Does OZ owe it's freedom to the US?

We were moving "units" forward. The US was materially unprepared for WW2. Indeed FDRs military advisors told him in summer of 41 it wouldn't be until mid 42 that the US was ready for war and late 42 before they would be ready to go on the offense. In the mean time we were shipping a lot of material to the UK, France, and others and Germany attacked the USSR there as well. Logistics was a vital constrain especially early in the war. Mac convincing the US leadership that the Philippines should be defended also affected both logistics and resources. Moving the fleet to PH was a classic case of deploying units forward by the way. The lining planes up at the bases at PH was a defensive move. Short with some considerable justification thought sabotage was the greatest threat and that was one of the measure he took to prevent or minimize it. As for air patrols PH was flying what could be sustained with the aircraft on hand I believe.

 

Which was a rather low number considering the number of deaths of many of the other participants.

Also, there was no consensus that Japan would go to war.

Again, there was no consensus that the Japanese would decide to go to war. Most US politicians believed that the Japanese would give in to US demands. The British and Dutch were both capable of deciding what the outcome would be, with or without US input, as they had their own people to make such decisions.

 

The US of 1940-41 was not the US of today. The global reach did not yet exist within the US, it did with the British Empire, but they were already occupied with a war in Europe. America had tremendous potential, but that was 3 years in the future and after largely assuming the place of the British Empire.

Acting preemptively against a major power, and Japan was a major power then, was simply not done by a democracy. Gunboat diplomacy could be done against a much weaker power but any nation answerable to its electorate had to allow/make the other side fire the first shot. This was true for the Anglo-French in Europe and for the US in the Pacific.

 

Being so poorly prepared just makes the decision to risk a war even more unwise. Why not wait until mid or even late 1942 when they would be ready to go on the offensive? If you're going to provoke such a volatile foe, make sure you do it when you are holding all the chips. The reasons for the embargo have all been stated but none of them involved an immediate mortal threat to the US. They didn't need to do the embargo when they did, and every day that passed gave the US an improved military position. So why not wait?

 

Yes but surely it would have been prudent to share intel with you allies?

 

There is rarely a consensus for anything. The point is it was considered at least highly likely.

Concerning the number of deaths, try telling the families of those killed that 110,000 was rather low. Your position is more Stalinist (e.g. One death is a tragedy, a million deaths a statistic) that democratic.

 

Problem was they were essentially fighting a two-front war with a one-front military, and the US Army was not up to even that.

The USN had been shuffling ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic to bolster the Atlantic Fleet against Germany. With the deteriorating relations with Japan, those movements were halted.

Forward-basing warships beyond Pearl Harbor was impossible. Cavite was not able to handle a large influx of warships beyond what was already there. Nor was Australia, Singapore, or Hong Kong an option, because there was no logistical train capable of supporting a large fleet that far away in a foreign port where there were no mechanical supplies...Stuff breaks, and the ship will sit unavailable until parts arrive from the States. This was the major reason the US turned down a British suggestion for basing the PACFleet battleships at Singapore.

Air patrols at Pearl Harbor were inadequate, that is true. However, the emphasis was on training, not reconnaissance. Nor did th US Navy make any effort to use Army bombers in their recon efforts. For that matter, they never informed Short that this coverage was inadequate, and that Short should step up his radar coverage.

 

Been a while since I read it. Was that for a full 360 degree coverage or partial?

Their later report stated that 209 PBYs were needed for full coverage...There were 81 on hand.

Still, it glosses over the fact that the two services were not cooperating to handle the situation.

 

As per their joint agreement, the Navy was responsible for the air reconnaissance around Pearl, not the Army. The Navy was supposed to ask for Army aircraft when there was a shortfall, but I have never seen any evidence that they did.

I never mentioned Kimmel...But, he did have an obligation to see that his fleet was being properly protected.

Again, I had not mentioned Kimmel.

Only the fact that the Army and Navy were not cooperating as per the plans laid out in their joint agreement.

 

There was a period of time when even FDR was cut out of the loop of 'MAGIC' intelligence gathered by the military. MAGIC intell came from reading Japanese diplomatic code messages, but it was not foolproof as the differences in language and culture could lead to errors. Station Hypo in Hawaii also had some success in breaking Japanese military codes, at least enough to track some unit movements in general. Unfortunately this was lost as Japan changed her naval codes just before the outbreak of hostilities. US successes at Coral Sea and Midway were due in no small part to new code breaking at Station Hypo.

FDR was removed from the intell distribution as I understand it because one of his briefing papers were found in a Oval office waste basket. One of the oldest questions in military intelligence is how far is it dissimulated, too little and it doesn't get to the right people, too much and it becomes clear to a enemy that their plans are too well known.

Britain faced similar concerns with its ULTRA decrypts of German ENIGMA messages. Prior to the American entry into the war Britain did not share everything with the US, nor did we share everything we gathered with Britain, her Empire and Commonwealth.

 

I hate to return to the original topic but I always feel uncomfortable talking about who "owes whom " in war discussions. The US gave tremendously in human power and material. The Soviets would no doubt argue they gave more and that is their right as it is ours. Other countries can argue they gave more as a percent of their population and material. I am not sure why I dislike the "owe" concept. Perhaps I do not like owing or being owed which dates back to my childhood. I once saw a parade of US WW2 vehicles and men in Prague and felt my heart well up. I am beyond proud of what the US did in WW2. Of the men who served and especially those that died, of the enormous effort made by the population in producing materials. But I would not be surprised if New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and other countries did not percentwise do as much or more. Personally, I did nothing, being 5 at the war's end. I think most people, at least those that care to learn, know who did what. Since this discussion started with us and OZ I greatly admire all the Aussies that flew in the RAF, fought in North Africa, did more than their bit against the Axis. I do not feel they owe us, I feel they were our allies. Am I proud of us and out part, you bet, but not at the point of feeling we are owed.

Sorry about this silly long ramble I have had a long difficult day and a wee tired. Passover begins tonight, I shall go think highly of my Jewish friends and especially of Ron Goldstein who fought for all of us.

Gaines

 

Huh?

Why was the embargo put into effect? Because the Japanese, on July 24, 1941, had moved some 140,000 troops in to Southern IndoChina - This would be forward positioning that you had mentioned earlier. Now, the US was not in a position to militarily respond to this military encroachment. But, they could, and did, respond economically with an Embargo.

This forward positioning of Japanese troops much closer to Malaya and the DEI negates the claim that war was being risked as the Japanese were already making their opening moves for war. Hence, the Embargo was seen as a way to possibly diffuse the situation, when military strength was not an option.

Why did not the US wait. Unfortunately, the Japanese timeline did not allow the US such freedom of action. The movement of a large number of Japanese troops closer to Malaya and the DEI demanded a strong US response in return. The embargo was that response. The US could not affect the situation militarily, but it could economically, which is what it did.

In a perfect world, that would hold true...but this is far from a perfect world. In this one, you have to use the tools at hand.

Further, the volatile foe was hardly being provoked...Would the embargo been passed if the Japanese had not moved 140,000 troops into Southern IndoChina? Probably not.

Very few wars the US has been involved in have involved a mortal threat directly to itself. Far more often, these wars have been about mortal threats to friendly allied nations. Which is the case here.

Actually, they did need to embargo when they did. The US position was improving, however, that of the UK & DEI was not. The British were scrambling to cover a large swath of territory to meet German moves, and there was little that could be done in the DEI. It was hoped that the embargo would give the Japanese pause to reconsider the war that they were about to initiate. Thus buying the US time to bolster their forces in the Pacific. Unfortunately, the embargo did not have give the Japanese pause.

 

Thanks for the clarification Opana.