French fights

How many battles did the french actullay use their tanks?

 

Don't you read history? Look on some of the post on this site. Gembloux for one. The French armour got stuck in as well as they could.
Oli

 

Try looking at these for a start:
Arras
Gembloux
Philippeville: the first major tank-versus-tank battle of the war
Sedan
Stonne
Meuse
and something I hadn't realised: the only Allied tank force present in Norway in 1940 was the French 342nd and 343rd!
Oli

 

yeah unfortunely there good tanks were only used in peacemeal battles.

 

Hello,

There are many battles in which French tanks are involved. A quick summary about the main ones. Sedan was mentioned but there were no French tanks .... For Sedan itself, only 16 French infantry companies - grossly a string regiment - had to face alone 3 German armored divisions and 1 elite regiment supported by 700 German aircrafts. I have detailed a little bit what happened on the Meuse River.

1) battle of Hannut : the first big tank battle of WW2
The battle of Hannut (12th-14th May) is the first big tank battle of World War 2 : 411 French tanks (3e DLM and 2e DLM) are facing 674 German tanks (4.PzD and 3.PzD).
During the battle of Hannut, general Prioux had the actual command of a real French tank corps facing a German tank corps. They inflicted heavy losses to the Germans. The use of such a French tank corps is unique during the 1940 campaign except perhaps the formation of the "groupement Buisson" beginning June for the battles on the Aisne and Retourne Rivers south of Rethel which grouped the 3e DCR and the 7e DLM. On 14th May, having blocked the Germans as long as it was ordered, during 2 days, the cavalry corps moves back behind the French lines at Gembloux.


2) battle of Gembloux (14th-15th May) : involved only few tanks, 2 French infantry divisions blocked 2 Panzerdivisionen. There were several tanks from the French cavarly corps during the first stages and then 2 tank battalions : the 13e BCC (45 Hotchkiss H35) and the 35e BCC (45 Renault R35)

During the battles of Hannut / Gembloux in Belgium 12-15th May 1940, the Germans suffered very heavy losses among their tanks. In Hannut some 164 German tanks were knocked out and in Gembloux the French artillery alone destroyed about 50 German tanks, including 32 in the Pz.Rgt.35. On 15th May, the 4.PzD had only 137 operational available tanks left (including only 4 Panzer IV) from its 331 tanks. So there were 194 tanks damaged, under recovery/repair or destroyed after the battles of Hannut and Gembloux (only 41 % operational tanks).
On 16th May :
• The 4.PzD had about 55% operational tanks = 182 available tanks. Therefore 45 extra operational tanks than on 15th May. But 149 tanks remained unavailable, this number is including destroyed tanks and tanks in the repair workshops.
• The 3.PzD had 75% operational tanks. Therefore about 85 tanks are still destroyed or in the repair workshops one day after the battles.
On 16th May 1940, one day after the battles, 234 tanks (35% of the tanks) were not operational anymore, including an unknown number of definitively destroyed tanks. General Hoepner estimated that he was unable to continue efficiently the combats the next day. The Germans repaired probably some more of their tanks during the later days or weeks while the French could not recover the 105 tanks they had left in Hannut.


3) battle on the Meuse River - Sedan (13th - 15th May): NO French tanks involved at first.
On the Meuse River, on 13th – 15th May 1940, 7 French divisions generally largely under equipped (sometimes no AA guns like for the 55e DI and 71e DI which had also respectively only 12 and 8 AT guns instead of 62) defended an overstretched front (from Houx to Sedan - that is 15-30 km for each division whereas an infantry division should theoretically defend a 5-7 km front only). They had to face 40 German divisions including 7 concentrated Panzerdivisionen (about 2000 tanks) and about 1500 German aircrafts concentrated on a small area during hours. These two kinds of concentration were a first time in History. The French troops could only rely on very insufficient and largely unachieved fortifications. The Maginot Line by itself is indeed stopping at the border with the Luxembourg. The German infantry established bridgeheads and the tanks crossed the Meuse River and headed west in order to encircle the allied troops in the North.

Before the Meuse River, the advancing German troops had to face the Belgian "chasseurs ardennais" and elements of 2e DLC and 5e DLC (Division Légère de Cavalerie). These weak elements offered a courageous resistance in impossible odds. Each DLC at full strength had only an AFV strength of 13 Hotchkiss H35, 12 Panhard 178 armored cars (+1 radio car) and 23 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 light tanks = 48 AFVs. On the Belgian side, the "chasseurs ardennais" divisions have the highest AFV concentration of the Belgian army. The 1e division de chasseurs ardennais is equipped with 3 T15 and 48 T13 ; the 2e division de chasseurs ardennais has only 3 T15. Only the T13 self-propelled guns with their 47mm AT guns are able to engage enemy tanks.

On the north-eastern bank of the Meuse River there are also several French fore posts and fortified houses. The 2.PzD, 1.PzD and 10.PzD (799 tanks) advancing towards Sedan itself face them on 12th May. Elements of the 5e DLC which try to delay them on the Semois River retreat behind the French lines, being outflanked (one PzD one each flank) by the enemy.

On 12th May afternoon, the first German elements reach the Meuse River at the level of Dinant, Monthermé and Sedan. In the Sedan area of the south-western bank of the Meuse River there is the 55e DI, roughly the Bar River to Romilly, from Romilly to La Ferté there is the 3e DINA on 12th May 1940. On 13th May the 71e DI is deploying in between these two divisions and the deployment is roughly the following : 55e DI from the Bar River to Pont-Maugis, 71e DI from Pont-Maugis to Mouzon and 3e DINA form Mouzon to La Ferté. The main German attack will be sustained by the weak 55e DI, which has to face the "Grossdeutschland" regiment, the 2.PzD, the 1.PzD and 10.PzD.

- The 55e DI is composed of :
213e RI
295e RI
331e RI
- The 71e DI is composed of :
120e RI
205e RI
246e RI
But the 213e RI and 205e RI are far on the rears (the 213e RI is in La Neuville-a-Maire and the 205e RI is next to Yoncq) and therefore only 4 regiments are on the frontline to defend the Meuse River on 13th May. The area of Sedan itself is defended by 6 companies of the 147e RIF (fortress infantry regiment), 3 companies of the 295e RI (55e DI) and 6 companies of the 331e RI (55e DI). The men of the 55e DI are 29-40 years old and the men from the 147e RIF are 23-26 years old. The 1st company of the 11e BM (11th MG battalion) is reinforcing the position south of Donchéry. These 16 companies, roughly the equivalent of a strong regiment, and weak fortifications will have to face the concentrated assaults of 3 Panzerdivisionen reinforced by 1 infantry elite regiment.

On the south-western bank of the Meuse River there are several fortifications but most of them are not achieved, they often lack armament, doors or adequate crenels which have to be completed by sand bags. The fortifications were armed only with FM 24/29 LMGs, Mle1914 Hotchkiss HMGs, few 25mm Mle1934 guns and 37mm TR16 infantry guns. There were also several dismountable turrets Mle1935 and Mle1937 armed with a Mle1914 Hotchkiss MG and generally equipped with a camouflage/anti grenade nest around the turret. The MG barrel itself is protected by armor. There were also several open emplacements for Mle1914 Hotchkiss MGs, a few 81mm Stokes-Brandt and Brandt Mle1927/1931 mortars, several former Navy 65mm guns and a few 75mm Mle1897 guns more on the rear.

There are also AT mines but unluckily far less that there should have been. The French doctrine planned the deployment of 1370 mines/km on 1 row or 2740 mines/km on 2 staggered rows. The mines were placed in linear groups of 5 on a length of 2.50m, the groups being separated by 1.40m gaps. Such a minefield was usually prepared in 8 hours. At Sedan thousands of AT mines had been laid months before the campaign. Unfortunately they were reported to have been adversely affected by damp and so were dug up to be fixed. Sadly time did not permit them to be laid again, which was kind of unfortunate. Only about 2000 AT mines and an unknown number of AP mines were deployed on a total of about 70 km. As a comparison, Rommel used about 500,000 AT mines on 70 km in El Alamein in 1942. The 55e DI for example had still 422 AT mines stored in a dump but they were not used ! The officers were concentrated on trying to improve the unachieved fortifications, trenches and foxholes for the troops.

On 12th May 1940, the French HQ is still convinced that the main German attack is located in Belgium and in the Netherlands. The Germans are also thought to need about 1 week to concentrate enough artillery and to prepare the crossing of the Meuse River. Bu the Germans will initially replace the lack of artillery by the biggest air support concentration of History at this time.

On 13th May, at 11h00 about 1500 German aircrafts are concentrated on this front and made multiple sorties :
· 600 Heinkel He111, Dornier Do17 and Junkers Ju88 bombers
· 250 Junkers Ju87 Stuka
· 120 Messerschmitt Me110
· 500 Messerschmitt Me109

500 bombers escorted by 200 fighters are concentrated during 4 hours over the front hold by the single 55e DI. The Luftwaffe targets systematically the unachieved bunkers, the artillery positions, the communication and command centres. It is roughly without artillery support that the French first lines will have to stop the German assault. Each French battery entering in action is silenced by the Luftwaffe.

During 5 hours, the French troops are heavily bombed. The psychological shock of this air attack is even stronger than for the first use of combat gas during WW1 according to several testimonies. Heavy bombing occurs every 20 minutes on the men hidden in their trenches and the 55e DI is devoid of AA weapons and unable to return fire. All the communication by telephone lines between the first lines and the rear are cut. Battalions, companies and platoons are roughly isolated.

During the bombings the German troops are deploying for the attack :
- the 2.PzD (general Veiel) on the right flank
- in the middle, for the main effort, the 1.PzD (general Kirchner) supported by the "Grossdeutschland" regiment
- on the left the 10.PzD (general Schaal)

On 13th May, at 15h00, after the intense bombings, the German assault is launched in front of Sedan. The available German artillery, the German AA artillery (including 8.8cm FlaK), AT artillery and the German tanks firing from the opposite bank are replacing the Luftwaffe bombings to support the crossing. The Luftwaffe targets then the rear lines (HQ, artillery positions, dumps, cross-roads, rail-roads etc.), which will be bombed all day long while the first lines will face the German assaults.

The German troops cross the Meuse River on inflatable boats. At first they sustain nonetheless heavy losses and the landings are defeated in several areas. In front of Donchéry, west of Sedan, the 2.PzD cannot cross the Meuse as planned because of the intense MG fire of the III/147e RIF (3rd battalion) supported by the company of the 11e BM. The 2.Pzd could only cross the Meuse River after the successes of the 1.PzD at Sedan itself. Many little infiltrations occur, benefiting from the shock and the destruction resulting from the air attacks. Each time a resistance is met the German troops avoid it and go on. Many French positions, cut from the others, are attacked from the rear.

On the first line the companies of the 55e DI and of the 147e RIF nevertheless fight desperately but many men in the rear lines, especially in the artillery units of the 55e DI and 71e DI will flee away. At the end of the afternoon, rumours of the presence of German tanks near Bulson (despite the fact that no single German tank has actually crossed the Meuse River) will causes what is known as the "Bulson panic" in the 55e DI and 71e DI. Colonel Poncelet, commanding the French artillery in the area, unable to verify the truth, orders the retreat for his units.

While the first lines are still fighting courageously in a desperate situation, the rear troops are abandoning their position in panic. The HQ of the 55e DI follows the movement, without being able to check the information. The panic spreads in the rear lines, many men abandoning their weapons. This event is often generalized to caricature the whole 1940 French army. Colonel Poncelet will later commit suicide for that decision.

On 13th May evening, in Sedan, except some still resisting platoons in the first lines, the 55e DI has been pulled back and the Germans have established a 6 km wide and 3 km deep bridgehead. During the night the 1st Schützen regiment (1.PzD) moves to Cheveuges (see map). It is an important German success, but most of the infantry and all the vehicles and heavy armament of the 3 Panzerdivisionen and the GD IR are still on the north-eastern bank of the Meuse River :
799 tanks
168 armored cars
18 15cm sIG.33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I
6 8.8cm FlaK (Sfl) auf Zugkraftwagen 12t (Sd.Kfz. 8) also known as "Bunkerflak" or "Bufla" from the 1./s.Pz.Jg.Abt.8, attached to 1.PzD
all the attached StuG III (at least 6 of Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 640 included in the "Grossdeutschland" IR)
all the attached Panzerjäger I (at least Panzerjäger Abteilung 521 with 18 Panzerjäger I, attached to 10.PzD)
all the artillery and 8.8cm FlaK

More than 1000 AFVs are in front of Sedan itself but have not yet crossed the river. Despite the omnipresent Luftwaffe, a quick and strong French counter-attack would still be able to close the door to the German army.

At the same time, the 7.PzD and 5.PzD (546 tanks) have to cross the Meuse River in the area of Dinant and Houx. Elements of the 1e DLC and of the 4e DLC are retreating behind the French lines in that area. The bridges are all blown when the first German AFVs where crossing them. The 7.PzD is opposed to the 18e DI, which has only 70% of its theoretical strength and only 21 AT guns instead of 62. The 5.PzD is attacking the 5e DIM and the hinge between the 5e DIM and the 18e DI. The first crossing attempts are defeated but covered by the fire of the German tanks, the German infantry nonetheless manages to establish a small bridgehead.

On 14th May, a French counter-attack led by elements of the 5e DIM and several Hotchkiss tanks of the 4e DLC takes again the town of Haut-le-Wastia. Rommel is even slightly wounded by French artillery fire and the French troops are only hundred meters from him. The intervention of German tanks changes the situation. One French 25mm AT gun knocks out 7 German tanks but the numerous German tanks and the omnipresent Luftwaffe defeat the French troops. The 18e DI is supported by the 3rd company (13 tanks) of the 6e BCC (Renault R35 tanks) but they are dispersed in blockades on the roads.
Anyway this company would have been useless against the 219 tanks of the 7.PzD. After a strong resistance, the 18e DI and the 5e DIM are defeated.

On 13th May evening the 1.PzD, 2.PzD and 10.PzD have established a bridgehead in Sedan. The 7.PzD and 5.PzD have created a bridgehead in the area of Dinant and Houx but the 6.PzD and 8.PzD prove unable to exploit the planned bridgehead at Monthermé.

The area of Monthermé, north-west of Sedan, is defended by the 102e DIF (general Portzert), which has to defend a front of 35-40 km instead of the theoretical 5-7 km. This fortress infantry division is roughly devoid of fortifications. The town of Monthermé itself is located on a small isthmus, dominated by the heights of the opposite bank and difficult to defend. The 102e DIF is composed of :
· 148e RIF (fortress infantry regiment)
· 52e DBMC (colonial MG half-brigade)
· 42e DBMC (colonial MG half-brigade)

The 42e DBMC (lieutenant-colonel de Pinsun) is defending the isthmus, a front of about 25 km with only 3,200 men, against the 6.PzD (about 16,000 men, 56 armored cars and 218 tanks) which is followed by the 8.PzD (about 16,000 men, 56 armored cars and 212 tanks).
This regiment-sized unit is composed of 2,800 French and 400 Madagascan soldiers, organized in 3 battalions. Each battalion consists in 3 MG companies and 1 rifle company. The single available AT means are 6 25mm AT guns and blockades. Each company is also supported by 4 old Stokes-Brandt 81mm mortars. 1 battalion is defending Monthermé itself.
The artillery support consists only in 8 150mm T Fabry trench mortars from WW1. There are also 8 small bunkers and 4 dismountable turrets Mle1935 and Mle1937 armed with a Mle1914 Hotchkiss MG. The positions are completed by field emplacements, foxholes, trenches and barbed wire fences.
The 6.PzD, supported by elements of the 8.PzD, is engaged against Monthermé on 13th May 1940. The assault is entrusted to the 3rd Schützen battalion. One German battalion is therefore opposed to one French battalion in Monthermé. The French are behind a river, but in a position dominated by the other bank. The German battalion is supported by the engineer battalion of the 6.PzD for its crossing. It is also strongly supported by the Luftwaffe and by direct fire from the German 11th tank regiment, as well as all kinds of AA guns, AT guns and MGs on the opposite bank.
After 2 hours of stiff resistance and several French counter-attacks, a small bridgehead is established. The Germans will nonetheless need 2 days to defeat the French defense, unable to enlarge their tiny bridgehead despite a huge superiority.
On 14th May, a second German infantry battalion reinforces the first one. A renewed attack is launched at 6h00 but they are blocked by several French platoons led by capitaine Villard. The 150mm trench mortars are finally out of ammunition and the crews are used as infantry troop. At 14h30, a new German assault is defeated by the intervention of 1 company of the 148e RIF in reinforcement. At Dinant and Sedan the bridgeheads are being enlarged during the 14th May, but at Monthermé 2 armored divisions are still blocked by roughly 1 infantry regiment.
At 16h00, general Kempf orders a new all-out assault supported by the Luftwaffe but the attack is finally postponed. The Germans wait for the reinforcement of a 3rd infantry battalion and 1 tank battalion in the bridgehead. These 4 battalions are engaged against a single French infantry battalion. At dawn, on 15th May, the German assault is launched. Most of the remaining French troops are encircled and later captured or killed. Behind the 42e DBMC the French lines are empty. This unit delayed during 2 days the 6.PzD and the 8.PzD following it.
General Reinhardt said : "at Monthermé, the French troops offered a resistance worthy of the 'Poilus' of Verdun in 1916. They defended their position and even counter-attacked despite our superiority in number and armament. During my military career I rarely met so courageous soldiers".
According to the British historian John Keegan, the resistance at Monthermé would mostly be due to the numerous Indochinese troops and not the French ones … this is completely wrong. There are no Indochinese troops at all in this unit and only few soldiers from the colonies. The 42e DBMC is composed of 87.5% French and 12.5% Madagascan soldiers.

From Houx to Sedan, there are only 6 French light tank battalions available in the rear lines (351 tanks including 126 obsolete Renault FT17 tanks, 90 FCM36 tanks and 135 Renault R35 tanks) to face about 2000 German tanks strongly supported by the Luftwaffe, which are currently breaking the French lines. The battalions are sacrificed to delay the Germans like the 33e BCC with its 63 Renault FT17 tanks.
The Renault FT17 with a top speed of 8 km/h and a maximum armor of 22mm, each FT17 battalion had 39 FT17c with a 37mm SA18 gun and 24 FT17m (with a 8mm Mle1914 Hotchkiss MG) or FT31 (with a 7.5mm Mle1931 MAC MG). Only the 39 FT17c had a gun able to engage a Panzer I or a Panzer II but had to be generally < 25m to have a chance to knock out a Panzer III or a Panzer IV. This 37mm SA18 was the same in the FCM36, Renault R35 and most of the Hotchkiss H35 and H39 tanks. Conscious of the suicidal mission, these crews nonetheless went into the battle and 55 out of 63 FT17 tanks are destroyed. 110 out of the 132 men of the battalion are KIA on 15th May.


4) battle (small) around Bulson, south of Sedan on 14th May (1 FCM 36 tank battalion and 1 infantry regiment counter-attack). Defeated by German tanks, StuGs and the use of SdKfz8 + 8.8cm Flak SP-AT guns.


5) battle of La Horgne (15th May), south-east of Sedan - no French tanks but fierce defense of less than 2000 French troops from the 3e Brigade de Spahis blocking half of the 1. PzD during 1 day. The AT weaponry consisted only in one or two 37mm Mle1916 TR infantry guns and a single Hotchkiss 25mm Mle1934/1937 AT gun. 16 German tanks were knocked out.


6) battle of Flavion (15th May) : the second big tank battle of WW2, 546 German tanks against 144 French tanks.


7) battles south of Sedan in the Mont-Dieu area (15th - 25th May) : mainly in Stonne and Tannay
The woody hills of the Mont-Dieu area are dominating the plain 15 km south of Sedan. The town of Stonne and its hill called the "Pain de Sucre" (335m high) are located between the Mont-Dieu and the Mont-Damion. At Stonne the German advance could be stopped. From Stonne a French counter-attack could be launched on the flank of the German columns. The conquest of Stonne is therefore of importance for both German and the French armies. The battle in this area lasted from 15th to 25th May, 15 km south of Sedan. The German were unable to reduce the French defense before.

Guderian engages in the area the "Grossdeutschland" motorized infantry regiment, the 10.PzD and engineer elements from the 1.PzD. Later elements of the 2.ID (mot) and finally the 16.ID and 24.ID of the VI.AK (16.ID, 24.ID and 26.ID) are engaged. The presence of elements of both the 1.PzD and the 10.PzD is also confirmed by the Germans POWs captured by the French troops.
The 10.PzD has 275 tanks, Panzerjäger Abteilung 521 (18 Panzerjäger I) is attached to the 10.PzD and the "Grossdeutschland" regiment includes Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 640 (6 Sturmgeschütze III Ausf.A) for a total of 299 German tanks. Auflklärung Abteilung (AA) 90 (10.PzD) has a strength of 56 armored cars, AA 2 (2.ID mot.) contains 26 armored cars and the 16.ID has an armored car platoon of 3 armored cars, of which 2 are armed. There are therefore also 84 armored cars around Stonne, which makes a total of 383 AFVs. Other self-propelled guns and army / army corps elements may have been involved. The Germans troops had also strong support from the Luftwaffe.

To defend the Mont-Dieu area, the French troops include the 3e DCR (reduced to 138 tanks instead of 160 tanks), the 3e DIM and several reconnaissance groups.

On 16th May morning a counter-attack is led by 15 B1bis tanks from the 41e BCC and they met the Panzer Regiment 8 (10.PzD). A single B1bis tank (the B1bis "Eure" from Lieutenant Bilotte) pushed in the town itself into the German defenses and went back. He attacked a German column of Pz.Rgt.8 and destroyed 2 PzIV, 11 PzIII and 2 3.7cm PaKs. The first shots destroyed simultaneously the first (with the 47mm gun) and the last tank (with the 75mm gun) of the column. The armor of the B1bis was scattered with 140 impacts, no one penetrated or really damaged the armor.
After the 16th May, the 10.PzD was replaced by the VI. Korps. The "Grossdeutschland" IR had already lost 103 KIA, 459 WIA and 12 guns and is replaced by elements of the 2.ID (mot.) during the night.
There were many battles in the Mont-Dieu and Mont-Damion woody hills, in Tannay, in Stonne etc.
The battle of Stonne has been called by the Germans the "Verdun of 1940". The town itself switched side 17 times in 3 days (15-17th May). The Kriegstagebuch (journal) of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment indicates that "the name of Stonne entered in the history of the regiment with blood".
Stonne saw very hard combats and some German officers mentioned Stonne beside Stalingrad and Monte Cassino battles among the battles they will never forget. Look for example the book of Karl Heinz Frieser (Bundeswehr) : "Blitzkrieg Legende". During these battles the French lost about 3,000 men including about 1,000 KIA. The German losses were even heavier, serious studies estimate them up to 3-4 times higher compared to the French ones. There are 915 German graves near Stonne itself. During 23rd and 24th May, in only 2 days, the German 24.ID alone had 1,490 losses (347 KIA, 1,086 WIA and 57 MIA). From 17th to 25th May the 1st battalion of the German 79.IR sustained 191 losses (41 KIA, 144 WIA and 6 MIA) near the Mont Damion. Most of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment losses of the 1940 Western campaign were around Stonne with 570 losses (KIA, WIA, MIA). The French infantry lost many men, for example the 1st battalion of the 67e RI had 362 officers KIA. One company of the 51e RI finished the battle with only 5 sergeants and 30 soldiers left.


8) battles next to the Mormal forest. On 17th May, the 1e DLM withdrawn from the Netherlands is ordered to block the German tanks. It meets the 5.PzD and elements of the 7.PzD. The 1e DLM is far from having all its units but the counter-attack starts at 18h30 from Quesnoy towards Landrecies. The tanks of the 4e RC (colonel Poupel) and the 18e RD (colonel Pinon) are incomplete, inferior in number and forced to disperse to control the assigned area. Nevertheless the morale and the determination are high. During the counter-attack many Hotchkiss tanks are destroyed by 10.5cm filed guns used in AT role. The French counter-attack will significantly delay the 5.PzD.
On 18th May, 12 Somua S35 tanks of the squadron of captain De Segonzac from the 4e RC are holding the town of Jolimetz along with one company of Moroccan tirailleurs in support. During all the day they faced half of the 5.PzD (about 120 tanks and massive infantry, field artillery, AT guns and aviation support) on the move in this area. 1 Somua S35 tank (Maréchal des logis Enfroy) is damaged during a reconnaissance and sent back to Quesnoy. Only 11 French tanks are then controlling the town. The German attack is launched and after a few losses the Germans sent preferentially the heavier Panzer IVs in the town itself. At the end of the day the town was completely surrounded. In 10 vs 1 odd, the French have lost 10 tanks (destroyed or abandoned) and the Germans 26 tanks, mostly Panzer IVs. That is a perfect example of what well-trained French crews were able to do.
On 20th May, the 5e DINA (general Agliany) supported by the 1e DLM and the 39e BCC (45 Renault R35 tanks) attack the German 8.ID, 20.ID (mot), 4.PzD and 5.PzD. The combats last all the day long and on the evening several French troops are trapped in the Mormal forest after having sustained heavy losses.
The 2e DLM and 3e DLM on their side covered the retreat of the French 1st army from 16th May to 19th May. On 18th May, they launched several violent but limited counter-attacks in the area of Douai.


9) battle of Arras on 21st May involves also 60 French tanks, not only 47 British ones


10) 2 battles of Montcornet involving at first the 2e DCR and then the 4e DCR


11) battle of Crécy-sur-Serre with the 4e DCR


12) battle of Abbeville. There were in fact 3 attacks on Abbeville :

- First attack : 27th May 1940 - 1st AD (165 tanks) + few French cavalry elements
1st British Armoured Division (General Evans) failed in less than 2 hours and the British troops lost 120 tanks from the 165 tanks engaged.

- Second attack : 28th to 31st May 1940 - 4e DCR (176 tanks)
4e DCR led by General De Gaulle. The French troops despite loosing many tanks inflicted heavy losses to the Germans. The bridgehead is drastically reduced but the bridges in Abbeville and Mont de Caubert (hill) are still in German hands.
46e BCC (13 B1bis tanks)
47e BCC (19 B1bis tanks)
44e BCC (45 R35 tanks)
2/24e BCC (20 Renault R35 tanks)
3e Cuirassiers (40 Hotchkiss H39 and 39 Somua S35).

- Third attack : 4th June 1940 - 2e DCR + Commonwealth infantry
Between 1st and 5th June 1940 the 2e DCR (Colonel Perré) and Scottish troops (General Fortune) replaced the 4e DCR. On 4th June the Mont de Caubert is taken, it is close to a victory but the Germans were breaking the front around. It was like closing a door while the walls around are collapsing.

The attack is supported by about 200 artillery pieces for the biggest allied artillery concentration of 1939/1940.
In front of Abbeville (during 3 counter-attacks between 27th May and 5th June) the Germans sustained about 2500 KIAs + WIAs and 400 POWs but also most of the vehicles, AT guns, AA guns, HMGs and mortars of two regiments of the 57.ID were destroyed or captured. A whole battalion (III/IR.217) was wiped out in one attack of the 4e DCR in Huppy. Several German companies were reduced to only about 20-30 men. But the French troops lost a lot of tanks during this battle. Many German companies were reduced to about 30 men. For example the platoon led by Franz Arsan (from the 3rd company of the I/179.IR : 50 men, 4 NCOs, 3 MGs) has been reduced to 21 men including 2 NCOs and 1 MG.


13) Lille - very few French tanks
In Lille 7 German divisions were blocked from 28th to 31st May. About 40,000 French troops commanded by general Molinié - remnants from various units - held about 800 German tanks and 110,000 soldiers from the 4.PzD, 5.PzD, 7.PzD, 7.ID, 217.ID, 253.ID and 267.ID. They fought encircled until all their ammunition was used and led several counter-attacks, the commander of 253.ID, general Kühne, was even captured. The Germans let the defenders parade in the streets after the battle render them the honors and salute their fierce resistance. Even Churchill in his memories recognized the role of the troops in Lille in favor of the pocket of Dunkirk.


14) Dunkirk .... largely fought by French ground troops ... also few French tanks fought until the end.


15) battle on the Aisne River (Rethel) and the Retourne River (Juniville) - involves various B1bis tanks in May and the 3e DCR, the 7e DLM and the 10e BCC in June.


16) battle south of the Somme River, south of Amiens - mainly French infantry but few tanks.
e.g. on 5th June, the German XIV.Panzerkorps (9.PzD, 10.PzD, 13.ID (mot), 9.ID and "Grossdeutschland" regiment) assaults the French positions south of Amiens on the Somme River. The 14-20 km front (including the plateau of Dury) is hold by the 16e DI supported by 2 companies (30 Renault R35 tanks) of the 12e BCC. More than 400 German tanks and about 64,000 men are launched against about 18,000 French troops and 30 tanks. The French troops are organized in strongpoints in the towns and woods on a depth of about 10 km sometimes. These hedgehogs include infantry, HMGs, 25mm and 47mm AT guns, 75mm field guns used in AT role, AT mines etc. for a 360° defense. The advancing German tanks are rapidly cut from their supporting infantry and confronted on the rears to French 75mm, 105mm and 155mm artillery batteries engaging them in direct fire. On 8th and 9th June the 16e DI rears are reinforced by the 24e DI. After 5 days the German operation is stopped in that area, it failed and the Germans sustained heavy losses. The XIV.Panzerkorps is then moved and engaged behind the XVI.Panzerkorps in Péronne. The German troops lost 196 destroyed or damaged tanks (136 against the 16e DI and 60 against the 24e DI), including many definitively destroyed ones especially against French artillery batteries firing directly on the enemy tanks. The 2 French divisions have lost 60-70% of their strength but they stopped a Panzerkorps. Unlike in Gembloux the French troops had no strong artillery support since the artillery was mainly engaged in direct fire missions. After this battle the number of operational tanks of the XIV.Panzerkorps dropped to 45%.


17) battle on the Loire River / Saumur - various small armored units. Several corps francs de cavalerie, remains of the cavalry corps etc.

And others ...

David

 

Marvelous, thanks David
Oli

 

Hi,

An other example... On 22nd May, the 25e DIM supported by the 38e BCC (45 Hotchkiss H35 tanks at full strength) drives the German 32.ID from the field near Cambrai on the Escaut River, east of Arras. The French breakthrough is important and the Germans engage massive air support to stop it. 18 Dewoitine D520 fighters from GC 2/3 in patrol in the area intercept a Stuka group and 11 Ju87 dive bombers are shot down. But, the French attack is stopped by the intensity of the bombings.
The same day, general Prioux decides to regroup the cavalry corps in the area of Arras. The I/4e RDP supported byt the 18e RD and its Somua S35 tanks (1e DLM) leads a brilliant counter-attack which allows to take Mont-Saint-Eloi north-west of Arras. During this attack, the 2e DLM and 3e DLM covered the flanks of the attack.

Regards,

David

 

if i dont know the outcome of this campain i would guess the germans were heavily defeated the way you write is curios germans were defeated here and there heavy german losses attacks has been repulsed and then the germans had a bridgehead and the same again and agian and in the end they where in paris but the hole way to paris they were defeated and recived heavy losses. how wonder

 

Such is the difference between the large strategical picture and the small tactical one. You'll notice that even if the French achieve local victories they will end up battered beyond operational value, or outflanked and forced to retreat. There's also the fact that in the abovementioned battles the German tactical air force rarely plays a part; in greater stretches of the campaign's history this has decisive influence.

The examples just show you that it wasn't all quite as easy as it seemed for the Germans. I'm not sure how great their total losses were against France and Britain in 1940 but they were high.

 

It is an interesting anomoly of the early Blitzkrieg years that wherever the Germans bumped into an enemy force of roughly equivalent strength who were not feeling a tad demoralised they were often given rather a hard jolt. This is true in the Polish, French, Balkans and Russian campaigns.

I think the point is that overall, the German's better mobility, communications & tactics allowed them to win the campaign, (or in the case of Russia, make significant gains) mostly by concentartion of armoured stength coupled with excellent air support. However, on a local level, the opposing forces could & did inflict limited defeats.

 

Like the allied in 1944-45

 

Well, check out Operation Cobra.

Mostly however it is tough to use Blitzkrieg on an opponant who not only invented the tactic, but also has very strong defensive assets and a rather fanatical mentality (mixture of ideological brainwashing & the 'unconditional surrender' bugbear).

 

Operation Cobra was carried out against the exhausted men of units barely worth the name "regiment" even though they were divisions. Supply and communications had broken down, and the German high command's only order was to hold ground at any cost. I don't think this can be compared to the German attack on France in 1940 very easily.

This isn't to downplay the actions of the Allied armies in the NWE campaign, but just to make sure that any comparison made is historically accurate.

 

Didn't Le Clerc get between Patton and Falaise? Le Clerc would not attack the gap and would he not move out of Pattons way, because he wanted Paris. I must have read 3+ or 6 books on Patton.

About COBRA, I believe Panzer Lehr and Bayerlein were pretty good. He claims 80 tanks lost in July 1944. I don't know, he is quoted 80 lost in Cobra, but his official reports claim 80 lost in the whole month, including Falaise.

 

Panzer Lehr was subjected to one of the most lasting and ferocious bombardments of the war, including from the air by all types of bombers (tactical and strategical), during the opening phase of Operation Cobra. I believe Bayerlein reported having only about 1200 combat-worthy men left after this bombardment, which came after weeks of frontline action for the division.

 

Roel wrote:

A fruitless line of reasoning isasmuch as nearly all Allied attacks(after Normandy) were preceded by ferocious air and artillery bombardment which significantly weakened the German forces. When one has a war winning advantage over your opponent it is only good tactics to take maximum advantage of it. The US Airforce (with British assistance natuurally) achieved air superiority early on and never lost it. The more German units weakened from air attacks the fewer lives had to be spent to defeat them.

 

Cobra did get the biggest of the lot though. I'm not sure why Roel pointing out that Lehr had been under bombadment is a fruitless argument, as they were, and it did reduce their effectiveness. Just as it did for the German forces subjected to similar (but smaller) attacks around Caen (even though the ground attacks failed).

btw -

Is an interesting way to put it! I'd just like to point out the actual conditions of the ETO air war after Germany invaded the USSR (and before the USAAF got involved ), and remind all British members (including myself) not to get all knee-jerkily xenophobic.

 

I'm curious. Roel will jump in and state that the Germans at so-and-such operation were subjected to so-and-such stipulation that made them as a unit weaker, therefore the efforts of the Western Allies really weren't that fantastic.

Then within the same 24 hours, he'll have no problem saying something like the Americans had the advantage in the begining of the Ardenes offensive and the German effort there was a spectacular display of the might of the almighty Panzer armies.

I'm seeing a double standard here.

 

Ricky wrote:

Pointless would be a better adjective I suppose. Pointless because that is true of virtually all Allied offensives after D-day.

I'm a risk taker..what can I say?

When I say"early on" I am of course referring to the period of time in which the US ArmyAirCorps had significant involvment in the ETO in closeair support operations(as opposed to strategic bombing)...i.e after Normandy.