EVOLUTION OF SMALL UNIT TACTICS

Good Evening to all............

Tonight an article for your discussion, and one that, amongst wargamer circles in the seventies, generated a lot of interest.

This article will be unexpurgated, for the simple reason that it is a "classic", and to tamper with it really would spoil the overall effect. It was written way back in 1978 by a man whose reputation for game design was at it's hieght in this period. John Hill wrote this article for the now defunct Avalon Hill Gamers company magazine, "The GENERAL"(Vol 14 No.5). It's purpose was to highlight interest in a game that John Hill designed, a game that was to become the largest selling tactical wargame of the hobby industry...SQUAD LEADER. Developed by Donald Greenwood, it featuring 20 scenarios in a programmed instruction format that ran into a lengthy 40 page rule book.
This game, more than any other, wrenched your emotions, forced you to do many things you just cringed at, and was packed with what the hobby itself called "chrome" (rules that gave a distinctive flavour). Critics of this game called it "The Chrome Plated Machine Pistol" for it's German emphasis and voluminous rules, but hobbyists loved it. No other game, before or since conveyed the experience of small unit actions and street fighting quite like it, but, it was an exercise in interpretation of infantry combat, specifically, John Hill's interpretation. Even his critics refered to him as "Honest John Hill" because he explained exactly WHY he thought each rule section of his game should have merited inclusion, something that a lot of designers simply could not, or would not do.
The article you are about to read showed, basically, what kind of research John had put into to his masterpiece, and in doing so, he wrote this article to "spell it out" for those that might wonder exactly why there was a GERMAN emphasis to the design.
It speaks for itself in this respect, and is offered as a discussion starter.


THE EVOLUTION OF SMALL UNIT TACTICS...................by JOHN HILL.

The tactical concept that the main element of infantry combat was the small ten man group of soldiers did not suddenly appear in World War Two. Rather, it evolved slowly, all the way up from the beginning of the gunpowder era. As weaponry imporoved, the destructive potential of small groups became greater, and it is very difficult to say when infantry combat tacticians began to forsake the concept of massed infantry in favour of the small grouped infantry, but it started soon after Napoleon.

In the Napoleonic era, the classic use for infantry was in ever larger attack columns which were, in essense, a solid battering ram of bodies. When the opponent had been properly prepared by artillery and maneuver, this battering block was generally sucessful. But this was the last golden era of the massed shock infantry attack. The British, by use of the reverse slope and disciplined volley, made these attack columns a very dangerous proposition. Nevertheless, in the writings of this era, and even before, we do find references to the possibility of what could be done by these small groups attacking on their own. However, these tactics were still regarded as an if all else fails type of thing. As a matter of fact, the whole tactical doctrine was indeed referred to as the "forlorn hope".
But the hope was to grow............

After the Napoleonic Wars, Baron De Jomini wrote an extensive technical study of combat in 1838. He called it the "ART OF WAR". By drawing on many battles, he came to the conclusion that the best way to attack would be; not in massive columns NOR in extended line, as others would say, but in a loose front of "little columns". In other writings the words "attack group" also crop up. Though the manner of war was not changed by these thoughts, it did show where the trend would be starting.

The nature of combat in the American Civil War was defined by the greatly increased firepower of the rifled musket with it's elongated mini-ball. With it, devastating fire could be thrown out in excess of 300 yards with relative ease. As the troops became more proficient and as repeating rifles became more common, the war evolved into trench-type fighting very similar to the Somme of 1915. At Fort Stedman, in the Petersburg front, the Confederates used a style of attack that would become quite common in the next century. The Infantry was grouped into three compact groups under one attack leader. These groups moved quickly and without fanfare in the attempt to gain maximum advantage of terrain and suprise. They used no formation as such, but would rely on the individual courage and initiative of their NCOs and officers, right there, leading the advance. Eaach group had it's own engineering tools to break through the abatis.
And it worked......
The heavily entrenched fort was taken with a minimum of casualties. Quickly, the attacking confederates attempted to bring up "support weapons"and set up "fire bases" with their 12 pound cannon. All in all, it was a very modern attack. And the Union reaction was equally modern; a quick, instant counterattack by reserve echelons that cut off and isolated the confederate attack groups that had penetrated their line. There were other examples, in other wars, and more and more the principle of the small group began to grow.

Then came World War One, and for the first three years, the small group theory was almost totally forgotten. Attacks were made in large waves, one after another, in an attempt to literally smother the enemy machine guns and defending infantry. The British attacks in Flanders were primarily linear with lines following upon advancing lines. The German response was much more advanced. Their typical defense was not simply an opposing line, but rather, an interconnected series of strong points. Each "point" might only have the infantry equivalent of a platoon or even a squad, but there would be a "nest" of two or more machine guns that would set up a murderous cross fire. In such defense, the actual interconnecting trench might only have what would be called a "skirmish squad" that acted as a net to capture what few survivors stumbled through the cross fires. Here, the Germans were making battle with a small, determined "combat group" of soldiers based on the presense of concentrated automatic weapons fire. It worked well in a defensive environment, and it was only natural that the Germans would adapt the whole concept to an offensive scenario..............
It is difficult to say exactly who was responsible for the evolution of the now famous "strosstruppen" tactics that evolved in this period. Seeing the success of the small group concept in the defense, General Von Hutier, of the German Eighteenth Army began to organize these concepts into a more formal doctrine. Also, the German artillery expert Colonel Bruchnuller contributed a new "philosophy" in terms of the probable and desirable effects on various weaponry. Both of these men came to the conclusion that given the high state of the defensive art and the extensive entrenchments, it was extremely difficult to kill a defender, regardless of the amount of high explosive and weaponry used. However, it was possible to demoralize him and most likely, the method of doing this was to concentrate on creating an environment of doubt and confusion in enemy rear areas.
From the artillery viewpoint, it meant that "communication" targets, such as headquarters, reserve staging areas and the like became more likely targets for pounding than did front lines. While, in the front itself, the artillery would be a mixture of high explosive, gas & smoke. The overall effect was to create a sense of confusion. Also, while it would be intense, it would be short. In some instances, it was advocated that the front line should be shelled for only a total of five minutes duration before the infantry went in. It was argued that longer than five minutes gave the defending infantry time to gather their wits.
And then came the infantry.
Rather than the line waves used by Grant at Cold Harbour(1864) AND Generall Haig at the Somme(1916), the soldiers came out in small groups, moving quickly through the gullies and quirks of "no-mans-land". These were the "strosstruppen" or "storm troopers". They were highly motivated and led by battle experienced officers and NCOs. their objective was not necessarily to "take out" the defensive strong points, but to probe aggressively, taking maximum advantage of the temporary confusion the unorthodox bombardment had created. They sought weak points, and then infiltrated through to set-up their own strongpoints deep in the enemy rear. Such a "breakthrough", even by small groups, created a definate feeling of doubt and worry to the enemy defenders still far forward in their impregnable machine gun nests. And it was self generating; the more these little groups probed, the more weakness they found, and then the more infiltration they did; and this created even more "little weakness which meant even more troops leaked through. And soon, like a great mansion eroded by termites, the whole defense simply collapsed.
This technique sent the Russians streaming in panic at Riga (1916), and at Caporetto(1917), ten miles of prepared defenses were gobbled up in one day. The small, highly motivated and well-armed groups of infantry were becoming particularly vicious termites. When the Germans unleashed this tactic in March of 1918, they came embarrassingly close to ending the war in a single knock-out blow.
However, the allies had developed new ideas of their own. Their answer to the "trench problem" was not one of finesse as was the new German infantry tactic, it was simply a "better hammer" rather than an adroit rapier. The point was that it worked so well, after the initial hassles, that the Western allies stopped developing newer and better small unit tactics and concentrated on perfecting their "better hammer". In November 1918, it ended, and both sides retired to think about the lessons of the Great War.

Between the wars much thought was given to tactics by both sides. and since the tank was the "newest" development, it recieved the lion's share of the thinking. Liddel Hart, Fuller, De Gualle and guderian all contributed to the dialogue on the "new" war, and it was during this period that the doctrine of the mechanized blitzkreig would take root in German thought. It was during this period that Erwin Rommel, the "tank genius of the desert" wrote an amazingly cogent study of small units of squads, companies and battalions. It was titled "INFANTERIE GREIFTAN" and concerned itself with actual case studies of infantry combat in the First World War. So, despite the preoccupation with armor, the Germans were still quite aware of what could be accomplished with the Queen of battle- the infantry.
In studying WW1 the Germans made rather obvious observations that what made the infantry so devastating was the machine-gun, but yet their tactic of stormtroopers infiltrating their way through the enemy defenses precluded the dragging about of the "typical" WW1 machine gun, since they were usually bulky, water-cooled contraptions that, although effective, were rather unwieldy. What was needed was a LIGHT machine gun that could easily be carried and operated by two, or even one man. In this respect, the allies "helped" the Germans. One of the provisions of the odious Treaty of Versailles was the clause that forbade the Germans from owning or developing any large number on "sustained fire weapons", which basically meant water cooled machine guns. They intended to force the Germans to use only air-cooled machine guns, which could not maintain a good rate of fire due to barrel overheating. Hence. the German infantry would be permanently handicapped.......
WRONG.
What actually happened was that the Germans concentrated on a family of machine guns that utilized the option of "quick-change" barrels to get over the overheating problem. This dove-tailed nicely with the Germans' already declared intent to "lighten" the machine gun. And by 1939, German infantry had the start of both quality and quantity in light machine guns. When coupled with their already proven strosstruppen tactics, their infantry was more than a match for those they would face in the opening stages of WW2.
In the opening battles, however, it was the German armored formations that stole the limelight.
The Western Allies were so befuddled by this new "lightning" form of mechanized warfare that they did not realize that their infantry had also become outclassed..
However, the lesson would sink home in 1942 at DIEPPE.
On the coast of France, at the town of Dieppe (August 18th, 1942), the cream of the British infantry, (Canadians and commandos), made a large scale raid to "test" the quality of the German defenses and infantry in France. The "test" was an eye-opener. For the first time, the Western Allies really saw the effect of the vast number of German light machine guns. Their troops were, with small exceptions, cut down by numerically inferior, but better deployed and equipped German squads. In the words of one Canadian,
"We went into intense, accurate light machine gun fire."
It was a true disaster, but it did have merit. In no small way was the lesson of Dieppe lost on the British. By the time they returned to France in 1944 they may have been the best drilled and practiced of the Western Allies in infantry tactics.
Throughout WW2, the tactics did evolve, and did change, and often observations made in 1940 were irrelevent by 1944. But the essense of change was still usually based on a coherent theory that merely changed it's "application". It was mentioned that the Germans concentrated on their theory on the small group and how to maximize effectiveness. Let us now study some typical applications of this theory.....................

First of all, the basic concepts behind German training were very much different from others.....
In most of the pre-World War 2 training programs of the other nations, a tactical problem would be presented by the training officer who would answer any questions about it and then dismiss the class for about an hour so the cadets might reflect upon the correct answer when they were recalled.........
In the German infantry classes, the same problem might be presented, but, each of the students were expected to have a "workable" answer WITHIN TWO MINUTES. Maybe two or three of the fledglings would be called upon to present their solution. The instructor would listen, then pick one cadet as "gruppenfuher" and have the class act out the proposed tactics IMMEDIATELY. Criticism was harsh and freely made both by the instructor and his peers. However, one element was seldom criticized. A student was almost never chastised for exhibiting ELAN. Furthermore, QUICK decisions, even if wrong, were constantly encouraged.

Meanwhile, in the "Sandhurst" method, after an hour of pondering, the exercise would be discussed and maybe even acted out. But, unlike the Germans, the emphasis was completely different. With the Sandhurst method, recklessness was discouraged and a constant stress was made on the methodical conservation of resources as the objective is logically and correctly deduced. Following the evolution of the exercise, the instructor would then discuss it and further amplify the principles of method, conservation or co-ordination. And after it's completion, there would be a leisurely rest period. One final point may be worth mentioning. Since the Germans forced their exercise through with great immediacy and speed, while the rest paced it through, the German trainers would probably be able to study two or three tactical problems in the same time span it took the others to analyze but one.

Over in Russia, things were somewhat simplified.Tactics were basically two types......
You either attacked, or you defended.
If you were defending, you simply STAYED where your officer put you until the enemy was defeated, your officer ordered you elsewhere, or you were dead......
On the attack, you charged, closed with the enemy, and killed him.
Or you died trying...............
There was only one accepted excuse for failure.........your death.
Needless to say, this system does indeed explain to a large extent why the Russians had the highest casualty rate of ANY of the European participants.
So, in summation, we might say that in regards to initiative....
The Germans ENCOURAGED it.......
The West FORGOT it........
and the Russians CONDEMNED it.

One of the more illustrative of the German methods was the "attack technique" in regards to an obstacle on the line of attack. This obstacle could be assumed to be an enemy defense, possibly dug in and perhaps even with minefields and artillery support. But, despite the outward formidableness of the obstacle, a battalion was expected to be able to mount an attack, in complete co-ordination with the parent regiment, in no longer than thirty minutes from the time the obstacle was first discovered. The principles for battalion commanders would be the same as those that would be used by his subordinates in the company and platoon level. The first step was to win the firefight ( feuerkampf) by quickly increasing the fire density on a particular section of the contact frontage. The point here was to establish a fire superiority on both a specific area and to a dictated depth. The actual evolution of this often followed a three phase scenario.....
The first phase was called "NIEDERHALTEN" or "nailing down"...........In this phase, the foremost troops would stop movement and begin laying down an intensive fire in an attempt to stop all movement of the enemy. If artillery support was available, it was used now. The intent was to make the enemy seek cover in his entrenchments, so that the individual squad leaders could make perform unhindered their basic terrian reconnaissances.
The next phase was called "BLINDEN"......... in which newly brought up troops would join the first ones to increase the fire to the point where the enemy defenses would be "blinded" to the now initiated movement of small groups attempting to penetrate the enemy position.
The last phase would take place after successful infiltration had been made into the soft spots of the enemy defense. This was the "NIEDERKAMPFEN", in which the enemy would be "beaten down" by flanking and rearward fire from the infiltrated units which still maintained an intense fire from the front. At this point, it was hoped that the defenders, demoralized by fire from all directions, would begin to "break" and cease to function as an organized body. If that happened, it was all downhill and the position would quickly crumble.
Throughout this "phasing", the Germans stressed a number of "points" they wished their commanders to always keep in mind. The attack would be confined to a narrow frontage. For a battalion, this would be under 1000 yards and hopefully about 600 yards. The attacking commander must concentrate all his firepower on the objective to his front and disregard the flanks. It was assumed that the regimental people would protect his flanks while his battalion did it's job.
In essense, it was the age old concept of FIRE and MOVEMENT. But, the Germans placed more emphasis on the "do it NOW" idea than did their western counterparts. However, in all honesty, this method did have considerable drawbacks. With it's emphasis on quick decisions, there was room for misunderstanding, and as the war went on, they had to mix well-trained and experienced officers with replacements who were not so well trained, resulting in misunderstandings that became more and more common and more costly. Secondly, it was risky. In the confusion which their tactics forced on the enemy, often they would become victims of their own smoke and chaos of battle, with the result that independently advancing infiltration groups fired on one another or would be pinned down by their own supporting fires. But the Germans argued that, despite these unpleasant side effects, their system, in the long run, yielded fewer casualties than the more deliberate methods of the Western Allies, which minimized misunderstanding but maximized time. The Germans claimed that every minute a defender was allowed was another minute he grew stronger. And yet, before we conclude that the Germans were necessarily better, we must remember that their armed forces suffered many a decisive set-back, but ironically, it was usually when they ignored their own advice, and gave the enemy extra time to strengthen his defense.

At this point, let's turn our attention to how RUSSIA evolved her infantry in the same time span. It has been noted that the Russian system was short on initiative and high on obedience. Nevertheless, there were other salient points that made them different.......
First of all, while the German infantry leaders were constantly reminding their people to concentrate their fire on a narrow front, the Russian instructors were doing just the opposite. Their 1941-42 tactical doctrine was to attack on as BROAD a front as possible with the hope that somewhere, due to mass and the "odds", somebody would break through and cause discomforture to the enemy, and, since the infantry's objective is to close and kill the enemy, it really does not matter "where" the breakthrough occurs, as long as it does occur.
This was a complete contradiction to the German thinking, which was very specific as to where they wanted things to happen.
As an example of a Russian situation, consider........................
The commander of a three battalion rifle regiment normally would prepare for the attack by deploying in two waves, accompanying the second wave himself. Close support artillery would most likely be given in the form of SP guns that would accompany the 2nd echelon rather than using indirect called artillery. In a word, it was simple. After everything was "staged", the attack would begin. This was often started by the first wave crawling as close to the German positions as possible during the night before the attack. This "creeping" phase would continue until a pre-set time, or the Germans discovery of them, or when some superior officer got impatient.
At this point, the "assault" phase would begin.....
The regimental commander, with the second wave, often "ordered" the final charge by having his echelon "fire into the air", which would alert the first "creeping wave" that the assault was now to begin.
At that signal, there would be rampant cheering and shouting to make sure everybody knew "THIS WAS IT", and then the first wave would jump to their feet and make a mad charge for the German machine guns, firing and yelling as they went. Simultaniously, the second wave, with the regimental commander, would join in with their mad rush, hoping to reinforce any "success" of the first wave. Since the SP Guns would be with this second wave, they would be available to "blast" any resistense the first wave uncovered. If tanks were available, infantry would often ride on them to increase the velocity of the assault and enable their soldiers to "close with the enemy". The Russians, once the attack did begin, were violent with it's execution and cherished the time factor as much as the Germans. Their opponents often commented that Russian infantry was "slow TO THINK of the attack, QUICK TO DO IT, and SLOW to stop it."
While the above method was very expensive in terms of lives, the Russians defended it's results, claiming that it was the "most demoralizing" to their enemy. It was indeed very disheartening to the Germans to see the complete willingness of their enemy to attack in an endless array of people despite casualties. And, since one of the best ways to defeat an enemy is to demoralize him, the attack method is thereby a success, according to the Russian viewpoint. In all fairness, it should be noted that the "Russian" system was ideally suited both to the nature of their culture, and the numbers needed.
Had they opted for a more sophisticated training system, they would probably never have had the time to totally rebuild their army from the severe beating it took in 1941.
But rebuild they did.......
And, like any soldiers that survive, they learned.
One weakness of the Germans in the early stages of the war was their failure to perfect the principles of urban warfare.
The reason was fairly obvious. Up to the war and throughout it's early stages, there was very little city fighting. The German victories were made by quick, decisive actions generated by "going around" cities and bypassing them. Hence, little effort was made to study this particular problem. Not that the Russians, or British, or americans did, but once it became obvious that there would be heavy urban fighting, no one side really "had the jump" on the other. In late 1942, everybody started from scrstch on this problem.
And in the streets, the Russians were the equal of anybody.
In urban fighting, the actual "combat range" is much less than in open country. Out on the steppes, it was quite common for the infantry, particularly the machine gun sections, to open the engagement at about 1000 yards, depending on visibility; and as the combatants closed, the fighting usually settled in at about 200 to 400 yards for a firefight. At this range, the Germans with their better weapons were at a definate advantage. But in the city, where combat range was very often "across the street", the Russian weapons were equal. In the streets, the main weapons became the submachine gun and the grenade. In contrast to the echelon waves used by the Russians in the country, their urban attacks were based more on an "attack group" of up to sixty men that would literally blitz a single building from all directions, and the Russians became adept at turning any building into a fortress. And when they weren't fortifying, or "blitzing" they would constantly be moving about; filtering through back alleys, crawling through sewers and darting along rooftops. It was a new "citified" concept of Fire and Manuever. In the early stages of the heavy fighting around Stalingrad, the Germans, used to the "blundering Russians", were very much punished by the CUNNING that these same Russians displayed in the city. At the outset, it was the Germans who found their infantry tactics, for the first time in the war, INFERIOR to the enemy.
The initial German reaction was to quickly bring in more and more of their best equiped and trained small units. These were the Pioneers (Assault Engineers) who treated each building as a bunker and went about reducing it with heavy infantry weapons and sophisticated equipment such as demolition charges and flamethrowers. It did work, but in the attrition process, the Germans were forced to "trade-off" their best specialists against regular Russian peasant soldiers.
And that was an expensive trade..................
But the commitment of these elite formations bought the time needed for the regular line units to learn the "urban trade". And by late 1943, the Germans were as adept at urban fighting as their Russian opponents. The Germans began fighting like the Russians with FIRE GROUPS against individual buildings, but they also attempted to set up "killing zones" along the streets that paralelled the "target building". Here, their superb medium and heavy machine guns were ideal. The theory was that the battle-point would be isolated by preventing any reinforcements from reaching the position. By setting up machine gun fire lanes, they hoped to put a break on the constant Russian "flittering about". It was a good tactic, and many a Russian squad was cut down by accurate fire from a hidden position far down the street. The Russians countered by using sewer movement to an even greater degree, and setting up many and devious ways for getting from one building to another.

And so, the Russians and the Germans taught each other, and in the West, the Germans imparted their hard-earned urban techniques to the Western Allies with a vengeance.

By the end of 1943, the Western Allies had taken to heart much of the earlier lessons the Germans had shown them. Dieppe, as mentioned, illustrated the immense value of the light machine gun, and the British countered by doubling and sometimes tripling the issuance of their LMG, the BREN GUN. Also, Allied training was much more realistic and became modeled on GERMAN lines. And then, in January of 1944, at the town of CASSINO, in Italy, the "new" Allied infantry tactics were tested against the Stalingrad educated Germans. Once more, they had to play "catch-up"
Once again, the Allies found their small unit tactics were outmoded......
In many respects, the experience was similar to the German dilemma at Stalingrad. But they reacted differently to the problem. The Germans correctly saw that it was an infantry problem, and attempted to solve it with infantry means. And that was, bring in better infantry in terms of their assault engineers. The Americans and British reacted with brute force and attempted to ERASE the offending obstacle with air and artillery bombardment. Even the Monastery was literally blown off the top of the mountain. But still their infantry sqauds could not advance and they SAW that a destroyed and rubbled city was just as good, maybe even better, from a defenders viewpoint, as an intact one. So they, too, learned how to form Fire Groups and cover streets with fire......and they too, learned the high price of urban warfare extolled in men.

At this point, we might stop and compare how the British and Americans differed in the applications of the lessons the Germans were showing them. First, let us look at the BRITISH.....

The concept of British small unit tactics went through a number of shocks, as we already mentioned, such as Dunkirk, Dieppe and Cassino, where even their crack New Zealand troops were one-upped by the street-wise Germans. But the British by then were used to change and adaptation. Their approach to the small unit problem was basically that there are certain tactical dilemmas and each one of these has a correspondingly correct solution. Therefore, to solve a tactical problem, one first had to identify it, select the correct solution and implement that solution. The first two parts were fairly easy compared to the last, the implementation. And to perfect that implementation the British evolved a series of DRILLS that would be the same army-wide and would give predictable results both in time and effect. They felt that with the vastly different array of forces in the British Army, it was important that they all have a universality of tactics so an infantry leader could easily be moved to a new company and still have the same predictable results.
This may have seemed like a backward step compared with the German emphasis on tactical creativity, but it was well suited to Britain's complex Army structure and blended well with their cultural trait of neatness, which is very well expressed by Montgomery's desire for a tidy battlefield. Each DRILL was very well thought out and when properly employed would give a successful conclusion in a majority of cases. There were DRILLS for everything; attack and defense, over farms, cities, with and without armor, and with and without artillery. They were quite specific. The whole concept hinged on the theory that the prospects for success and survival would be gretaest if all members of a small unit or section thoroughly understood what their job was, how they were going to do it, and what everybody elses job was as well. An example of the detail these went into was the drill for an eight man squad moving in file down a road. The file would be as follows, with each man's duty as listed,
MAN 1.........Sqaud Leader, leads patrol.
MAN 2.........Watches Right.
MAN 3.........Watches Left.
MAN 4.........Watches front for Squad Leader signals.
MAN 5.........Watches Right.
MAN 6.........Watches Left.
MAN 7.........Watches Squad Leader and MAN 4 for signals.
MAN 8.........Watches Rear.
Hence, if you were MAN 3, your job was to WATCH LEFT whether you were in Normandy, Italy or Burma. This British approach lacked glamor and was somewhat unflattering in regards to the initiative concept, BUT it produced results, and by 1944-45 the British were able to stand toe to toe with the Germans and give as good as they got in any situation.

There was a famous saying about the Americans from none other than Rommel himself,
"No-one is more incompetent in battle, but no one learns faster."
The evolution of small unit tactics in the american Army was probably the least systematic of any participant in the War. This philosophy was, almost;
"Try something, try anything; it might work".
From nothing in terms of size in 1940, the American army in Europe had blossomed into almost 100 divisions. This created a need for mass produced training and quick smatterings of tactical doctrine. At first, it might seem that the British DRILL method would have been ideal for such a problem. But it probably wouldn't have worked for the basic reason that the American soldier differed very much from his British ally.
As a soldier, the American is an amateur and always will be. He is often an exceptionally talented amateur, but he is not, and has no desire to be, a professional. To the American, the concept of fighting is not of a soldiers profession, but is rather a dirty job that has to be gotten on with. A comment made by in the Civil War was that Grant's army looked like a bunch of day labourers. It was more true than realized, because in philosophy and tactics the American soldier IS a day labourer. He is a confirmed skeptic, a diehard opportunist, and a dedicated scavenger. His squad and platoon leader is more like a shop foreman than a captain of men. So, had the American military attempted to instill dogmatically practiced DRILLS, the soldiers would have treated it as so much worthless "Mickey Mouse"
But if all of these were weak points, he had a number of amazingly good strong points. Left by himself, he often could be amazingly ingenious in devising tactical tricks that often rivaled the best their German enemies could think of. He loved gadgets and things mechanical, and given a few moments, could make any device work, after a fashion. He had little respect for rank, and despite orders, he had a tendency to do things his own way. When he blundered, it usually was EXTREME, resulting in punishing casualties. but when he was right, he was probably better than any of his contemporaries.

The American military stumbled onto this and attempted to capitalize on this innate desire to try it "his" way and published field manuals on a never ending series of subjects, not as Drill Manuals, but as guidelines for the soldiers to base their tactics on. Throughout the war there was a constant stream of updates and quickie pamphlets on tricks of the trade. The whole thrust was that you will win if your "trick" is better than the German's "trick". The American soldier was bombasted with never-ending series of these publications and he usually glanced at most of them. The hope was that by constantly exposing the soldiers to good tactics, perhaps some of them would rub off.
All this might have made the American squads more buffooons than soldiers, if it were not for the fact that their weapons, per squad, were the best of any armies. The basic American squad with no extras, could out firepower anything else. Their M-1 was definately the best infantry rifle of the war, in overall usefullness and durability, and the Browning Automatic Rifle, while not a light machine gun, could often substitute effectively for it.
Hence, the American Army,despite the demonstrated effectiveness of the German light machine guns, never really produced or issued one. They felt it was more important that the sqaud have devastating firepower without adding anything extra. In essence, the only way a German squad could stand up to the American was WITH the addition of a light machine gun. This was brought to light in a small infantry battle between two opposing infantry platoons on Djebel Tahent in the closing days of the Tunisian campaign. The American and German platoons squared off against one another behind two opposite stone walls and simply fired until the German platoon was wiped out by the firepower of American infantrymen.
It had not been a contest......
There was a catch, however. While the American soldier could dish it out, he was not very good at taking it. In general, he would break under fire before either the German or the British. He was always quick to take cover. In many ways, he always felt that being fired ON was not really part of his job, and he would always do his best to avoid that. On the other hand, though he might duck for cover and run quicker than the others, he had a strong stubborness that caused him to usually rally and come back to try again before another soldier would. It almost might be summed up as,
"Quick to run, quick to rally."
Hence the American squad was deadly and brittle, but properly used with a good imaginative leader and a little bit of luck, it may have been the most formidable squad in 1944-45 Europe.
As we noted, the American squads did not have a light machine gun, preferring to make up the deficiency with better organic firepower. And in some respects, they did. However, this was not to say that the Americans were without support weapons. Quite the contrary. In reality, when the Americans added support weapons, it was of a quantity that bedazzled all other participants. The Americans, figuring that "bigger" is "better, felt that if you needed MG support, it should be as big and beefy as possible. Hence, they issued their superb .50 cal Machine guns almost like popcorn. And in fire effectiveness, it was a machine gun without equal. It is still perhaps the most devastating infantry MG on the field, and the design has not really changed much at all. The penultimate development of this deadly weapon was the M16, a quad-fifty halftrack which carried the descriptive name of "chopper". The final point of this was the liberal availability of these weapons, even to the point that it was not rare to see them mounted on trucks.
Which brings us to the final point on the Americans. And that was the total number of vehicles that they had available. No army could approach them. American INFANTRY formations usually had more vehicles than most mechanized Panzergrenadiers! When they went into battle, it was on such an assortment of trucks, jeeps, halftracks, scout cars and whatevers that NODODY walked. In the Ardennes offensive, the Germans were astounded by the flippancy with which Americans abandoned their vehicles. As a matter of fact, one German officer, in all seriousness, felt that the American Army had as many trucks as they did combat infantryman! His statement was exaggeration, but not excessively so......


And so, by the end of the war, all the nations had evolved their own infantry tactics to achieve roughly the same net result. Each nation's infantry book of operations reflected both their national cultural backgrounds, and the tricks of the trade they had picked up from their gallant opponents........


B5N2Kate.......so there you have it.......meantime....PONDER.

See ya!

 

I am looking into that. Great article. Remove this so you may continue where you left

 

It early in the morning...more training for me tomorrow......look for comments then, but meantime, thank you all and goodnight from me....

B5N2Kate.

 

One of the key elements in the evolution of tactics between the wars was direct infantry support weapons. German Tactics in particular are of great interest. The main influence on German tactics was the Versaille treaty and the lopsided enforcement of its provisions. Exactly like the USA allowing the Iraqi's use of their helicopters the Treaty forced the Germans to adopt many interesting tactics. Infantry being the most important we can examine them first. What was unique about German Infantry at a tactical level and how did it help them evolve their tactics ?

Can you compare the German Infantry to any other infantry in the world and find something truly unique in their tactical doctrine ?

 

Forum style don't support very well colors, I asked designer to change the look but it can't be done only in postbit section.
I am looking another one with a lighter background, let me know if you catch one.

Anyway, article is very good, but as I don't speak english as a first language, I will need to read it three times to get all. Comment will follow;D

 

I was sort of thinking about colors....you must do something to break up the text, or to highlught points of interest.....anyhow, will turn colors off...easy....

 

problem I have is Highlights - I try to read things that I find relevant - Highlights really break up my concentration - I think everyone that reads something on a forum sees it differently - whats relevant to one is irrevalent to another. So stressing something important is one thing but highlighting every other word makes it difficult for a reader to stay with the posters train of thought. Words like cringed, wrenched and BUT in the first paragraph for instance - I'm totally lost on why they would be highlighted... normally I wouldnt have paid attention and moved on to more substantive text but the bold text and highleghts as well as color led me to believe there was something there.

 

Don't get me wrong....whatever makes it more readable I'm for.....But, does make it rather DRAB to have the same type of text all the time.....

I do listen, you know.....

.what do you think, Gothard me ol' mate?

 

"In studying WW1 the Germans made rather obvious observations that what made the infantry so devastating was the machine-gun, but yet their tactic of stormtroopers infiltrating their way through the enemy defenses precluded the dragging about of the "typical" WW1 machine gun, since they were usually bulky, water-cooled contraptions that, although effective, were rather unwieldy. What was needed was a LIGHT machine gun that could easily be carried and operated by two, or even one man. In this respect, the allies "helped" the Germans. One of the provisions of the odious Treaty of Versailles was the clause that forbade the Germans from owning or developing any large number on "sustained fire weapons", which basically meant water cooled machine guns. They intended to force the Germans to use only air-cooled machine guns, which could not maintain a good rate of fire due to barrel overheating. Hence. the German infantry would be permanently handicapped.......
WRONG.
What actually happened was that the Germans concentrated on a family of machine guns that utilized the option of "quick-change" barrels to get over the overheating problem. This dove-tailed nicely with the Germans' already declared intent to "lighten" the machine gun. And by 1939, German infantry had the start of both quality and quantity in light machine guns. When coupled with their already proven strosstruppen tactics, their infantry was more than a match for those they would face in the opening stages of WW2.
In the opening battles, however, it was the German armored formations that stole the limelight.
The Western Allies were so befuddled by this new "lightning" form of mechanized warfare that they did not realize that their infantry had also become OUTCLASSED."

heres a very relevant section of text - extremely erronous and in need of clarification. words like wrong and outclassed are highlighted. The entire point of the paragraph is lost and it the most important point. The German Machine guns were not just LMG's by attaching a tripod they instantly became HMG's. Key to the success of the german tactics was the ability of the Germans to bring firepower forward. Meaning once the artillery stopped to allow the Infantry to advance the enemy popped out of their holes and started shooting. In all other armies - Russian, chinese, Japanese, French, for instance this created a huge handicap. the Germans had the ability to provide suppressive fire at point of impact continously without exposing themselves to uncontested fire. Wrong and outclassed havent got a whole lot of meaning - but the fonts, etc... distract.

Now the key to Versailles was that it was very restrictive regarding HEAVY machines guns, specifically as regards ammo stocks for these weapons. but substantially less so regarding LIGHT machine guns. The fact that German HMG and LMG were one and the same but were classed as LMG gave the germans a distinct advantage, the key being adequate ammunition.

 

Dont get me wrong - I admire your enthusiasm - your posts are nicely done and the content is extremely interesting. But the visual effects are quite annoying - I'm not here for that - I'm here to read and comment. And I've very limited time to do it =(.

 

They did not just "attach tripods"....telescopic sites were fitted to MMG HMG, AND they were air cooled, lightening the load even further....The main problem, as you so pointed to, was AMMUNITION consumption......telescopic sights and selective fire make a machine gunner far more likely to blast away, rather than short, controlled nursts of three-five rounds.........the GAME conveys all this info....

OUTCLASSED was MY highlight....WRONG is in big bold capitals in the original....

Furthermore, if you look at the phases of the German system, you find that they would not advance until this "blinden" phase was complete,....having already called in their artillery support, it was a matter of survival for troops to win this 'phase' of the firefught....then and only then would 'niederhalten' be put into action, followed by the assault itself.....

I think what made German inbfantry so effective was their ability to rapidly change their plan of action in about twenty minutes from the problem recognition....it took other armies a lot longer to modify their initial tactical plan....German infantry NCOs at a company level could authorize a counterattack or a modification to the plan of action....and do it much faster than any other infantry of the day.....but it was risky when mixed with troops not so well trained or drilled...

No plan survives first contact with th enemy...it must be altered due to battlefield circumstance...and it must be done by the ppeople on the spot. Chain of command in other armies was a cumbersome way to alter what you were doing ON THE DAY, and the Germans simply did that faster than anyone....
As the text says...."do it NOW"

Comments, Got?....Higge?

 

Look at the Russian for an example of an Army that could not modify their plan at all....

Once the assault was in progress, it was very difficult for the Regiment to change what it was doing. Soviet officers were often forced to keep throwing units in the same manner at defenses that had already pushed back initial echelons......Hence, once an attack was in progress, they would frequently use the very same avenues of approach that had failed before, because of their inability to recieve fresh orders from the commanders controlling the assault.....German squads were equipped with radios to facilitate this.....whole Soviet Regiments often only had one radio, or a telephone line that was frequently cut...so...when reinforcements arrived to continue the assault, they were simply thrown in the same old way because their Officers had recieved no orders to the contrary....

 

Now....everything highlighted in the original text IS......

One of the significant aspects of the German system was it's ability to control what was happening even after something had gone drastically wrong. More and more, however, their replacement system diluted this advantage, until the edge provided by superior leadership was gone by the late war period. In fact, the more one examines the Allied reaction to all of this, the more one is forced to conclude that opponents of German infantry were frequently forced into paths of decision that they simply were not trained to cope with. As losses became higher and higher, these German NCOs dissappeared, and late war German tactics suffered from this. Allied theorists and trainers had time on their side to formulate a policy that would, eventually, be no more than a carbon copy of this German system. John hills game does a good job of pointing out national differences between the combatants, but you basically find yourself resorting more to mass if your level of leadership is poor for the scenario played. Artillery is at it's most effective when preplanned...the short duration of firefights mean that you spend a lot of time trying to call in Artillery and dropping your spotting rounds in the right spot.....and you must be allocated Arty support in the first place, and even then, there is no guarantee you will get to drop it right where you want it to go. This means that support boils down to INFANTRY weapons on the spot....and you can't move them easily,so they simply stay in place...hence the emphasis on LMGs

 

No hard feelings Got.....your posts are the BEST ON SITE!....

Be critical and I will take all of what you say onboard.....If you notice, I have altered nearly every post made here, turned off colours and put them into the same text with no highlights......

Now we can get down to the Comments!!!!!!

 

Germans had HMG's throughout the war. If you read the treaty provisions youll notice the entire ammo supply allowed for HMGs under the treaty amounted to about 4 hours effective fire.

 

Indeed they did, but the Thier LMG was really just a stripped down version.....and MOVING it was the problem. A light machine gun gets around this problem, and enables fire support to be right where you wish it to be. Portage of ammunition is what I think I was driving at,; you can only carry so much out of your "jump off position"....and it will run out when you least expect it to. Stockpiling next to a jump off point is fine, but once you move, you can only take so much with you....Anyhow, great to hear from you, as always....

What about the time factor for changing your orders?....You did ask me what I thought was the most significant difference of the German system to others, what made it unique....And I think lack of radios for the Soviets more than explains their tactical thickheadedness....Soviet tanks suffered from this same deficiency.With only one radio to every six tanks in 1941, they were like a bunch of cows all following one another into the barn.........

 

That was my whole point - the German Army was the only one in the world with the ability to project direct suppressive fire while advancing. German Infantry quality was for the most part poor, trained reserves were unavailable, ammunition and equipment shortages crippling, qualified officers and NCO's substantially lacking. A very small minority of German forces were even remotely capable of offensive action at any point in the war. Their only advantage - again was the ability to attack effectively and restore their positions. That was the key to German success and it was based on the employment of the aircooled machine guns. There were a lot of factors that contributed to these tactics - Some were based on versailles and used the HMG/LMG factor as Lmgs werent very prevalent in WW1 and the treaty writers didnt foresee the German employment, thus giving the Germans a loophole.

 

Good point to keep in mind is the very limited duration of most of these small scale actions.....20 minutes, in most cases was enough for something to develop that meant a decision could be seen (ie. The action was won or lost). Larger concentrations of men for major offensive move (Regimental level) took a little more time to develop, mainly due to delays caused by larger support elements needing to co-ordinate their activities. And this is something the German army did very well....AND FASTER than most opponents they face....

By the way, you are correct to say that a "very small minority of German forces were even remotely capable of offensive action at any point in the war.", but it only take a very FEW experienced NCOs who are "on the spot" to make all the difference.....Poland, France, Norway, Barbarossa.....all these campaigns showed that even a small percentage of professionally trained Infantry can make all the difference to the outcome....keeping the "flow" of the actions going from point to point, stringing all these local advances into a major move, and stringing major moves into a strategic victory.......Once the attrition process had removed these people from the scene, they were literally irreplaceable.....And always.....SPEED was the key. The ability of the German NCO to change their plan "mid-stream" may have been the lynchpin element in their bag of tricks. French forces in 1940 took up to 4 HOURS to alter a tactical plan of any kind.....and the Soviets never quite learnt the trick and were still "steamrolling" German positions right up to Berlin!

 

French docrine was easily traceble - Top down leadership is only effective if the "Top" is efficiently organized. For Instance the Soviet command structure was unique in that the "Top down" leadership had weeded out the roten apples and replaced them with a highly dedicated cadre of junior leaders and backed it up with a draconian disciplinary system and a highly centralized Industrial base ( small but highly efficient within its limitations. ) Theory developed in the excellent officer and NCO schools and influenced by the German missions at Kazan and Lipetsk could rapidly be brought into reality and tested... apparently some people - such as the tankers who were "tested" by being oopsed out of airplanes didnt appreciate this system but it was effective nonetheless. The world leaders in Mechanization and armored warfare were the italians going into the 1920's. They had the same "Top down" command structure as the Russians but the Cronyism unique to the Fascist regime and the constant political manuevering made the higher leadership ineffective. Couple that with the regimes inability to perform a housecleaning on the scale of Stalin's purges and the Relative age of the Italian officer Corps left you with an officer corps that wasn't able to effect the type of changes proposed by the totally ineffective high commands. A weak economy and a totally insufficient industrial base that totally dominated the political/miltary leadership left the Italians in desperate straits militarily despite their impressive paper figures. The only point in which the Italians excelled was personal bravery and NCO leadership, but that was nowhere near enough to overcome the myriad of problems that symbolized Mussolini's bankrupt political leadership. Italians stood up pound for pound in every situation that was at or near material parity and outperformed the Germans in many instances - Malta in Spring 1940 being a prime example.
The French "Top Down" leadership was even worse - The fact that they never even established a staff college ( I dont take the pathetic efforts started in 1932 as even remotely resembling a staff college ) It was a beauracratic nightmare of the worst sort with mutiple pages of details required to simply move a latrine 50 yeards east. In true WWI fashion the entire French Army moved on densely complicated orders that removed their leadership from the field. There was no room for initiative and even if there was there was no command schools that had the ability to teach it to the officers.

Armies like the British and the Germans and to a great degree the USA were more reliant on "Bottom up" leadership with a great deal of authority being given a highly qualified and uniformly trained officer Corps.

 

Hmmm....I like that last post, particularly comments concerning Italians....I too, tire of hearing of Italian inefficiency, and believe that, had they been better managed from the "top", as you sugesst, this state of affairs might not have eventuated.....and Mussolini is as much blamed by Italian generals for their own mistakes, as much as Rommel tended to blame others for his own lack of understanding of command at the Corps and Army level....how many times were Rommel's needs met by Hitler over the protests of those that knew better?....

I think the stage can be said to be "set" for a new look at all of these well known figures, Hitler included......