How Hitler could have won

Forget the terrain...

...what about the logistics?

They couldnt supply North Africa!

There is a 'What If' on this subject in the book "More What Ifs"... Lets just say the historian who wrote it wasnt that impressed by the idea.

 

On shipping: One ship may be able to 'carry 100 panzers" but, you have to add in the trucks, half tracks, men, tools, arms, artillery and what not necessary to support them. A full division will require 12 to 20+ ships to transport depending on their size. The Germans simply do not have them in the Mediterrainian. They are almost totally reliant on the graces of the less than fully cooperative Italians in this respect.
As for escorts, they are totally dependent on the Italians.

As for supplying troops well forward of a port: At the Alamein position the Germans were using between 4 and 5 gallons of gasoline to deliver one to the front using trucks. They had an overall shortage of both so this is a very uneconomical means of operation. So, in effect, the lack of a rail system in Lybia DID stop the Germans in North Africa!
The Germans proved unable to effectively clear ports and put in place improvements in transportation systems as well. This is a major reason why Tobruk remained largely unused by the Germans; too many wrecks blocking the harbor.
In engineering the Germans were not even in the same league as the US was in terms of construction ability. They (the Germans) could not have built roads like the Ledo, Burma, Alaskan or, Persian ones. Their construction troops were virtually unmechanzied. They would have had few, if any, bulldozers, road graders, rollers, dump trucks, trenchers, earth movers, excavators or, any of a plethora of other heavy construction machinery commonly found in US construction units. Thus, they have a mere tiny fraction of the construction ability to repair or build roads and railways.
This alone means that logistics will be a huge, insoluable problem for them in this theater.

The Luftwaffe is not going to fix the problem either. The large transport gruppen can only operate when pilots and aircrews are stripped from training centers in Germany. Thus, they denude the Germans of a capacity to train new pilots while in use.
As for their transport capacity, it amounts to about 100 tons per day long term. This is sufficent to supply a single mechanized division on the defense. So, all the Ju 52s, Me 323s, Ju 90s and what-not are not going to make up the difference.

 

Put em on the rail system.

 

HAHAHHAHAHAHHAHAHHA

Where is all the rolling stock coming from? How are you gonna get the rolling stock there?

How are you going to protect the rolling stock from attack?


Dont you think that maybe the reason the Germans DIDNT try this strategy is because it wouldnt have worked?


Still... I prefer the idea of filling Gigants with Panzer IVs and dropping them on the Russians...

 

Capability for this depends on whether you're using European of African Me323s...

 

Maybe you could put the Pz IV in a sling and two Me 323s could lift it between them.....

 

Where's the rolling stock, hmm, somebody has a reading problem, it's already in place in Turkey & Armenia as outlined above. Why didn't the germans do it? Um, because Hitler was more interested in squashing the menace of the east. Raeder, Goering & Kesserlring did favor this southern strategy. Even Hitler agreed, but told Raeder it had to wait til after Barbarossa.

Za still upset about pink swastika? is that the motivation for your very *yawn* unimpressive feeble attempts at insultation? perhaps Stick to ski photography, you're a little better at that.

 

So Turkish and Armenia rolling stock consisted of flatbeds capable of ferrying large amounts of troops, tanks and supplies?

I do have a reading problem...

I cant read a load of balls.....

 

Gentlemen, I think we have better things to do other than feeding the ego of somebody who has superglued himself to an idiotic idea. I suggest either that the Moderator will lock this thread which is too drastic and paying excessive attention to something unworthy, or we simply let it die the natural death.

Back to the Monty Python imagery, I'm reminded of the Black Knight who wouldn't change opinion after having all limbs chopped off

 

Just for you Za, go to the free fire forum.

 

So the trains successfully used in Russia by Germans did work, but Trains in Turkey wouldn't ? Hmm what an unusual thought process you have there Baron. Flat cars ferried over from Greece didn't occur to you then? Pretty easy to turn a regular car into a flat car anyways, tear off the roof & walls, & wa la, a flatcar. I'm sure the Turks had plenty of rolling stock, why would they expand their railroad between the wars if they had no rolling stock?

Quote; The Bosporus separates Europe from the Middle East. We crossed by car ferry in fifteen minutes. In the next two days we drove 300 miles to the capital city of Ankara. Many trucks (mostly military) and busses used this fairly good, partly mountainous, highway."

& Za your assumption that you've better knowledge than The German higher ups is amusing. & I realize words like idiot are big ones for you, but would also remind you not only of your repetitive rules violations, but also, your consistent rudeness to other posters.

If you have nothing academic to share regarding a thread, please use some gentlemenly behaviour & respect the your neighbors by passing on it.

This is a very polite way of requesting you grow up just a bit.

[ 27. July 2006, 04:40 PM: Message edited by: chromeboomerang ]

 

http://www.bevinalexander.com/excerpts/world-war-ii/victory-strategy-raeder-hitler.htm

The Axis could move at will into the Middle East, for the British had no substantial forces there. Thus, not only would Syria and Palestine fall, but German panzers could seize Iraq and Iran with little effort.

The advance on the southern frontier of Turkey would put the Turks in an impossible position. Hitler was already in the process of gaining Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria as allies. Therefore, Turkey could be approached either by way of Bulgaria across the Bosporus at Istanbul or from northern Iraq and Syria. Turkey would be forced to join the Axis or grant passage for Axis forces and supplies. A defiant stance would result in the swift defeat of the Turkish army and disaster.

 

Why would Germany want to invade Middle east when they could have Soviets vast resoures.?

 

Um, the point of invading middle east was to get the Soviet oil in Baku. & Yes Soviets had 6-12 month reserve which would be partially used up defending Baku.

& if battle occurred in north, Poland Romania etc, rest would be used up quick & Russia would have to concede. Lend Lease could do nothing to solve Soviet fuel situation, or very little.

 

Ok, so answer Chromeboomerang what would you do if the Soviets destroyed the oil fields so that it would take at least 2 years to get some oil pumped. Your big army would just be an easy target in the middle of nowhere,right? It might lead the USSR into trouble but your army would be twice that much in trouble.

Hitler thought he could get Maikopi and the oil and he got Maikopi but no oil in 1942-43. So the operation was actually totally useless in the end if you look at it. And he almost lost 300,000 men in the Caucasus area as well because he would not let them retreat until early 1943.

 

They would destroy equipment, but they can't destroy a field. If you have a link demonstrating your 2 year theory, that would be good, otherwise seems like speculation. Oil equipment can be replaced-repaired etc.Iraq proved that.

Regarding Maikop, they barely had 6 months of occupancy there, 3 months of it during winter, ( well 2 anyway, Dec-Jan ), & it was much smaller than other locations.

"Maikop yielded to German exploitation. As was the case in all areas of Russian production, the retreating forces had done a thorough job of destroying or dismantling the usable installations; consequently, the Germans had to start from scratch. In view of past experience with this type of Russian policy, such destruction was expected, and Field Marshal Hermann Göring’s staff had begun making the necessary preparations in advance. But a shortage of transport that was competing with military requirements, a shortage of drill equipment as well as drillers, and the absence of refining capacity at Maikop created such difficulties that when the German forces were compelled to withdraw from Maikop in January 1943"


Operation not useless as it denies Soviets it's oil while Ploesti remains intact. That means Germans still have useable source, Soviets don't. Which means land battles on steppes "can" be pursued by Germans, but not by Soviets. & without doubt, Germans would make bigger effort at Baku than was done at Maikop. & with campaign successful, the problem of transport craft competing with military needs would not be near as acute.

Army easy target? who would be the attacker? Oiless Russians? or underequipped British?

 

Well, it took six months in Kuwait 1991 to cap the fires.

http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/owf_ii/owf_ii_tabc.htm

And like you yourself found:

"But a shortage of transport that was competing with military requirements, a shortage of drill equipment as well as drillers, and the absence of refining capacity at Maikop..." does not make it much easier I guess.

And even if the army was not attacked if it doesn´t have oil and cannot move it is an easy target for anybody and useless as well.

 

But it did have oil, Ploesti.

http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/32_folder/32_articles/32_ww22.html

& like you said, an army with no oil can go nowhere.

According to a report submitted on February 22, 1940, by General Gamelen to French Prime Minister Daladye, since Baku provided 75% of all oil requirements of the USSR, he believed the Soviets would fall into crisis if those sources were lost. "Dependence on oil supplies from the Caucasus is the fundamental weakness of Russian economy. The Armed Forces were totally dependent on this source also for their motorized agriculture. More than 90% of oil extraction and 80% of refinement was located in the Caucasus (primarily Baku). Therefore, interruption of oil supplies on any large scale would have far-reaching consequences and could even result in the collapse of all the military, industrial and agricultural systems of Russia."

 

& as for Maikop, it did begin to produce, & no doubt would have increased dramatically in the ensuing months.

Even under normal conditions, Maikop's production was only one tenth that of Baku's. However, before withdrawing from the city, the Russians had thoroughly destroyed the oil fields and supplies and equipment, right down to the small incidental tools of the workshops. Consequently, by January 1943, the Germans were able to eke out no more than 70 barrels per day there (Yergin, 336-337).

 

Ploesti could not supply the operation in Autumn 1942 ( only one Army group as there were three attacking in 1941 ) so how could it supply the operation further away in the Middle East?

And for 6 months work 70 barrels/day. Does not look good, does it? If the Germans had got the oil from Ploesti 100% in 1942 the German troops might have reached Stalingrad much earlier but without the oil, panzers were stuck.

In 1940 USSR was still an ally to Germany. The French and British planned to bomb Baku and thought they could destroy it totally that way (?!) So the Gamelin theory has its roots there. In 1942 the allied would have helped with oil from their sources, not Germany. It still leaves Germany empty handed if Baku area oil fields had been blown.