Germany signs peace with Britain

By the time that The Germans had thrown British out of Europe at Dunkirk, the British may have saved a lot of their manpower, but they left a lot of military weapons and supplies behind for the Germans. Germany may have had a chance at invading Britain if they had seized the initiative after Dunkirk based on the state of the British troops and how weakened they were. The Germans were even rapidly sending troops to France after they conquered France in preparation for the possible Operation Sea Lion. But instead of taking the initiative, Hitler decided to bomb the British into submission which although was causing a lot of damage, cost the Germans the crucial initiative. And by that time the US was already sending in more and more supplies to help reinforce the British.

 

Isn't that the whole point? It's the British perspective on what was happening right then/patently about to happen that would have panicked them into agreeing to Hitler's terms/offer.

WE now that....now. But it didn't look like that at the time. We had virtually zero visibility on what was happening on the Continent, just as they had no real idea of what was happening in the UK; although it's clear they ahd access to British newspapers etc. via Switzerland, Portugal, Spain etc, albeit a few days weeks out of date. Fleming notes that Hitler et al were reacting to newspaper reports of various court cases etc. as indicating that british morale was weakening.

 

...after his "peace offer" was rejected The Wehrmacht had been doing considerable work on the prospective invasion since the last two weeks of June - Halder chaired his first staff meeting regarding invasion before the end of June - but Directive 16 was only issued around the time of the peace offer rejection....and from the point of view of the conduct of the Battle of Britain the more important Directive No 17 came after that again.

 

But that assullmes unity among the Conservatives and I simply don't think it was there.

I'm not familiar enough with the system or personalities of the time to know if this could reasonably happen or not. I would think it unlikely but that's not based on much other than a "gut feeling".

But the Conservatives in general and Chaimberlain in particular had had very graphic examples of how much faith they could put in Hitler's words.

I thought I remembered reading somewhere that there were some raids carried out by capital ships but I could be wrong or it could be it was in the period just before D-day. I did find that Revenge was stationed at Plymoth at the end of August 1940 for "coastal defence". See:
https://books.google.com/books?id=WnhIAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA374&lpg=PA374&dq=naval+shelling+%22France%22+world+war+2&source=bl&ots=TF61M4Z6UW&sig=Snk0XZuskh8d6I9_Yx-TWJF8YRI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=56KJVMraEcOnNqG3gJgG&ved=0CFgQ6AEwCzgK#v=onepage&q=naval%20shelling%20%22France%22%20world%20war%202&f=false
page 411

But shelling a port that's activly trying to support an invasion is another matter. Even if little direct damage is inflicted it's going to mess up time tables.

But what could the Germans reasonably put in place in this time period? It was mid June before they had an armistace with France after all and a lot of effort in the rest of the month had to go into insuring that. Trying to plan and gather the ships and troops for an invasion in a single month is really pushing it.

As for the US arms I beleive they at least started arriving in June.

 

Perhaps a more plausible alternate course might have occurred if some mishap came to Churchill's plane during his spur of the moment trip to France to keep them in the fight. The confusion and selection of a new PM might have sapped some determination.

 

Thing is...

...what they WERE united pretty much in was a dislike of Churchill - what support he had was as individuals, rather than sections of the party - and a support for a number of Tory grandees...among them Lloyd George and Halifax.

Churchill was insulated from the rest of the party to a greater extent than Chamberlain because the inner "War Cabinet" was not Conservative-heavy It was much more of a meritocracy.

This split the problem into two...

1/ ports supporting/basing an invasion WERE attacked, as you know - at least one unsuccessful naval bombardment, mostly the bargebusting attacks by the RAF...at night, against targets clear deliniated against the sea-land interface. The thing about bombarding or even bombing other asopects of invasion preparation is that you have to know where they are! The British only achieved a very little in respect of this....and in attacking them even less; one large munitions dump at Dunkirk was blown up by bombing, and that was pretty much it. Infrastructure targets supporting an invasion were easier to find out about - the Dortmund-Ems Canal brining barges to the coast, railway junctions etc.....but actual troop concentrations, dumps etc. required intelligence that in the main the British didn't have.

At THAT point in the war - as Fleming notes - the Channel was a REAL barrier; neither side knew very much at all about what the other was doing on the other side!


2/ after the start of an invasion, the number of ports supporting it would rapidly slim down to those closest the South Coast of England...to reduce sailing time back and forth, possibly allowing one or two fast steamings in a night, or a slower, single-way transit by night. Only the Second (and putative Third) invasion waves would depart once more from their original, longer distance ports up into Belgium and Holland....supplying a German army In England would have to be almost 100% from French ports...

Which means all the issues of the shallows off the French coast etc; look at the parable of Dunkirk and the three (only) channels that could be used...a lot of the French coast right down into the Narrows was like that. Further out to sea...and you've got all the issues with minefields, other sandbars and shallows, and a general lack of sea room for capital ships to manover to avoid fall of ordnance if bombed. Forbes pretty much lost his job over it...but he was right LOL

Not actually very much; the 75mm guns and munitions, general munitions alreayd ordered, Thompsons as ordered for the Army and the first of various batches of weapons for the Home Guard...and the first batches of aircracft diverted to the Uk from the French orders; of these latter, however, the majority of these first aircraft batches turned out to be pretty useless in European conditions and to RAF standards.

See Macksey. I don't like the idea myself....but it was feasible - it depended on what the defenders could bring to bear in late June, early July....and that wasn't much!....just as much if not more than what the GERMANS could deploy!

That's after all what makes a successful lodgement - get ashore and defeat what the defenders can locally bring to bear;THEN there's a hiatus while the defenders muster the forces necessary to push you off again...during which time YOU are strengthening your beachhead too

And it's why the British feared a large "raid" - was it the invasion itself....or a distraction??? Send enough forces against a 1-3 division-sized raid....and you weaken your defences elsewhere...

Don't send enough...and the raid can punch through your weaker forces and make a dash on London.

Here's a funny though...

No; from naval history.net...

August​

1st – At 1430 hours convoy TC 6 with REVENGE and destroyers INGLEFIELD (D.3), AMAZON, SIKH, KEPPEL, WANDERER, VISCOUNT, HIGHLANDER, and VANQUISHER arrived at Greenock.



11th – REVENGE, with £14½M in gold bullion embarked (Operation FISH) escorted by destroyers ASHANTI, GRIFFIN, WATCHMAN and VORTIGERN sailed from Greenock.
In the North Channel the REVENGE force RVed with the troopships EMPRESS OF AUSTRALIA, ORONSAY, SAMARIA, ANTONIA, DUCHESS OF YORK and GEORGIC, some of the troopships had evacuated children embarked, escorted by destroyers HURRICANE and WALKER.
The convoy designated ZA, formed up and set course for Halifax.



12th – Destroyers ASHANTI, GRIFFIN, HURRICANE, WALKER, WATCHMAN and VORTIGERN detached.



19th – Convoy ZA and REVENGE arrived at Halifax.



27th - Convoy TC 7 comprising 6 troopships with 10958 Canadian troops embarked sailed from Halifax escorted by REVENGE and destroyers ASSINIBOINE and OTTAWA.



28th – Destroyer ASSINIBOINE detached and returned to Halifax.

September​

2nd – Convoy TC 7 was joined by destroyers AMBUSCADE, JAVELIN, JAGUAR and WOLVERINE.



4th – At 0600 hours convoy TC 7 and escort arrived in the Clyde.



It was a week after this that Revenge was sent to Plymouth... but spot the caveat at the end...


(September)
14th - REVENGE and cruiser EMERALD sailed from the Clyde for Plymouth to come under the command of Western Approaches, escorted by destroyers MACKAY and WESTCOTT.

En route MACKAY and WESTCOTT detached and destroyers SCIMITAR and SKATE joined.



(This deployment was made by the Admiralty when intelligence suggested that a large scale invasion appeared imminent. Had the invasion taken place REVENGE would have been the only capital ship in the Channel area)



15th – REVENGE, EMERALD, MACKAY and WESTCOTT arrived at Plymouth.


This came up recently on AHF; take a look at a bathymetric map of the Channel Plymouth is south of the Narrows, and therefore south of where the depth of the Channel suddenly shallows entering the Narrows She would have been effective against Invasion traffic departing Cherbourg if she had intercepted them in time the night before S-Day...

But that area south of the Narrows was where, inconveniently, the KM intended to deploy virtually all its available uboats, south of the line of minefields they intended to lay there, tying together the British fields.

The single effective naval bombardment of this Sealion scare period was actually carried out by Revenge....in the seecond week of October!

back to naval-history.net...

October​

​

10th – At 2000 hours REVENGE escorted by the destroyers JAVELIN (D5), JAGUAR, JUPITER, KASHMIR, KELVIN, KIPLING sailed from Plymouth on Operation MEDIUM.

(Operation MEDIUM was a combined operation by the RN and No 2 and 3 Groups RAF to attack German invasion shipping in the port of Cherbourg.



The first attempt at a naval bombardment was made using the monitor EREBUS, but this had not been successful, due to her lack of manoeuvrability in anything of a seaway.

The Operation MEDIUM plan was for Blenheims of 2 Group to bomb the harbour area followed by Wellingtons of 3 Group who would carry out a combined bombing and flare dropping during which the REVENGE force would carry out a bombardment of the port area.


To cover the REVENGE force from surface attack from the west were the light cruisers NEWCASTLE and EMERALD and destroyers WANDERER and BROKE and Polish destroyers BURZA and GARLAND. To the east were the light cruiser CARDIFF and destroyers VANOC and VOLUNTEER)

11th – At 0035 hours the REVENGE force RVed with MGB’s 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 51 who had sailed from Weymouth and were tasked with covering the bombarding force from E-Boats.
At 0230 hours the MGB’s formed a screen ahead of the REVENGE force ready to engage any E-Boats or small vessels encountered.
At 0315 hours the bombing attacks commenced ad flares were dropped over Cap de la Hague to enable REVENGE to obtain an accurate fix.
From 0333 to 0351 hours from a range of approximately 15700 yards the REVENGE group bombarded Cherbourg harbour. During the 18 minute bombardment 120 x 15in shells were fired by REVENGE and a total of 801 x 4.7in shells from her escorting destroyers.

The force then retired under fire from a German shore battery, estimated as up to 13.5in calibre, east of Cherbourg. The firing continued for 30 minutes and although accurate no hits were achieved. During the withdrawal REVENGE worked up to 21½ knots.



12th – At 0800 hours REVENGE and the destroyers of the 5th Flotilla arrived in Spithead.



This is the bombardment mentioned in Schenk when he discusses the German coastal artillery, positioned to cover the invasion flotillas. I should have remembered that earlier Revenge didn't actually do very much damage onshore at all...and didn't manage to hit any of the German batteries that opened fire on her...but some of them came FAR closer to Revenge than she came to them, so she departed the scene toot sweet!

See the note about HMS Erebus the monitor? That was one of the WWI era big-gun monitors originally built to shell ports in the Low COuntires basing iboats, supposedly big enough to destpry lock gates etc...but even in WWI the several such bombardments attempted in the more temperate waters of the southern North Sea had proved ineffective - hence Keye's Zeebrugge raid instead.

In reality, Revenge was only in Plymouth for two weeks of the likely invasion period...proved later to have minimal use...and in the event of Sealion would have been vulnerable, stuck in a quite narrow area, to uboats, mines, and the KM.

 

I was going by
https://books.google.com/books?id=WnhIAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA411&lpg=PA411&dq=Revenge+1940+august&source=bl&ots=TF61M6ZdQS&sig=QhouBPaFekFOeGC3qVpS0ulHwgQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=l_OJVPbhEMekNqzngugK&ved=0CEwQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=Revenge%201940%20august&f=false
page 411 which lists Revenge as ordered to Plymoth on 31 August for coastal defence. Which of course means she wasn't there yet.

Still bombarding a port where one's opponent is trying to run log ops is a bit different from attacking one where resources are being gathered/stored.

 

I would think almost 1,000 75mm guns along with their ammo would be signficant especially at the time. Likewise rifles, maching guns, and mortars along with their ammo would have proved quite useful if the Germans had invaded in July. I'm not sure when the planes go there but compared to some of what the British were prepared to use again I think they would have had some utility.

 

Yes....and again no; they caused a number of unique problems all of their own!

Yes - in that they brought a lot of divisional arty units up to establishment, and were also used in an anti-tank role to make up shoirtfalls in 2-pdr A/T gun availability after Dunkirk...

No - in that they were deployed in "mixed" divisional artillery batteries, often with 18/25 pdrs and 25 pdrs... causing headaches over ammunition issue and portage.

They came originally with either very little or no solid shot for A/T use (have to check which) and the British had to start a crash programme stripping out "old or damaged" 75mm HE rounds from what was sent and fitting them with locally-manufacuted solid shot.

Another problem was that...they came as guns! No limbers with them, and no British tows were suitable at that point in time. Often you see them static-positioned as A/T guns covering the approaches to nodal points or coastal batteries....not unlike the old wooden-wheel 18pdrs used on Malta for that purpose....and a couple at RAF airfields as part of the defence. As the years passed after 1940, you see other units "taking possession" of them in situ in those positions; the RAF regiment in particular inherited many in their somewhat static airfield defence role after it was constituted in 1942!

For a couple of months the .303 "Enfields" of WWI vintage - commonly referred to as the P14, whatever manufacturer they came from...Winchester, Remington or Eddystone - were issued to British Army units but mostly to the Home Guard. After a couple of months they were taken back from the Home Guard, who were issued "P17"s in their place - the .300 M1917 from Remington, Springfield, and Eddystone. The P14s were issued on again to regular Army units....and also to Commonwealth units...to ease the issue of commonality of small arms' ammunition across front line units.

There are snippets of film stock that occasionally show up in the Battlefield series, and at one point in The World At War, that clearly show Commonwealth troops in the Western Desert carrying P14s!

There was actually a LOT of .303 SMLEs in the UK at the time, in store....but they were ex-WWI items, had seen a lot of use...whereas the majority of P14s arrived in their heavy yellow packing grease from the factory having never seen use...or even daylight!...in WWI, before being re-crated and stored.

For the same reason, BARs that reached UK shores were only issued to the Home Guard...as were the Thompsons, although some were used by the regular Army...and the Commandos of course. In Home Guard hands the Thompson provided an infantry squad with a squad automatic weapon; they didn't mind....or rather, didn't grumble LOL...about the difficulties of carrying round those bloody great 10 round drums etc...

 

Did you drop a 0? At least according to wiki they had 20 and 30 round sticks or 50 and 100 round drums. The same article mentions the British not being happy with the 50 round drums:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thompson_submachine_gun

 

No, dropped the 5 LOL No, the regular Army didn't like them...but the Home Guard lapped them up...

...including the American citizens of the "Eagle Squadron of the Home Guard", formed of U.S. Citizens in London during the Blitz, including most members of the peripatetic U.S. press corps as they were posted to then home from London. Unlike the rest of the Home Guard it was fully "motorised"...members having their own cars and enjoying a generous petrol ration....and fully armed with automatic weapons, the members buying Thompsons on mail order from home!

A year later, the same (former) U.S. officer who founded the unit went on to found something potentially a LOT more useful to the War effort - the Eagle Squadron of the RAF!