D0 355 delayed 2years?!

He 162 = I./JG 1, too many accidents and a high risk besides being a total failure.......what a waste of time and effort

 

Push/pull aircraft have been tried since world war one. There are pros and cons to the concept. The last production of the idea that I am aware of was the Cessna 0-2 that was used both in civil and military versions.

http://marchfield.org/o2b.htm

 

I've no doubt the concept was worked on & played around with by many, but again to make it work well is the relevant thing. & the semantics of "operational" or not is splitting hairs, if it did fly in a combat situation then it flew in a combat situation, period. & 38 were delivered to Luftwaffe, but I don't believe any XP47 J's or XP 72's were delivered to USAAF.

This is much different than being back at Wright field being tested 4 thousand miles away from the combat zone with no e/a around to shoot at it.

Thanks for clarification on Clostermann.3 of his errors disproved. But not his possible encounter with a 355. His wartime accomplishments are nonetheless worthy of respect despite his errors of which he is not alone in the annals of air combat. Bishop & some say Mike Kawato being other examples. Kawato was banned from the Zero pilots organization I read somewhere. & there can often be a large gap between an error & a fabrication. You would know better than I on Clostermann.

 

On the XP 47J / XP 72: The former flew on 11/26/43 and attained 504 mph on 8/4/44 in level flight. The USAAF rejected it for production in favor of the more advanced XP-72 which first flew on 2/2/44 followed by a second prototype on 6/26/44. Both prototypes were fully equipped with bomb shackles and 6 .50 machineguns etc. The USAAF placed an order for 100. But, before production began the order was cancelled in favor of the P-80. There was simply no need for a new high speed interceptor at that point in the war.
But, given the P-72 did 490 mph at 25,000 feet had a 5,280 ft/min initial climb rate and 3,550 ft/min climb at 25,000 ft it would have been one tough act to follow.
As for the P-47M: 130 were converted from standard P-47D. The conversion consisted of changing the turbo-supercharger to the CH-5 model used in the XP-47J, fitting the higher powered R-2800-57C engine with water injection and adding air brakes under the inboard portion of the wing to aid in decelleration in diving attacks. The M was primarily used in V-1 interceptions serving exclusively in Europe.
The longer ranged N model which included substancial structurial changes was sent exclusively to the Pacific where it served primarily as a B-29 escort plane.

If anything, the US had a far more sensible and pragmatic approach to aircraft development and deployment than the Germans. It was simply stupid for them to have even wasted the effort they did on the Do 335 so late in the war. It makes more sense that the Dornier plants should have been tooled up to manufacture one of the jets coming on line in late 1944 rather than a large piston engined aircraft of dubious value. Even having them manufacture Kurt Tank's Ta 152 would have made more sense than introducing a whole new model aircraft so late in the war; especially given Germany's deteriorating situation.

 

The O-2 was its military designator. The aircraft was a Cessna 337 Super Skymaster. It was a well respected observation aircraft. Many are still be used today. There is another pusher/puller surveliance aircraft currnetly on the market, the Schweizer RU-38B Super Condor.

 

I think everyone will agree on the fact Germany was far from being in position to introduce and mass produce a new plane at the time, especialy a brand new design : impossible to train pilots, and anyway, no more gas to fly anything and impossible to convert a factory to build it.

Everyone will also agree the Do-335 was not operational and only an handfull ever flew.

We also know that, with the end of WWII, the fighter planes entered the jet era, and therefore, onre can't expect such a design to have a long future.

And everyone will agree that Germany was not rational with so many "ultimate planes" projects, some of them totaly crazy, sucking time and supplies when these were so scarse, instead of putting everything they had into already proven but competitive designs.

It's just that :

- at the time it flew, not 4000 km away from the battlefield like Chome says, the operational tests were successfull so far (although they were not completed), this plane had very good performances without major teething problems or conception flaw, so it is very allowed to think that, not taking into account the context, it technicaly could have entered production and been operational, if the Germans had what it takes to do it, which was far from being the case at the time.

- at the time it was under operational tests, it flew faster than any allied pistion fighter in the sky of Germany.

So don't stress, I don't think anybody says Germans were smarter than Americans because of the DO-335, or that the Do-335 was close to enter mass production and to change the course of the aerial warfare.

 

Some I think have missed the original point, which was not tooling up at the end of the war for the DO 355, rather it was delayed 2 years. The better approach would have been to work on it earlier. & unlike the P-47 J or XP-72, it had been around for a long time & was as far as we can tell pretty well combat ready. The p-47 M had bugs.

& it is not outside the realm of possibility that it flew in the combat zone. Professor Tank did inadvertantly in his 152. It is also then possible Clostermann chased one. He chased "something" that outran his Tempest. How many options does that leave? A 152, or perhaps some other advanced longnose, V-18 maybe. But again with his experience, one would think identifying a plane with a prop on the back, or one without one would be within his ability level. Very doubtful it was a jet.

& I find it unfortunate that some feel he was a incompetent boob & 100 % unreliable for writing some errors in his book. Something he has in common with gads of other aviation writers. Townsend Bickers, Arch Whitehouse & so on. I could go on, but the point is made. & again, an error is not the same as an outright lie. I've not met Clostermann, but he was at least respectful of the 109 in his book, & again had the birdseye view none of us had.

 

Along this line of reasoning, could we (it's Christmas season, remember?) Wish for the MiG-15 in 1943 and the T-34 in 1941?

Oops! The T-34 *was* available in 1941

 

maybe go back to the reasoning of elimination of the DO 335 idea altogether and get rid of the Dora idea and pursue the Ta 152H as T.A.G suggests instead of wasting precious man hours and hardly available funds on a pusher principle

jets were in the fortee for the future, the Dora would of meant nothing in bomber elimination with it's limited arms

 

Mig 15 in 43? that's dumb. The Dora could well have been available in 43 if the DB 603 engines had not been used up by the UHU & ME 410. Same old personal jibes from Za. Typical.

Dora in large numbers would have indeed been better than the twin engined planes that neither performed as well as the Dora, nor could be built in nearly as large of numbers because of extra material required to make these twin engined planes. Switching Antons to Doras much easier to facilitate.

 

Jets may have been the future, but wars are fought in the present. The reliability and maintenance needs of the jets were a major problem.

Piston aircraft was still a major factor twenty years later. Maybe not as fighter aircraft, but in many other areas.

 

Jets also needed long concrete runways. The Luftwaffe had a winner in the 355 & didn't pursue it starting in 42 when they could have done.

& Hackl & Schroer had no prob with the heavies with the Dora. Schroer could knock down B-17's with a G-6 in the med, which had less armament than the Dora.

No doubt the 30 mm cannon was the better weapon though.


As for pursuing the 152 instead of the Dora & 355, it looks good on paper, but doubtful in the timespace available. 152 was not really ready til 45 no? Would this have changed had 152 been given go ahead earlier?

 

neither of the pilots you mentioned scored US heavy bombers in their tally with the Fw 190D-9

remember Schroer was on the Ost front with the Dora against Soviet a/c

this is getting off topic, last point Schroers G-6 was a Kanonboot which had two underwing 2cm mounts making one more cannon than the Dora 9 equipment

 

You youself mentioned Hackl downing a heavy on his 1st mission in the Dora.

Am familiar with Schroers late war G-6. This however was not the machine he used in 43 in med against B-17's as far as I know. His Dora kills look to be all Russian, so correct on that point.

here are his 43 B-17 kills. Some in May 43.

70. 11.5.1943 12:14 B-17 Stab II./JG 27 S Marsala
71. 18.5.1943 13:45 B-17 Stab II./JG 27 NW Trapani
72. 19.5.1943 13:42 P-38 Stab II./JG 27 W Maréttimo
73. 21.5.1943 11:21 B-17 Stab II./JG 27 S Marsala
74. 21.5.1943 11:28 Spitfire Stab II./JG 27 NW Pantelleria
75. 25.5.1943 11:17 B-17 Stab II./JG 27 NW Maréttimo
76. 31.5.1943 14:40 B-17 Stab II./JG 27 WNW Trapani
77. 7.6.1943 6:44 P-40 Stab II./JG 27 5km N Pantelleria
78. 10.6.1943 9:26 P-46 Stab II./JG 27 3km SSW Granitola Torreta
79. 10.6.1943 9:27 P-46 Stab II./JG 27 4km SSW Granitola Torreta
80. 10.6.1943 - Boston Stab II./JG 27
81. 15.6.1943 8:23 B-17 Stab II./JG 27 2km W Favignana
82. 11.7.1943 13:20 B-24 Stab II./JG 27 25km S Crotone
83. 16.7.1943 13:00 B-24 Stab II./JG 27 5km SW Santeramo in Colle
84. 16.7.1943 13:15 B-24 Stab II./JG 27 10km WSW Bari
85. 23.7.1943 14:10 B-17 Stab II./JG 27 20km N Stromboli
86. 6.9.1943 11:08 B-17 Stab II./JG 27 E Geislingen
87. 6.9.1943 - B-17 HSS Stab II./JG 27 S Echterdingen
88. 6.9.1943 - B-17 HSS Stab II./JG 27 SE Stuttgart
89. 14.10.1943 - B-17 Stab II./JG 27 Alzey
90. 29.11.1943 14:48 B-17 Stab II./JG 27 SSW Bremen
91. 19.12.1943 12:38 B-17 Stab II./JG 27 Krimml

 

wrong I never said that Hackl scored in any Dora 9 Fw 190, he scored many in his Fw 190A-8 and used the Bf 109G-6 with out underwing cannon to engage Us fighter escorts. He had several a/c and it was his perogative to use what seemed fit to him up in the air. courtesty of volume 2 JG 1 and 11 Dr. Jochen Prien

 

Yah you did. Said he got a Stang & moquito & a B-24. & gun pod U-4 & R-6 were not around mid 43 in the Mediteranean when Schroer got the 13 B-17's shown above as far as I know.

This I got from you..

He recieved the Dora late 44 & on his 1st mission in this kite he scored a Mustang, a Lancaster, & a Mosquito in 4 minutes!

 

actually in 5 minutes in the II./JG 26 war diary that he led on 23 December 44

note : NO US BOMBERS, and that is my point

 

minor point by photo's, G-6 Trops with Gondelwaffen: datum, 7 Juni 1943. Existing G-4 trops also were equipped. page 284 photo evidence of leader Emil Claude sitting on the fuselage in front of the cockpit on his Kanon bird - March 1943 and page 288, showing black 11.

Prien, Rodeike u Stemmer, II./Jagdgeeschwader 27

 

Oh I see, US bombers leagues better than 4 engined British ones. & some G-4's had pods, great did Schroers June 43 109 have them? Were they commonplace in the Med in June 43?

 

Back on topic, having Doras & 355's instead of 410's & Uhu's would have been better strategic path. Those planes need 2-3 crew, all of whom have to be trained. So without an extended dissertation on how many 355's & Doras could've been made vs 410's & Uhu's, one can easily see more would have been built & more would have flown as only one pilot required to fly either, ( 2 seat excepted ). I would imagine both of these could outdive & outmanoeuver the twin engined planes, which means they could hit & git much better, & survive to have a go another day.

http://www.ipmsstockholm.org/magazine/2000/08/stuff_eng_spahr_me410.htm

The 410's operational record, beginning in 1943, was moderately successful until allied fighters started escorting the bombers and made their own fighter sweeps. Even the improved 410 was no match in dogfight for a modern single-engine fighter such as the P-51 or the Spitfire. Beginning in the summer of 1944, the destroyers were taken from front line duties and production was phased out in favor of single-engine fighters, with the 410's remaining in service flying reconnaissance duties only.

Did we catch that Za? phased out summer 44, which oddly enough was about same time Dora given green light.