Classic military blunders...

Well, you prepare for what you believe the enemy is capable of doing. What you believe is dictated by intelligence and analysis. US intelligence and analysis said that Pearl Harbor would not be attacked, because some of the Japanese carriers(3), did not have the range, and they "knew" that the Japanese had never practiced underway refueling with the big ships. The US did not know, that the Japanese had recently been practicing underway refueling with their big ships, and that the Japanese had decided to cram all the extra 55-gallon oil drums in every nook and cranny of their Pearl Harbor strike force.

Pearl Harbor did not have the necessary aircraft to perform a full 360-degree, two-phase search, they did not even have enough aircraft to perform a 360-degree single phase search. The PH powers that be could have done better by enlisting the Army bombers for help, but the USN never asked(not that it would have been fool-proof, but something is better than nothing)..

Midway is the same, a failure of intelligence and analysis. The Japanese had prepared to overfly Pearl Harbor with H8K "Emily" long-range flying boats. However, when US Navy ships were found at the refueling point, the mission was scrubbed. Rather, than break off the Midway Operation until information could be obtained. It was decided to blindly continue ahead with the operation, and to rely on the Japanese submarine patrol lines to be the trip wire. Unfortunately for the Japanese, their older submarines were assigned to the midway Operation, while the majority of the newer Junsen B fleet scout submarines were sent to the Aleutians. The older submarines arrived late, and would continue to report no US carriers sighted - Never knowing that the US carriers had already passed 24 hours before the Japanese submarines arrived.

 

Yes and no. Obviously, Pearl Harbor was prepared to fight off an air raid...They had many AA guns, and a lot of Army fighters(which were not allowed to fly more than 10-miles from the coast, as such, they were of no use other than point defense). These toys are meaningless except to defend against air attack. So, defending against an air attack was at least thought of.

However, not much else was done as preparation...The AA guns ammo was mostly locked up, and few fighters were kept on short notice alert. The Army defenses were predicated on having plenty of time to get ready to meet an air attack. Nobody told them the USN was not flying long-range reconnaissance like they were supposed to, and that the Army would likely have little or no notice before an air attack.

Which brings us to possibility and probability. You cannot prepare against what is possible, you can only prepare against what is probable(and even that is iffy). But, her again, Intelligence and analysis are major players in that decision making process.

 

Regarding the discussion about covering against enemy capabilities, the crux of the discussion is about one's intel, analysis, and planning. Knowing what your enemy can bring to the table, analyzing what capabilities those options offer, and then planning to address them.

It also introduces another cardinal military sin: complacency. From what I've read, PH had its ammo locked up and planes lined up because the leadership there assumed that the first Japanese blow would happen elsewhere. While I can understand the rationale behind lining up the airplanes to protect against sabotage, I can't really wrap my mind about putting an organization on war footing while keeping its ammo stowed under lock and key.

 

..plain and simple - per my original post...the ''rule '' I read said you plan for what the enemy is capable of, not what you think they will do.....
..now =! intel should tell you what they are capable of, not what they think they will do--and this is not semantics....PH is a perfect example---most people never thought the IJN would attack PH--but they were capable of it----not having enough aircraft has nothing to do with it.....
..and with Midway--exactly--just like at PH, they didn't know where the carriers were--they didn't learn from their own attack

..capable of: ie--intel says there is a battalion of troops 8 miles from your area...they are here....they are capable of such and such because of terrain, weather, distance, foot march vs vehicles, etc....not I think they will attack the left flank......


and--they had aircraft for searches = many were destroyed on the ground!!!

 

see post # 44
1. I just said it = one way is patrols.....you do ground patrols around your area--generally out to mortar range ..you don't know what's out there, so you put out patrols....
2. another, after the PH attack, they had dawn and dusk alerts....at PH, they should've--at least--had dawn-dusk alerts

--remember the other ''rule''/etc = plan - prepare for the unexpected/the worst--hope for the best ....

 

To a point, but only to a point...
The Japanese were also capable of striking Alaska, the West Coast, Panama Canal, etc. However, all those points were lightly defended.

You do not include in your calculation availability of resouces(material, financial, etc.) that will allow for proper defense, as opposed to an ad-hoc defense.

As I stated, the US did not believe the Japanese capable of placing a large striking force off Pearl Harbor, because their intelligence told them so.

Intel tells you what they are capable of, and analysis tells you what they believe they will do. Both are the job of the intelligence services. Intel without analysis is just information. Analysis without Intel is meaningless.

If they never thought of it...Then why have all those AA guns, Radar, and fighter aircraft...Obviously, it was thought of by the US.

Not having enough aircraft has a lot to do with it. As it would allow for the spotting of an approaching attack force before they could get within range of to launch an attack, thus allowing the defender to prepare to repel said attack. Without proper air reconnaissance, the likelihood of an attacker getting the jump on the defender goes way up.

That is complacency, Yamamoto was confident that his forces were capable of handling whatever the Americans could throw at him.

 

plain and very simple--they thought Japan would not attack PH--but they had the capability --and they did

 

Yes, that is why they had all the AA guns, radar, and point defense fighters at Pearl...Because they thought Pearl would not be attacked by air.

 

No, but there where 12 other B-17Ds at Pearl, as well as, 33 B-18 Bolos, 12 Douglas A-20s, some B-12s, and some Army Grumman Gooses.

 

That was the optimal figure for a two-phase 360 degree search.

In the Hewitt Inquiry he said he needed 84 patrol aircraft for a 360 degree search. However, he only had 61 operational patrol aircraft & 6 B-17s. Of these, 12 PBYs were at Midway...Only a handful were out on patrol.

 

Very much bare bones.

 

This speaks directly to analysis of enemy intentions. That's a dangerous stage, where one side's preconceived notions can fritter away proper preparations with complacent mindsets. That's why P-40s were lined up for guarding, and not dispersed for protection against air attack. That's why ammo was locked away rather than at the ready. Properly equipped as the bases were, we did not dispose our forces in terms of readiness. I think the Japanese, through espionage, were aware of that weakness and acted to take advantage of it.

While the commanders at PH had the "war warning" message, I think their interpretation and analysis of it meant bad news for us Americans. Their threat-analysis focused on Nisei sabotage, rather than what the IJN could actually do.