Biggest Market Garden Mistake

Yup - OP Market Garden was either doomed or a waste of resources even if perfectly executed.

But it depends on what you think the allies were trying to achieve.

The big hope of launching a strategic air assault was to project a force into Germany that would prompt a German collapse. The original plan called for 2nd Army to advance east crossing the Rhine somewhere near Wesel and sweep north of the Ruhr with Bradley on the right.

The Western Allies did not have the resources to defeat Germany in 1944, In September the allies only had around 35 Divisions supported over a tenuous lines of communication. There were not enough troops and material conquer Germany as long as the Germans were willing to fight. Not under Montgomery nor Patton. Nor Bradley "breaking through near Aachen" No plan could have succeeded in winning the war in '44, as long as the German moral held up. BUT no one knew whether the Germans were going to fight on. After all they had collapsed in 1918, and in July there had been a revolt against Hitler. So the allies tried all manner of hasty attacks to test German resolve in the hope that they might be close to collapse. In retrospect the allied Siegfried Line attacks were all doomed to fail to win the war in '44.

The plan to thrust east was replaced by a thrust North, with the purpose of cutting off the Netherlands from Germany. Although never stated, the reason why this northerly thrust was chosen was to prevent the Germans from launching a potentially devastating rocket offensive on Britain. Britain had endured a summer of V1 cruise missile attacks and now faced V2 SSBM. As it turned out the V2 rockets were far less effective than had been feared, causing around 10,000 civilian casualties, compared to the 15-17,000 military casualties lost in the operation. Even if successful Op Market Garden would have delivered marginal benefits.

There was much wrong with the execution of Op market Garden - and I refer you to the link to the New Mission verbs thread on ARRSE. This and other operations in the fall of 1944 were conducted by men in a hurry to win a war they thought was already won. (I will see your Op Market Garden fiasco and raise you a Huertgen Forest).

Monday morning quarterbacking is the wrong analogy. The allied commanders were making decisions based on imperfect information with a lot of unknowns. They were placing bets. Criticising the higher commanders for their decisions is like picking winners after the race has been run..

 

Well that was my fundamental point in my original post.
By the time XXX Corps reached Nijmegen, the Germans had already decimated British Airborne and massed between Arnhem and Nijmegen.
Using the three roads noted in my original post, on the map in Horrocks's own autobiography, would have prevented the Germans from concentrating on a XXX Corps tank front of one tank.

And that was my secondary point in my original post.
The Americans should not have been dropped in division strength far from their objectives.
Instead, the Americans should have been dropped in regimental or even battalion strength on each individual objective.

 

The problem was not getting XXX Corps to Nijmegen, as they did that in reasonable time. The problem was the 82nd had not yet secured Nijmegen and the bridges there. So, rather then rolling through Nijmegen, XXX Corps had to help capture the bridges and then secure the city.

Again, that was not the problem. Gavin & Browning were focused on securing the Groesbeek Heights. So much so, that the 505th & 508th PIR wet committed to the task, and capturing Nijmegen was almost an afterthought. Whereas the 504th PIR was given th we tasks of capturing the 5 other minor bridges.

 

Frost was promised relief, in Arnhem, not Nijmegen, in 48 hours.
XXX Corps did not even near Nijmegen until the third day.

 

BROWNING was focused on the Groesbeck Heights, not Gavin. In fact, Browning was so focused on the heights that he directly interfered in his subordinates - Gavin's - plan, which was focused on capturing the bridges. Gavin was furious, but had no real recourse, but to salute and follow orders.

There is a very good reason "Boy" never commanded another airborne formation and never had operational control of forces after MG.

Of course, Urquhart and Lathbury added to the stew of poor decision making and failing to pay attention to critical objectives. The first came up with a horrible plan of advance, assigned no more than a single battalion to the critical objective, and then joined his subordinate brigadier in gleefully micro-managing the engagement of individual companies. In effect, at one point the pair were both bypassing the commander of the sole battalion available in order to direct its company commanders in the advance to join Frost...instead of managing the battle as a division commander and brigadier. It is difficult to call it anything other than what it was, bloody-minded incompetence.

Worse, it is pretty evident that once the Nijmegan bridges were seized, but the 1st Airborne was woefully cut up and left in a tiny perimeter, Monty, Bimbo, and Horrocks basically cut them loose to fend for themselves. There was zero real attempt to get serious assault bridging or amphibious lift forward and no realistic plan for either reinforcing or withdrawing them. That the bulk of the survivors escaped is a near miracle.

 

Not exactly. He asked how long he would need to hold. IIRC, when told 48 to 72 hours he said he thought he could manage the first, but the second would be a stretch. He held it for four days, but it wasn't enough given there was nearly zero emphasis on speed from start to finish in XXX Corps or GAD.

 

You sure? Horrocks' speech on September 16th said that the Guards Division would be in Arnhem in 60 hours.

The advance elements of XXX Corps were in the outskirts of Nijmegen by the afternoon of September 19th, other elements were rapidly coming up.

 

Some old quotes we remember.

On the narrow corridor that would carry the armored drive, there were five major bridges to take. They had to be seized intact by airborne assault. It was the fifth, crucial bridge over the lower Rhine at a place called Arnhem, sixty-four miles behind the German lines, that worried Lieutenant General Frederick Browning, Deputy Commander, First Allied Airborne Army. Pointing to the Arnhem bridge on the map he asked, "How long will it take the armor to reach us?" Field Marshal Montgomery replied briskly, "Two days." Still looking at the map, Browning said, "We can hold it for four." Then he added, "But, sir, I think we might be going a bridge too far."
-Major General Roy E. Urquhart, Arnhem

 

Blast from the past...

http://ww2f.com/threads/arnhem-two-lifts.2648/

From the Reynolds book sons of the Reich II panzer corps actions...

Unfortunately don´t have the book with me now so I don´t have the names but it seems that the Irish Guards that led the 30th Corps stopped for the first night to sleep...or was ordered to rest(??). Does not sound like the best thing to do if the chaps are waiting to be released in Arnhem even if the Germans did knock out some tanks. Reynolds says and the sources he has picked tell that they could have continued their attack during the night. One given explanation by the commanders was that the tanks needed repairs and supply but Reynolds says that just after 12 kms that is a weak excuse...
( comment by Martin Bull: The actual reason for stopping at Valkenswaard ( seven miles from the starting point, six miles short of Eindhoven ) that first night was that news of the blowing of the Son Bridge had reached the Chief of Staff of the Guards Armoured Div'n. Tanks needed to be serviced and the men rested and the opportunity was taken at this point.)


The air power did not help enough as the Germans later on mentioned " Our own troops´ movements were practically undisturbed in spite of the good weather."
( Comment by Martin Bull : the lack of air support by 2 TAF cetainly did. In retrospect, the hurried planning overlooked Tactical Air Support - Broadhurst later claimed that prior to Market-Garden, he was unaware of the airborne element of the operation and was briefed only to support the advance of XXX Corps.)

It seems Student had got the complete operation map early in the operation???

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Gliders and pilots....

From 82nd Airborne division by Verier

" Initially some 150 pilots were trained to form the initial glider units. On a peace-time basis this would probably have sufficed- America was still trying to keep out of the " European war "- but then came 7 December, Pearl Harbor, and America was at war.

On 20 December the pilot requirement was increased to 1,000, by April 1942 it had risen to 4,200 , and then later to 6,000. Even by scouring draftees for anyone with experience, asking for volunteers and training at civilian schools the demand could not be met.

By the time of the Arnhem operations it was common practice for the senior NCO present in the glider to be "promoted " to co-pilot during the flight to the landing zone. He would thus spend his hour or so bumping along in the slipstream of the towing Dakota being instructed on the basics of landing the thing should the pilot be incapacitated.

 

The Guards were just one of several organisations that seemed to have treated Op Market Garden with less care and urgency than they should.
Nothing in principle stopped the 101st at Son exploiting and patrolling as far as Eindhoven. The 82nd could have taken the Bridge at Nijmegen with a modest force the day they landed.

The infantry of the Guards Armoured division started the operation seriously under strength. .

The British army is organisation on a class base. The Household Division provided a disproportionate number of senior officers. Its young officers recruited from the upper echelons of society included many aggressive soldiers keen to be involved in every innovative development. IRRC the Brigade of Guards was formed from volunteer recruits rather than conscripted national servicemen, and were under recruited. It was too posh to draw on the draft - in theory.

Somewhere in WW2 they developed an obsession with operating tanks and formed two armoured Brigades as well as two infantry brigades. The Guards provided commandos and paratroopers. Browning was a guardsman as was Richard des Voeux CO of 156 Para. By 1944 there were so many guardsmen manning tanks, jumping from aeroplanes, messing around in boats or doing warry stuff with the SAS that there was a real shortage of guardsmen doing infantry work. By Op Market Garden the infantry companies of tyjhe guard division had been made up to 75% strength with drafts of men recently transferred from the Royal Artillery and Royal Air Force.

One reason for caution throughout the campaign was the knowledge that there were few guards replacements. Whether this was the right organisation to lead the spearhead of a do or die mission is open to question.

 

I think the troops considered the war was over by X-mas. As we notice it was not. So much war and wounded both sides. I feel for them both.

 

It is also covered in Beevor's book on Arnhem.

Colonel Joe Vandeleur halted the Irish Guards on the orders of Brigadier Norman Gwatkin, commander of the 5th Guards Brigade, and approved by Horrocks.

The problem with this explanation is that the Bailey Bridge could not begin being constructed until the engineers accompanying the Guards got to the Son. Apparently, Horrocks was under the impression that the 101st engineers were capable of constructing a bridge capable of handling tanks - But he never checked to see if they were capable of the task.

 

I consider the biggest mistake of Operation Market Garden was conducting the operation at all. The clearing of the Scheldt Estuary should have been undertaken first. What good would a push into Germany do if the lack of proper supplies were hampering the Allied effort at that point? The parachute units could have been employed in an attempt to cross the Rhine or some other useful operation.

 

Monday morning quarterbacking. If the Germans were at the point of collapse, clearing the Scheldt was un -necessary caution and would give the Germans time top recover. The German capacity for recovery was one of the Donald Rumsfeld's known unknowns that could only be tested by an attack in force.

If the Allies had decided not to try Op Market Garden .and cleared the Scheldt instead, people would still have argued about Op Market Garden. There would be angry posts about how the Allies blew the opportunity to win the War in 1944 by a daring coup[ de Main using the carefully trained airborne forces. How Montgomery was such a cautious wuss etc...

 

I am going to have to disagree here. First the allied effort to get all the simple things right with respect to logistic's was one of the things that distinguish allied planning over German. Clearing the Scheldt was not sexy, but a real force multiplier. We only had limited supplies which slowed the 'Broad Front' strategy giving M-G some viability as a option. The better option is solving the original problem, limited supplies. The first might win the war, the latter will win the war.

We also know that M-G as planned had no real chance of success. If it had not been executed the 'debate' would have largely relegated to Monty's memoir as was some of his other claims, and nobody's dad, husband, brother or son dies over a debate

 

Actually it's not Monday Morning Quarterbacking. And I am going to agree with Bels to disagree with you. If clearing the Scheldt would've been undertaken instead of the OTL, as Bels said Operation Market Garden would've been a mere almost footnote in history, like the dozens of other airborne operations that were canceled due to drop zones being overrun by Allied forces after Operation Cobra kicked off. There would be no angry posts about it because it would have never have happened. Gambling on thinking that the Germans were on the brink of collapse without concrete proof to launch such an operation as MG is a stretch at best, regardless of who proposed it. Nobody is attacking Montgomery here so no need to state your opinion that he was a cautious wuss, etc. The thread is about the biggest mistakes of Market Garden. I believe that deciding to go with it was the biggest mistake, and that falls at Ike's feet. Makes about as much sense as giving George Patton a priority on gas and letting him run straight to the Rhine and then on to Berlin.

 

We will have to agree to differ as we are in the land of alternative histories- what ifs - and counter factual history.

The reason that a cancelled OMG might have spawned counterfactual arguments lies in service politics. The apparent success of German airborne troops in Norway, the Netherlands and Crete inspired a swathe of officers in the US and Britain. The allies made a big investment in expensive airborne forces and transport commands. Thrusting officers had bet their careers on airborne forces as the way ahead. There were ideas about the strategic use of airborne troops as a parallel to armour. But until OMG no allied plan offered to do anything other than drop airborne troops as a tactical aid to the land battle. OMG was a godsend for the airborne commanders. It was a chance to prove the strategic value of the airborne arm. As it played out the allies learned more about the limitations of airborne forces - one of what Jim Sheehan might have described as a typical cruel disappointment of war, Had OMG been cancelled there was a ready made lobby of airborne fanboys ready to argue that the war could have been over six months earlier iif only the allies had been more bold. The frequent resurrection of arguments about Op Overlord in 1943 are an example.

 

Except, in OMG, the Airborne troops were only a tactical aid to the land battle. The ground troops were the ones that were expected to do all the "heavy lifting". Unlike, say Crete, were the Airborne forces were expected to do much of the work themselves.

 

IIRC, Beevor perpetuates the myths that the 1st Airborne Division Reconnaissance Squadron never arrived and that Sepp Krafft's battalion played the primary role in blocking the 1st Airborne advance on Arnhem.

The record of the Guards movement to contact and movements after contact demonstrate what can be charitably called a measure of indolence in their urgency to move forward.

 

It can't be blamed on Monty or Ike or any one person. The whole Allied high command, up to Marshall and Hap Arnold back in Washington, were looking for a chance to use the new airborne army in some decisive way. It was getting more urgent as the progress of the armies on the ground threatened to outstrip the range of airborne forces based in England. "What airborne operation can we do?" was getting to be just as urgent as "What's really the best way to win the war?"