Hitlers turn south in 1941

I am beginning to think that is some ways Hitler actually saw things better then his generals. He was still an idiot, but I believe that the motive for Hitler turning south towards Kiev was actually based on the realization that the Soviets were not collapsing as Hitler believed they would. Since the war was going to last longer then planned it was essential that Germany acquire more resources and these were available in the Ukraine. I think it is possible that if Germany had gone after Moscow first that Germany may have lost as early at 1944 or even 1943.

 

1st goal of Barbarossa was the destruction of Soviet Forces in Western Russia and preventing their escape to the east. Red Army forces in Kiev Military District were a threat to the flank of Army Group Center.

By going south Germans secured their flank and destroyed Soviet Forces around Kiev. Move south was in keeping with Barbarossa's operational goals.

Kiev operation was numerically Germans best victory in 41.

War for Germany was lost when it attacked Russia. Only lack of any defensive plans by Russians led to collapse of Red Army in 1941. If Russians chose to defend instead of counter attacking in 41-42, the war would have been over, like you stated in 1944.

Happy New Year everybody.

 

Over the last 18 months I have read extensively about the Eastern Front ( there are now some very good books available ). And the more I read, the more I think that you are right.......

But for the 'armchair historian' and military history buff, the subject is endlessly fascinating.

Oh - and a Happy New Year to you, too ! :S!

 

In reading Stahels book he contends that the Germans knew it was really beyond German capacity, but one could not argue with Hitler and after all he had been right about France falling so why not simply pretend that the Soviets will just collapse and we can avoid the difficult question of what if they dont

 

I believe it is the big numbers that the Germans caught as POW that made them think the war is soon over. 3,5 million Red Army prisoners... What other army in Europe could take such a hit and stay fighting back....

 

It is precisely this.

The plan "Operation Barbarossa" called for the destruction of the Red army within the first 600km.

In June 1941, the total Soviet armed forces stood at approximately 4.5 million men.

By December 1941, the Wehrmacht had inflicted a total of 4.6 million casualties (KIA, WIA, MIA), for about 750,000 of their own. The trouble being, the Soviets were replacing losses at the sustained rate of around 500,000 men a month, whereas the Germans were basically unable to provide sufficient replacements to their exhausted units.

Considering that Germany had just over half the population of Soviet Russia, the Soviet feat was remarkable.

 

The Germans had ran out of reserves by September. There was a pool of 150,000 men at the start and the Germans lost that number by AUgust

 

I really don't think one should say, "Hitler lost the war when he attacked Russia." Huge wars like this are made up of decisions big and small and when BARBAROSSA started anything could have happened. It was anybody's game but the Germans had to win quick. Had Germany been able to capture Moscow, who knows what could have happened. I think it's correct to say that once Hitler started eastward he was certainly taking an enormous chance. I suspect he was thinking things along the same track as the German generals in 1914: "If we wait, they will only get stronger. Now is our only chance!" Perhaps in November of '41 Hitler could have had an attack of rationality he would have started negotiations with Stalin. At that point Staling probably would have ceded large amounts of territory in order to keep power. Hitler's "all or nothing" mindset was his biggest problem.

 

There is no proof at all that in november 1941 Stalin would have ceded anything . Why should he ? It was very clear in november 1941 that the Germans had failed again,irrevocably,:even without hindsight,the final outcome was obvious : the Soviets in Berlin .

 

In Dec 1941 Stalin had several new armies and gave the order of an attack covering almost the whole AGC length. If he had listened to Zhukov who wanted to break through at several strategic points, the AGC might have been lost after the Typhoon had ended early Dec 1941. Stalin was ready to win the war, not giving up.

 

I don't think you can say that it was obvious, at the time, that Hitler had lost the war in November. He did dither in the summer and earely fall and lost opportunity thereby. It did make victory less likely, but at that time the Soviets hadn't demonstrated that they could beat the German forces. In fact for them to succeed in their two first victories, Moscow and Stalingrad, the Germans had to commit stupidities that nobody would have believed in November of '41. Earlier Stalin was very depressed and had lost hope. Nobody ever claimed to know what Staln was thinking or what he would do. All we can say is that Stalin would cling to power no matter what he had to do. Who knows.

 

The Germans couldn't win unless the Soviets absolutely collapsed. They grossly under estimated how many troops the Soviets had and their ability to make new ones. The German planners knew their supply chain would collapse before they got to Moscow and yet they clung to the belief they could get to Moscow in 2 months

 

Yes and no : they were more realistic than one is assuming : the success of the operation depended on

a) the decision of the Soviets to go west (to the border) to stop the Germans and to chase them away:if the big fighting happened east of the Dnepr-Dvina line ,it was over for the Germans

b ) on the impossibility for the Soviets to mobilize and send to the front very quickly their superior manpower :if they could,it was over for the Germans .

As both points depended only on the Soviets,the Germans guessed that they would happen,and staked everything on these points : a happened, b not .

About b : the Germans knew that on 22 june,the Soviets would proclaim a general mobilisation,they could do nothing to prevent this .The only possibility for this mobilization to fail,was a general collaps of the Soviet state in the summer : in july,august would be already to late .

If after a few weeks fighting the front would collaps = every one would go home (as in 1917) to kill the local communists and Jews,this would result in the sudden collaps of the Soviet state, in chaos and civil war,and the general mobilizatio would abort
An alternative scenario would be that the Soviet state would collaps,resulting in the collaps of the front .

Whatever,as this was the only possibility for a German success,the Germans were staking everything on it .The SU could not be defeated with classic means = by operational planning . If the war was not decided after a few weeks,logistic problems would become overwhelming ..

 

Considering the material losses, men losses and especially veteran losses, probably the losses by Dec 1941 were devastating, plus the losses by winter and spring 1942, you got a very weak looking Eastern front attack force compared to German material on June 22, 1941:

Hayward " Stopped at Stalingrad"

The Germans:

The army staff worked hard to strengthen the Army Group South´s forces in time for "Blau". 25% of replacements ( I think the author means here of the replacements to the Ostfront ) went to AGS in February 1942, 34% in March, and 39% in April. On 1 May, according to a detailed report prepared by the OKW operations staff, AGS infantry strength still stood at only 50% of its 1941 level ( while the other two army groups stood at a mere 35% ). Although additional replacements arrived in May and June the AGS never reached more than three-quarters of its 1941 level.

OKW also deprived the other two AG`s of most of their motor vehicles to ensure that Bock´s forces regained at least 85% of their former mobility.

Despite having receiced 1,100 000 fresh troops up to 1 may 1941, all the three Army groups were still 625,000 short of establishment.

 

One of the reasons Moscow wasn't taken was that AGN was also trying to take Leningrad. A choice should have been made early on but the German forces weren't able to do both. What resulted is that they did neither. Another option as to retire to a defensible line in early November, wait out the winter (and thus avoiding the horrible losses due to the extreme cold) and defeat the Siberians as well as the hoards of ill-trained recruits that came after. All the while they could build up their forces and shore up their supply lines while bleeding the enemy's resources. The Soviet supply of manpower is large but it was NOT inexhaustible. I say this to point out that there were other options and nothing was absolute at this point. Only on December 11, 1941 was the fate of the Nazi regime sealed.

 

Getting back to SR801's original post, I would say that Hitler did see the economic side of warfare better than his generals: they couldn't get the information! (See Fuhrer order # 1). Hitler kept everybody in the dark so that he could manipulate them.

 

In WWI,it took the Germans 3 years to eliminate the SU. In WWII,they had no 3 years:the SU had to be defeated in the summer;all that happened after the summer was irrelevant .

 

AGN perhaps was faster as the Baltic nations´ people started fighting the Red Army as well and Germans could keep on going with lesser resistance. The bad thing for Hitler was changing his main objects during the operation in 1941, from Leningrad to the AGS sector and its wheat, then back to Moscow. The panzer groups were sent to somewhere hundreds of kilometers away and then called back. That definitely causes a lot of wear and taer to panzers and crews. He should have kept clear goals at least and not change his mind every other moth where to go.
If Hitler had got the Finns attack leningrad from North, That would possibly have made the difference.

 

1. The Germans didn't fight the SU for 3 years in WWI
2. It did not by necessity have to be that way. It was planned that way, for political reasons, and came close to achieving it.

The Soviet census of 1937 showed a population of approx. 162 million.

The German population of 1939 census was 79 million.

Germany mobilised during 1941 47 divisions. http://www.axishistory.com/axis-nations/germany-a-austria/waffen-ss/145-germany-heer/heer-unsorted/3422-the-german-mobilization-1941

While that sounds impressive, Russia was mobilizing that each month, on a population only just twice as large, inspite of loosing a big chunk of them, and at a time when German rule over Europe was larger than ever.

In effect, in 1941, Nazi Germany was trying to win the war without actually having to put any real effort into it, in order not to disturb the peace at home.

Had the Soviet Union been a democracy, it probably wouldn't have survived either; Germany probably had done enough damage that the government would've collapsed.

 

1)The population of 1937 is irrelevant: the population in 1941 was some 200 million

2)In 1941,Germany had already shortages of manpower

3) as has been proved by Tooze,in 1941 Germany was already effecting a total mobilization

4) The number of divisions is irrelevant,because a big part of the WM manpower belonged to the LW and KM.

june 1941: mobilized : 7.234 million ( = 9 % of the population)

Field Army :3.8 million (203 divisions)

Reserve Army:1.2 million

LW: 1.68 million

KM:0.404 million

WSS:0.15 million (5 divisions and 1 brigade)

At the same time,the SU had mobilized 5.7 million men (3 % of the population)

It is thus obvious that the SU could mobilize more men than Germany .

For the last point :as the SU was not a democracy,your statement is meaningless and can not be proved .