Could anything more have been done on Corregidor in 1942?

I've done a bit of serious research over the years and have come to the conclusion that, had the Japanese invasion of that embattled island at the mouth of Manila Bay been hurled back into the sea, then perhaps 50% of the island's artillery could have been brought back into service, had they been given but a few day's respite from the constant Japanese artillery bombardment.

Only problem was, the fortified islands had but a month's worth of food supplies left at half rations for the garrison and they were running low on drinking water because of a serious lack of diesel fuel to run their water pumps. What say you guy and gal historians?


http://corregidor.org/chs_moorerpt/war_damage.htm

 

In my minor opinion, they should have made plans to evacuate as best they could. A Dunkirk type evac of American troops and everyone that could not be evacuated should have been sent into the hills to organize into guerilla units. Trying to hold Corregidor was a major mistke. It just trapped the troops without a way out.

 

A Dunkirk-type evacutaion would have been an unworkable scenerio as the Fillipino-American forces on Corregidor were cut off for several hundred miles in every direction. There were few, if any ships of any size left to withdraw and carry its garrison to an unfriendly, Japanese occupied shore and no fuel remaining to propel what few ships that remained.

My principle question was, could the garrison on Corregidor have lasted until the early weeks of June, 1942, once the initial Japanese landing had been beaten off and would they have made any additional difference in the fighting of the Pacific War?

 

There were less than 25,000 U.S. troops there. The best thing would have been to disband the filipino troops and help them set up guerrilla outfits. That would have saved probably 75,000 filipinos. If they had protect the PBYs and B-17s, they could have been used to ferry troops to safety in a large part. Any troops that could not be evacuated could have been sent to many of the over 7000 islands in the Phillipines. Small 15 man squads with filipino guides could have scattered and gone into hidding, with arrangements for eventual rescue. I would have also diverted all submarines and other vessels to as close as safe positions and ferried some troops out that way. The problem is that second sight is 20/20. MacArthur was too egotistical to accept that he could not hold out, and the government did not feel the threat high enough to rush supplies there.

The use of Bataan and Corrigidor and the Fort was folly. It delayed the access to the bay, but also was undefendable and made them a target. They also could not resupply. The pennisula was too wide to properly defend and the vast majority were uneducated, untrained local troops.

 

By this late date, there were no PBY Catalina flying boats in the PI and all the remaining B-17's were in Australia as was MacArthur. The US submarines were being used in the far more important role of cutting the Japanese supply lines.

The original War Plan Orange III plan was envisioned to keep the Japanese out of Manilla Bay by Fillipino-American forces falling back onto Battan with ample food supplies and with the fortified islands used as the "cork in the bottle", keep out the Japanese Navy, to await the inevitable counterattack by the US Pacific Fleet.

 

What needed to be done was ignored in 1941. They needed the supplies which MacArthur had requested and which were deferred in order to supply Europe. At the first sign of attack on Dec. 8, MacArthur should have realized the futility of his position and started evacuations. He had the gasoline to ferry them to other islands. He had no suitable aircraft and no anti-aircraft weapons. He had insufficient supplies and weapons. Most of the troops were using old Lee-Enfields. He was going against a superior force that had time, training, and equipment on their side. Trying to hold out was a ridiculous waste of people. It was only one of many examples of troops dying for lost cause. I suppose they figured on humanitarian treatment by the Japanese, but they were not prepared for so many POWs. The Japanese ignored the Geneva Convention with a strong antipathy for other races.

By disbanding the filipino forces, he would be able to save them and reserve supplies for the American troops. The majority of the filipinos troops spoke several languages, while the officers spoke other languages, and the Americans only spoke English. Communications were almost nil. Evacuation by sub could have been given enough priority to save quite a few soldiers.

 

Actually, MacArthur probably saw himself in an advantageous postion. He could not have foreseen the destruction and overunning of the Dutch and British Forces on his western flank by the Japanese, nor could he have predicted the massive destruction at Pearl Harbor and the subsequent closing of the vital sea supply lanes. As it was, he had the nucleus of a very large and capable army, airforce and navy already at his command. The one thing that he lacked was the time needed to knit it all together.

MacArthur had planned that the Japanese wouldn't attack until after the end of the Rainy Season, sometime in the late Spring of 1942, whereby he would have already been massively reinforced by numerous supply and troop convoys from the United States.

Perhaps this explains why he abandoned the strictures of WPO-3 (War Plan Orange-3 and decided to initially take the offensive against the invading Japanese troops with his partially constituted army.

Re: Aircraft. The P-40 B and P-40 E were capable and durable aircraft that were in many ways were the equal of their Japanese counterparts. These were the planes of the much vaunted AVG "Flying Tigers" of China, who fought the Japanese Navy and Army Aircraft there to a standstill. The Boeing B-17's based in the Philippines had no Japanese bomber counterpart worth talking about or even comparing with.

Re: AAA. The 3-inch, 75mm anti-aircraft gun was an effective, accurate weapon for its day. However, at the outset of war it was still working with old, outdated, ammunition. Once the newer, mechanically fused shells were rushed to the Philippines by sumarine, it's effective blast ceiling was raised by some several hundred additional feet, making the bombing by Japanese horizontal bombers a hazardous proposition.

Re: Philippine languages. The primary language on Luzon was and is Tagalog with English holding a strong second for both officers and enlisted men.

Re: The superiority in numbers of the Japanese. I don't believe that at any time during the Luzon campaign did the Japanese Army enjoy this advantage.

Re: The Lee Enfield Rifle. The Lee Enfield was an excellent bolt action rifle. Sgt York used one to kill and capture all of those Germans during WW I.

Re: Lack of supplies. MacArthur had massive quartermaster supply depots on the plains north of Clark Field. It has been calculated that there were enough foodstuffs, ammunition and equipment there to supply his army for over a years time in the field. What he did not have was the transportation means to move them all into Bataan once WPOIII had again put into effect.

 

"What he did not have was the transportation means to move them all into Bataan once WPOIII had again put into effect."

There is a key point. With insuffcient supplys in Battan & too little transport MacArthur needed to stall the Japanese landings to preserve his supply base. Unfortunately the Japanese struck before the US/PI army could be deployed for effective defense of the landing sites.

Had somehow a US/PI army survived, preserving air bases into the summer of 1942 then the naval & air battles that revolved around New Guniea & the Solomons would have started sooner & extended to the Phillipines.

This would be interesting variant for a stratigic level wargame of the Pacific war.

 

Extremely bad luck and bad governmental decisions had much to do with the Fillipino-American soldier's lack of rations on Bataan. A large number of Allied ships loaded with food stuffs were never delivered or unloaded because they were sunk in the waters of Manila Bay. Case in point. A Vichy French ship carrying five million pounds of wheat flour, destined for Saigon was sunk by Japanese aircraft well within sight of Corregidor.

Tens of thousands of tons of rice were prohibitted from moving south into Bataan by railroad because of Fillipino governmental restrictions preventing rice from being shipped from one province to another.

What would a Fillipino-American Army that was well-supplied with a nearly two year supply of foodstuffs and ample munitions have done to the Japanese invaders in and around Bataan is an interesting question that has never been fully pursued.

 

I personally take the view that that the US positions in Corregidor and Bataan could be held successfully. But several things have to happen in order for the defense to be successful.

The parallel I cite is Guadalcanal. US forces there won control of the air and persisted to run Navy convoys to the island despite heavy losses. In a chapter of the Marine general's memoirs, he mentioned the parallelism of Bataan and Guadalcanal. Because of US persistence, that island gradually sapped Japanese strength.

In Corregidor and Bataan, the opposite happened. The reinforcements and supplies for these posts never arrived or were diverted to Australia. These positions were written off as lost in the minds of the planners in Washington.

My friends wargamed this several times and usually, the Japanese commander won if we stuck to historical events.

If US aircraft had survived the December 8 bombing of Clark Field and planners took the risk of deploying their carriers to support the early relief of the Bataan and Corregidor garrisons, these positions could've been held in 1942. Luzon, in effect would have been transformed into magnet to divert Japanese forces from other operations in Southeast Asia.

SOmething like the Coastwatchers organization could've been in use in the other smaller Philippine islands, allowing whatever US aircraft available to pounce on approaching Japanese naval formations.

As for the quality of the Filipino troops, the Philippine Scouts Division, which was a regular US Army formation, was first rate. The other 10 Philippine divisions were iffy because they were just newly formed. But war is a Darwinian process and had the US persisted, it was just possible that the troops that survived in the initial clashes would've had the time to be bloodied and toughened to a point that would've further bolstered the defense of Corregidor and Bataan.

A little trivia: the last mounted US Cavalry charge was made during the defense of Bataan. If I remember correctly, it was at the Battle of the Points.

 

All i know about the situation in the Philipines is that many veterans i have spoke to regard MacArthur as the ultimate coward, he got out to save his own skin, left behind many troops that were wounded and told them to hold the line and when the Japanese did invade they faced a force that was very depleted and then insulted them calling them cowards, while MacArthur was comfortably in Brisbane at the time, MacArthur alway was known to lead from behind and was fiercely hated by his men, also when things went wrong it wasn't MacArthurs fault, but when things went right he claimed all the glory for himself. As i said he cut and ran like the coward he was and didn't have the ball or the backbone to stay a fight, At least that is where MacArthur and Paulus was different.

 

Macarthur as a coward IS a perception that many veterans in other Pacific areas might share. However, for a majority of veterans of the WWII USAFFE, Macarthur is viewed fondly. Everyone, of course, has his own take on Macarthur.

According to historical records, Macarthur received orders from Washington to leave Corregidor and organize US forces in Australia. It's recorded too that upon receipt of the orders, he threatened to resign and remain as private. For that reaction, I personally think it was his ego talking.

I believe a book (which I unfortunately cannot recall right now) about Macarthur and Truman during the Korean War reveals more about the character of the late general and could provide an insight on why he did the things he did when he was still in Corregidor.

 

Well some of the US veterans i have spoken to during our Anzac Day marches, would gladly have put a bullet into him even after all these years, why because he left so many wounded behind and told those wounded to stand and fight to the last, while he drank cognac and smoked his pipe thousands of mile away in a cushy atmosphere in Brisbane, if he actually threatened to resign then why didn't he do it, if MacArthur had that a strong a convictions then he would have carried out his threat but again here comes into play his cowardice.

And onto Korea, MacArthur was sacked because when he wanted to invade China, i can guess the amount of American troops that would have perished in that fiasco, but here again we have the great leader leading from behind, at the time of his intention to invade China he was in Japan.

 

Yes, MacArthur was sacked and I believe President Truman was right in doing so. In theory, the President and COngress decide national policy and soldiers are tasked to execute that policy. Macarthur overstepped those bounds. However, it is also the duty of soldiers to point out to the government what is possible and what is not. That's a fine line and it takes an officer with a good grasp of diplomatic tact to do this. Ike, who was a colonel in the Philippines before WWII, had the knack for this.

I respect your view about Macarthur but I do have to point out that he is viewed differently by a lot of Filipino WWII vets here. As the saying goes, "I may disagree with what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say it."

 

Thank you, back at ya, i am just going on what i have read by many and spoken by US Veterans who recall their memories of MacArthur, and i respect your right to defend him.

 

By the time the US was down to defending a few fortified islands in Manila Bay they had already lost the war in the Philippines. Corregidor was not going to last any great length of time. Much of its coastal defense artillery was ill-suited to defending the island against invasion. Many of its guns could not bear on the invaders for example. One of the two 12" mortar batteries was already out of commission suffering a magazine explosion destroying the battery position. The other battery was low on ammunition having supported the defense of Bataan for weeks already.
On its own, Corregidor was finished. The Japanese could have simply waited out the defenders and let them starve.

 

In the end MacArthur had to accept full responsability for the loss of the Philipines, correct me wrong but was he not the supreme commander of all Philipino forces US and Philipino alike and basically was comfortable in his posting, he became terminally unprepared, laying blame onto subordinates is the first supreme act of a coward, and blaming subordinates was MacArthurs style. MacArthur to me was a coward and nothing will sway me from that, unfortunately those he gutlessly abandonned were the real heroes.

 

Yes, the US garrison in the Philippines was caught flat footed despite having an eight-hour lead time after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I read somewhere a claim that a B-17 strike at Formosa was already in the air but had to turn back to their Philippine base because of cloud cover at Formosa. It also claimed that combat patrols were launched but returned when nothing was found.

The strike and patrol had just touched down and was refueling when the Japanese air strike arrived.

As to defending the main Philippine island of Luzon, he had decided to ignore War Plan Orange at first. Dividing his forces into the North Luzon and South Luzon Forces, he hoped he could defeat the Japanese landings. When he decided to implement War Plan Orange-3, he only had enough time to withdraw the two groups into Bataan with the Northern Luzon Force forced into a series of mostly successful but bloody rear guard actions.

If the rearguard actions had failed, the Japanese would've gained entry into Central Luzon earlier and cut off the Southern Luzon Force. There would've been no Bataan and Corregidor would be standing all alone. One note, though. . . despite the rear guard actions, the US failed to transfer its stocks of fuel, ammo, food and medical supplies from its supply dumps in Manila and Clark.

That was a big factor in Bataan siege.

I have to agree, though, that Macarthur did have an imperial air around him. Love him or hate, he's still Macarthur, the American Ceasar.

 

MacArthur, The American Ceasar, well it is a pity they didn't kill him on the way to the Forum.