Faults of German defence strategy Western Europe during 1944

Too little, too late.

 

Nobody had tactical freedom in the bocage, with or without fuel and air cover. It's a maze of hedgerows totally unsuited for tank warfare.

 

???? Total production of V-2's was a bit over 5,000 they could barely hit a city. How are you going to saturate a linear target like a beachead with them?

Most of the suplies came over the beachhead in any case. Looseing the other Muhlberry would have been a problem but hardly an unsurmountable one.

Did they? Most of the reserves weren't going to get there very quickly anyway and moving them during the day into the naval gunfire support range doesn't sound all that promising to me.

 

First operational V2 launch was early September 1944, IIRC.

By 16th September 1900 were built, over the next six weeks, another 900 were built. It was estimated a maximum of 100-launches per day.

Increasing accuracy over the course of the war, particularly on batteries with Leitstrahl-Guide Beam, was countered by British misinformation.

It sort of hard to provide misinformation on the observable. Sort of easier to do with London, rather than Normandy.

No, you are not going to get pinpoint accuracy, and they didn't use biological or chemical warfare.

But the primary use of battlefield ballistic missiles (which, realistically, the V-2 was, akin to the Scud) is to attack concentrations of force and logistical buildups. There would never be another such obvious, formidable buildup of Western Allied supplies, in a concentrated area.



http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/v2.htm

"Tests of prototype V-2's in 1943 indicated a 4.5 km CEP (circular error probable - the radius within which 50% of the shots impact). 100% of the shots fell within 18 km of the target. A radio beam guidance update system was introduced in December 1944, which in tests produced a 2 km CEP. In reality, in the campaign against Britain, 518 rockets were recorded as falling in the Greater London Air Defence Zone of 1225 fired, implying an average CEP of 12 km.

Part of this lack of accuracy was attributable to a skillful British disinformation campaign. Nazi agents in Britain were the only source of information to the Germans as to where the missiles actually hit. Most of these agents had been turned by British intelligence and were sending back false reports as to the impact points of the rockets. These false reports indicated that the missiles were going long and impacting beyond London. As a result of corrections due to this false information, the German average impact point moving farther and farther east as the campaign went on. The average impact point for the entire campaign ended up on the eastern edge of the Greater London Air Defence Zone.

Had accurate post-attack reports been available to the Germans, the CEP would have been more like 6 km, reinforcing Dornberger's claim that by the end of the campaign the missile was close to achieving its tested accuracy. Without the British disinformation campaign, the number of the Allied victims of the V-2 would have been more than doubled, demonstrating the effectiveness of that operation. However even at its best accuracy made the V-2 was hugely cost-ineffective."

6km CEP and 50 launches a day;

 

If the 15th Army from Calais had been released early at least it would have been a tougher battle for Normandy.

 

The Western Allies were in minor supply predicaments; they managed them well enough for it not to cause major issues. This does not mean that they would've automatically absorbed further problems without issue.

As it was, most supplies were coming through the beaches, and that was causing problems.

Below is From "United States Army Logisitcs: From the American revolution to 9/11" by Steve Waddell

"The wind and high seas destroyed Mulberry A, and severely damaged Mulberry B. The storm also stopped all movement of supplies over the beaches for three days and led to shortages in a number of areas. Ammunition was the most seriously affected, as shortages had already developed as early as D+9. To avert disaster, units were limited to one third of fire per day. Daily tonnage levels did not reach pre-storm levels until the end of June."

The storm occurred on June 18th, Mulberry's were planned to be operational on D+18 (June 24th).

 

Would it? When would they have arrived? In what state?
If they are fed into the battle as soon as possible it might make the fighting tougher for a while even slow the break out but when the break out finally happens what's left to slow it? Especially if more supplies are available because the allies have had more time to accumulate them.

 

I'm sure it would cause problems. I don't see it resulting in an allied defeat in Normandy though. Indeed depending on just what happens the potential for an even more serious defeat of German arms is there.

 

Only if the forces at Normandy were much larger at the time of the landing was there a chance of German success. Even then there was still the Southern France landing

 

Think of it like this; as difficult as it was for the allies to break out of the bocage, how much more difficult would it have been for the Germans to break in through the same awful terrain and defeat a large and concentrated force? This is terrain that has a natural defensive berm every 50 or 100 yards. Those berms are great defense against artillery and direct fire, and the canopy (the actual hedgerow) on top provides excellent cover from observation. All armor is limited to moving along narrow crooked roads, with those same berms on both sides and ahead. Kill the lead tank and you halt all armor in the column - you can't just push it aside, the roads are lined with high berms.

The allies broke out eventually, but only by employing a massive air strike (Operation Cobra) that flattened the German defense lines and enabled them to get to the more open country beyond. The Germans, without heavy air power, had no chance to defeat the landing force after the first few hours, and no chance of heavily reinforcing that part of the coast in those first few hours. Their best bet was containment, and they did a very good job of that for seven long weeks.

 

If worse came to worse there was nothing to prevent the allies from delaying the Normandy landing and waiting till after the southern landing had drawn off German troops

 

In the back of every German's mind: " God let the Western Front crumble quickly to spare my family from the Russians!" The Soviets had, not only, The WWII axe to grind. There was still the 1914 - 1918 years to be settled.

Of course they put up a much better fight than they probably would have liked and The BoB defies any logic whatsoever ( all those resources should have been used at the Vistula to buy time for the bug out).

 

The Germans and the allies both agreed that the failure to redeploy infantry to Normandy caused the Germans huge problems. It meant that the panzer divisions could not be withdrawn from the battle for Caen and used, as the Germans wanted for either a decisive strike to the sea or as a counter stroke against the allies. For want of infantry the 21st, 12SS, Pz Lehr all were used to hold the line. The casualties they experienced blunted their offensive capability, The Germans wre only able to withdraw armour from the front line in late July early Aug.

The first troops detached from 15th Army were the KG from 346 Infantry Division E of Le Havre which reached the Eastern part of the bridgehead in 8th June having been ferried across the Seine.

Except.

1) Delaying D Day until late August wasn't a good idea.

2) A three division landing in the South of France would have been another Anzio. It would not have needed the full weight of OB West to have isolated and contained the bridgehead. Provance is further from allied air support than Anzio or Normandy and might have given the Germans a better chance. Arguably the Diadem May 1944 offensive in Italy was even better diversion as it forced the germans to redeploy resources just before D Day. I think Op Dragoon was timed OK as it turned out. The Germans had to abandon any ideas of retaining France and developed a second secure supply route.

 

While most will say the Rommel was over rated (Which Ill concede he was, Good Corps commander but far to inexperienced for an army command) I reckon we can all agree to some extent that he was right about France, That if they couldn't stop them on the beaches then they wouldn't be able to stop them full stop. All well and good to have more freedom of movement for the units but with the Allied aerial superiority there ability to get there intact was limited, Rather having the forces already on the beaches like he wanted would have been there best bet. Yes would have suffered huge casualties from the bombings and bombardments but they would still have better chance stopping the Allies.

They just simply lacked the number's to effectively be mobile so stationary was only option, Lucky for the allies so many of the best units where stationary so far away.

 

All was depending on the following

1)The ID had to prevent the Allies to land : they could not do this

2)Thus,the ID had to hold the front line,while the mobile divisions arrived :they were unable to do this :their only function was to man the Atlantikwall

3)Result : the PzD never could launch a big attack,because they were obliged to stop the gaps ,and,only a few were operational.

the final result was inevitable

 

Actually, the Germans did have a number of intact and mobile Panzer Divisions. That much is obvious if you look at what they put together for Operation Luttich in early August. The problem was that those armored units were useless (except in a defensive role) closer to the Normandy coast. They simply could not attack into the hedgerow country, any more than the allies could stage a major armored attack out of the hedgerow country. The terrain is a death trap for armor. A single AT gun could immobilize an entire column.

Note how quickly Patton and his 3rd Army swept through France, doing a complete end run around the entire German force once they broke out of the bocage in late July. That same armor (3rd Army) was immobile until they got free of that terrain with Operation Cobra.

In some ways, the situation at Normandy resembles Stalingrad. The Germans were able to sweep right up into the city with their armor, but once in that city maze, the armor became useless and it became an infantry struggle - small unit actions from building to building, rubble pile to rubble pile. That's what was happening in Normandy, except instead of buildings it was a maze of earthen berms topped with hedgerows.

 

It is all closed fields but the 'bocage' was 80% the US sector. Only the area of BLUECOAT came close to this description in the UK sector and around Caen it was fairly large fields with hedges.


West



East.

 

Perhaps so, but the British/commonwealth forces sort of squandered that advantage with piecemeal daylight attacks. There are some very compelling accounts from the 12th SS who were able to stand off and kill Canadian armor at long range simply because they used formations that exposed themselves in a horizontal line to the German AT guns. On the other hand, if the Germans had concentrated and thrust deeply into those positions, they'd still have their flank exposed to the Americans on their left (the allied right). And that's assuming a period of bad weather that would keep them from being destroyed by air while they made that thrust.

Largely, it wasn't just a matter of numbers of men, or armor, or logistics. The allies had their back to the coast, which gave them not just a tactical advantage against envelopment, but unlimited supply since they controlled the sea and air. Really, the Stalingrad comparison applies here - the Germans could only win by frontally assaulting and destroying every allied soldier and gun in front of them. They couldn't use the standard pincer movement. The further they went in frontally, the more compact the defense they had to break - and the stronger the artillery support (imagine what those big naval guns could have done had they driven in closer to the coast).

After those first few hours or days, they could only hope to contain the invasion. And in that containment which continued on for two months, they depleted the reserves they needed when the breakout finally happened.

 

Tank casualties were the same for both allied armies, c 2,000 each. It did not seem to make much difference if it was closed or open terrain.

 

The difference is the British were destroyed mostly in frontal attacks against prepared positions , the Americans were in the small unit attacks of the Bocage.