Hossbach Memorandum http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/hossbach.htm Some parts of the memorandum BERLIN, November 10, 1937 Minutes of a Conference in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, November 5, 1937, FROM 4:15 to 8:30 P.M. Present: The Fuehrer and Chancellor, Field Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister, Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, Commander in Chief, Army, Admiral Dr. h. c. Raeder, Commander in Chief, Navy, Colonel General Goring, Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, Baron von Neurath, Foreign Minister, Colonel Hossbach. The Fuehrer began by stating that the subject of the present conference was of such importance that its discussion would, in other countries, certainly be a matter for a full Cabinet meeting, but he -the Fuehrer- had rejected the idea of making it a subject of discussion before the wider circle of the Reich Cabinet just because of the importance of the matter. His exposition to follow was the fruit of thorough deliberation and the experiences of his 41/2 years of power. He wished to explain to the gentlemen present his basic ideas concerning the opportunities for the development of our position in the field of foreign affairs and its requirements, and he asked, in the interests of a long-term German policy, that his exposition be regarded, in the event of his death, as his last will and testament. The aim of German policy was to make secure and to preserve the racial community [Volksmasse] and to enlarge it. It was therefore a question of space. Germany's future was therefore wholly conditional upon the solving of the need for space, and such a solution could be sought, of course, only for a foreseeable period of about one to three generations. Before turning to the question of solving the need for space, it had to be considered whether a solution holding promise for the future was to be reached by means of autarchy or by means of an increased participation in world economy. Since, with the solving of the unemployment problem, the maximum consumption level had been reached, some minor modifications in our home agricultural production might still, no doubt, be possible, but no fundamental alteration was possible in our basic food position. Thus autarchy was untenable in regard both to food and to the economy as a whole. Period 1943-1945. After this date only a change for the worse, from our point of view, could be expected If we did not act by 1943-45' any year could, in consequence of a lack of reserves, produce the food crisis, to cope with which the necessary foreign exchange was not available, and this must be regarded as a "waning point of the regime." If the Fuehrer was still living, it was his unalterable resolve to solve Germany's problem of space at the latest by 1943-45. the annexation of Czechoslovakia and Austria would mean an acquisition of foodstuffs for 5 to 6 million people, on the assumption that the compulsory emigration of 2 million people from Czechoslovakia and 1 million people from Austria was practicable. The incorporation of these two States with Germany meant, from the politico-military point of view, a substantial advantage because it would mean shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of forces for other purposes, and the possibility of creating new units up to a level of about 12 divisions, that is, 1 new division per million inhabitants. a 100 percent victory for Franco was not desirable either, from the German point of view; rather were we interested in a continuance of the war and in the keeping up of the tension in the Mediterranean. Franco in undisputed possession of the Spanish Peninsula precluded the possibility of any further intervention on the part of the Italians or of their continued occupation of the Balearic Islands. As our interest lay more in the prolongation of the war in Spain, it must be the immediate aim of our policy to strengthen Italy's rear with a view to her remaining in the Balearics. But the permanent establishment of the Italians on the Balearics would be intolerable both to France and Britain, and might lead to a war of France and England against Italy.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/battles/hitler/hitler_9.shtml One other policy decision is clear from the Hossbach Memorandum: the love-affair with Britain was over. Throughout the meeting, Britain was lumped with France as a potential enemy whose possible reaction to Germany's aggression should be carefully analysed. Karl Boehm-Tettelbach accompanied Field Marshal von Blomberg to London in 1937 for the coronation of King George VI. The German delegation took the opportunity to have talks with senior British politicians. Blomberg told his aide how disappointed he had been with the results of his discussions with Baldwin, Chamberlain and Eden - especially with Eden, whom Blomberg described as 'unfriendly'. But the Royal Family were nicer, even without the presence of the newly abdicated Edward VIII, whose friendliness to the new German regime is infamous. Unfortunately for the Germans, the British politicians appeared not to be so agreeable and this was the news Blomberg reported to Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Boehm-Tettelbach followed behind Hitler and Blomberg on a long walk in the mountains as the bad news was broken to the Führer. On the way back to Berlin, Boehm-Tettelbach asked Blomberg what Hitler had said about the news. 'Nothing,' replied Blomberg. But shortly afterwards more resources still were planned for the army, something which Boehm-Tettelbach believes 'was the answer and reaction from the coronation'. Hossbach, in his memoirs, writes that neither Blomberg nor Fritsch, the commander of the army, appeared overenthusiastic after they heard Hitler explain his plans: 'the behaviour of Blomberg and Fritsch must have made it clear to the Führer that his political ideas had simply produced sober and objective counter-arguments instead of applause and approval. And he knew very well that the two generals rejected any involvement in a war provoked by us.' There could be no greater contrast than between their sober pragmatism and Ribbentrops's aggressive radicalism. Unfortunately for them, Hitler much preferred the latter's approach. According to diplomat Reinhard Spitzy, Hitler once said, 'My generals should be like bull terriers on chains, and they should want war, war, war. And I should have to put brakes on the whole thing. But what happens now? I want to go ahead with my strong politics and the generals try to stop me. That's a false situation.' Within a few months of the Hossbach meeting, those senior military officers who had not leapt enthusiastically to support Hitler's plans were removed.
Latest reseach strongly indicates that the s.c. "Hossbach-memorandum" (there is no original, but only a microfiche and several write-offs) is in fact authentic and reflects "somehow" the actual event as it took place on Nov. 5, 1937. However, the document is by far not "bullet-proof", so serious histography should not make her case only on this document, because there is still a lot of doubts around it. Jonathan Wright: "Hitler, Britain and the Hossbach-Memorandum", in: Militärgeschichtl. Mitteilungen 2/1987, p.77 Jonathan Wright and Paul Stafford: "A Blueprint for World War? Hitler and the Hossbach memorandum", History today, Vol.38, Issue 3, March 1988, pp11-11 Bradley F. Smith: "Die Ueberlieferung der Hossbach-Niederschrift im Lichte neuer Quellen" in: Vierteljahreshefte zur Zeitgeschichte 38 (1990), p. 329-336 Jonathan Wright and Paul Stafford: "A Strategy Conference?" (text of the Hossbach Memorandum), pp. 109-120; and "The Hossbach Memorandum Evaluated," pp. 120-128 in: Keith Eubank (ed.): "World War II: Roots and Causes"´, 1992 Herrmann Graml: "Hossbach-Niederschrift", in: Wolfgang Benz (Ed.): "Legenden, Luegen, Vorurteile", 1992, pp.97-99 Cheers, [ 11. March 2003, 10:52 AM: Message edited by: AndyW ]
