think that the Germans had something to do with it too. Or to exho Sosabowski, "But the GERMANS! The GERMANS!"

 

For a full background on the planning I cannot emphasize the imprortance of reading Buckingham's update to his old work on MG.

 

..well, that's a critical issue--is it not? = why did they not use them
..anyone know?

 

The fundamental problem was not the advance on a single axis but rather the failure to secure key bridges before they could be destroyed or firm defenses established. A concurrent advance on a second route would face the same problem. How would COMET have addressed this, especially since it involved less than half the airborne strength of M-G?

The Wikipedia article on COMET, citing Bennett, David (2008), A Magnificent Disaster describes the airborne element as follows:

"Comet envisioned using the British 1st Airborne Division, along with the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade, to secure several bridges over the Rhine River to aid the Allied advance into the North German Plain. The Divisional Headquarters for the British 1st Airborne Division, with the 1st Airlanding Brigade and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade were to land at Nijmegen, the British 1st Parachute Brigade was to land at Arnhem, and the British 4th Parachute Brigade was to land at Grave, Netherlands"

Not even addressing what became the 101st zone and the critical bridges at Son, Best, St. Odenrode, and Veghel, let alone a second route.

And of course "all roads lead to Nijmegen". The Allies would still have to deal with the Nijmegen bridges and then get to Arnhem in time to do something more than rescue the survivors. Granted, if the force advancing on a second road was not held up by defenses or demolitions, they might have reached Nijmegen a little earlier, but that could more certainly have been achieved by making a proper job of securing the bridges on the main route.