Britain sues for peace in 1940

Dover September Weather

 

If Britain went for peace terms in June/July 1940 the Germans would be most happy with a free hand in the East.
Even the return of the colonies they lost in the war was not that important to Hitler.
Mussolini may out of a matter of pride asked for nothing, as he did when he withdrew from a request for French territory.
He did not want to be seen as getting scraps from the German table.
Mussolini however would have wanted a free hand in Greece and Yugoslavia.
He could also be placated with Portuguese colonies if need be as no cost to the British.

Hitler may also have offered Italy the German colony of Cameroon has that been returned.
The British had considered giving the Italians a colony in Western Africa in the late 1930's.

Either way the British could have had peace at little price.
Germany would then have invaded the USSR a year later and Italy would likely have invaded Yugoslavia rather than Greece as originally planned in August 1941.
Yugoslavia would be defeated and divided among its neighbours several months later.

 

Hitler's original peace offer was to let England keep their entire empire, but to keep out of German affairs in the East because Hitler invading the East was in his plans all along. Whether or not Hitler would keep to that agreement, as he broke agreements in the past, is another story.

 

After his victory against Poland,he proposed peace on the condition that he could keep his part of Poland .

After his victory against France,he proposed again victory,without giving any details,but,we know that he never intended to give anything back of his conquests .

 

Do we ? in 1939 the Germans had a hard fight taking Brest-Litovsk from the Polish army, but they had to do it all over again in 1941.

 

Just because Britain ask for a peace deal doesn't mean that they will accept just anything the Germans have to offer. It's almost a requirement that the deal include a German withdrawl from Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. Although said states may have also been demiliteraized and provisions for German "observers" allowed. Under this sort of deal the Commonwealth will almost assuredly go along.

Now if Hitler attacks the USSR will Britain get back in the war?

 

This is apples and oranges : in 1939,he had to treat the SU as an equal;in 1940,he would tell the looserswhat were his demands .

 

Poor me, I have to agree:it is the end of the world as I know it .

But,lucky me, there is something to disagree with (in fact,there is a lot):

1)There would be no deal,only a Diktat

2)The Germans will offer nothing,they only will proclaim their demands

3)If Hitler attacks the USSR,will Britain get back in the war ? : of course not,because,it will be occupied (totally/partially) and disarmed : Adolf will not be that stupid to believe the promise of LG (the British Pétain) that he will remain neutral,while Germany is busy in the east .

4) Hitler will (in these ATL) not attack the SU:in the OTL,Hitler attacked the SU with some 150 divisions,while 50 others were remaining in the occupied territories:if Britain is occupied,Hitler will need more occupation troops and aircraft .Thus,the Oostheer will be weakened,thus no Barbarossa .

 

There is no reason to assume that based on history or the original post. So that's simply an opinion you have formed for no particuarly valid reason.
3)If Hitler attacks the USSR,will Britain get back in the war ? : of course not,because,it will be occupied (totally/partially) and disarmed : Adolf will not be that stupid to believe the promise of LG (the British Pétain) that he will remain neutral,while Germany is busy in the east .
Again there is no reasona at all to assume that. Indeed based on the OP mentioning that the RN is still in service all be it with reduced crews and fuel similar to the French there is very good reason to assume that that would not be the case. Britain might be willing to accept a peace under some condition but occupation would be a real deal breaker IMO.

Of course he would or at least it would be extrmely likely. When it occurs is an open question but I would think that 41 is still a likely date. Remember it was the "lebensraum" he was after and that didn't exist in the west.

 

1)In 1941 he was not giving as reason : Lebensraum;this was mentioned before the war

2)Lebensraum was economy,not ideology,and thus there was Lebensraum outside the SU.

 

weak

 

The ideology is that Germany was threatened by Jewish Bolshevism and it was essential to launch a war to destroy it and also taking the lands Germany needed to be self sufficient. One cannot separate Hitler and his ideology from WW2.

 

There is also the question of what Italy will get out of joining in. Either Hitler has to give Italy spoils or risk alienating him.

 

Malta - and he'll get it even BEFORE the talks even take place It'll be his price for "facilitating" the talks as he did at Munich (as discussed by Winston during DYNAMO)

 

Will the British accept having to lose Malta? Wouldn't that open the door to Spain demanding Gibraltar and then other demands on British territory by multiple countries.

 

1) No one is saying that one should separate Hitler and his ideolgy from WWII


2) The question is :was Barbarossa caused by military reasons,economic reasons or ideological reasons ?

Was Hitler going east because

a) he thought it was the only way to finish the war with Britain before the intervention of the US?

b) he needed the raw materials of the SU ?

c) because he wanted to destroy the Jews and Bonchevism ?

 

21 May through to 28th May, the French offered to give Mussolini Tunisia and Djibouti and an understanding on Algeria as their down payment to facilitate Peace talks with Adolph. They put serious pressure on the British and Lord Halifax in particular.

Halifax offered to discuss all out standing Italian grievances in order to encourage Mussolini to intervene. The Italians and the French pressed for "precision" on what these would be - this was code for at a minimum "demilitarisation and internationalisation" of Gibraltar, Malta and Suez (and probably annexation).

Fortunately for Halifax and the British Government, Mussolini played handball - the reason was that he wanted war as Count Ciano explained to the German Ambassador 28th May "even if the French had doubled their offer (ie Tunisia and Djibouti) the Duce would not accept - he wants war".

 

This looks strange, the French could not offer British controlled territories with any hope of credibility without the British governments agreement, I have a copy of Ciano's diaries somewhere so will look that up. I doubt the British would agree to giving up Malta, I believe they would fight for Egypt as Suez and the Med were vital to British interests. The whole base for an armistice is the British loosing nothing vital in exchange for giving Hitler the green light for going East. With the fall of France the centuries old policy of preventing any continental power from dominating Europe was already lost, letting the Germans bleed themselves white fighting the Soviets, for which they had no love, could have seemed a good idea.

Tunisia was historically an Italian objective since before WW1, the French occupation of Tunisia was one of the reasons of the "unnatural" alliance with Austria, but they made no determined attempt to get it in 1940 either by military or diplomatic means.

Hitler had no real objective West, barring Alsace-Lorraine, and would be happy with a neutral Scandinavia as long as the supply of iron ore was guaranteed. So he had a lot he could bring to a negotiating table at no political cost to himself.
Mussolini is a bit of a wildcard, he had at least one good reason to be worried about German dominance of continental Europe with no active war (South Tirol).

 

Much more subtle than that - the Italian diplomats\ambassador was looking for "precision" of the Italian grievances which in diplo-speech was Gib, Malta and Suez and the French were encouraging Halifax to give this as payment for Mussolini not declaring war (almost blackmail as the French intimated that Italian involvement would be the last straw) and facilitating peace talks. The War Cabinet did not accept Halifax's argument, as we know, but the debate latest 3 days.

The Ciano bit I found in Costello's book "10 Days which saved the West" - very interested if you can confirm this or not (date 28th May discussion with German Ambassador)

 

From Ciano's diary (extract):

Dramatis personae (some need to be checked) :
Edda: Mussolini's eldest daughter and Ciano's wife
Mackensen: German ambassador to Italy
André François-Poncet: French Ambassador to Italy.
Philips: US Ambassador to Italy
Sir Percy Lorraine: British Ambassador to Italy.
Soddu: Italian Army Chief?
Pavelic: Croatian nationalist leader (at the time of writing).
Christch:
Italo Balbo: Fascist leader and governatore of Lybia at the time.
Jacomoni: Italian viceroy of Albania.

9th of May: Boring dinner at the German Embassy, Mackensen asked for my phone as he may need to call me later
10th May: . At 4AM Mackensen calls, they both go to Mussolini and Mackensen delivers a message from Hitler justifying the attack through neutral Belgium and Holland with allied plans to do same. After the meeting Ciano tries to argue with Mussolini to wait while the dictator wants to intervene. He comments Mussolini doesn't want to hear arguments against intervention and Edda tells her father the country wants war. Poncet looks demoralized, Philips states the USA is taking this very seriously which worries Ciano. He then has a meeting with Pavelic that urges him to act otherwise the Germans will. They discuss about Bombelles that is described as "a Belgrade agent", his subsequent talk with Mussolini is about possible operations in Yougoslavia. The replacement of Chamberlain with Churchill doesn't make any impression, Mussolini is actually ironic.
11th May: Facist "squadristi" s beat up a British citizen that had removed an anti-British poster and Lorraine come to complain, Mussolini looks more restrained after the army and Balbo report on unpreparedness.
12th May: Mussolini angry at the Pope's telegrams to Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg. His anger extends to the king.
13th May: Mussolini states the allies have lost the war and that the action in Yougoslavia should be postponed in favour of joining Germany against France and Britain, waiting would be "dishonourable".
14th May: Letter from Hitler to Mussolini on military developments, Discussions about Mussolini taking command in case of war over the military. The Pope doesn't budge from his position.
15th May: News of the Sedan breakthrough of the Maginot (sic), Ciano is sceptical it's decisive. Letter from Roosevelt in much more conciliatory tones than the previous veiled threats.
16th May: Ciano believes the "breakthrough" is just a small penetration. Sir Percy Lorrain shows a British optimistic assessment of the situation that acts as a brake on Mussolini. The kink still opposes intervention. Friendly (Ciano uses the term goodwill) message from Churchill to Mussolini. Some attrition with the Vatican related to "incidents" during the distribution of the official newspaper Osservatore Romano (squadrist again?)
17th: News of German successes. Ciano believes the population is happy about the possible end of the war but deeply worried about the future, but most politicians are jumping on the German and pro-war camp.
18th: News of German success keep coming, the British reports are still "rose tainted" but Poncet is worried. Mussolini sends his answer to Churchill that Ciano judges "unnecessarily harsh". A similar note is given to Philips in answer to Roosevelt's message.
19th: Ciano is in Milan, he reports the local population is not in favour of the war as anti German feeling is strong.
20th: Mackensen offers a reapproachment with the USSR mediated by Von Ribbentrop, Ciano agrees but states the USSR must make the first step by sending back an ambassador. The news of the capture of Giraud impresses Ciano as Poncet had indicated him as a possible successor to Gamelin.
21st: The king is nervous Ciano states his lack of trust in the Germans and total distrust of verbal promises, he plans a meeting with Von Ribbentrop on what will Italy get.
22nd: He goes to Albania, the population is "enthusiastic" about possible Italian support to take Kossovo and Ciamuria.
23: Still in Albania, visit to a copper mine.
24th: Sill in Albania, discusses the "colonialist" mindset of the officer corps and especially their wives with Jacomoni.
25th: Back to mainland Italy, notices support for war has increased amongst the population.
26th: Reports back to Mussolini, who is still annoyed abuot the question of ultimate command in case of war. Goering proposes Italian interventionfor when the Germans turn South towards Paris after liquidating the northern pocket and Mussolini is favourable.
27th: Long discussions with Poncet and Philips. Roosevelt is offering to mediate and guarantee respect of any agreements made. But Mussolini doesn't receive Philips., Ciano tells him Roosevelt doesn't understand the situation. his diary states about Mussolini . "vuole la Guerra. Se pacificamente potesse avere anche il doppio di quanto reclama rifiuterebbe" which translates as "he wants war, even he could get by peaceful means twice what he is asking means he will refuse".
In the talks with Poncet Corsica was ruled out as "integral part of France" but Tunisia was and possibly even Algeria were mentioned. Ciano replies "too late" and recalls past grievances over French objections to the Italian Dodecannese, while there is definitely an opening from the French the talks stay "academic" in Ciano's words.
28th: News of the Belgian collapse spurt Mussolini to accelerate entry, the date of 10/6 is first mentioned. In a talk with Sir Percy Lorraine about the stop to negotiations on the blockade Ciano states they are useless as war is inevitable. Both partecipants are saddened.
29th: The "Alto Comando" is created and Mussolini gets his military leadership and fulfils his dream of leading the country in war. Ciano gives reassurances to Christich on Italian neutrality towards Yougoslavia.
30th May: The decision is final, Mussolini shows Ciano his message to Hitler on Italian DoW. The Egyptian minister (they probably didn't have an ambassador but minister is a diplomatic not political rank here) states his goverment's wish to stay neutral. Ciano insists with Mussolini on keeping proper forms with Poncet and Lorrane.


Ciano throws the blame for war entirely on Mussolini, no surprise there but he was pro British and anti German. What's interesting is that no mention of Malta or Egypt is ever made, from the diary Sir Percy Lorraine repeatedly stated his faith in an ultimate British victory and doesn't seem to make any openings to concessions.