German superiority, myth or fact?

Whereas unlike the theoretical, abstract equipment comparisons- this would be more apt as a valid, grounded comparison in terms of the overall superiority (or proficiency?) that USMCPrice was getting at.

Nothing abstract there, just a valid point regarding who was actually fighting in the field for either side during a given time period.

:cheers:

 

Well I am pleased with where the thread has gone. I want to thank all the posters that gave reasoned well thought out responses. I'm also pleased that it has remained a discussion and hasn't devolved into an argument. I'd also like to welcome back CrazyD, you added much to the thread, as did all our old reliables.

I can say definatively, that the line of thinking that everything German in WWII was superior is a myth. Look at the information the forum members have provided, Germany (nor any of the protagonists) had a monopoly on superior troops, pilots, technology, weapons, research, tanks, aircraft, tactics, doctrine, etc. Each of these areas was constantly evolving, being refined, adapting to the situation and the enemy's capabilities. I do not think it is possible to claim the title of "superior" or "best". What is best for group A under a certain set of circumstances is not always the optimal choice for group B facing a different set of circumstances or requirements.

Brad and Volga Boatman provided a couple of small statements, that when analyzed, perfectly illustrates the larger question.
Volga Boatman:

Formerjughead wrote:

When the Allies first encountered the Zero early in the Pacific Theater it dominated air combat. It's superior agility, rate of climb, speed and range, coupled with veteran pilots with massive amounts of air time, gave it a reputation rivaled by few other weapons systems deployed in WWII. (the PZVI Tiger and Flak 88 being two examples) Inadequately trained allied pilots, flying obsolete or mediocre aircraft just amplified the Zero's apparent superiority.
The Zero also had a downside, it was lightly built, didn't have self sealing fuel tanks and the cockpit lacked armor protection for the pilot. The allies quickly learned the Zero's weaknesses and developed better tactics that emphasized the strength's of their aircraft, rugged construction, better protection and heavier firepower, while minimizing the Zero's strengths. This enabled the allied pilots to stay competetive with the Zero in air-to-air combat. Allied pilots gained experience, newer/better aircraft were fielded and the Zero lost it's dominance.
These same factors can be found in virtually any weapons system/organization. They all have strengths, they all have weaknesses, their strength's can be countered by tactical innovation, improved training and veterancy. They will all, eventually lose their technological and/or performance edge because thier opponents will improve their existing types and introduce new and better types, or develop effective counters.

 

Very well said. And indeed an interesting discussion.

The notion of some overall, grand scale "German superiority"- as your original post suggested, that idea doesn't stand up to close examination.

Once broken down to component parts- there's enough variables to make many different arguments and cases for superiority in various areas.

And to top it off... superiority in an area was anything but a garauntee of victory.

If one only looks at the armor available, the Battle of Kursk would have shown a clear level of superiority for the Germans, I'd think. But the reality of the battle, how said armor was used, and the actual results of the battle... the end result certainly did not mirror any percieved superiority of the individual components used.

Discussions like these are what made me participate in this forum as much as I did back in the "old days"!

And of course, happy to be back!

:cheers:

 

CrazyD,

Actually you've made the following comment or something along the same lines a number of times in several posts, within this thread:

That was what actually made me decide, along with Volga's and Brad's comments, to attempt to illustrate the point with an example like the Japanese Zero. Something on a smaller scale, where more of the variables could be examined. Also, people don't seem to have the same emotional investment or pre-concieved notions when it comes to things Japanese. Early war Japanese performance was just as impressive as that of the Germans, a point I tried to make in the original post, but few argue that they possessed some innate military/technological superiority.

Finally, I'm glad you've enjoyed the discussion because I've enjoyed your participation.

 

Not exactly "as soon as" there was some time between the removal of Mussolini from power in July and the Armistice/German occupation in September.

 

You are correct TOS, of course. What I was getting at was he already had troops and such there and only re-enforced it post Mussolini's arrest and detention at San Graso (wasn't it?), as well as rescuing Il Duce from said "house arrest". I still think the Italian government should have handed Mussolini over to the allies instead of keeping him for themselves.

Don't think he would have been tried as a true "war criminal", and if that had been done he might have survived the war years actually. I'm not aware of his breaking too many treaties (like Hitler, or the Nazis), planning for an aggressive war, or using slave labor. There were four charges, the only one left was crimes against humanity, and that wouldn't fly against Mussolini either I don't think.

 

Some big names like S.L.A. Marshall, Russell Weigley, Martin Van Creveld, John Keegan, Max Hastings, Trevor N. Dupuy & John Ellis among others, maintain the German soldier was the superior soldier in WW2.

Creveld concludes that the 'German army was a superb fighting organization. In point of morale, elan, unit cohesion, and resilience, it probably had no equal among twentieth century armies.'

Dupuy in his valuation study came to the view that the Germans had "better utilization of manpower, more experience, greater mobility, better doctrine, more effective battle drill, superior leadership, and inherent national characteristics."

He observes that "We didn't like one of the two conclusions which this adjustment forced upon us---that 100 Germans were roughly the combat equivalent of 120 Americans or British---but we could not ignore the fact that our numbers demonstrated that this was so."

[Think the difference Germans vs the Soviets were considerably greater]

Keegan take's the view that the German army was innovative, aggressive and resourceful in defense, and that its panzer arm was without peer in the practice of mobile warfare. He shares these perceptions with a considerable number of historians.

Creveld & Dupuy [a retired United States Army Colonel] naturally have the distinction of being the historians most despised by critics like Mansoor, Bonn, Doubler and their cohorts.

The Germans probably reached the epitome of a 20th century war machine, with innovative tactics, commanders & weapon systems, but it might have been interesting how the Germans of '40/'42, would match up against the Red Army or British/Americans of '44/'45 [all things being equal.]

 

To my way of thinking, this debate smacks of something we've all heard before. It reminds me very much of the "Stab in the Back" myth that German veterans and generals perpetrated after the Great War. The phraseology of this lingers in the minds of those who feel that German "superiority" somehow wasn't brought to bear for these reasons..(insert here)

It recalls Bonaparte complaining miserably after the 1814 Campaign that "God is on the side of the biggest battalions."

The plain fact of the matter is that you cannot have quantity AND quality riding the same cart. At some stage, if you want "levee' en' masse", you must sacrifice the excellent quality that time, training, and money can bring. One of the reasons the German army was able to attain a measure of superiority in the Inter-War period was the very fact that their army was limited in size. "The 100,000 man Army" was superbly trained, and lavishly equipped by the standards of the day. Reichswehr Generals later balked at the idea of a mass of conscripts diluting the very quality that they had struggled so hard to achieve. This became one of the principle reasons why the Reichswehr referred to the Sturm Abteilung as "The Brown Trash", and fought the concept that they could be absorbed into the regular army tooth and nail. (Might have had a lot to do with the percieved character of Ernst Roehm as well, with commentators from the Army making statements such as, "Re-armament is too serious an issue to be left in the hands of drunkards and homosexuals.")

No...I'm not buying this myth. It's far too much like the "Stab in the Back" for my tastes. Modern Neo-Nazis dine out on this sort of thing, altering minds to their lost cause. Confederate veterans had a similar mindset post 1865. "If only we'd had more...etc, etc, etc"

I am certain Hannibal Barca used to brood over this idea as well, late at night around the campfire, thinking of the tremendous victories gained by "better" organisation and training, mooning over "What might have been, but for....."

It's a disease of the mind that all defeated soldiers go through. And yes, this has been an EXCELLENT thread with all participant contributions giving their opinions with style and intelligence, rather than reduced to a ball park argument.

 

In this interesting analysis of army skills I would like to point out back then the populace supported their troops in every way they could (a reason I so admire this generation). War Bonds bought by those with extra money, metals recycled specifically for the war effort, rubber given up and even substituted with leather in hydraulics to preserve the supply of rubber for military equipment, the rationing of so many items that defy mentioning so that the troops would be fully supplied. Whole industries like the vehicle industry given up to manufacture war equipment. Ship and aircraft manufacturing headed up by the ladies to supply workforce for their manufacture. It leads one to ask....what do we believe in today when our troops go to war? God bless our troops today for continuing to fight for us despite our lack of populace demonstrated support. Why can't we buy a war bond today to help our troops? Instead people run around griping about taxes, deficit and anything else they can think of despite living with the highest technologies ever experienced by man on this earth. What is great about what this generation did is that they chose to do those things as a people. In Germany and Japan I believe there was less of a choice although I do not question there was support for their armies as well.

 

about the tanks :tanks neede 1)a huge logistic apparatus 2) protection from motorized infantry .
without those two,tanks were as useful,as an honest man in politics.

 

I think "comparative" military/ technological supperiority would also be accurate.

 

And you could perhaps add air supremacy.

But I don't think that logistics was the problem for the Panzer's alone LJAd, it was a chronic problem for the Wehrmacht as a whole.

As the Cambridge history of warfare says... The German military planning for Barbarossa was a mixture of tactical and operational genius, with woolly headed political optimism and logistical imbecility.

But you have to admit that the Panzer armies, led by ace commanders, caused a bit of a problem at times.

 

I forgot the air supremacy,although on the Eastern Front,it was not determining .
Logistics were a big problem for the Germans and also,but less,for the other armies .
Till 1942,the Panzers were determining the battlefield (some exageration ),afterwards,afterwards,their importance was decreasing,if and when,the opponent could counter them with mechanized and armoured artillery(AG,SPG)
I have my doubts on what the Cambridge history of Warfare is saying,but I will reply later on this .

 

about the Cambridge Warfare History quote:IMHO,this is a traditional,but superseded theory(I hava also my doubts on the German tactical genius,but I will limit myself to the "logistical imbecility".Broadly speaking,it means:the Germans were very good tactically,but very bad logistically,while the West (especially the US,were very good logistically).
A first opoint:the advance from the West stopped in september 1944,mainly due to logistical problems (the US tried to solve the problems by using trucks-the Red Ball Express-,but,of course,this failed:you can't supply an army by trucks,only by railway. In 1962,at the Cuba crisis,a US AD was transported to Florida,and this,by railway),well,to accuse the US of logistical imbecility,should be ....unwise
Returning to Barbarossa:
the Cambridge W H quote is,IMHO,wrong,because it's assuming that a)the Germans could have done better(logistically)and,by doing this,could have won:that's totally neglecting the presence of the opponent:the Red Army.
That's also assuming that a US army,with better logistics(IMHO,unlikely) would have won .The big fault of the concept of Barbarossa was that it was ,dangerously ,leaning,and even depending,on the assumption that the Red Army would not be able to survive the initial onslaught.This was,of course,wishfull thinking,but an attenuating circumstance is ,that this assumption was the only possibility for the Germans to win .
To return to the 'logistical imbecility':very broadly speaking,to supply an army,one needs two things
A)a sufficient production of all sorts of supplies (including human replacements)
B)to being able to transport that production to the front .
concerning A:due to a lot of reasons(who are of topic here),the German war economy was not able to produce enough supplies.
Some exemples:the losses of the 38III(t) tank till 30 september were 385,while the production was 205;for the PzIV,it was 187 and 128 .
For the ammunition:already after the first week(!),there was a problem with the supply of the 5 cm Pz gr.
An indispensable source to understand point A is,IMHO,'the wages of destruction'(A.Tooze)
concerning point B:the transportation of supplies depended on the Germans being able to switch the Russian railways on German ones,there were a lot of ,insoluble problems ,as:changing the gauge,Russian coal being unsuitable for German locomotives ,...Notwithstanding,the Germans were able ,broadly speaking,to supply their troops .BTW:an other popular myth (related to logistics) is that the stupid Hitler had refused to supply the troops with winter clothing .The fact is:there was enough winter clothing,but it was useless to transport it to the front in the summer,the assumption was,that the fighting would be over in the autumn and that there would be time to supply the winter clothing to the front .
A good source is :The Deutsche Reichsbahn in WWII.
With my apologies for the countless typos,I am still not able to correct them,unless to retype the whole thing.

 

I don't think that's a requirement. Now it might be argued that preventing your opponent from achieving it is.

 

The US logistics was superior, if at the cost of a much higher rear to front troops ratio, but IMO British logistics was nothing to write home about. I know little about the soviets but I think they eventually developed a mix of hi-low units, with infantry and cavalry units that had low logistics requirements, and the massed artillery and the tank armies getting most of what the battered rail system could move forward, whatever they had it worked for them as they did get to Berlin.

War favours risk takers, and the Germans were the biggest gamblers out there, most of their "superiority" was just that, the Japanese were possibly even more aggressive but more prone to overcomplex than to high risk plans.

Gemany had to take risks as they had no chance of winning an attrition war (well possibly in late 1940 just against the British by switching priorities to something that could actually hurt them but that window of opportunity didn't last.).

IMO the campaign in the USSR failed politically because of the German racist policies long before failing militarily because of logistics. It's nearly impossible to conquer such a vast country, the best chance was causing a political collapse like in 1917 but the nazis were incapable of developing a strategy equivalent to what their fathers had used with success against the tzar.

 

Don't get me started on Dupuy and his QJM! His model is putting nicely, a steaming pile of $h1+. His conclusions are based on nothing more than than a circular proof. That is, he has this supposed statistical model that "proves" his conclusions. But, the model is based on his own choice of inputs that are designed to make the model give "historical" conclusions. That is, he makes the facts fit the model and then concludes that the model is accurate and the results are, indeed, accurate as well.

 

Yea sure the were good but not that good the only reason the Germans rolled over France and Britain was because they were using old ideas and tactics and plus a few lucky breaks I believe the the Germans just got luck in the 1940 Campaign.

 

What old ideas and tactics which the Germans were using are you referring to? Surely not the Blitzkrieg?

You may believe what you like Mark4, but the conquest of Western Europe by Germany was no luck.

 

The theory that the Blitzkrieg is something new,is not accepted by every body;some are arguing that it is only an old idea,but ,successfull in 1940,because the technological means existed to execute successfully a Blitzkrieg;others are arguing that the Blitzkrieg was a mean of the feeble (=Germany) to avoid a war of attrition,which they could not win .
Whatever,there is always some luck in success,but luck is never determining .