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"Game Changers"

Discussion in 'Wonder Weapons' started by formerjughead, Feb 13, 2011.

  1. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    There has been a great deal of discussion lately on weapons that could have changed the War. The one recurring theme is that the majority of the "Wonder Weapons" came into play too late in the game to make a noticeable difference.

    Germany, without a doubt, lead the pack on leading edge research and Japan made some advances, albeit on the coat tails of Germany, that were impressive as well.

    However; at the end of the day the US, and by default the Allies, reigned supreme. For the most part the Allies were playing "catch up" to the technology and tactics that the Germans and Japanese had. There were really no "Gee Whiz" pieces of equipment that the Allies developed or possessed during the War, except of course for the Atomic Bomb.

    On paper the Germans should have won and the Japanese could have won; but, it didn't turn out that way.

    So, am I just being naive in assuming that the "Arsenal of Democracy" was so solid that nothing would have changed the course of the War once the US entered?

    What were the "Game Changers" what did either side develop that either caused the tide to turn for or against them?

    As always cite your sources and don't start your reply with "If"; because we all know that if your sister had a mustache* she'd be your brother.
    (mustache is a metaphor and no offense is intended to follicly prodigious women)


    ALLIES
    (1)Standardization of Equipment / Materiel-1936 (AoD)
    (2)Lend Lease / Logistics- 1940 (AoD)
    (1) Raids in Depth-1941 (Doolittle, Comandoes, LRDG et al)
    (1)Cryptogtology/Cryptography - 1941
    (4)RADAR integrated Air Defense-1941
    (1) Strategiac Air Bombardment-1942
    (1) Expeditionary Engineer Units/Operations (1942)
    (1)Proximaty Fuze-1942
    (1)Centralized/Integrated C&C-1942
    (1)Standardization of Training-1942
    (1)Deferrments for Occupations Criticle to War Production-1942
    (1)Utilization of Women in the Workforce-1943 (AoD)
    (1)Advancements in Medical Treatment and Technology-1943 et seq
    AXIS
    (1) Coordinated attacks (Radio)-1939
    (3)Air/Ground Combat Coordination (Blitzkrieg)-1939
    (1) Tactical Use of Aircraft -3D battlefield- 1939
    (1) Synthetic Fuel / Process-1942
     
  2. machine shop tom

    machine shop tom Member

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    "Game changers" came about because desperate and unique measure were needed to stem an enemies overwhelming advantage in materiel production. Had the allies been against the wall as the Japs and Jerries were, we would have probably tried to field some of our own wonder weapons. When one plans for a short war and ends up in a long slug-fest, one must count on an ace-in-the-hole. Problem is, that also counts on the other guy not having four queens to your one ace.

    tom
     
  3. machine shop tom

    machine shop tom Member

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    The proximity fuse was a game changer for the allies. Certainly, it softened the blow that the Kamikaze weapon was against the fleets arrayed against Japan. Fortunately the Germans hadn't developed a similar fuse to use against the bombers that hammered them.

    Here's an interesting treatise on the development of the proximity fuse:

    Innovation During WWII

    And a chilling thought on how close the Japanese were to effectively using a proximity fuse of their own, from the same source:

    "The Japanese were also introducing their own proximity fuzes in bombs and rockets (a more stable platform than cannons). In June, 1944, the Japanese bombed an airbase on recently captured Saipan, with a single1700 pound proximity bomb, which exploded 35 feet above the airfield, destroying or damaging scores of parked B-29s, (the most advanced bomber of the time), which were to be used to begin bombing raids on Japan. Proximity fuzes were scheduled to be used by Japan in a fleet of kamikaze bombers to be launched from submarines at US cities on the west coast and the Panama Canal just a month after the atom bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. As the Pacific war ended, Japan had perfected and produced over 12,000 proximity fuzes for use in AA artillery. Fortunately there was not an opportunity to use them."

    tom
     
  4. CAC

    CAC Ace of Spades

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    As Yamamoto realised, America's industrial might was astonishing...NOTHING in the world could touch it at the time. Put one machine down and two came to replace it...on and on....
    And the US DID devise a wonder weapon, one that PROVED wonder weapons can win wars...the Nuclear bomb.
     
  5. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    I think in 1942 the game was just beginning but we'll give that the "nod". It was in use/ development prior to US entry into the War and it played a big role in the effectiveness of the A-Bombs.

    We already covered that one in the Opening Post.
     
  6. A-58

    A-58 Cool Dude

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    The use of women in the factories and the war industry on the US homefront. That changed a lot of things.
     
  7. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    I think we can color that one with the "Arsenal of Democracy" crayon
     
  8. Biak

    Biak Boy from Illinois Staff Member

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    I know I'm going off base a little from the "Wonder Weapons" but I believe the "Game Changer" between the participants was neither 'Wonder Weapons' nor our huge domestic production capabilities, although that helped. Nearly everything we read about the "strategic thinking" of the Military leaders of Germany, Italy and Japan, places an emphasis on the dysfunction between the Branches.

    This from one of Sniper's threads: http://www.ww2f.com/war-pacific/467...-southwest-pacific-area-volume-ii-part-i.html
    From a Japanese report of operations tactics.

    "The necessity of avoiding any exaggeration of enemy losses was clearly recognized because of the importance to future operational planning. Combined Fleet staff officers thoroughly studied and sifted the action reports of the combat flying units. Although these reports were considered of dubious reliability, Second Air Fleet strongly insisted upon their accuracy, and in the absence of adequate post-attack reconnaissance, the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters had no choice but to base its assessment on the reports at hand. Enemy losses were finally listed as follows:67
    Sunk: 11 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser).
    Damaged: 8 carriers, 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser), 13 unidentified ships. In addition, at least 12 other ships set afire.

    These results, officially accepted and announced, added up to the most phenomenal success achieved by the Japanese Navy since the attack on Pearl Harbor. "

    The above successes? of the Japanese (near the end of the war), would have been more than phenomenal if true.
    I'll always hold to the idea that "it is not the weapon but how it is employed". It would have been a big "game changer" had Germany or Japan relied less on their "Superior Race" ideology and more on an honest appraisal of events.
    Each combatant developed weapons designed to give them an advantage but nearly just as quickly the other side came up with a way to counter the new weapon. One example; The "V1's" of Germany were highly advanced weapons for the times but less than a quarter of those launched reach their target area. Fighters, anti-aircraft fire and barrage balloons shot down many of these "Wonder Weapons".
     
  9. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    So... something along the lines of force integration or centralized command and control?

    How Eisenhower was Supreme Comander in Europe
    MacAurthur was the HMFIC-PAC
    Nimitz was CNO-PAC

    Are we good with calling it Centralized Command and Control ?

    Germany was pretty "centralized" with it's C&C ; but, Hitler really didn't have as much on the ball as Eisenhower, MacArthur and Nimitz did.

    I mean no disrespect to the Brits; I am just not that familiar with who they had leading things in the Pacific or Atlantic.
     
  10. Biak

    Biak Boy from Illinois Staff Member

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    That is what I'm thinking. It seems we, our commanders, had a better system of "sharing information" and not trying to advance our own agenda. Although MacArthur was pretty good at doing that. The Japanese had the capabilities but wasted it by the fear of losing face. The above mentioned reports of sinking 11 aircraft carriers was a complete fabrication and had it been a truthful accounting of air offensives would have certainly altered the following operations. In actuality the loses to the US forces were considerably less and Japan had lost over 200 aircraft which they could not afford to lose.
    In-fighting was known to exist within the Allied Forces whether for "The Glory" or a deep felt belief they were right, but it looks like they shared intelligence truthfully rather than deliberately tell the higher command structure what they felt it wanted to hear. Hitler started out a true Juggernaut but due to Syphilis or whatever, he ended up disorganized and by all accounts disconnected to reality. Japan knew from the beginning the longer the war continued the less chance they had and self-aggrandizement overruled common sense.
     
  11. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    I'll buy that. I think that could also be colored with the same crayon as women in the workforce, So, I'll throw em both on the list.
     
  12. machine shop tom

    machine shop tom Member

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    Way out of my area of expertise, but I believe the breaking of the German and Japanese codes were instances that could surely be callled game changers. Midway comes to mind and the reading of German U-Boat information was key.

    tom
     
  13. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    Battles really aren't what I am getting at. I am thinking more like weapons and structure. The German Wolfpacks operating in the North Atlantic and Eastern Seaboard were very efficient in their Command and Control with the ability to coordinate attacks on Allied shipping. But, it wasn't a game changer. By June 1942 though, the Wolfpacks were withdrawn and U-boats were generally operating independantly in the Atlantic; So I don't know if that really fits. Integrattion of Aircover, Convoys and the ability to produce more shipping than was being lost had as much of an impact as anything else.

    I don't think breaking the Enigma code played nearly as large a role in the Atlantic as did breaking the Japanese Naval codes in the Pacific.

    We can add "Cryptology/Cryptography" to the Allied side for S&G.
     
  14. LRusso216

    LRusso216 Graybeard Staff Member

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    I'm also thinking that the Allies had, at least in the Pacific, more flexibility in their approach. In short, they learned from their mistakes, even if sometimes slowly. Both Hornfishcher in Neptune's Inferno and Mrazek in Dawn Like Thunder tell of the Japanese continuing to use the same assault tactics on Guadalcanal, even after they proved ineffective against the dug-in Marines. From what I've read, Allied (American) land forces quickly altered their thinking when a particular method was unsuccessful. I will agree that better communication also played into it. The Japanese forces on Guadalcanal stuck rigidly to their plans, even when communication breakdowns made it impossible to co-ordinate their forces.
     
  15. dazzerjeep

    dazzerjeep Member

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    On a different note how about mounting the British 17 pounder on the Sherman thus creating the Firefly, That led to the Allies standind a better chance against the German armour
     
  16. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    This isn't about "What If's" this is about what was.
     
  17. Jaeger

    Jaeger Ace

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    I disagree. This is a prime example of pragmatism from the British. Make do with what you have, rather than blow enormous resources at some pipedream. (building an enormous tank, rather than jury rig enough of the one you have got.)

    It is like them characters who try to match the battlefield to the map rather than the otherway round.

    Why not put up the USMC? A living development team that shifted the nature of warfare. I'm pulling the string here, but I don't beleive that the allies could win a contested beach without the experiences of the USMC. Throw in trans-oceanic warfare (I don't know if there is such a term, just thought it sounded nice) to boot.

    AND logistics.

    8th Army advanced for 1,300 miles along a single road. Nobody else could have done that in 1942. That the British Commanders considered the logistics as the decisive factor is quite interesting aswell.
     
  18. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    I'll second Jaeger's suggestion and be even more specific. The Marine Corps pushing for the adoption of the Higgins Boat/LCVP over Navy objections.
    The development of the LVT as a logistics vehicle and the foresight to employ it in an assault role to overcome coral reefs. The development of amphibious doctrine during the 30's and early 40's. The logistical proficiency of the Navy/Merchant Marine. Without their expertise neither the Pacific nor European fronts could have been sustained.
     
  19. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    Improvise, Adapt and Overcome is always better than Reinvent, Squander and Abandon.


    I don't think the Marines added anything more to the battle than did the Airborne in Europe. It's just the method of delivery. When you are attacking an Island the only way to approach is from the Sea, I don't think it was very ground breaking or innovative. The Pilgrims established a beach head in 1643.

    The Airborne "Verticle Envelopment" as demonstrated at Normandy was rather impressive though.

    I think there is more to it than that though. As the Allies advanced toward Berlin their supply lines got longer while the German supply lines got shorter so Logisticaly it should have been a wash. The same holds true Japan, except there wasn't the same apprehension associated with entering Germany as there was with Japan.

    We'll put Logistics on the board with 1940 as the date because of Lend Lease.

    The LVT's are another example of what Jaeger illustrated as adapting things you already had. Why the LVT series wasn't utilized at Normandy instead of the DD Shermans I have no idea. Would they have gotten off the beach any better than the Shermans I don't know either; but, I think they would have gotten on the beach instead of foundering in the Channel.

    I think we can add a hashmark to Logistics.
     
  20. Gebirgsjaeger

    Gebirgsjaeger Ace

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    Personally i think the Germans didn´t had an "Game Changer". They had some good developments on aircrafts and weapon technology, but the Leading persons didn´t understood to use them right. Take the Me262 as an example. At least the development of the atomic bomb was the only game changing thing. But at late 1942 the germans were running of the point of no return, and started to loose all the important sources and lost the most of their well trained men. So with that in their minds the war couldn´t end in an other way than he did. And no "Wonder Weapon" had an influence on this.
     

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