Did the Japanese REALLY have ANY concept of what they were doing?

I was thinking . . . to have their ambassadors make peace overtures while they're sneak-attacking us? to attack us on a SUNDAY?! 70 years ago, on Sunday, you went to CHURCH! It was a gross oversight I think, on Yamamoto's part, to believe that we wouldn't, as a nation, rise up in righteous fury and wrath to utterly destroy Japan. I mean really, what the hell was he THINKING?! I know, I know, he was given orders to attack, and I know he did a bang up job of planning, and I shouldn't lay it on Yamamoto, but on his superiors instead -- Y actually had a pretty good idea what was going to happen, I think. I wonder, was it a cultural blindness due to a sense of racial superiority or was it a complete disdain for the hedonistic Americans (who, the Japanese conveniently forgot, managed to stomp the Germans pretty flat in WWI)? I don't want to be seen as some raving nationalist, but you have to admit that attacking the USA was incredibly stupid, even IF Japan was painted into a corner (both by their own inability to lose face and the efforts of other countries to wage an economic war on Japan prior to the knives coming out). Sorry, this was really rambling, blame the pain meds again and the asshat who shot me which is why I am on pain meds. Asshat middle eastern jerk.

 

When the separation of diplomacy and military in Imperial Japan of the moment is taken into account, there is less mystery and also somewhat less deviousness. Kuribayashi and Yamamoto were the only two high ranking military (one Navy and one Army), who argued against proceeding with or starting a war against the US. The reason? Both spent time in the US and Canada and knew full well the production and population reserves of the western democracies.

Kuribayashi was of a higher Samurai family than the adopted Yamamoto, and his opposition to the plan of waging war against America was met with particular disgust. He (Kuribayashi) was one of very few men who could have a private meeting with Hirohito, and to negate his influence in the court his name was removed from the advancement rolls, and he was relegated to defending the obscure outpost of Iwo Jima. He served there with resolve, and ingenious defense until the end. Much to the dismay of the USMC.

Yamamoto also knew full well of the latent power of the United States (he had both studied and traveled extensively in America), and counseled the military overlords against war against the US. He was a loyal Japanese however (lesser Samurai family), and he promised he could run "rough-shod" with victory after victory for six months after the war started with good planning and execution. He knew full well that after six months of recovery from the shock of attack, the American population and its latent production ability would swamp the Imperial Japanese. As a Shinto, he knew the importance of the Sunday in American culture, a planner of military attack would be not worth his "merit" if he didn't take advantage of every weakness of his enemy (see Sun Zu).

He (Yamamoto) was correct almost to the week. The two unfortunate ambassadors to Washington D.C. (Nomura and Kurusu) most likely had no clue they were pawns in the lead-up to the Pearl Harbor attack. And don't get all "nationalistic" with our contribution to the defeat of Germany in WW1. Our inclusion into the formula was an overpowering influence, but America didn't "stomp" anybody flat on the battlefield. We held out own as new combatants and stalled the offensives of the new Ludendorf attacks, but didn't do too much more than that. To say more is over stating our contribution (Alvin York excepted).

Most of the German high command recognized that our (American) injection into the fray would off-set any gain they had from the removal of the Tsarist Russian threat, and would only get stronger and stronger as time went on due to both our population and known war production ability.

 

I have often wondered just how a military service can declare war on the most powerful industrial nation on earth when 90% of it's resources were already committed to China, and with only 2 million tons of fuel oil and lubricants in the country entire!

The Japanese planners certainly did not listen to their own naval advice, nor did they take into account the determination of the United States to wage war against the run of play.

Yamamoto was one of the few who actually knew more than the average diplomat of the true capacity of the U.S., having visited that country, and Kuribyashi was another military man who had spent time in the U.S. and was also aware of the incredible strength that the U.S. military could bring to bear.

Pity for Japan that their advice fell on deaf ears.....and that Hirohito was badly informed by his diplomatic advisors. Explains why the Allied powers felt that a trial for warcrimes of the Japanese Emperor was not on the cards.

 

I think that there was an awareness of American capacity among the IJHC, but they convinced themselves that America did not have the will to die for their country. Do not under estimated the impact the ultra nationalist groups had on policy. There was period in which several politicians were asassinated for not being enthusiatic enough for war and Yamamoto himself was sent to sea for protection.

 

Hummel,

You can be as "nationalistic" as you want, but that won't change the fact, that in 1941, America was a first-rate nation, with a second-rate navy, a fourth-rate air force, and a sixteenth-rate army. America was building up her military, but that would not come to fruition until 1943.

In 1941, Japan was at the pinnacle of their strength, and America had only just begun to build-up and modernize it armed forces. For every month that passed, Japan would only become "relatively" weaker, and America "relatively" stronger as the American military grew by leaps and bounds. Had Japan waited, her military would no longer be a threat to America, and Japan would have no choice, but to bow to American will.

As a result of her ongoing war in China, and her military build-up, Japan's financial situation would soon become very desperate, and likely by 1942-43, bankrupt.

As for America "stomping" the Germans in WWI, considering the Americans fought only very briefly at the end, after the Germans had been mostly beaten, does not add much to your argument. But, perhaps, some more recent thinking into the mindset of those whom were plucked by the Selective Service in 1940-41, do you recall what OHIO meant to those whom were drafted?

The short of it is, the Japanese had no viable diplomatic option open to them, the only option was a military one. Had Japan waited any longer, the military option would no longer be viable. Since, a long-shot is better than no shot at all, and as every gambler knows occasionally the long-shot pays off, the Japanese took their shot.

 

From what I understood, the Japanese recognized America's industrial strength, but figured that we were weak/decadent enough to not put up much/any fight, and would wait until we had our war production running full-steam before attempting to go on the offensive in the Pacific. They hoped to have fully consolidated their hold on the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", which would have given them adequate natural resources to fuel/arm their army, navy, and air forces. At which point they thought they would be on a strong enough footing to negotiate a treaty or truce with America. Our holding out on Guadalcanal, and kicking their butts in New Guinea really threw them for a loop. It took a while for the "bushido"-bound planners to realize that banzai charges and "glorious death for the Emperor" (ya gotta love Patton's corollary to that: "Nobody ever won a war by dying for his country. He won the war by helping the other poor b@stard die for his!") were not going to win, that the Americans weren't the soft, decadent playboys they had imagined (although we learned a lesson or two about stereotypes, as well...we just learned faster, I think), and that the "sleeping giant" that Yamamoto feared woke up a whole heck of a lot faster than they expected.

 

Something else from above...

I have Carlo D'Este's Biography of George S. Patton Jr. sitting by me as we speak. The accomplishments of Sergeant York were definately not the only thing achieved by Pershings AEF in 1918.....

Taking into account British operations with tanks at Cambrai, Patton formulated ideas about the offensive use of tanks that others later claimed as their own (like Guderian). Of Patton's Brigade at Saint-Mihiel, D'Este writes,
"This final tank action of the Saint-Mihiel offensive earned high praise from Patton for being the leader of "the only (known) successful operation of tanks absolutely un-aided by other troops in attacking and routing an enemy". More important, it sowed the seeds of what was to become Patton's trademark employment of armor in WW2-the deep penetration. Lieutenant McClure's exploits so impressed Patton that he later told Semmes that he believed his tanks could have slashed into the German rear if only McClures force had been larger. He vowed that the next time such an opportunity presented itself he would employ larger numbers of tanks and aim for a genuine breakthrough. What Patton had begun to envision went far beyond the officially prescribed mission of the Tank Corps as a support arm of the infantry. He had grasped the enormous potential of the tank as a potentially decisive factor on the modern battlefield. It was the concept of mobile warfare, and it had begun with what became barely a footnote in the history of the Battle of Saint-Mihiel.
During the interwar years Patton would refine his ideas and by 1928 would state that with the advent of the tank and the airplane there was now a solution to the problem of delivering the coup-de-grace to an enemy force. "Such a (tank and aerial) force could be used in a manner analagous to that employed by Napolean with his heavy cavalry. The tanks and the attack planes or a large proportion of them should be held as a reserve to be used after a general battle had developed the enemy's plans and sucked in his reserves. Then at the predetermined time and place this force should be launched ruthlessly and in mass".

We are speaking of a general who studied the terrain in Normandy in 1918 by driving through it with a Michelin Guide to aquaint himself with the area for his future reference and anticipated return to the area as commander of a large Army tasked with fighting their way through it. Just name even one other general of any nation with the prescient talent to forsee his role in another conflict, much less take positive steps toward his own preparation for the envisaged role. Patton's raw intelligence and sheer breath of knowledge can only be described as both unique and awesome....and he wasn't even a full Colonel at the time! This alone makes Pattons peers of 1944, like Omar Bradley and Courtney Hodges, look very vin ordinaire.

Had they but known it, the Germans were providing George S. Patton Jr with exactly the experiences he needed to run rough-shod over their forces in 1944.

Alvin C. York wasn't the only "good thing" to come out of the AEF. Without the AEF experience, it is most probable that the performance of the U.S. Army in Europe in 1944 would have been much different, and much more costly, than it already was.

Americans have forgotten people like McClure, in the same manner that they forgot the inter-war writings of Patton and Eisenhower, as career minded officers began to look to their immediate future. Billy Mitchell's court martial had produced shock-waves amongst the inter-war officer corps that made others very unwilling to stick their necks out in the pursuit of new ideas.

sorry...off topic, but this needed to be said. "Blackjack" Pershing was all the more correct when he quipped "Lafayette, we are HERE!" on his arrival in France. The French have never forgotten the AEF.

Americans should likewise stir the coals of a long forgotten memory. People like McClure, and 'Georgie', deserve no less.

 

I sort of thought I made it clear I DID NOT want to be seen as a nationalist. I am a patriot, yes, but I do NOT believe my country is right rain or shine. And my saying we stomped the Germans in WWI comes from first hand accounts of post-WWI German immigrants who fought in the war. One, a family butcher named Karl Meuser (who fought in WWI on the German side and in WW2 on the American side) told me he would have least liked to fight the Americans because the French were basically idiots on the battlefield and the British artillery couldn't hit the ground, but the Americans aimed at crowded trenches and were at least as good as anyone else on the battlefield. That is pretty much how I remember it, and that is NOT exaggerated.
Takao, didn't the Japanese have their overseas monies frozen by the USA? I mean, they were @ war with the British already, and forcing the French to hand over airfields in Indochina. When they moved in the USA froze those assets. Wasn't that why they went to war? They had no more money to continue their wars, yes? Why not just back down, avoid a war, swallow your pride, and continue to purchase oil? I mean, let's not forget that the Japanese government was a government that basically came to power because they murdered the opposition in the 1920s and 30s and then started wars of conquest. And sure, they were the **** when it came to equipment and training and such in 1940 -- best carriers, best naval aircraft (by a LONG shot), one of the best armies (if very light on mechanization and heavy artillery) in the world. Does that mean that they thought they could overcome the industrial might that the USA could have and eventually did bring to play?

 

@Biak: AMEJ? What would you mean?

 

There was no War Crime Tribunal against Hirohito because we had just spent 4 years battling an enemy that we knew wasn't afraid to die for a cause...and we knew that Hirohito had NO influence on the military. He was puppet at best....read about it. He wanted the war to stop a year before, but was over ruled by his government. We didn't try him because we knew it'd cause an uprising in a country we were barely occupying.

 

"Did the Japanese REALLY have ANY concept of what they were doing? " this question should also be asked of the Germans. If they hadn't declared war on the U.S. after Pearl Harbor it would have been very hard if not impossible for Roosevelt to adopt the Europe first stategy. It was quite hard for him to do so, historically because the U.S. public's anger was focused on the Japanese.

The Japanese had planned for the diplomats to deliver a declaration of war shortly before the attacks occurred, unfortunately they were late and the attack preceeded the declaration. Mistake #1. The unbroken string of early victories also led the Japanese to become overconfident, and they overreached. Mistake#2. Their overconfidence also led them to utilize their greatest asset, Kido Butai, in a peacemeal fashion. In "Shattered Sword" the authors make a very good case that if an operation was worth doing, your should used your full, available strength. Imagine how differently the battle of Coral Sea and the invasion of Port Moresby would have turned out if the entire Kido Butai had been employed. Instead they half-azzing their operations and their loss of focus would have to be mistake#3. It is likely, given the preceeding condition, that the U.S. would have lost both of it's carriers at Coral Sea and Moresby would have fallen. Momentum in war is a powerful force. With a different outcome for the Coral Sea/Port Moresby operation, it is quite likely that the Japanese would have kept their focus on isolating Australia, with continuing operations in the New Guinea/Coral Sea area and seizure of New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. A Japanese presence there with naval bases and land based air would effectively sever the lines of communication between Australia/New Zealand and the U.S. Also, New Caledonia, Espiritu Santo and Efate played a significant support role in the U.S. Solomons campaign, these would have to be retaken before the historical campaigns could be attempted. The U.S. would be faced with the Midway in reverse, if they attempted an offensive to neutralize or retake these areas. Land based air (and Japan's aircraft enjoyed a substantial range advantage) would be able to locate and threaten U.S. carrier forces and a full strength Kido Butai could operate, undetected and get a first strike in on the U.S. carriers. A more likely scenario would be the U.S. is forced to fight a holding action, or engage in raids until the Essex class carriers joined the fleet. Only then would they have sufficient strength to take on the combined strength of Kido Butai and land based air forces. You're probably talking the fall of 1943 at the earliest. By the time the U.S. was strong enough to launch an offensive, Japan would have greatly strengthened their pacific island defenses, and thus the drive towards Japan would be much more costly. I think there is a good chance that if the war was drawn out, the American public might tire of the war and open the door for a negotiated peace.

 

I believe the top Japanese leadership knew exactly what their chances were, but I don't think they felt they had any choice. With the Japanese Bushido mindset at the time, the idea of giving up what they had gained in China was unthinkable. They just could not even consider this-they felt that would spell the end for the "Yamato Race". Rather than lose face in a dishonorable defeat by succumbing to western demands the Japanese felt that their only chance of survival, as slim as it was, was to fight. Yamamoto more than anyone knew what they were up against, and planned his naval war accordingly. He felt from the onset that they possibly (though improbably) could get the Americans to negotiate a settlement early by completely annhilating their Pacific Fleet in a Tsushima type battle they may have a chance. He knew that if the war lasted more than six months they would be doomed. Midway was truly the key, at least as far as Yamamoto was concerned. He felt if he could lure and completely destroy the American fleet, and occupy Midway, he would have his best chance of a negotiated settlement.

Of course it's doubtful the US would have negotiated anything. Sure they would have to defend Hawaii from air attacks from Midway, but new ships were completing and would soon be ready for deployment. I'm sure Yamamoto knew this would be the case, but again he saw this as the only course he could take.

Interestingly, he nearly achieved total annhilation of the American fleet at Guadalcanal-there was a point where all we had was one damaged carrier and a handfull of cruisers and destroyers (Although we did have a few of our new battleships which turned out to be splendid anti-aircraft escorts for our carriers). Unfortuantely for the Japanese, they were running out of experienced Naval Aviators, and their carrier losses from Midway were not being replaced.

 

I agree with the above post. The Japanese plan was to "buy time" by sinking the Pacific Fleet. The Japanese had to know America would recover and rebuild the fleet. However by the time America had re-built, Japan had hopes to have a firm grip in the PTO and a ring of fire protecting their territory and thus cutting of Australia. As mentioned above "Our holding out on Guadalcanal, and kicking their butts in New Guinea really threw them for a loop."

FT

 

I think he was involved up to his elbows in the war in China, and in military matters in general. The characterature of the meek marine biologist writing poetry about doves and flowers was misleading and after the war was propogated by MacArthur in order to perpetuate the Japanese throne, helping subdue the Japanese population.

Since his death there have been several excellent sources published that have shed light on the true nature of Hirohito. Probably the best and most comprehensive(IMO) is Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, by Howard Bix.

 

Speaking of Americans learning about 'stereotypes" reminds me of the final words of narration from the BBC seventies television series, "The World at War". The documentary entitled 'Pacific' had this to say.....

(Narrator) "The Americans, at the end of their great advance across the Pacific, had discovered that the animals, the faceless fanatics, willing to die for their Emperor, were human beings like themselves.
(Veteran) "They showed kindness to their own wounded, when we had thought that, 'well, life was cheap to them'....carrying each other, even though they was hurt themselves....so they were people just like us."

 

IMHO Hirohito should have been strung up with the rest of them after the war. I will look for the book by Bix, sounds interesting..

FT

 

They didn't go to war sith the British until about an hour and a half before PH (or was it 45 minutes). Thier funds were frozen and the bill that did so was interpreted in such a way that oil was also embargoed.

Tne message that they were to deliver just before the attack was not a declaration of war. It simply stated that they were breaking off negotiations.

 

The message delivered to Hull was not a declaration of war or even a breaking of relations, but a simple stament of a breakdown of negotiations.

"Thus the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."

HyperWar: Japanese "14-Part Message" of 7 December 1941

Edit: just noticed lwd got it first.