Hitler's summer pause 1941

Wiki writes:

My question is wouldn't it have been more intelligent to take Moscow first, then the Ukrainian agricultural, mining and industrial resources second? I'm not sure how strong the Soviet forces were harassing Army Group centre's southern flank but I think taking Moscow was a necessary part of conquering Russia and the sooner it was taken out the better. It was true that in 1812 Moscow proved to be not as important as Napoleon thought it would be. But I think in 1941 Moscow was much more crucial to victory than in 1812. A much higher percentage of the population was living in cities in 1941 than in 1812. I think also that if the German troops could have wintered in Moscow less of them would have died from frostbite and their morale would have been much higher. I think Russia would have continued to fight if Moscow had been taken, but if the German had taken Moscow, then Lenningrad a little while later, plus the oil of the Caucusus I think it would have been very difficult for Russia to continue fighting. I also think that it would have been more difficult to coordinate the Russian army without all the organization that had been built up in Moscow. When the Americans were kicked out of their capitol, Philadelphia in 1777 it didn't matter much because back then government was a much smaller operation than it is today. Nowadays however the government is so much bigger and there are so many more moving parts that it becomes very difficult to coordinate such a machine.

 

The point is that their was more than the Moscow break. The Italian intervention in the Balkans had delayed Barbarossa, for example.

lso Leningrad was the symbol of Communism for Hitler and rather than take the city he wanted to starve its population.

This , added to the Caucase fields , scattered the greedy invaders who could not take eveything and did not grab what they could when it was time.

Winter and the somewhat belatde reactions of the Soviets brough the Germans to a halt .

 

One should not always believe Wiki .

Some points

1)It never has been proved that a capture of Moscow in september was possible (a capture in the summer was excluded)

2)Why should the Germans do the trouble to capture Moscow ? It is more than unlikely that a capture of Moscow would result in the fall of the SU .

3)Why would it have been very difficult fot the SU to continue the fighting if it had lost Moscos,Leningrad and the oil of the Caucasus ?

 

I've seen pretty strong arguments that it was the weather rather than supporting the Italians that caused the delay.

In any case the Germans weren't really ready to get to Moscow in September. Most of August was consumed resupplying and getting vehicles back into operation. If they had decided Moscow was the number one goal they might have reached it in late September or October, but that's a long way from taking it. I'm not sure that they could have fully enveloped it in 41 even with that emphasis.

 

A pause was certainly required, but when they resumed operations, the Germans conducted two simultaneous army-group-scale offensives, one to Kiev and one covering a distance comparable to advancing to Moscow. Unfortunately for them that one was directed to and beyond Leningrad. It was not just a question of "Moscow or Kiev?" as it's presented all too commonly in history books.

Pre-Barbarossa war cames (conducted by von Paulus incidentally) had anticipated both the need for the pause and the request from AGs North and South for a "loan" of panzers from AG Center. This is often presented as a choice between supporting both flanking army groups or continuing the advance in the center. This is also false. The situations on the two flanks were not mirror images. Although we speak of the Germans advancing east, the axis of advance in the center was actually ENE, Warsaw-Moscow. On the left, the front ran roughtly perpendicular to the axis of advance all the way to the Baltic; there basically was no left flank. Moreover, an advance on Moscow would cut the main transportation arteries to the Leningrad area, an unusual situation in which driving forward would reduce the threat from the left.

Not so on the right. German armies around Smolensk were already well to the east of the Russians around Kiev, and the exposed right flank would get longer as they advanced. To the right, to the southeast, was all the latent strength of Russia, troops, transportation, industries, agriculture, population, all mobilizing to meet the invaders. Securing the right flank was not an alternative to advancing in the center, it was an absolutely necessary prerequisite.

Of course we can never know if the Germans might have reached Moscow, but here's what we do know: starting in September, the Germans made two major advances, each of which involved operations on two fronts - Leningrad and Kiev, then Vyazma and Bryansk. It was the third bound, the final assault on Moscow, which faltered. Suppose the first advance had been Vyazma rather than Leningrad? Bring PzG4 south to AG Center rather than sending PzG3 north. Historically that first bound in the center took the Germans about 3/4 of the way to Moscow, despite the Russians having another month to build up forces and defenses. All we have to hypothsize is the Germans advancing the same distance they did, at the same time they did, and the second bound encircles Moscow, with the southern flank secured by the Kiev and Bryansk operations.

Each of these operations, and several others earlier in the campaign, resulted in the encirclement of half a million or more Russian soldiers around a major city, followed by their capitulation in a few weeks. Is there any reason Moscow would not have gone the way of Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Bryansk, or Vyazma?

 

There's a thread over on the Axis history forum titled something like 'German railroads in the East' that may prove illuminating to this discussion.

 

Thanks for the input, I really appreciate it.

 

You're very welcome. It's an interesting topic. The "Moscow or Kiev" debate was largely about the deployment of Guderian's panzer group. His memoir Panzer Leader describes a dramatic meeting with Hitler about it. That was one of the first sources from the German side, and I think it influenced a lot of subsequent historical writings, making it seem as if "Moscow or Kiev" (one of his sub-chapter titles) was the whole story.

I agree that taking Moscow would not mean the total defeat of Russia, but it was probably the most useful thing the Germans could do to conclude the 1941 campaign. Their emphasis for 1942 would still be in the south as it was historically.

 

The aim of the Germans was to defeat the Red Army,and therefore,the advanve to Moscow was the most logical thing to do : Hitler and the OKH agreed on the principle,but,whatever may say unreliable person as Guderian AFTER the war,an attack in the direction of Moscow before october ,was impossible .It never was :Moscow or Kiev:it was Moscow,but meanwhile,they would go to Kiew,because,Moscow without Kiew first was impossible .

 

One must understand the mentality that lead Hitler to his decision, besides being forseen in the original plans, the Germans had not counted on any Soviet resistance after they reached Smolensk. Since German intelligence did not discover the presence of any of the Soviet reserves and according to the original estimates the Germans had destroyed about 2/3 of the original Soviet army. Those in the Ukraine represented the last Soviet units and so due to the failure of German intel it was logical to destroy the last major Soviet units and capture the resources so desperately needed for the war against Britain. Do not take Guderians memoirs seriously, he would have us believe that his Panzers could simply march as far as they wanted and there would never be any problem resupplying them. For all of his claims of not being a Nazi, he stayed in Hitler's graces until the end of the war.

 

"For all of his claims of not being a Nazi, he stayed in Hitler's graces until the end of the war."

Steverodgers801, you seem to be implying something here that isn't warranted. Hitler and Guderian had a stormy relationship with many loud verbal arguments. Before the end of the war he was fired from his post as chief of staff. What people don't recognize about Hitler is that he respected people who didn't go behind his back, but confronted him. Officers like Guderian and Galland weren't cashiered or removed automatically from office for advocating things Hitler disagreed with. They, and others, got away with behavior that wouldn't have been tolerated in just about any other military. After the war, Guderian, with every other senior officer, was investigated for possible war crimes. No charges were ever filed on him. He was a protégé of von Seeckt who demanded non-involvement in politics. I've never seen any evidence that he embraced Nazi ideology but, as a serving officer, he was loyal to the government in power.

I have always felt that the capture of Moscow in 1941 would have provided great dividends for the Germans. Soviet rail, motor, and other communications hubbed in Moscow. That, and the fact that their very centralized government, with all of its senior bureaucracy, was in Moscow, would have made it much harder for the Stalin government to prosecute the war, had it fallen. I'm not saying here that the capture of Moscow would have automatically won the war for the Germans. If it had fallen, it would have done so right at the end of the campaign season and thus the Germans wouldn't have been able to fully capitalize on the chaos that would have resulted.

 

To put it in other words: In June 1941, the Red army had approx 4,800,000 in service. By 1st October they'd suffered 2,800,000 casualties. More than 50%. By First January 1942, a staggering 4,400,000 casualties. IOW, by the time of the Moscow offensive, the Germans had already inflicted losses equaling 90% of the size of the entire Red Army just 6 months earlier. Barbarossa did what it set out and planned to do. It just didn't have the political success anticipated.

I know of no other nation that has ever sustained such a massive blow in less than 6 months, and still continued to function. In order to do so, it was conscripting at a sustained rate of 500,000 men a month.

7th October, 1941 Georgy Zhukov, was forced to report to Joseph Stalin that there was no longer a continuous front in the west, and the large gaps could not be closed because the command had run out of reserves.
16th October, 1941 While thousands of civilians continued to flee the city, the Soviet government and diplomatic corps moved to Kuibyshev 1,500 miles to the east; Joseph Stalin, however, chose to stay.
19th October, 1941 German troops defeated the Soviet forces within the Vyazma pocket in Russia and captured 670,000 men, 1,000 tanks, and 4,000 artillery pieces. In Moscow, Lavrentiy Beria advised the Soviet GKO to evacuate the capital "or they will strangle us like chickens", but it was rejected by Joseph Stalin; however, Stalin did order the Politburo (less Stalin, Beria, and Georgy Malenkov) to evacuate.
28th October, 1941 The Soviet Military Collegium evacuated Moscow, Russia for Chkalov (now Orenburg), Russia.

October, 1941 was a bad month in the USSR

 

the strength of the Soviet forces in june 1941 was some 5.7 million,of which (IIRC) some 2 million were stationed in the western military districts .

 

If you wish to count the various other armed militias, air forces, and assorted coastal navies, be my guest. They're not the Red Army, however. Just be aware also that most authors agree that the number of Casualties stated is low.

Glantz states in Operation Barbarossa, that the losses endured by the Red Army by end of December 1941 was equivalent to its entire strength in May 1941. I'm being generous when I say only 90%.

"The loss of 2.8 million soldiers in the first three months of the war, and another 2 million by 31st December, virtually eradicated the peacetime Red Army, and forced the NKO to raise largely untrained forces led by relatively inexperienced command cadre."
- D Glantz, Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941

 

You are ignoring the most important factor,which is not the number of Soviet losses,but the time factor : when these losses occurred .The loss of 1.5 million POW in the summer was more important than the later (September-january) loss of 1.8 million POW .If the war was not won in the summer,he was lost :after the summer,the SU could send more men to the front than the Germans could "kill",while the Germans could send less men to the front than the Soviets would "kill" .Thus,time was essential,and,while october was a bad month for the SU,it was not decisive .

 

Yet Harolds after so many officers were sacked by Hitler especially after the July plot Guderian managed to remain in power and actually became chief of staff. Guderian may have argued with Hitler about details, but he never questioned Hitlers authority or position.
Even though the Soviet army was in real bad shape, the German army was not in much better shape. Its mobility was less then half of what it had been at the start of the campaign. The most telling thing is how the Germans could not take advantage of their early successes.

 

sr801: Let's see, what was the usual fate of officers who opposed Hitler's authority and position at that time? Usually, it was a piano-wire necktie. Guderian wasn't dumb, nor was he suicidal. Actually, he argued with Hitler about the whole conduct of the war in the East. At that time Hitler's grasp on reality was getting a little weak. Nobody ever accused Guderian of being a toady.

Back on topic: Remember, Guderian and other like-minded generals believed in the thrust(s) deep into the rear of the enemy, flanks be damned, capture the centers of power and thus paralyze the enemy.

 

He claims he argued repeatedly with Hitler. He had to have kept Hitlers trust how ever when he became the chief of staff after the July plot.

 

The problem was that Rundstedt could not keep up with the other Army Groups so there was a million men on the right flank of AG center. Also Hitler´s idea that the Red Army would collapse did not happen. The Red Army had all the time fresh troops to put in line but Wehrmacht kept on fighting with the same troops with more and more bigger losses. And not much new troops or tanks to replace them.

If the Southern sector had been able to keep up with other Army groups perhaps things might have changed, as Moscow would have been the major target, probably, in September-october. Stalin himself said he won´t leave Moscow so that would have been a massive blow to the Russians. But would he have stayed if Moscow had been lost? Many top Army men said to Stalin they could go as far as the Siberia and still come back winning.

I remember von Bock say that the biggest problem is that the"corporal" don´t know what he wants. Leningrad, southern sector wheat, Moscow etc...

 

sr801: Hitler couldn't sack all his generals and Guderian couldn't be connected to the plot. Guderian had a long history of being a difficult subordinate and it's doubtful he changed his personality for Hitler.