German vs. Russia - No England.

As odd as this seems, I went back through over 3 years of "What-if's" and couldn't find this one. It may be there but I didn't see it.

Anyway:

Britain surrenders, negotiates a peace, whatever, following the Fall of France. The scenario for this happening isn't important here but, Britain ends up out of the war.

Hitler turns his attention on Russia. By sometime in 1941 he invades that nation. Again, the exact date isn't critical. We know pretty much what such an invasion would look like in terms of success and such.
At this point, could Germany have defeated the Soviets (includes a negotiated peace) having no second front to worry about? Could the Soviets have successfully checked the German invasion without a British front in the war?

My suspicion is that this scenario would end in the Soviets having to make a peace with Germany and conceeding most of European Russia along with Ukrane, Belorussia to them as well. I think that the best the Soviets could have drawn was a draw.

 

I came across a factoid that stated that the Germans only needed two or three more full strength Panzer divisions to hold and stop the Moscow counteroffensive.

 

I agree with Terry. There would have been a negotiated peace with the Germans in possession of European Russia. Why, because what caused the most damage to Germany was the bombing of it's factories and fuel resources along with the material that ended up at the bottom of the Med.

Now if the Western allies are out of the picture, Hitler has his oilfields intact, factories are producing without interuptions, population morale is high and more equipment available with a higher number of panzer divisions as well as panzergrenadier divisions. I think the the year 41' would have been the same but 42' would have been different and afterwards.

Contrary to what the Soviets believe, the bombing campaign had a definite impact in the German operations in the East as well as the campaigns around N. Africa and Italy. What would determine a success is the limit of Hitler's meddling and mistakes that he would cause. If left alone, I truly believe the General staff would have much more successes.

 

I tend to believe it ends in a draw as well but suspect it's more likely to be close to the prewar boarders. The Soviets stopped the Germans before the West had much effect on things. Especially considering how well things went initially I can see the Germans not realizing how tough things were going to be until late in the fall of 41. I think in this scenario they are going to be even slower to go to a full war economy. The Soviets may well be able to buy some things from the West as well. LL isn't going to exist but gold still talks especially once you get into 43 if the US is fighting in the Pacfic there is probably still production capacity available. If they aren't then there's a lot available and it's easy to ship things to Siberia. One of the problems the Germans have is the Partisans are going to be a constant drain on them that's greater the more territory they hold. The greater territory is also going to stress their army due to the length of the lines. If a ceasefire occurred in say 43 how long would it last? I can see both sides using it as a lull to rearm.

Since the Ukraine was Hitlers primary objective would he have been willing to leave the Soviets Russia?

 

What would have Hitler and the German high command done differently in Russia in 1941 other then send in a few more divisions?

Regardless of Great Britain exiting the conflict, Germany still faces the same problems in the East which she had with Great Britain in the war.

 

Nothing different in 41' but afterward it would have.

No, Germany's industrial complex is intact.

 

Is Brittain Neutral?

 

Yes. Gardner wrote:

"Britain surrenders, negotiates a peace, whatever, following the Fall of France. The scenario for this happening isn't important here but, Britain ends up out of the war."

 

Well without Lend lease the Soviet army would not be able field at least 1 million men as they did OTL since these would have to be put into the economy to make up the short fall. Next you have a deficiency in explosives , high octane fuel, steel, aluminum and other raw material they got from lend lease. So the Soviets would have had a smaller less capable force to fight the Axis from 42 on. I there by think a stalemate would have occurred along the Volga river line.

 

According to Glantz, while performing excellent on the battlefield, their approach in the East was flawed. They fought a Western style war in the East. This was the case in 41' again in 42' and repeated again in 43'......

I guess my question is why the change all of a sudden? Surely, with Britain out, this doesn't change their whole doctrine or approach or does it?

It was intact in 42' and in the beginning of 43'.

Again with this Lend Lease. What LL, did Russia receive before 43'?

 

On the other hand a lot of fighters were devoted to the west. There was also considerable air defences protecting cities in Germany and the West. Without Britian in the war (and as a consequence without the US) these resources can be moved West. Furthermore the resources spent on subs and the KM in general can be devoted to the Heer and LW. KM heavy units can also lend their fire support in places in the East as well.

The impact of LL is admitedly greater in 44 and 45 but the Soviets were desperate in 42 and some stuff (mostly British) had shown up in 41.

I did find the artidle at:
http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/90/363/9941_roosevelt.html
which states

and

And from: http://www.feldgrau.com/econo.html

 

I don’t wish to denigrate the superb Soviet contribution to the defeat of Hitlerism in the ETO, but that said without Stalin's new western allies verbal promise of aid forwarded to him by the American ambassador in July of 1941, it is not outside of the realm of possibility the Stalin's soviet might have sought and signed a temporary"truce" with Hitler in late 1941 in order to gain some "breathing room/time". However, when he was promised and started to receive aid from the west he fought on, changed the "national patriotic song", and spurred his populace to great effort in the combat of Hitler’s National Socialism/Fascism.

American aid alone (British not included), received by the Soviets not just "shipped", looks like this from late October ’41 through June ’42 (before the Nazi Stalingrad offensive), NOT counting the military equipment bought outright by gold transfers before and after June, 1941 when the Soviets were included in the Lend/Lease Act. In those nine months alone, L/L totaled:

All aircraft types; 1,285.
All AVF types including tanks; 2,249 (mostly light Stuarts and the sad M3 Lee/Grants).
Machine-guns, all calibers; 81,287.
Explosives, in pounds; 59,455,620.
Trucks, all types; 36,825.
Field telephones; 56,445.
Telephone wire; 600,000 kilometers (375,000 miles).

All BEFORE Stalingrad was attacked! This must have been of some aid. Even late in the war, Stalin did make many public statements praising the American aid received under Lend-Lease, most notably at Tehran and later Yalta. Plans to continue Lend-Lease as part of a post-war reconstruction program died with Roosevelt, as President Harry Truman ended all Lend-Lease aid on Aug. 15, 1945, the day the Japanese accepted the Potsdam Declaration. The Soviets kept rather extensive records of what arrived, since it was only those goods which they would be responsible for either buying or returning (if the items survived the war) after the war ended.

Quoting Zhukov: "Speaking about our readiness for war from the point of view of the economy and economics, one cannot be silent about such a factor as the subsequent help from the Allies. First of all, certainly, from the American side, because in that respect the English helped us minimally. In an analysis of all facets of the war, one must not leave this out of one's reckoning. We would have been in a serious condition without American gunpowder, and could not have turned out the quantity of ammunition which we needed. Without American `Studebekkers' [sic], we could have dragged our artillery nowhere. Yes, in general, to a considerable degree they provided ourfront transport. The output of special steel, necessary for the most diverse necessities of war, were also connected to a series of American deliveries." Moreover, Zhukov underscored that `we entered war while still continuing to be a backward country in an industrial sense in comparison with Germany. Simonov's truthful recounting of these meetings with Zhukov, which took place in 1965 and 1966, and are corroborated by the utterances of G. Zhukov, recorded as a result of eavesdropping by security organs in 1963: "It is now said that the Allies never helped us . . . However, one cannot deny that the Americans gave us so much material, without which we could not have formed our reserves and could not have continued the war . . we had no explosives and powder. There was none to equip rifle bullets. The Americans actually came to our assistance with powder and explosives. And how much sheet steel did they give us. We really could not have quickly put right our production of tanks if the Americans had not helped with their steel. And today it seems as though we had all this ourselves in abundance."

Interestingly this secretly recorded conversation of Marshall Zhukov is in contradiction to Zhukov's own book where he "toes the party line" and denigrates the Lend-Lease aid. In view of the Soviet control of publishing, I wonder which I would put most faith in, his recorded words or his published words?

Then let’s look at what no LL food stuffs would mean, that would = more soviet citizens required to remain in agriculture and food processing factories = fewer soldiers available and less military output, OR less healthy people = less productive and less combat ready troops. No LL flat steel, trucks, locomotives, railroad etc. = more people in factories to build those and therefore fewer T-34s and less soldiers OR less mobility of Red Army and therefore the possibility for Nazis to regroup and stop the Red Army offensives. These things all tie together in ways some posters choose not to acknowledge.

As to the "percentages" of the material sent to and used by the USSR in the three years, and ten months of Lend-Lease aid, these are the approximate percentages of the total materials, both direct military and non-military material made available to the Soviet military and industrial complex that were supplied by American Lend-Lease alone (UK and Commonwealth contributions to the USSR removed, and these are verified by USSR documents), and these are approximate percentages only so don’t jump on me:

80% of all canned meat consumed.
92% of all railroad locomotives, rolling stock and rails.
57% of all aviation fuel used.
53% of all explosives.
74% of all truck transport.
80% of all radio equipment.
53% of all copper.
56% of all aluminum, sheet and ingot. (some processed from reverse LL bauxite, I think)
60% of all automotive fuel.
74% of all vehicle tires.
12% of all armored vehicles.
14% of all combat aircraft.

That percentage list does NOT include the percentage of the high grade plate steel mentioned by Zhukov, communications cable, telephones, transport aircraft, canned non-meat foodstuffs, which was the SPAM, whole chickens and Russian recipe Tushenka made by Hormel, medical supplies, vitamins/vitasterols, and virtually every modern machine tool used by Soviet industry during and after the Great Patriotic War. Even though this ends up being between somewhere between only 12 and 16 percent of ALL Soviet War Production, there are some significant individual numbers of non-military goods. Those were the most important to my mind.

These numbers are similar to if not identical to Major Jordan’s records. At the immediate end of the war Truman demanded that the Soviets repay the U.S. for many non-military supplies, including cargo ships, worth more than $2.5 billion of the $11 billion total, while offering to "write off" the other nearly $9 billion. When the Cold War erupted, it effectively ended any such hopes of repayment, until finally thawing in the late 1980s with the outbreak of "glasnost". In June of 1990, to qualify for IMF, and U.S. loans and credits under the still active Johnson Debt-Default Act, the former USSR negotiated an agreement for repayment of her remaining WWII, non military material war debts, one year later the Soviet Union ceased to exist, but the CIS did honor the commitment for repayment of the Lend-Lease debt

 

These percentages are pretty amazing..(didn't realize the statistics were so high). It almost seems that the Soviet Armed forces would of had only of 1/3rd their decisive military material allocated into the field if it were not for lend-lease.

 

My point exactly, supply more men and material to a flawed approach in the East. All this would do, is simply delay the inevitable. Russia's industries are still in tact which are outproducing Germany by 41'. And Russia has a much larger pool of manpower. Russian is able to replenish it troops and at the same time grow in size and adapt, while Germany still shrinks and continues to make the same mistakes.

Logistics, winter, not being able to replace casualties, fuel etc. are still problems for Germany which numbers alone don't solve.

It is one thing to commit these resources and another to full fill them. How many of these ever reached Russia consistently? Would it be safe to assume less then half?

Even still, while helpful, these numbers are not significant enough to change the tide of war.

 

But how flawed would it be if the Soviets loose even more troops in their counter offensives and the Germans loose less. That was a very real potential and the Soviets were on the edge by the end of WWII. I believe the Soviets would have pushed the Germans back I'm just not sure how far they could have done so before both sides became exhausted.

For every extra German especially every extra German gun or plane the Soviet cost goes up as it does for every tank or plane they don't have. Cut out the promise of LL and they have to convert factories to truck and rail road production (although these might well be light tank factories) which means less domestically produced tanks as well.

 

Actually when comparing shipped to received L/L goods (and the Soviets kept excellent records of received goods), it appears that those shipped to Murmansk lost under 25%, and the Persian and Northern Pacific routes went almost undisturbed with less than 4% loss. It wasn't the "war making machines" which was of major import to the former USSR, it was all the other stuff. One of the most interesting is the rail-road stocks. The Soviet was VERY dependant on rail trasnport, and while they started with a great number of locomotives of all versions, many were damaged, destroyed, or captured before the end of 1941.

Comparing Lend-Lease supplied rail, rail cars and locomotives and holding them against Soviet stocks may not tell the whole story as per numbers and percentages of same. That is if we count production rather than existing stock, it's clear that L/L accounted for the majority of new Soviet rolling stock and, particularly the rails on which they rolled.

The internal Soviet production figures for 1940 were 928 locomotives, 30,880 freight and 1,052 passenger railway cars. In 1941, before the Nazis invaded and captured the largest factory for producing locomotives (Kahrkov ?), the rail-cars production figures remained on the same level, passenger car production ceased, and locomotives production fell rapidly down to under 715.

In the following years after 1942 there were no locomotives and car production to speak of at all. For example, in 1943 Soviet industry produced just 43 locomotives and 13 railway cars. The advent of Lend-Lease material itself increased the need for both locomotives and cars, and the USSR had always been highly dependent on trains, yet the need to produce weapons meant that only about 92 new locomotives were produced in the USSR during the entire war.

In this context, the supply of 1,981 US locomotives can be better understood. Likewise, the Soviet air force was enhanced by 18,700 aircraft, which amounted to only about 14% of all Soviet aircraft production (and only about 19% of its military aircraft).

Much of the above is from;Russia's Life-saver: Lend-lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II; by Albert Weeks (2004)

And the American deliveries to the Soviet Union can be divided into the following phases:

"pre Lend-lease" June 22nd 1941 to September 30th, 1941 (paid for in Gold)


a) first protocol period from October 1st 1941 to June 30th 1942 (signed October 1st 1941)

b) second protocol period from July 1st 1942 to June 30th 1943 (signed October 6th 1942)

c) third protocol period from July 1st 1943 to June 30th 1944 (signed 19th October 1943)

d) fourth protocol period from July 1st 1944, (signed April 17th 1945), formally ended May 12th of 1945 but deliveries continued for the duration of the war with Japan (which the Soviet Union entered on the 8 August 1945) under the "Milepost" agreement until September 1945 when Japan capitulated.

On September 30th 1945 all Lend-Lease to Russia was terminated.

The list below is the amount of war matériel shipped to the Soviet Union through the Lend-Lease program from its beginning until September 30th, 1945 (hope this transfers):


Aircraft
14,795

Tanks
7,056

Jeeps
51,503

Trucks
375,883

Motorcycles
35,170

Tractors
8,071

Artillery
8,218

Machine guns
131,633

Explosives
345,735 tons

Building equipment valued
$10,910,000

Railroad freight cars
11,155

Locomotives
1,981

Cargo ships
90 (not counting the 120 chartered to the USSR)

Submarine hunters
105

Torpedo boats
197

Ship engines
7,784

Food supplies
4,478,000 tons

Machine tools and equipment
$1,078,965,000

Non-ferrous metals
802,000 tons

Petroleum products
2,670,000 tons

Chemicals
842,000 tons

Cotton
106,893,000 tons

Leather
49,860 tons

Tires
3,786,000

Army boots
15,417,001 pairs

See:

Lend-Lease: Facts, Discussion Forum, and Encyclopedia Article

 

If GB is out of the war and remains "Neutral" I do not necessarily see the US getting involved and would therefore not be encouraged to supply Russia with lend lease equipment and material.

So if GB and the US abstain from a Russian/ German conflict then the availabilty of LL materials is off the table and the determining factor would be who could produce the most "bullets" and get them to the front lines: Russia or Germany?

Russian and German supply lines would be close to equal in length and the crux would be keeping the logistics chain fueld and moving in both directions.

Now, if Brittain surrendered / negotiated neutrality etc.. what would become of the commonwealth troops of Australia and Canada?

 

It may be an interest experiment in economic calculation if one were to calculate how much weaker the Red Army's military capabilities would be if Lend lease was completely removed. There would be a drastically different allocation of military, industrial, and human resources.

 

The wording of the Lend-Lease Act was such that it didn't direct itself toward Britain alone, but all nations involved in opposing the Axis powers. Britain itself in or out wouldn't alter the offer of aid to any nation/government opposing the Axis.

Canada was an autonomous nation/Confederation and the surrender of Great Britain would have no impact on their continued participation in the war against Nazi aggression, the same for all the other Commonwealth and Dominions of the UK.

The same for the Free French, the Free Poles, and all other governments in exile. The Soviets would be included as they were historically, and only the British contributions to the USSR would be effected.

All of this was in place ten months before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and Hitler declared war on America. Here are the pertinent sections of the Act which I am referring to.

Lend Lease Act
11 March 1941

AN ACT
Further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate add House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States".

(this section reveals that ANY nation in opposition to the Axis powers is eligible for Lend-Lease material)

To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any country (all emphasis mine) whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.


Source: Public Laws. Part 1 of United States Statutes at Large Containing the Laws and Concurrent Resolutions Enacted During the First Session of the Seventy-Seventh Congress of the United States of America, 1941-1942, and Treaties, International Agreements Other than Treaties, and Proclamations. Vol. 55 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942): 31-33.

(me again) with Great Britian out of the "loop", our L/L supplies would have still been offered to any nation fighting the Axis. And only the miniscule Murmansk run might be eliminated, the bulk of the goods arrived in the USSR through the Vladivistok and Persian corridors anyway.

 

i don't think overrruning european russia up to moscow is as important as destroying soviet capabilities strategically. destroy the crimean oilfields, either destroy or render unproductive the industrial centers behind the urals, blockade any place where imported material can flow in.

germany must have a two-ocean navy, strategic bombing (over at least 5 time zones) and a strong-enough army to withstand a counter-attack.