Bombers, speed over defensive armament, why were lessons ignored ?

Even full of drugs, Erich is the bomb...Hope you're ok there.

 

Forgot one thing....Once you fire your cannon, get the F out of there! One fires from below and behind...guess where the debri wants to fall??

 

Which didn`t work.......

(I accept that the escort fighters, particularly the Mustangs, did work, which makes one wonder why it wasn`t tried earlier, after all drop tanks weren`t a new idea in 1942)

 

Breakdown in communication here, I`m saying the speed of the Mosquito was significant, and, in fact, all bombers used without heavy fighter escort, should have had a similar speed.
I accept what you say that bomber streams and other counter measures (mainly electronic) lowered the loss rate on the Bomber Command heavies, but the loss rate was still too high.
Far too high.
A 5% loss rate was considered acceptable, that`s 5% per sortie !
I can`t think such a loss rate would be acceptable in any other mainstream branch of the British military.
I don`t think it was acceptable, mainly the death rates of those brave young men, but also the sheer cost of it. Not only the cost of the heavies themselves, but the cost of training up all those crew, to last such a short time on ops.

 

Agree completely.

 

German nightfighters were limited by their radar control setup. A station had a Freya search radar and two Wurzburg tracking radars. Wurzburg was an AA gunnery control radar designed to track a single target. In fighter direction one would track the selected target and the other their own fighter. The targets appeared on a plotting table (Seeburg) as colored dots, and the controller guided the fighter dot to the bomber. Thus it took three radars to control one fighter, and a station could control only one fighter.

The British made an important innovation with the Plan Position Indicator, the round scope with the rotating sweep that has become so ubiquitous it is usually just called a radar scope. A single controller looking at a PPI had all the information he needed to direct an interception, plus he could see everything else the search radar was picking up. Theoretically he could control multiple interceptions, although that was more difficult. Moreover a single radar could feed multiple PPIs, called repeaters, and support several intercept controllers simultaneously.

 

There's an aspect of both Bomber Command and USAAF daylight operations that would bear FAR more study than its ever had up to now - and that's the mechanical loss rate to squadrons.

If you look at squadron diaries and histories - you'll be instantly struck by the number of aircraft lost to mechanical faults, that RTB'd after takeoff due to technical problems, or that were lost in takeoff/landing/ground manouvering accidents.

We look at things like the He177 and its excreble mechanical record in the STEINBOCK raids and others - but Allied multi-engined bombers were just as reliable as any multi-engined aircraft of a the period built "down" to a budget. I'm not saying they were cheap...but they weren't built to have the service lives WE see nowadays, or even "period" airliners enjoyed; just a few hundred hours' total, until the next mark or improvement came along I've seen "loss" percentages as high as 35-40% on occasion for squadrons reaching targets over Germany due far more to mechanical failures and faults than nightfighter operations!

5%? That's only 1.5 men out of a company of ~30 in the Army???

 

Site map with lots of info including losses by type and squadron per month.

Bob Baxters Bomber Command Sitemap

Aircraft losses per group and command

Bomber Command Group Statistics

 

Have you read the AHF pages I linked you to? Unless there was a Mlawa Line of defences in Spain defending a city called Mlawa in Spain north of a city named Warsaw in Spain, and armed by an "Army of Modlin" in the SCW....it's most definitely from September 1st-2nd-3rd 1939.

 

Although the Mosquito often conducted precision operations, the Light Night Strking Force did mainly area bombing, often with the 4000lb 'cookie', a cylinder full of explosive which was the antithesis of precision. 'Harassment' might be a better term than 'area' since the Mossies often attacked singly or in small numbers, but it was the same concept.

drop tanks weren`t a new idea in 1942

True, drop tanks were used on many fighter types and provided a significant increase in range over internal fuel only. A combat radius of say 200 miles might be increased to 300, but no one had indentified the need for a single-engine fighter with range comparable to a heavy bomber. There was also a strong feeling that such an aircraft was technologically impossible, that a long-range fighter would inevitably be outclassed by high-performance interceptors operating close to their own bases.

The Luftwaffe was ahead of its contemporaries in recognizing the need for a long-range fighter, and they also appreciated that performance and firepower could overcome the classic small maneuverable fighter, but the aircraft they produced, the Me110, wasn't the right solution.

There was also the belief that speed and/or defensive firepower would enable bombers to avoid interception or get through with acceptable losses (and inflict losses on the defending fighters). We should keep in mind that these ideas and the aircraft which embodied them predated the development of radar; 'the bomber will always get through' was a much more viable proposition when Baldwin said it in 1932 than it would be in 1940.

The United States was just as convinced as anyone that its 'flying fortresses' could operate without escort. The Army Air Corps/Force never issued a specification for a fighter with bomber range either; they were fortunate that the big, powerful fighters they had were able to be adapted for long-range escort.

Most single-engine fighters carried all or most of their fuel supply in the fuselage, so the natural way to add capacity was a single belly tank. As noted, this gave a useful range increase by fighter standards. The P-47 for example could take a belly tank but did not have piping for wing tanks installed until the -D-15 model. As it happened two of our principal fighters, the P-38 and -51, were incapable of accommodating a centerline tank, so external tanks necessarily meant two under the wings, a bit of a lucky break.

 

the idea of a LW NF being controlled by 3 radars does not work due to the fact of the congregation of so many in a restricted area like the attacking target itself. it may possibly work early war with the Kamm line being in prduction afterward of Normandie as I said the system fell apart with only ground control finding it very hard to control let alone track a defensive single NF. Döberitz as the main concentrated defense station close to Berlin found it extremely difficult to co-ordinate when more than 3 NJG's were in the area. then you have a crazy group of jet guys flying in defense of Berlin with little or no contact at all making the confirmation of BC // LSNF Mossie targets impossible.

 

The HC range of bombs in 4,000lb, 8,000lb and 12,000 lb sizes weren't actually a product of the "area bombing" era of Spring 1942 onwards; it had been developed before that, in Bomber Command's "night precision" period - before they came to know better They were excellent FOR area bombing....because they were unaerodynamic and unaimable, being cylindrical and fin-less. And because they were so damn' BIG...

They were developed simply because the RAF's range of "iron" bombs of 25, 40, 125, 250 and 500 lbs capacity were generally thin skinned bombs that frequently failed to explode. When they did explode it was usually on the surface of whatever they hit, as they were not strong enough to penetrate far before they split apart. But although stocks had deteriorated with age - they were what BC had when the war started....so for better or worse, they had to keep on using them until new munitions could be developed. They also HAD to be delivered from medium-high or high level...because they would loft debris and shrapnel anything up to 5,000 feet in the air! The "cookies" had especially thin casings that allowed them to contain approximately 3/4s of their weight in explosive, with the 4,000lb-er HC containing over 3,000lb of Amatol.

The Mosquitos carried it - because in weight and physical size it was the biggest they could carry.

The "cookies" atually went into service before the Area Bombing period; some years ago now I did a lot of work on the Bomber Command campaign against Scharnhorst/Gneisenau/Prinz Eugen in Brest leading up to CERBERUS - and in the first weeks of the campaign, some time before Bomber Command turned its full weight against them, night "precision" raids were attempting to hit them with anything and everything in their armoury...including a suprising number of "cookies"!

(Most people suppose that in the "hiatus" after the Butt Report, Bomber Command wasn't actually doing much of anything until the new bombing doctrine appeared in early '42; in fact, it was more than busy trying to plaster Brest! )

 

But that loss rate is per sortie, not per battle.
The tour of duty for Bomber Command crews was 30 operations, not Pathfinders, they had to fly 45 !
Simple maths, 5% loss rate for 30 ops means statistically you wouldn`t survive.
As far as I can remember, only the German U Boats had a higher loss rate*.

* Excluding the Japanese Kamikaze squadrons, obviously ! !

 

Yes - the "acceptable by Bomber Command" loss...have you looked at the stats yet?

[TABLE]
[TR]
[TD="bgcolor: #a79ef5, align: center"]

Group​

[/TD]
[TD="bgcolor: #b4c2eb, align: center"]

Total Sorties​

[/TD]
[TD="bgcolor: #b4c2eb, align: center"]

Aircraft Lost​

[/TD]
[TD="bgcolor: #b4c2eb, align: center"]

Loss %​

[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 16%, bgcolor: #a79ef5, align: center"]No 1[/TD]
[TD="width: 32%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]56,340[/TD]
[TD="width: 28%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]1,429[/TD]
[TD="width: 24%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]2.5%[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 16%, bgcolor: #a79ef5, align: center"]No 2[/TD]
[TD="width: 32%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]14,460[/TD]
[TD="width: 28%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]542[/TD]
[TD="width: 24%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]3.7%[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 16%, bgcolor: #a79ef5, align: center"]No 3[/TD]
[TD="width: 32%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]66,613[/TD]
[TD="width: 28%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]1,668[/TD]
[TD="width: 24%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]2.5%[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 16%, bgcolor: #a79ef5, align: center"]No 4[/TD]
[TD="width: 32%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]57,407[/TD]
[TD="width: 28%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]1,509[/TD]
[TD="width: 24%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]2.6%[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 16%, bgcolor: #a79ef5, align: center"]No 5[/TD]
[TD="width: 32%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]70,357[/TD]
[TD="width: 28%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]1,888[/TD]
[TD="width: 24%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]2.7%[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 16%, bgcolor: #a79ef5, align: center"]No 6[/TD]
[TD="width: 32%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]39,584[/TD]
[TD="width: 28%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]784[/TD]
[TD="width: 24%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]2.0%[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 16%, bgcolor: #a79ef5, align: center"]No 8[/TD]
[TD="width: 32%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]51,053[/TD]
[TD="width: 28%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]675[/TD]
[TD="width: 24%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]1.3%[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="width: 16%, bgcolor: #a79ef5, align: center"]No 100[/TD]
[TD="width: 32%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]16,746[/TD]
[TD="width: 28%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]122[/TD]
[TD="width: 24%, bgcolor: #cbc4f7, align: center"]0.7%[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD="bgcolor: #a79ef5, align: center"]Totals[/TD]
[TD="bgcolor: #edbcba, align: center"]372,560[/TD]
[TD="bgcolor: #edbcba, align: center"]8,617[/TD]
[TD="bgcolor: #edbcba, align: center"]2.25%[/TD]
[/TR]
[/TABLE]


Now...

Does anyone know the training throughput rate for Bomber Command as a compared percentage of BC's operational pilots/aircrew?

 

I found this on a separate site, you might find it of interest.

"The normal heavy-bomber tour was the equivalent of thirty
operational flights. All raids to Germany counted as one operation but
bombing raids on Belgium and Holland and on France as far east as the
6(degree) east line of longitude, and laying mines in the seas off
those countries, counted as one third of an operation only. Mining in
German waters and inside certain heavily defended French harbours,
however, still counted as a full operation. Leaflet raids did not
count towards the tour but the records show that a leaflet crew was
entitled to an "operational egg"- the jealously preserved symbol of an
operational aircrew. An aborted operation, known officially as an
early return and unofficially as a 'boomerang,' did not count unless
bombs had been dropped on Germany. Crews in Mosquito bomber squadrons
had to do fifty operations and those on Serrate and Intruder squadrons
thirty-five.

"The Pathfinder tour was forty-five operations but this included
any flown with another squadron before joining 8 Group [Pathfinders].
If they wished, Pathfinder crews could go straight on to do sixty, in
which case, the extra fifteen counted as a second tour and they could
not be called for further tours. These tours compare with a Fighter
Command tour of 200 operational hours' flying, a Coastal Command one
of 800 hours and one of twenty-five daylight operations for American
heavy-bomber crews." (Martin Middlebrook The Nuremberg Raid pp.
52-53)

Goto:

raf tour of duty ?

 

How many of the stats included in that table include the last 6 months of the war when the loss rate fell hugely. Ironically by then it was obvious the war was being won anyway and the Bomber Command offensive was arguably even more wasted effort, but that`s a separate argument entirely.
I`m talking about slightly earlier in the war when the heavies had more opposition.
As far as I`m aware from the books I`ve read a 5% loss rate was the yardstick that Bomber Command regarded as an acceptable loss rate.
To take the period November 1943 to the end of March 1944 Bomber Command sent out 20224 sorties (9111 against Berlin) and suffered 1047 aircraft lost which was a 5% loss rate. However, that figure does not include a further 1682 aircraft damaged or written off.
During the same period Bomber Commad sent 2034 Mosquito sorties against Berlin (the most risky target) and only lost 10 aircraft.
These statistics are from Max Hastings book on Bomber Command, but are also repeated elsewhere.
I would personally not have wanted to be a Bomber Command aircrew member in WW2 because the odds were stacked so far against you.
Which only goes to show how bleedin` brave the aircrew actually were.

 

But were those Mosquito sorties bomber ops.....or pathfinder/nightfighter ops?

 

That`s interesting about the Mosquito crews having to do 50 ops, which only goes to prove that Bomber Command (and the crews) were fully aware that a Mosquito was far less likely to be shot down.
I have to say that, given a choice, I`d rather have flown 50 ops in a Mosquito than 30 in a heavy.

 

Does that matter ?
Pathfinders still add to bomb the target, and night fighters engage in combat over occupied Europe and even Germany itself.
The statistics quoted above regarding required ops to complete a tour are apposite here, Intruder and Serrate squadrons (weren`t they Mosquitos ? ) apparently "only" had to complete 35 ops.

 

No, but remember that drop tanks alone weren't enough to go to Berlin and back. P-47's, even with the huge 108 gal. tanks, could only go as far as Dummer Lake because they lacked something the P-51 had: A very large internal fuel supply. Mustangs had that huge, fuselage fuel tank to get them on their way before having to tap the drop tanks. They'd take off on the internal tank until it was drained enough to create a better weight and balance, then switch over to the drops. Use the drops until they had to drop them, and switch back to internal. The Jug couldn't match it in the ETO.