German occupation of the Ukraine

When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 they took the Russians by surprise, even Stalin himself was surprised and had a nervous break-down and was not seen again for weeks untill he made a public appearence. When the Germans occupied the Ukraine it is said that the Wermacht treated the Ukranians better then the Soviets did giving them more food and supplies, and the Ukranians welcomed the Germans into there country (so I have heard). I would like to hear other people's opinions on how the occupiers treated the occupied and if there is any more historical insite it would be very much accepted.

 

From AHF.

Partial Translation of Document No-1128, Prosecution Exhibit 2370. Submitted at Nuremburg trials.


In 4 months over 400,000 people executed, 159 villages destroyed, 1978 farms destroyed.




Submitted 31 December 1942
[Initial] A.
Headquarters
29 December 1942.

The Reich Leader SS.
Subject: Reports to the Fuehrer concerning the combatting of Guerrillas.

Report No. 51, Southern Russia, Ukraine, Bialystok. Results in combatting Guerrillas from 1 September 1942 to 1 December 1942.


a. Counted dead after engagements (x): August 1942 (227); September 1942 (381); October 1942 (427); November 1942 (302); Total (1337).

b. Prisoners executed immediately: August 1942 (125); September 1942 (282); October 1942 (87); November 1942 (243); Total (737).

c. Prisoners executed after lengthy and thorough interrogation: August 1942 (2100); September 1942 (1400); October 1942 (1596); November 1942 (2731); Total (7828).

2. Accomplices of guerrilla and guerrilla suspects.

a. Arrested: August 1942 (1343); September 1942 (3078); October 1942 (8337); November 1942
(3795); Total (16553).

b. Executed: August 1942 (1198); September 1942 (3020); October 1942 (6333); November 1942 (3706); Total (14257).

c. Jews executed: August 1942 (31246); September 1942 (165282); October 1942 (95735);
November 1942 (70948); Total (363211).

3. Deserter owing to German propaganda: August 1942 (21); September 1942 (14); October 1942 (42); November 1942 (63); Total (140).

(x) As the Russians remove their dead or rather, bury them immediately, the figures quoted can be regarded as considerably higher, also, according to statements made by the prisoners.

4. Weapons captured or destroyed.

a. Heavy mortars, guns etc.: August 1942 (8); September 1942 (10); October 1942 (21);
November 1942 (16); Total (55).

b. Automatic weapons: August 1942 (33); September 1942 (51); October 1942 (53); November 1942 (37); Total (174).

c. Other small arms: August 1942 (482); September 1942 (654); October 1942 (560); November 1942 (207); Total (1903).

5. Ammunition.

a. Various kinds: August 1942 (52447); September 1942 (531403); October 1942 (551612);
November 1942 (9165); Total (1616647).

b. Hand grenades.: August 1942 (1049); September 1942 (1296); October 1942 (1225);
November 1942 (1181); Total (4751).

c. Mines: August 1942 (20); September 1942 (21); October 1942 (46); November 1942 (216); Total (303).

d. Explosive (kilo): August 1942 (2); September 1942 (235); October 1942 (570); November 1942 (409); Total (1216).

6. Radio sets captured or destroyed: August 1942 (6); September 1942 (2); October 1942 (3); November 1942 (5); Total (16).

7. Captured cattle and implements.

a. Cattle, cows and oxen: 3442; pigs: 2869; sheep: 2930; horses: 486; calves: 65.

b. Cereal: 1600 cwt.

c. Linseed: 48 cwt.

d. Implements [equipment]: 1 surgical kit, 2 radio sets, 2 bicycles, 12 fodder machines, 200 farming implements (spades, shovels, saws).

8. Engagements: August 1942 (83); September 1942 (106); October 1942 (108);
November 1942 (150); Total (447).

9. Guerrilla camps destroyed: August 1942 (15); September 1942 (24); October 1942 (143);
November 1942 (103); Total (285).

10. Villages and localities.

a. Searched and combed: August 1942 (223); September 1942 (481); October 1942 (625);
November 1942 (387); Total (1716).

b. Burned down or destroyed: August 1942 (35); September 1942 (12); October 1942 (20);
November 1942 (92); Total (159).

11. Single farms.

a. Searched: August 1942 (1026); September 1942 (1040); October 1942 (1376); November 1942 (386); Total (3828).

b. Burned down: August 1942 (257); September 1942 (621); October 1942 (312); November 1942 (788); Total (1978).

12. Own casualties.

(1) SS Regular and Security Police.

a. Dead: August 1942 (43); September 1942 (16); October 1942 (24); November 1942 (91); Total (174).

b. Wounded: August 1942 (16); September 1942 (5); October 1942 (16); November 1942 (95); Total
(132).

c. Missing: August 1942 (2); September 1942 (3); October 1942 (3); November 1942 (5); Total (13).

(2) Indigenous Security Units [Schutzmannschaft].

a. Dead: August 1942 (67); September 1942 (67); October 1942 (58); November 1942 (93); Total (285).

b. Wounded: August 1942 (34); September 1942 (33); October 1942 (17); November 1942 (43); Total (127).

c. Missing: August 1942 (16); September 1942 (10); October 1942 (39); November 1942 (68); Total (133).

13. Raids: August 1942 (153); September 1942 (171); October 1942 (168); November 1942 (191); Total (683).

14. Destroyed property.

a. Estates belonging to the state and others: August 1942 (18); September 1942 (64); October 1942 (21); November 1942 (10); Total (113).

b. Saw mills and forest service stations: August 1942 (9); September 1942 (7); October 1942 (6); November 1942 (8); Total (30).

c. Industrial plants: August 1942 (6); September 1942 (13); October 1942 (11); November 1942
(5); Total (35).

d . Other property: August 1942 (18); September 1942 (57); October 1942 (15); November 1942
(20); Total (110).

15. Acts of sabotage.

a. Railroads: August 1942 (44); September 1942 (59); October 1942 (86); November 1942 (73);
Total (262).

b. Bridges: August 1942 (15); September 1942 (8); October 1942 (9); November 1942 (22); Total (54).

c. Communication stations: August 1942 (11); September 1942 (13); October 1942 (12);
November 1942 (18); Total (54).

d. Others: August 1942 (8); September 1942 (15); October 1942 (9); November 1942 (8); Total
(40).

[Signed] H. Himmler.

 

1)That Stalin had a breakdown is a myth :he was working 88 hours the first week :see :Stalin in june 1941:a comment on Cynthia Roberts
2)The positive welcome of the Germans was limited to Galicia (which only had been annexed by the SU in 1939)

 

There were about 459 villages in Ukraine completely destroyed with all or part of their population by the German Army with 97 in Volhynia Province, 32 in Zhitomir province, 21 in Chernihiv province, 17 in Kiev province and elsewhere. There were at least 27 Ukrainian villages in which every man, woman and child was killed and the village completely destroyed by the Germans. (Ukrainska RSR u Velykyi Vitchyznianiy Viyni, vol.3, p. 150).

 

As mentioned by another, this is hogwash. That whole business about Stalin having a “nervous breakdown and hiding at his Dacha” was a part of a Khrushchev speech made during his denunciation of the “party of personality” which had developed under Stalin. However he only made the statement when both Stalin and Beria were safely out of the picture.

In contrast to what some seem to think of as Stalin’s dithering after the Nazis invaded (he was surprised for a few hours as he digested the information, as he couldn’t believe Hitler would open a second front without first defeating Britain), these were his documented actions directly after the opening of "Operation Barbarossa".

On June 22nd, the Politburo with Stalin at its head worked on the text of the speech to the Soviet people, which was actually delivered by Molotov that evening, giving directives, commands on mobilization of other civilians and to the ranks of Red Army, announcing the appointment of Marshals and Generals of different fronts, etc.

On June 23rd, The General Central Command was established with Stalin at its head.

June 24th, an emergency meeting of the leaders of Industry to plan the war output and transfer of machine tools was held in the cabinet of Marshal Stalin.

June 25th, a Reserve Army was called up and placed under the command of Marshal Budyonny.

June 27th, the decision of all the Unions of the Communist Party to mobilize both Communist and Komsomol members

June 29th, the speech by Stalin to the general populace and the military was completed with the approval of General Command and the Politburo, to be delivered on July 3rd.

June 30th, the Establishment of the State Defense Committee was announced with Stalin at its head.

Here is a link to Stalin’s speech of July 3rd, 1941:

STALIN, SOVIET PREMIER, BROADCAST TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION

Old "Uncle Joe" had a busy 10 days there didn't he! I forgot to add that immediately after the Nazi invasion, between June 22[SUP]nd[/SUP]-June 24[SUP]th[/SUP] , all Soviet assets in American banks (which had been frozen after the Soviet attack on Finland November 30th, 1939) were released by President Roosevelt, which enabled the Soviets to immediately purchase 59 fighters for immediate deliver (including at least 21 P-40s). Negotiations concerning application of the Lend-lease act were simultaneously initiated. The promise of extending the existing program of Lend-Lease was offered by the American Ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet directly after the Nazi invasion (early July), then after getting Congress to approve the move to include the Soviet Union FDR was able to (by telegram) guarantee that $1 billion in USA gold backed goods in Lend-lease aid would begin to be sent to the USSR on October 30th 1941 with payment deferred. The first deliveries of military equipment under Lend-Lease actually began in early November 1941.

While this diplomatic and logistical crud between the new allies was going on, and the Lend/Lease material being authorized and shipped, there were, in total 1523 industries relocated away from the Nazis between mid-July and late November 1941, this alone involved the utilization of over 1.5 million rail freight and flat cars in those four months. Consequently I can see no situation in which the Nazis had much of a chance as to the Soviets seeking a "peace" with the Nazis after loosing the "war", but I will not rule out the possibility of a "truce" or armistice rather than a "peace" treaty per se.

Stalin was neither dithering, nor having a nervous breakdown and hiding away.

 

In 1941 Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft developed a "hunger strategy" aimed to deprive millions of Soviet citizens of food and to provide food for the German army in Russia. A document prepared by the "Economic Staff East, Agricultural Group" on 23 May 1941, states:

The plan applied first and foremost to Ukraine and Belarus. Nazis have sentenced millions of Ukrainians to death by starvation!

 

Hunger and disease were the real killers in Axis occupied Eastern Europe-and a direct result of the deliberate NAZI policy of plundering the conquered peoples and leaving them to fend for themselves. To this day nobody has an clear idea of the numbers of victims-but in Belarus alone it is estimated that between 1/4 to 1/3 of the population perished-some by war and mass murder- but most by the twin plagues of famine and pestilence.
JeffinMNUSA
PS. Can you read the enclosed attatchment? The wife found this old samovar at an estate sale yesterday.

 

The first arctic aid convoy to the USSR departed already 21st August. There were two more shipments before November 1941.

The aid deliveries via Far East started already in June 1941, immediately after the German attack.

The Persian Gulf deliveries started in November 1941.

Arctic convoys of World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
APPENDIX -- A

 

While I don't doubt this is true (even if it is listed in "Wiki"), but I would postulate that these were shipments purchased with the released funds of the USSR being held in the US. They had been frozen after Stalin invaded Poland, and released after Hitler invaded the USSR. I was referring to the L-L stuff, not the purchased stuff.

 

I'm sure you are right. However I don't see much difference in western shipments no matter how they were funded. Part of US "aid" was releasing the funds of the SU. The US had the choice not to - after all the SU was still occupying the Finnish territory she had robbed.

IMHO the main poin is that the aid shipments started immediately.

 

On 30th June, Stalin went missing for almost 48 hours - he had proved himself be inept as a military leader and failed his Country, Party and the Revolution. And this was obvious to his cronies and generals.


He had suffered moments of collapse before (eg Nadya's death, the Finnish campaign and the death of his first wife) - however he bounced back immediately and certainly did so in this case.

Sebag-Montefiore points out that Ivan the Terrible had used this technique (Stalin's hero), ie temporary removal from power. It enabled to Stalin see if there would be any challenge to his regime (and cut off the heads, as Ivan had done).

An added advantage was that the Politburo in effect re-elected him which Molotov and the rest of the gang did when they went to his Dacha and demanded he lead them to victory.

Overall an excellent political move - and not the abject breakdown that Khrushchev claimed.

 

This was the moment when Stalin could have been arrested and "been taken care of". Stalin knew that,too. However, Molotov and the others knew better, they had only Stalin as the leading figure to make them win the war and unite the people. They had the option of losing the war or ask Stalin to lead the country to victory.

 

I really do not believe that Molotov and others wanted Stalin to lead. After witnessing the Great Purge, why would they trust him with their own lives. So many upper innocent militaries and intellectuals were killed, that a new nation could have been build. I think they all feared Stalin, since he was a foolish unpredictable thug. Not a single one of them DARED to "step up to the plate" and take any action against Stalin, for all they knew Stalin was going to blame them for the Germany invasion and ineffective Soviet defense, (where Stalin was the only one at fault).

 

A thug - certainly but foolish and predictable, not very often and a lot less than any of the other main political actors in WW2.

Detest him or fear him, this was a very clever move. Stalin knew that there would be many more times where Soviet Forces were decimated before the tide was turned.

He still had power at this stage and by this tactic, he wiped the slate clean - from then on, the Politburo could not blame him solely because they had endorsed his leadership in the full knowledge of the reverses suffered.

True he had faced them down and none of them had the courage to stand up to him - the Soviet equivalent to winning a Vote of Confidence! Stalin never lacked personal courage, although he normally got others to shoot the bullets.

 

My bad "unpredictable" not predictable

 

The commandant of Stalag 318, a Colonel Falkenberg, noted on September 11, 1941:

'These cursed Untermenschen have been observed eating grass, flowers and raw potatoes. Once they can't find anything edible in the camp they turn to cannibalism.'

May Lord have mercy upon Herr Falkenbergs soul because he was blinded by his own hatred. Herr Falkenberg has forgotten that his barbaric treatment forced them to seemingly behave like sub-humans.

 

All of these moves by Josef Stalin are 'clever' only with hindsight.

The German military threw away any advantages that might have flowed from Stalinist ineptitude.

Stalin won by 'not losing'. There were disasters aplenty, but, the essentials of Soviet defence were put in place very early on. It remained only to see how far the German Army was capable of putting the plans of their generals into action. They had not the Soviet capacity for recovery. Stalin knew this better than anyone.

The greater majority of Soviet people voted with their feet. Nobody needed to propagandise their atitude to the invasion,; the Germans had already done this all on their own. And, in the words of one Soviet citizen...."We had a choice between two dictators. We preferred to side with the one that spoke RUSSIAN."

There was no choice for the ordinary citizen. It was fight or die, either quickly on the field of conflict, or slowly in a containment camp, factory or German field brothel.

Not much of a choice really. This is one of the many arrogant decisions enacted by the German High Command. Classic case of counting chickens. But, as Stalin knew, the battle wasn't over until the last German soldier surrendered at Berlin.

 

The lord may show him mercy...I'd show him nothing. Maybe just a fence and a field of grass...Occasionally I might fill his water trough. But I may not.

 

Well when you stated that, basically, the Nazi's plundered and stole everything, I agree with you completly however, could any of these deaths by starvation also have been because the Soviet's delibratly pulled back the large majority of there reasources (Mainly food) to prevent the Nazi's fron seizing them? I heard that this was exactly the case at Stalingrad so now I am questioning: Could this have happened all across the Soviet controlled Eastern front area's (Including Ukraine) or was it simply the case at Stalingrad and no where else?

 

How you are murdered though, doesn't really matter if your one of the murdered.