German Fate

Hi guys, just a small input to interesting discusion...

What if the Germans had done better....what if D-day would of have failed.....whould we then now be talking of Hamburg / Nurenburg insted of Hiroshima / Nagasaki?????

Regards

 

I don't think so. I'm skating on very thin ice here, but as we've seen from looking at the 'Dresden' debate set against the often-completely-overlooked B-29 firebomb raids on Tokyo, the Americans considered Germany to be very 'different' to Japan.

So, for whatever political reasoning this was, the A-Bomb would not have been used in Europe.

 

Pesonal opinion yes. that is what the bombs were developed for. they were developed due to the fear of hitler developing them first. Truman, and his advisors, intention was to scare stalin, so probably would have been used in europe as this would have had more of an impact on stalin than when they were used against japan. if your interested in this subject i suggest you read a book by Gar Alperowitz called Atomic Diplomacy.

 

I have a feeling that they might not have used it in Europe but if it had seemed that war otherwise would have lasted for ages the allied might have changed their mind.

This would have meant that their own troops would have been evacuated further away which would have looked odd, at least for a while.

Don´t know if the possibility of shooting down the B-29 over Germany would be bigger than over Japan...(?) and thus Germans gaining the bomb (?)

 

The atomic bomb was developped entirely with the intent of using it on Germany. Had the need arisen, I am sure the Americans would not have hesitated to use it there, though only in cases of a German resurgence or of Germany developing the Bomb itself.

There is no question that the US would have deployed the bomb in Europe if need be.

 

Actually I think the Americans would have hesitated in using the bomb in Germany because that there was more of a connection of that they looked like us and the japanese did not. It's possible that the racial prejudiced factor might have come into play.

It's well-known that Truman was a bigtime biggot. He often referred to the Japanese as "vomit colored people," while the Germans were "only" Nazis.

Or do you feel that im around the bend on this one?

 

I think you're right, Carl - otherwise, why the continual insistence on 'bombing in a pickle barrel' over Europe, whereas over Japan - anything went...?

It would have been a BIG turnaround in policy to 'nuke' Berlin.

 

Bombing the pickle barrel was cmplete fiction anyways, and the Allies, US included, realised this over the course of the war.

By the time large scale area bombing of japanese cities started it was already march 1945, and the lessons of high altitude bombing had been learned. It was even worse given the sronger gulf-stream and the higher altitude of the B-29.

The reason there was no precision bombing talk over Japan is because by March 1945 the US had realised any such talk was pure crap.

Yes, it is true that the Japanese were portrayed in a terribly rascist light, while the Germans were at least caucasian. But to assume because of that the Germans might not have been suject to the bomb is to ignore the deep hate the west had for the Nazis by that point. White, yellow, black red or green, the Bomb was designed to put an end to the Nazi regime, and to forstall their obtaining atomic weapons.

Its use in the Pacific theatre was never even contemplated until it became clear that the only way to eliminate the japanese government might be through an invasion of the Home islands.

 

Vermillion,

Got any ideas on the peace negotiations between Japan and USA and could it have been possible to make peace without the bomb? Did the bomb actually change the matters except for the fact that the Japanese kaiser stepped down?? I think this was the main thing that stopped the US from accepting the Japanese terms in the first place.

Just interested because to Japanese the war was over by long time and only the maniacs would continue.

As well it is interesting the the Japs used the Russians as their negotiator to the USA in the peace affairs and did Uncle Joe put the papers to the US....??? Does someone know if there war a small delay of months or years....?

 

I love this board, this is the topic of yet another of my masters papers...

In July of 1945, Japan was not about to surrender. The cabinet was formed of three factions. The army, which was completely against surrender, The navy, who supported the army, though their voice was minimal as they were a disgraced faction, the IJN had been wiped out at this point, and the civilian leaders, who were split, but most favoured some kind of peace settlement.

The Army had the power to VETO any decision, and could in fact force a new cabinet (they had done this several times throughout the war). they refused to consider peace, and refused to countenance any treaty. They had this power because the Army could still point to the vast stocks of men and supplies on the Home islands and in Manchuria, which comprised about 80% of the Army's pre-war strength. because of the nature of island hopping, Japan still had a strong army, unengaged and distant from the fighting. However, the remaining forces were mostly second line, and equipped with obsolete equipment.

The first atomic bomb did very little. We have all the reports from the cabinet, and it ranged from boredom (army commander surveying the site the day after claimed the damage was less than the march 2nd and 3rd conventional raids on Tokyo) to incredulity (Civilian leaders thought the allies has dispersed strips of magnesium in their air and then set them on fire, even those who believed it was an atomic weapon claimed that the US could not repeat such a feat)

Either way, it did not in any way change the single-mindedness of the Army. Even as members of the civilian faction tried to negotiate some kind of possibility through contacts in Russia, the Army sentenced to Death several Japanese ambassadors and minor dignitaries who made peace feelers to the West.

Then came the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. In one swoop, the Kwangtung army was annihilated, and the claims of strength of the Army faction evaporated. The Army lost enormous face here, which allowed the civilian faction to claim dominance. Still the debate about a course of action raged.

The second bomb demonstrated that the US had repeating power of destruction, and following that, the debate on surrender was deadlocked. It took a personal intercession from the Emperor (something that almost never happened) to convince the Cabinet for peace.

Even once this had been done and surrender was decided, the Army refused to accept the decision. They staged a coup that night planning on putting the emperor in ‘protective custody’ before he could announce his surrender, and continue the war. The coup failed, barely, and the Emperor made his announcement. About 30% of the high officer corps either boarded kamikaze planes and attacks the US fleet or committed suicide following that announcement.


So when people ask me if the bombs were really necessary, I say not only were they necessary, but they were not enough. Two bombs and the invasion of Manchuria and the intercession of the emperor were required to force surrender, and even then there was a coup to prevent it. Even with the two bombs, Japan almost did not surrender.


The ASrmy had the power to VETO any decision, and could in fact force a new cabinet (they had done this several times throughout the war). they refused to consider peace, and refused to countenance any treaty. They had this power because the Army could still point to the vast stocks of men and supplies on the Home islands and in manchuria, which comprised about 80% of the Army's pre-war strength. because of the nature of island hopping, Japan still had a strong army, unengaged and distant from the fighting. However, the remaining forces were mostly second line, and equipped with obsolete equipment.

The first atomic bomb did very little. We have all the eports from the cabinet, and it ranged from boredom (army commander surveying the site the day after claimed the damage was less than the march 2nd and 3rd conventional raids on Tokyo) to incredulity (Civilian leaders thought the allies has dispersed strips of magnesium in their air and then set them on fire, even those who believed it was an atomic weapon claimed that the US could not repeat such a feat)
Either way, it did not in any way change the singleminded ness of the Army. Even as members of the civilian faction tried to negotiate some kind of possibility through contacts in Russia, the Army sentenced to Death several japanese ambasadors and minor dignitaries who made peace feelers to the West.

 

Nuclear special: 'One hell of a big bang'

Tuesday August 6, 2002
The Guardian

"Paul Tibbets, the man who piloted the Enola Gay on its mission to Japan, tells Studs Terkel why he has no regrets - and why he wouldn't hesitate to use it again ...

Paul Tibbets: '...My edict was as clear as could be. Drop simultaneously in Europe and the Pacific because of the secrecy problem - you couldn't drop it in one part of the world without dropping it in the other. ..."

[ 06. August 2003, 09:45 PM: Message edited by: Crapgame ]

 

Completely agree with this. Why? Because the Germans were not included in the racial policies of the USA. Japanese were to Americans what Russians were to Germans... It was not the same killinf French or British civilians than killing Russians. Is the same in the Pacific.

Besides, Great Britain and France (as well as the exiled governments of small nations) would have not agreed in the use of such a weapon in Europe.
If you drop the bomb on Berlin. Remember that Prague and Polish and Dannish cities are not very far...

And if racist president Truman DID hesitate for a while in using it against the Japanese, he of course, wouldn't have used it on EUROPE.

General George C. Marshall found inconvenient using the bomb against Japan. When he was told by scientists that the bomb could kill 60.000 people he said: "We have killed 120.000 Japanese in one night with a normal bombardment".

And of course that the Atomic bombs had an impact on Japanese negotiations. But people mostly forgets that the menace of Soviet invasion was the greatest fear ALL Japanese chairmen had, military and civilian. And when the Soviets invaded Manchuria and declared war (along with the banning of Hiroshima) made them sue for peace immediately. The Japanese might have halted an American invasion, but not a Soviet one.

Even if D-day had failed, the Western Allies would not have used the A-bomb in Europe because of the reasons mentioned above and because by that time, the Red Army would have been in the German border anyway...

 

Would the Western allies have used the bomb on Germany, if D-day had failed and the Russians were being held on the Eastern front ???
My answer is, Yes!
The Allies were terrified that one of the V-weapons Adolf kept going on about, was a German nuclear bomb. So the view that they should use the bomb on Germany before they used it on us, would have strong support.
It should also be pointed out, that it was only after the attacks on Japan that the full dangers of radio-activity became clear. To the politicians and military it was just a big bomb, they were not fully aware of the after effects. So the 'moral' issue would be less important than most people think.
Dresden is remembered mainly due to the fact that Germany was all but defeated when it happened. But if Germany was still strong?? I doubt if there would be the same outcry.

[ 07. August 2003, 04:45 AM: Message edited by: redcoat ]

 

And there would be signs " No dogs and Americans" in Berlin/Germany like on Monte Cassino...