Delayed Response

Why was their such a delayed response by US Forces (namely in the Philippines) after news of Pearl Harbor broke?

I've started reading 'Tears in the Darkness' by Michael + Elizabeth Norman and they mention that the US had been preparing for war in the Pacific and even had drawn up plans. They had started to send troops and equipment to the Philippines, expecting war with Japan as war in Europe broke out.

Part of the plans involved bombing Formosa, the island from which Japan would/could stage an attack on the South Pacific and the Philippines. The Japanese air-raid on Clark Field was supposed to happen around the same time as the attack on Pearl Harbor, but due to pea-soup fog, it was delayed a full 6 hours.

In those 6 hours, the American planes took to the air without bombs. They then came back to land to get their bomb loads when the order was finally given to bomb Formosa. Of course, this was timed perfectly for the Japanese aircraft to arrive, catching all the American planes on the ground (most parked wingtip to wingtip) and a turkey-shoot ensued, with heavy American casualties and the the complete destruction of the airfield and air force stationed there as a fighting force. The Americans even thought that they were friendly aircraft and not Japanese aircraft until they noticed the bombs falling towards them.

This to me sounds like complete incompotence. But even so, why wasn't a raid against Formosa launched immediately after it became clear the US was now at war with Japan?

 

He said it twice so it must be true!

The harsh truth is that if every Fortress had been loaded to the gill's, somehow managed to avoid the enemy CAP and actually landed bombs on target it would have done absolutely nothing to change the fate of the Philippines. It might have offered a false sense of bravado that we had 'done something', but it could have cost those aircrews for no meaningful gain. The US needed at least 18 months to two years longer to build up the defenses of the Philippines to the point where they might actually hold out long enough to be relieved.

 

Ok, so actually bombing Formosa is off the radar, but then why not get the fighters off the ground and flying patrol? Or some sort of better early-warning system, especially knowing that an attack is eminent? Better to get off the ground and have a chance of shooting down some Japanese planes than being lined up like ducks. Disrupting the bomber-formation would have made it less effective. Probably isn't going to change the outcome, but having some friendly air coverage may have made Japan rethink strategy a bit.

 

It was not cancelled by bad weather...It was never ordered until roughly 10:15AM-10:30AM-11:00AM, depending on which report you believe. However, the reconnaissance mission was still in force, so the attack could not be flown until that was done. Except, there were not near enough cameras to go around, so a B-18 had to be flown to Nichols Field to get more - That plane did not return until about 12:30PM.

The B-17 attack was cancelled by the Japanese bombing Clark Field.

 

One could say that of all the defenders of the Philippines in 1941...No matter how hard they fought, it would do absolutely nothing to change the fate of the Philippines. Yet, they still fought on and fought quite hard.

It had nothing to do with a false sense of bravado, but doing one's duty.

That would be almost every mission flown by the USAAF during World War II. It was a risk that was known and accepted. Very few missions, in and of themselves, offered "meaningful gain," and a great many were flown knowing that the mission could end at considerable cost to the aircrews.

Unfortunately, MacArthur promised the moon, and the US Army high command believed him.

 

Well the high command was really hoping that we wouldn't get into the war until mid 42 at the earliest. By that time the Philippines may not have been defensible yet but they could have given the Japanese a much harder time. I don't have too much of an issue with Mac politicking for material and men to defend there. His tendency to take a day off when hit by an unpleasant surprise on the other hand ....

 

Why would it be? It offers the only effective way for the bombers to strike back at the Japanese. It might also force the Japanese to put more of their fighter aircraft on patrol over Formosa, and not over the skies of the Philippines.

Many were...But, they were many prospective targets that needed protecting and too few aircraft to do the job. Not to mention the mass confusion that took place when the war began. Nonexistent Japanese raids were reported flying here and bombing there, with some fighter being pulled in several directions at once. Meanwhile, other FEAF fighters sat on the ground awaiting orders that never came. Then, when the real air raids took place, the fighters were out of position to intercept, or were sitting idly on the ground still awaiting orders.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the most, if not all, American fighters lacked portable oxygen bottles, and found it virtually impossible to intercept Japanese bombers coming in at 18,000-24,000 feet.

Practically impossible at the time. Communications all round were beyond dismal. Radar helped, but could not judge height - leading to several missed interceptions. Native spotters could only become effective when Japanese aircraft were over land, but then, it was only a short distance to the target, so there was not enough lead time to get aircraft up to combat altitudes. These Philippine spotters also lacked the necessary training and communication equipment.

But, all of this would still be unable to surmount the American fighters' altitude handicap.

Only if the Japanese obligingly flew low enough for the Americans to intercept, which they tended not to do. Further complicating matters would be the many A6M Zeroes that flew escort for the Japanese bombers.



I would suggest downloading "They Fought With What They Had" by Walter D. Edmonds.
They Fought With What They Had: The Story Of The Army Air Forces In The Southwest Pacific, 1941-1942 : Edmonds, Walter Dumaux, 1903- : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive

Another good book on the subject is William H. Bartsch's "December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor."

 

I have heard it suggested that if they had launched a raid on Formosa and been able to hit the air fields there due to weather conditions (fog?) they would have caught a lot of Japanese planes on the ground. Pretty big if or two there though.

 

It's been a while since I read it but I think read that ground fog kept the planes on the ground long enough that a B-17 raid could have caught them. Whether it could have hit them is another matter. The person who wrote it could also have been wrong or I could have misremembered it. As has been stated the number of trees killed and bandwidth used in discussions with regards to Mac and the Philippines is truly impressive. How much is signal and how much noise is an open question.

 

The Formosa-based Japanese planes were delayed several hours due to the pea-soup fog that prevent one from seeing their own hand in front of their face. It was apparently an unusual weather pattern at that time of year, otherwise the Japanese air-raid would have been launched in conjunction (time wise) with the attack on Pearl Harbor. Due to the weather, the attack was delayed 6 hours and the Japanese were fully expecting the Americans from Clark Field to be prepared for them - not sitting on the runway having a lunch break.

 

Who again actually sent MacArthur there and told him to defend it?

 

President of the Philippines, Manuel Quezon, asked for MacArthur, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved it.

You don't get any higher than that.

 

But, apart from the obvious, who else sent him there, and told him to defend it.