Not entirely certain upper winds were something about which carrier strike planners were particularly overly concerned. Note long list of info for scout missions; same went to strike missions. Carrier mission profiles were usually from a known point to another known point, that is, from a carrier to a point of land somewhere. Strikes against enemy warships in the middle of the open ocean, while certainly more gee whiz for the historian, were actually a rarity. One can probably count the major ones of those without resorting to toes. Further, with the limited ranges, rarely in excess of 200 miles, these were not particularly rigorous navigation feats – remember, known point to known point or somewhere someone else already scouted. It would take some pretty hefty winds aloft to knock an entire Able strike so far off course to miss a target, especially a land target, entirely. Most occasions I can of which I can recall where full strikes came up empty handed (HAG VB-8 & VS-8 at Midway for example) were the result of basic errors in mission planning, not navigation or winds at higher altitudes. Certainly the problems more usually faced were either simple inexperience or bad weather or both. Early strikes in the late winter of 1942, just to keep the Japanese on their toes, were plagued with bad weather and a slow transition from peace-time practices to the realities of wartime (cost one VB squadron commander his life). At Midway, VF-8 lost its entire morning strike escort due to a combination of poor planning, poor leadership, poor navigation, and possibly, remotely possibly, carbon monoxide poisoning; thankfully, most of the pilots were eventually rescued - that was one VF CO who never held another combat command. Later in the war, 25 January 1944 to be exact, almost an entire squadron of F4Us (VMF-422) was lost on a ferry flight from Tarawa to Nanomea, about 465 NM, when they hit an over-water storm front about 100 miles short of their destination – a loss of 22 aircraft and six aviators. Only one pilot managed to get his plane on the ground, landing at Funafuti after five hours in the air. This incident alone accounted for 10% of F4Us lost in the Pacific to non combat causes. Causes were attributed to poor communications, planning, and training. Rocking and rolling in Richmond!