Dieppe Raid August 19 1942

This is the anniversary of the Dieppe Raid where Canadian troops were shot to hell while making an ill-considered raid on Dieppe under Lord Louis Mountbatten on August 19 1942.
It also marked one of the last victories for the Luftwaffe over RAF fighter Command due to the FW190 outclassing the Mark V Spitfire over Dieppe.
Apologists for Dieppe 1942 say it taught the allies valuable lessons about maphibious landings but I'm not so sure-after all, look at what happenend at Omaha beach in 1944?

 

Don’t disagree overall Scotus, but I would say it taught the British not to make a frontal assault on a fortified port – viz. the revised approach concerning Port en Bessin in Normandy, but the mistakes the Americans made at Omaha were mostly of their own making.

No.9

 

Yes, if the Allied had not made the Mulberry systems would the invasion/breakthrough later on have succeeded? And yes, the other one broke soon but still...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mulberry_Harbour

"Port Winston saw heavy use for 8 months—despite being designed to last only 3 months. In the 100 days after D-Day, it was used to land over 2.5 million men, 500,000 vehicles, and 4 million tonnes of supplies providing much needed reinforcements in France."

 

Yes, Number 9!-that is fair point. But I also wonder if the relative ease with which British Combined Operations succeeded on raids to the Lofotens' Vaagso and Bruneval raids, bred in Combined Ops chiefs like Mountbatten, a false sense of security in their approach to Dieppe?.

 

Of these large scale raids, Lofoten was unquestionably a soft target and subsequently a number of men left the Commandos disillusioned. However, Vaagso, Bruneval and of course St. Nazaire (March 1942) - the Greatest Raid of All – were not without loss in their successes. Dieppe was also the first time massed infantry and tanks were involved (comparatively speaking), in special ops. This operation probably has more parallels with Wolfe at Quebec than Vaagso.

While the Commandos were ‘writing the book’ for special ops, so too Combined Operations were formulating a new permanent concept. Poor old Roger Keyes, the first real commander, had more plans rejected than came to fruition. I remain not the biggest fan of Mountbatten, who perhaps and understandably inherited the planning of Keyes, but I remain unconvinced he was best suited for the job militarily? Cunningham was a fine Naval commander in the Med, but when he tried his hand a combined ops involving some Middle East Commandos and infantry on an island near Crete, it was utter disaster.

My view, the essence of Combined Operations is naval and/or air support of an Army engagement. Therefore the core unit is Army and the ultimate plan should be under control of an Army commander. IMHO Bob Laycock was a good chief later on, but hampered by lack of gilt connections in the smoking rooms.

There’ve probably been more studies/books on Dieppe than any other raid, and just as many angles of approach – even the bizarre fancy that a Marine sold the plans to the Germans. The initial raid was cancelled and shelved, and frankly I think they had already blown-up the balloons and invited the guests so decided to have the party, which of course pleased Stalin.

No.9

 

One thing that was learned at Dieppe was the use of Heavy bombers. The no-go due to the loss of surprise with bombing, proved to be wrong.

Another issue was the close security. Remember that the Dieppe was called off once and later launched (against the judgement of many higher officers)

As a contrast to the 'swift' raids of the commandoes there was a lesson to be learned for a successful 'phib operation. The need for deep beacheads to reorganise after the initial landings. Careful grouping of the assault parties with regards to size and equipment.

Many write off the 'we learned a lot from Dieppe' as an excuse for an operation gone horribly bad. But there is a lot of truth in it.
Armchair generals looked on the Commando raids and thought that larger raids with the Army would be easy. However the learning curve was slow and some simply disregarded the danger of opening a front from the sea. Anzio and Salerno were near disasters, that could have been avoided with a bit more sober approach to the problem.

 

Not following Jaeger, are you saying the town and port should have been pre-bombed, or just made a bombing assignment?

Re Anzio and Salerno, the Anzio landing went very well, it was following the landing the problems began. With Salerno, having had his proposal snubbed for a landing much further north, Mark Clark seems to have acted a bit like a disgruntled child and many shortcomings in his capabilities manifested themselves in his planning. If he was a Boy Scout he certainly didn’t follow its maxim of expecting the best but being prepared for the worst.

Days earlier in Monty’s landing at Taranto, he did find the best but nevertheless went in as if the worst awaited him.

With Dieppe, I would say the Allies threw themselves into a ‘Horatio’s Bridge’ predicament. If the men could have moved forward quickly, if the tanks had no problems on the shingle beaches, if the Germans only had the expected defences, then the rush in – shoot-up – and get out scheme may have worked. Effectively the main force were contained in a small area which even a lesser German defence could have contained. Better one of two approaches. Either make a smaller covert Commando landing at night, or make larger landings above and below the town and pincer in on it. In both case having a secondary off-shore force ready to go straight in to the port as and when suitable.

But, this was not a capture and hold exercise, just a pigs-ear hit-and run.

No.9

 

Good posts-Jager and NO-9-I''ll rsspond in greater detail soon.thanks!

 

Yes Number 9, but didn't a bunch of stroppy Jocks mutiny in the middle of the near debacle at Salerno as described by Major Hugh Pond in his 1961 book ''Salerno''?-Pond's book was the first-I think-to expose the Jocks revolt at Salerno which was due to the brass telling North African Scottish veterans-some who had been wounded- that they were going back to Blighty-hence the mutiny once they found themselves on a boat for Salerno.

 

Please Scotus, the ‘stroppy Jocks’ were the 51st Highlanders, the very same who were abandoned to a withering defence during the 1940’s evacuations from France. Was the order not to send the ships in harbour and ready to go, issued by ‘Golden Boy’ Mountbatten? To the best of my knowledge the relevant paper of Admiralty orders is still missing from the file in the PRO .

Anyway, yes absolutely the 51st had done more than their tour in Africa and were duly embarked to return to Blightly. Then found themselves disembarking at Salerno with Battle Orders being issued. Essentially that’s what it was all about. Matters thereafter ran akin to the famous ”Sam, Sam, pick up thy musket” monologue which successive senior officers appealing to the men. They did eventually relent, but several faced Court Marshall and a few death sentences were muted and commuted to imprisonment. Thereafter there were releases on condition the men went to front line units and thereafter were in just about every recce, skirmish and attack going. There is a documentary including Veterans who testify to this happening, and their belief it was preferred if they got shot.

No.9

 

No.9 Not the very same Highlanders. The 'new' 51st, that once was the 9th. Not much was left of the Old 51st since it was shot to shreds bar the batallions assigned to Ark Force.

My beef with Salerno is that it should have been the main event. No need for Monty's landing in the south. The Salerno landing should have been the 'one' landing. No need to open up ports all over Italy, to try and resupply smaller parties all over the mainland.

Anzio was also a waste. The Itallian campaign had to few resources to be a success on the scale of the operations in Europe. Opening up a beach in the enemys rear drew important resources and acheived nought. Mountain infantry (of Morrocco and Poland? I cannot remember) managed to infiltrate through 'impassable terrain' (like the Ardennes in '40) and the front was moved again.

 

I recall just recently having read ( unfortunately don´t have the book name or the author with me right now ) that the Germans were under orders to withdraw to the defensive lines below Rome when the invasion of Salerno took place and the Germans decided to attack them instead. Thus if the invasion took place , say, two weeks later, the invasion would not have met any real resistance from the axis forces (?!). Anyone else read about this?

 

Jaeger,

Right about 51st/9th Highland Div. The episode at Salerno was a perfect example of how NOT to handle men.

The landings at Salerno were not capable being enlarged. The shipping drain was to the UK for Overlord, the British landings at Taranto included the use of fighting ships to carry 1st Airborne so had a minor effect on the lift to Salerno, equally the landings at Reggio used short range lift.

Some reasons for the struggle,
the need (maybe unnecessary) to land with Allied Air Cover. This limited the choice of beaches to be landed on.
the lack of shipping , as mentioned sent to the UK for Overlord.
the lack of understanding of the problems involved in advancing up the Italian peninsula, where every bridge was demolished and the roads cratered.

As Monty said; "The High Command... thus embarked on a major campaign on the continent of Europe without having any clear idea - or plan - as to how they would developoperations and fight the land battle. There was no objective laid down, the whole operation was haphazard and untidy"

The Anzio would have been great if used during "DIADEM" to cut off the retreat, but when used the Germans weren't retreating!

 

Dieppe,

If taken more seriously a heavier force on the flanks and less onto the town beaches would have been far more succesful.

Plus some heavier naval support, at least 8" Cruisers and a major effort from the RAF heavies.

 

Yes the 9th was raised by the 51st as a copy of itself in Scottish Command in 1938. After the decimation in June 1940 with only one out of three Brigades redeemed (the 154th), Alan Brooke found them ”without much equipment and only fit for evacuation” and therefore not fit to immediately comprise the 51st Division he had been given towards forming a new BEF in France.

The 51st’s ‘understudies’ the 9th, became the the 51st around the surviving Brigade, the 154th, as there was now not enough men and materiel to maintain two ‘halves’. The 51st continued to maintain three Brigades, 152nd, 153rd and 154th.

Re Salerno, appreciate your view but totally disagree. If the men, ships and will was available there should have been more landings. As Ali points out, air cover was a major issue and one of the main factors which had Clark’s proposal to land on the far greater expanse of beach further north, rejected. Salerno is overshadowed by high ground and can only be deemed ‘expansive’ or a ‘bottleneck’ according to how many men and vehicles you are trying to land and the degree of opposition. One of the great floors of the landing was splitting forces either side of the river, making it very hard and impossible at times for one faction to support the other. Also, if you only have one comparatively narrow landing point, it allows the enemy to concentrate force to oppose you, and in this case, the geography was in their favour. Once you get much above say Naples, you lose any aspect of reasonable terrain stretching from coast to coast (Mediterranean to Adriatic) untill you enter the Po basin in the far north. Even then it’s not exactly ‘coast to coast’ but as good as for most applications.

Broadly, Rommel's Italy plan was to withdraw to the river Po – not to contest most of Italy – and while using the Po-Ticino river line put the main emphasis on a northern mountain line. Kesselring advocated a succession of defensive lines all the way up the peninsula – which Italy is eminently suited to – and which became Hitler’s choice.

Anzio failed initially because the Germans didn’t react as expected – they didn’t immediately begin pulling troops from the Gustav Line. As an independent entity capable of undertaking whatever manoeuvres ordered, the force was grossly under resourced and lacked quick direction. The threateners quickly became the threatened. It didn’t provoke a withdrawal from the Gustav Line, it didn’t advance to threaten same, and when the Germans were in retreat, Mark Clark elected to follow his own agenda for Rome. And yes, the crack in the Gustav that caused the Germans to start pulling back – and withdraw from the Cassino monastery – was generally made by the French, which included their colonial forces, in the mountains between the west flank of the Liri Valley and the Mediterranean, (the monastery high ground dominates the east flank of the Liri Valley – worth seeing).

No.9

 

No.9

I am confused. Do you want more landings in one area, or more landings in different areas? (beaches)

My view is for one large landing. A large beachead that is not easily contained. Much like the Normandy beachead. The Morgan plan was for a narrower beachead that could (and in my view would) have been a disaster. The location Salerno was not anybodys first choice. Clark wanted further north, but was told that it was out of cover. Why they 'settled' for landing in a cauldron I don't know, but there it is.

As Ali points out the campaign in Italy was extremely untidy. The US and the UK starved the theatre of equipment and men. Looking at Alex's order to Monty for his invasion at the toe of Italy sums it up. There was no plan, no goal for the campaign.

I fail to see a proper learning curve in the high command regarding 'phib operations.
Monty prepared for the worst in his crossing of the Strait of Messina. Ike proposed crossing it in rowboats.

The Salerno operation had several flaws.

Location beeing on top of the list. Clark had his spot rejected, and it seems as if Salerno is just pulled out of the hat. As you pointed out earlier the beach is divided by a river, and there are mountains all around it. Anybody on the beach is living under a gun. The beach itself was too easily contained, making Alex cry for Monty to rush up Italy to help. Something that he was unable to do. He had not enough men or transport to do so. In addition it was one of the occations where he 'dug in the heels'. His own views on the Italy campaign had come through and now he felt that the Americans could rub their faces against reality before 'bailing' them out.

If there was to be an invasion it had to have focus. No splitting of landing zones, no shipping forces back to the UK for Overlord. And picking the right beach.

History would repeat itself one more time.
Anvil/Dragoon nicking ships from Overlord. Another incredibly inept move by Ike.

 

i see ur point however like the saying goes, dont put all ur eggs in one basket. By having multiple beachheads not only do u have multiple chances of breaking through, but u also spread out the enemy and confuse it. Sure it is a risk however, if one or two break out of the beach they can work towards not only helping their trapped comrads but also hit the enemy on its flanks.

 

Sloniksp

I think Monty phrased it in the lines of 'fighting or frigging about'.

By landing in several places the forces become smaller. By making the forces smaller, they can also be easier contained.

I do agree that if the forces are landed in such close proximity that they can support eachother (like Sicily) it may be useful. But like Anvil/Dragoon and Overlord, Baytown and Salerno they were too far from eachother to have any effect.

Overlord had a large enough beachead to pin down the defenders on one side, and let the other side break out. Anvil/Dragoon landed in the south of France and didn't join with the Overlord forces until the battle for France was over. Baytown the same way. By the time the 8th Army had reached Salerno, the crisis was over.

What Anvil/Dragoon did accomplish was to push back the invasiondate by a month, and allowing the campaign to stop in Holland before winter.

 

Very good points. I guess we could go back and forth stating facts for both explanations until our faces turn blue lol. I guess in the end it would have to depend on the situation and the scenerio.

 

In this instance I am not advocating more landings in the same area as all would still have to exit north through the high ground – hence you’re just pushing more men into the bottleneck. What I mean is more landings at other locations.

Monty’s original orders from Alexander re the Straights of Messina, was to establish a bridgehead to secure the Straights from both shores. A retreating enemy was to be pursued and the more progress that could be made in this respect, the more it would assist the Salerno landing on the 9th – though Monty says there was no co-ordination between the two forces? Mark Clark stated in his briefing he expected the Germans to quickly concentrate at least four of their twenty some Divisions against the 5th Army. He was well aware securing the northern passes in the high ground was the key to battle length. Monty didn’t expect to exploit more than about 60 miles and only had resources accordingly. Eventually however, after Alexander directed him to assist Salerno on 14th September, leading elements of the 8th Army reached the American lines on 16th September, meaning the 8th had moved and fought some 300 miles. Monty records he felt the 8th played little part at Salerno, the worst of the situation being dealt with before their arrival.

Between Monty’s invasion on 3rd September, and Salerno on 9th September, other major military events were supposed to have taken place. On the 3rd the Italians reluctantly signed an armistice. Reluctant because it was in the face of Allied refusal to offer anything other than unconditional surrender, and the inordinate amount of time wasted in deciding 'terms'. Monty states it was never explained to him how someone who had surrendered unconditionally could then be his co-belligerent? Gen. Badoglio (the new leader) wanted and offered the Italian forces to immediately go on the offensive against nazis-fascist forces together with the Allies. Most importantly, the Armistice was not to be made public until 1800 on 8th September, and three hours later the 82nd Airborne would drop at Cerveteri and Furbara airfields, north of Rome, (Operation GIANT II*), which would have been seized and held in advance by Italian Divisions. At the same time the Italian Divisions moved on and around Rome, other Italian units would seize Taranto, Brindisi, Bari and Naples. Then on the 9th, the Allies would land at Salerno and Taranto.

*‘GIANT I’ was a planned para-glider landing along the Volturno River, which was never carried out.

In these intervening days, both sides lost faith with each other because of disinformation and diversity of opinion/lack of commitment, largely on the part of the Allies. The Americans cancelled the drop at the last moment, and Badoglio abandoned his operation and left Rome with the King and other seniors, leaving Italian Divisions without orders rather than initiate an unsupported offensive.

A great opportunity was missed and the war took a particular turn because of it. Monty’s general opinion that the Italian’s wouldn’t have achieved much was wrong, not that he was involved in ultimate decisions. In the midst of indecision and lack of direction, the Italians defeated the Germans at Bari, and one of Italy’s best, Gen. Raffaele Cadorna, took on the German 3rd Armoured Division near Monterosi and near Bracciano with his Ariete Armoured Division and forced them to withdraw from both areas with serious losses. Lack of strategic command and logistic support, particularly access to ammunition, prevented him pursuing the action or co-ordination with Gen. Tabellini’s Piave Division which had also taken the field. As a direct benefit, at least the armistice stopped Italian submarines assaulting the shipping at the Salerno landing.

No.9