Hitler and Calais invasion...

" So little did the Germans understand the realities of amphibious operations, that Hitler´s arguments at the Margival conference the day before had included a repetition of the theory that the V1 offensive would force the Allies to destroy the remainder of their forces in a head-on attack from seaward against the "Rocket coast" of Pas de Calais!"

From Caen Anvil of victory by McKee

Just wondering if anyone got more details on what was discussed at Margival? So did Hitler have more background to keeping the troops at Calais than the "real invasion" as we have been thinking??

 

Hello Kai-Petri,

I do not quite understand your forwarding in regards to the Margival Conference and the "day before".

The MC was on 17th of June. Rundstedt and Rommel had asked Hitler for that conference. Both Generals dissagreed on the tactic towards the Allied beachheads forwarded by Hitler.

Rommel forwarded to pull back the German units behind the Orner river and disengaging from Caen. Rundstedt forwarded that due to the Allied airpower an assembly of German troops to conduct a counteroffensive as ordered by Hitler was impossible.

Rommel was quite tactless towards Hitler and forwarded that the Wehrmacht was not able to hold the Allies in France, Italy and the East and that the Allies were poised to strike into Germany.

Upon this Hitler began to talk about the new wonderweapons such as the V-1 and Me-262 that would bring about the turn in the war.

Nothing was concluded and the two generals walked of empty handed to the front.

Regards
Kruska

 

Kruska,

the quote is from the mentioned book with no word taken away, so it might sound strange in places.

Anyway, I understand that Hitler believed he was forcing the Allied make another invasion to destroy the V1 ramps, whether the normandy invasion was a fake or not. So Hitler believed he was still holdin the cards of the war game in his hands. At least that´s how I see thing from this caption.

I´d like to find the exact wording of the conference to see if this can be seen as Hitler´s view. Mostly the comments of the Generals has been regarded as the main issue here, but perhaps also Hitler´s view on why not move the troops can be seen here. Even if his logic was false.

 

Crossroads at Margival: Hitler’s Last Conference in France: June 17, 1944 2nd Edition
by Peter Margaritis (Author)


By mid-June, 1944, just a week and a half after D-Day, the Third Reich was desperately struggling in France to throw the Western Allies back into the sea before they could consolidate of their foothold on the European continent. As the Allies continued to build up and move inland, Adolf Hitler became more and more agitated, both with the situation, and the failure of his two field marshals there. In charge of all German units in France was crusty old Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, the army commander famous for the many victorious campaigns he had led early in the war. Leading the troops at Normandy was Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the legendary “Desert Fox,” the Führer’s military protégé since the beginning of the war. Believing that his field marshals were growing pessimistic, Hitler suddenly, impulsively, decided to find out himself what the situation was, and to instill in his generals a tenacious resolve to win. So in an unprecedented move and to the amazement of all, he gathered up his command entourage and flew across Germany into France to meet the two field marshals. This article is the story of that unusual conference, recounted in detail in its entirety for the first time. Using a number of sources, it relates Hitler's second and last wartime trip into France, and tells of the beginning of a serious rift between the Führer and his two field marshals in the West—a grudging resentment that would have serious consequences for all three.

 

The argument.

 

Trying to get the book mentioned above. I guess it was some kinda success as there is 2nd edition.