Hitler's Italian Allies, A Book Review

belasar · Apr 1, 2011

Hitler's Italian Allies, Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the war of 1940-1943
By MacGregor Knox
Cambridge University Press, 2000, 207 pages
Amazon New, From $20.46, Used, From $9,55

This slim volume attempts to explain why the Duce's Fascist Italy faired so poorly in WWII, despite the fact that Italy under Mussolini had nearly a generation to prepare for the war it had so eagerly sought. Conventional wisdom has set down that the Italian soldier lacked the training, equipment, and the will to fight. While true why is it so?

Mussolini came to power in late 1922 much as Hitler did in 1933 in Germany. He was asked to form a government by King Victor Emmanual III to bring political stability to Italy. The Duce, like many leading Italian politician's felt that Italy must become a great power like Britain or France, and the only way to achieve this was through a great war. Italian leadership understood that the limitations on Italy in industry, and power generation as well as the need to import large amounts of coal and oil precluded a long war. They must have a short, victorious war or were doomed to defeat.

Realizing what they needed was as far as they got. Just about every choice they made to prepare for this war was wrong. The Army thought a large, slow moving mass of Infantry was the key to victory. The Navy built large Battleship's they could not provide enough fuel to operate, the Air Force adheared to the theory of strategic bombing but built bombers unable to preform the task and fighters unable to escort.

The biggest problem was that Mussolini was no Hitler. Hitler took complete power with the passing of Hindenburg, but Mussolini was always subject to recall by the King. The Military was a Royal one, not one that swore loyalty to the Duce. Industry could and did act to maximise their profits and power at the expence of quality equipment and needs of the state. Mussolini lacked both the power and the will to force these reluctent organs of state and industry to toe the line. These and other factors are explored.

Italy as a great power was a fantasy, but most problem's were self inflicted and there seems no reason why Italy could not have been a credible 2nd class power, with some influence on their fate.

This book left me wanting a bit more, not because it was not good, but because it was, and because there is so little in english on wartime Italy available. I consider it a worthy addition to my collection and can reccomend it to anyone wishing to learn more than the popular myths about the Duce's last war.

BR-VIII

Kai-Petri · Jun 5, 2011

Agreed. Some interesting details and easy to read, but a bit short. Worth buying still. If you can get in your hands F.W Deakin´s " The brutal friendship: Mussolini,Hitler and the fall of Italian fascism" then there´s a whole lot more to read on the subject...

TiredOldSoldier · Jun 5, 2011

I will try to get hold of those books, the subject is finally being explored in Italy by historians more intersted in finding what was went wrong than in politics but we are far from having a "defniitive" work. The self-serving nature, and incompetence, of a lot of Mussolini's regime key figures is staggering. One big problem is that a lot of them, especially amongst industrialists and military, retained a lot of power after the war and did their best to put all the blame on the dead.

BTW I wouldn't call Mussolini being no Hitler a "problem", Mussolini's biggest limitation was not that he lacked power or ruthlessness, what he lacked was the ability to see reality beyond his own propaganda. He did have a lot, if not absolute, power but contrary to Hitler, (and even more Stalin) he didn't get involved in the details, giving a free rein to incompetence and corruption with the result of having an ineffective force despite the large amounts of money spent.

knightdepaix · Aug 16, 2015

I agree in general with belasar's review; I believe they are literature on specific topics, say on Mannerheim, Horthy and Antonescu. For Antonescu, how about Hitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania 1940–1944 ?

http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/606

knightdepaix · Dec 14, 2016

I am comparing three sources on the performance of Semovente 75/18 self propelled gun that had been used as tank destroyer.

Information from books:

Hitler's Italian Allies, Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the war of 1940-1943
By MacGregor Knox
Cambridge University Press, 2000, 207 pages
Amazon New, From $20.46, Used, From $9,55

P.153
The effective range of the 47mm main tank gun against British armor of around 600 meters severely constrained Italian commanders. The Ariete armored battalion in the attack tended to make a headlong dash at the enemy at the M13's lamentable cross-country top speed of roughly 12 kilometers per hour, to bring the range down to 400 meters or less before British artillery and tank guns could perforate too many Italian tanks. Closer ranges also made best use of the M13's limited ammunition supply; as in other forms of firefight, the side that ran out first suffered deep embarrassment. The arrival in spring 1942 of FIAT-Ansaldo 75mm assault gun on the M14 chassis allowed the Ariete and the newly arrived Littorio division a somewhat wider tactical repertoire, until British deployment of U.S. medium tanks negated that small advantages
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Websites

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semovente_da_75/18#Service
The Semovente da 75/18s were deployed in the North African campaign and during the Allied invasion of Sicily, alongside M tank units to provide additional firepower. Despite the fact that they were not designed to fight other tanks, their 75 mm howitzer proved ideal (thanks to its low muzzle velocity) for firing HEAT shells; its 5.2 kg HEAT shell ("Effetto Pronto" in Italian) could pierce 80 mm of armour at 500 meters, and could thus defeat tanks such as the US built M3 Grant and M4 Sherman used by the British Army.[4] As such, these machines were responsible for many of the successes by the Italian armoured troops during 1942–43, when the medium tanks (all armed with a 47 mm gun) were no longer effective.
The most successful action fought by Semovente da 75/18 took place on 10 June 1942, south of Knightsbridge, during the Battle of Gazala. Thirty M3 Grant and ten M3 Stuart of 1st and 6th Royal Tank Regiment attacked a position held by the Ariete division but were repelled by Semovente da 75/18s as well as some M13/40s and gun trucks, losing three Grants and two Stuarts from 6th Royal Tank Regiment and twelve Grants and three Stuarts from 1st Royal Tank Regiment.[5] The Italians lost two M13/40s.[6]
Despite its limitations (namely its cramped interior and the insufficiently powerful engine in the M40 and M41 variants), the Semovente da 75/18 proved successful both in the direct support role and in anti-tank fighting; its main advantages, other than their sheer firepower, was in its thicker armour (relative to the medium tanks) and lower silhouette that made it more difficult to hit.
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http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/italy/Semovente_da_75-18.php
Tactically, these vehicles were mostly used as mobile artillery at divisional level. The organic structure consisted of two artillery groups for each armored division, 2 batteries of four 75/18 each and a command vehicle. The first batch was just enough to equip three armored divisions. The first units equipped with these vehicles started operating in Libya in January 1942. At El Alamein they performed remarkably well, continuing to do so during the entire campaign, until November 1943. They proved versatile and even deadly against many Allied tanks in direct fire, although the American M3 Lee/Grant and M4 Sherman required the use of HEAT rounds. They also served as assault guns, providing indirect fire. These vehicles were well-served by their low profile, good protection, and could fire either HE, AP or HEAT shells, and often performed even better than the mediums equipped with high-velocity 47 mm (1.85 in) guns.

However, there were several issues with this machine. Firstly, its lack of ammunition, with only 44 round carried, which required supply vehicles to be permanently on hand. Secondly, they lacked range compared to the open-topped Allied SPGs, like the Priest and Sexton, or the German Wespe, limiting the effectiveness of indirect support. Thirdly, they did not have a coaxial machine-gun and proved vulnerable to infantry assaults. The old-fashioned bolted hull was weaker than welded ones, and the 1930-style suspension did not allow great speeds.
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Information on websites appears to shade more positive views on the performance than that on the book. Is there particular reason for that appearing so?

lwd · Dec 14, 2016

... They also served as assault guns, providing indirect fire. ...
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I thought assault guns were there to provide direct fire.

knightdepaix · Dec 28, 2018

Some other books on the similar contents: why and/or how Fascist Italy failed with its objectives.

Burgwyn, H. James. Mussolini Warlord Failed Dreams of Empire, 1940-1943. Enigma Books, 2012.
Mussolini Warlord: Failed Dreams of Empire, 1940-1943 by H. James Burgwyn

Harrison, Mark, and Vera Zamagni (et al.). “Italy: How to Lose the War and Win the Peace.” The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison by Mark Harrison

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Hitler's Italian Allies, A Book Review

belasar Court Jester

Kai-Petri Kenraali

TiredOldSoldier Ace

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lwd Ace

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