Good arguments have been made by USMCPrice & others for a German Mediterranean strategy instead of trying for an unlikely invasion of Britain with perhaps a reinforced Rommel heading for the Suez & the vital oil of Iraq [seeing that oil was always supposed to be a high priority for Hitler] & perhaps Iran. At the start of the Italian push into Egypt from Bardia in Sept. '40, the Brits had a total of just 36,0000 men in just two divisions to take on the 250,000 Italians & in a classic campaign the British 7th Armoured Division & the Aussie 6th division routed ten Italian divisions & chased them back 550 miles from the Egyptian border to El Agheila & captured 130,000 prisoners in just over two months, while between the end of June '40 & Feb.'41, [when Rommel finally arrived in NA] most of the German army was sitting on it's hands, with some divisions training for a invasion of Britain that had next to no chance of succeeding. Operation Compass - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia [In fact from the end of June '40, until June 22 '41, the most potent army in the worlds only operation was the brief Balkans campaign & Rommels meager forces in NA.] When Rommel finally went into action he chased the Brits back to where they started in just three weeks, that's 550 miles, could a reinforced Rommel have possibly started at the Italian base of Bardia on the Egyptian border in September or soon after? From Bardia to Alexandria it's 290 miles, going by the above figures he might have been in Cairo in a few weeks. And if that strategy was combined with severing the British Atlantic lifeline starting with a determined U- boat effort in '39, the Germans 'might' have been in business. As Tooze says in Wages of Destruction, Dönitz argued that with 300 U-boats he could achieve decisive success against British shipping, but Germany started the war with just 32 U-boats capable of operating in the North Atlantic, falling to 25 by the summer of 1940. In '42, when Dönitz eventually had 90 boats the Germans sank just under 8,000,000 tons of shipping, & Churchill wrote that the Atlantic battle was the only time he was worried in the war, the Germans for a time, were sinking more boats then were being built. The 'what if' is, what if Navy convinced Hitler that major Navy funding should go to a U-boat program & by '39' they had 300 boats? If 57 boats can sink 4 million tons of shipping in '41 & 90 boats can sink 8 million tons in '42, what could 300 boats do? Britain could build more escorts, but going by the figures, they might have been in a bit of strife, would they get to the point of looking to mediate a truce as Halifax argued for in May 1940? For arguments sake 'if' Britain decided on a truce, how much could it help Germany in defeating the SU?