How we come to know what we know

I believe there is plenty of room for criticism of the Sherman or even classifiying it as a failure without making a relative comparison to another tank. I believe that Belton Cooper's title of "Death Traps" is fitting when you consider the protection that the Sherman offered relative to German means to defeat it, and I don't limit that to just tanks. One has to consider the specific anti-tank mines, shaped charge weapons, AT guns employed and general expertise in destroying tanks that the Germans developed as a necessity of survival in the East.
As a general/modern parallel I would point out the M1025 "Turtleback" Humvee that the US Army rode into Iraq in 2003 (the same one shown in "Blackhawk Down"). Based on strategic statistical analysis one could interpret the data to show that the war could be won by using said vehicle and that its simplicity, low maintenance and ease of operation as compared to the new Cougar MRAP is a strong argument. That doesn't mean that in its currrent operational environment it isnt a deathtrap for its crews or that its not inadequate/obsolete.
In my opinion the M4 was successful because of the overwhelming strength of the combined arms team that it was a part of and also because of the logistical support it recieved. The loss statistics that Cooper highlighted should not be overlooked. The Sherman was obsolete by 1944 (in regard to protection and firepower) and was carried to victory by the overwhelming strength and effectiveness of the rest of the combined arms team. In a parallel universe you could replace the Sherman with the Cromwell, T34, MK.IV, etc. and get the same results. The M4 is not to the world of WWII tanks what the Mustang is to fighter aircraft, not even close.

 

In what respect was the 'loss rate' of the M4 different from German tank losss rates?

 

You couldn't replace the Sherman one-for-one with any of the other tanks listed and get the same results. The reasons for this are mostly operational not tactical. But, in the grand scheme of things these reasons are actually very important to its success.

(In no particular order)

1. Reliability. The Sherman is far more reliable than a Cromwell, T34 or Pz IV, among other tanks. The other three have about a 300 to 500 mile track life for example. The Sherman will go 3 to 5 times that distance on a set of tracks.
When you consider a unit road marching say, 100 miles if half the unit suffers breakdowns at some point the march takes longer to complete. This increases the planning / operations cycle unless the commander is willing to commit units with less equipment running. This also increases the march time, the strain on repair and support services, etc.

2. Servicability. An engine change in a Sherman takes 2 or 3 men about 8 hours to accomplish and a skilled team can do it in about half that. This is about half to a quarter the time for the other tanks and those also require about 50% more manpower to accomplish the task. This can be shown across the board in terms of servicability.

3. Road marching. As the Sherman alone normally had rubber block tracks it tends to tear up roads far less than other tanks. This might seem like a small point but it is important. If a paved road is shredded by tank traffic it slows the rate of advance of following non-tracked and tracked vehicles alike. If it rains the road washes out and becomes far less servicable thereafter. These tracks also make the Sherman far quieter on roads than all steel tracks are.
Couple this with more efficent road mileage due to these tracks (among other things) and it becomes a critically important item. The Germans prior to the start of the war were amazed by the Pz 38t's reliability too. They praised this quality of that tank highly compared to their own more complex and breakdown prone vehicles.
Cruising speed in a road march is also important. Again, the Sherman is at an advantage. For the other tanks the faster they go the less efficent they are. The Sherman is actually more efficent at about 20 mph than at slower or faster speeds. This gives it about a 5 mph advantage over the others for distance marching speeds.

A good part of the Sherman's success, including in the Red Army, was derived from the above. It was being there 'firstest with the mostest' that often counted in mobile warfare. So, while the Sherman might have been replaced successfully with the other tanks listed it would have required larger numbers of those vehicles to accomplish the same level of operational tasking.

 

Compare to the Soviets too, while you are at it.

 

Black6-

In your post you say


"I believe there is plenty of room for criticism of the Sherman or even classifiying it as a failure..."
and:
" In my opinion the M4 was successful because of the overwhelming strength of the combined arms team..."

Are you okay with this?(Joke) I thinjk it is important to really think about the job of a tank in WWII when you are evaluating a tank. So many resort to the "fight other tank" qualifications and ignore so much else. When you look at the Sherman's reliability, durability and versatility I don't see how one can find huge fault with it at all. It had faults and they wer dealt with. Threads were improved, gun was improved (and had room for any gun you wanted) ammo storage was improved, etc. A great tank doesn't need to be unstoppable, doesn't need to have the thickest armor or biggest gun. It needs to be a good overall machine that can be produced efficiently, moved efficiently, and used efficiently.

I think when examining Cooper you must remember a few things. Kenny points out the comparison of tank losses which he does not provide. Remember what Cooper spent his day doing, cleaning the remains of crewmen out of Shermans. What would that do to your head? I read By Tank Into Normandy by Stuart Hills recently and he gives a detailed account of his time in a Sherman. I got no impression of him crying in fright that he was caught in a death trap, that they stood no chance, or any of the whining that Cooper does. he and his men had to do a hard job and they did it.

 

I don't have a ready answer as that wasn't in line with the spirit of my post. As I stated....

"I believe there is plenty of room for criticism of the Sherman or even classifiying it as a failure without making a relative comparison to another tank. I believe that Belton Cooper's title of "Death Traps" is fitting when you consider the protection that the Sherman offered relative to German means to defeat it, and I don't limit that to just tanks."

 

Good points TA and well taken. However I still view the Sherman as successful in the strategic sense because it was simply what we had and it was mechanically reliable. The breakthrough for Operation Cobra was accomplished by air power, not the Sherman. The dash across France was enabled by Detroit's finest trucks and in huge numbers. Just because the Sherman was able to motor across France does not in and of itself make it head and shoulders above all other tanks of the war. It was in a situation where its automotive attributes were able to be exploited and that was created by another piece of the combined arms team, not the Sherman. Im sure that any of the tanks previously listed could have accomplished the same mission, albeit with slight nuances but ultimately the same results. It was an average player on a team that had many stars.

 

"It needs to be a good overall machine that can be produced efficiently, moved efficiently, and used efficiently."

It needs to do all of those things while accomplishing the single most important goal, protect the lives of it's crew. The Sherman did not excel at that and I make no mention of comparative analysis. In Normandy the Sherman WAS a death trap, after the breakout it was able to really come into its own.

 

TA,

This is not entirely accurate. Armored units operating in Italy found that tracks with rubber blocks had an average life of less than 500 miles when operating on rocky mountain roads. Commanders asked that tracks with rubber blocks be replaced with steel tracks. In fact, most tank tracks constructed during 1944 were steel tracks with a newly designed rubber backing to decrease wear on bogies and suspension. As a result, steel tracks were much more common in the ETO than you suggest. (For a more detailed account see: Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions For War. pp. 306-308.)

Duckbill

 

"The M4 is not to the world of WWII tanks what the Mustang is to fighter aircraft, not even close. "

Interesting comparison. In response I would point out the following;

1.) It did not have to be. We saw in 1940 and 1941 what the Germans could do when working with armor that might be superior in a tank v. tank duel.
2.) The BAR, Thompson SMG, Colt .45ACP, Stuart, Dauntless, etc., etc., were probably not the best "machine for their purpose but best is not always best. Sometimes 49,000 adequate tanks equal great.
3.) The P-51 was not the best ground attack aircraft. Equate dogfighting with tank v. tank fighting, yes, the SSherman was not the best. The main job of a tank is not tank v. tank fighting, its main job is what you describe, being part of a combined weapons assault. What tank brought as much to this?

 

Let me quibble about the wording you chose. What medium tank excels at crew protoection? The Panther at ten tons (is that the right number?) did not excel at crew protection. It side armor was so thin a Sherman's 75 could penetrate it at normal combat range. In Normandy the Sherman was advancing on camoflaged, entrenched positions; troops laying in wait; hidden AT positions, etc. What tank would have excelled in crew protection under such circumstances? As Kenny asked, what numbers do you offer that make Sherman losses in Normandy seem high to you? You must offer a comparison to make this point, no? Also, can you attribute these losses to the tank, not the tactics?

 

If this is truly the case how do you explain the existence of the M1 Abrams series of tanks? Simply put, the Abrams is the result of a long, linear evolution of tank design. They have the ability to penetrate the armor of any known tank at great distances, possess very strong armor, require enormous amounts of fuel, and are highly complex and very expensive to manufacture. They are also battlefield proven as a superior tank.

This is an interesting corroboration of what I experienced during my many interviews with veteran tankers. That is to say, WWII combat veterans rarely whine, not that I would characterize Belton Cooper as a whiner for sharing with us his personal experiences with the M4 medium tank during the war.

Duckbill

 

In other words, its not the tank's fault its the crews' because they took it somewhere where it got knocked out.

How do you separate the tool from the doctrine it was designed to support?

Duckbill

 

There is the not so small matter of planned replacement rates vs actual losses. I can provide them if you wish, but suffice it to say the actual losses were much higher than the planned rate of replacement. This says something very specific about the life expectancy of the M4 medium tank after the landings in Normandy.

Eisenhower's demand for an investigation into the inadequacies of the M4 medium tank also says something about its performance.

Duckbill

 

And yet General Jacob L. Devers, Chief of the Armored Force, said on more than one occasion that the best tank destroyer was another tank.

Duckbill

 

In Normandy, or anywhere else, the Sherman was no more a 'death trap' than any penetrated tank. Cooper's losses for 3rd AD are extreme. This Division had nearly twice as many losses as its nearest rivals (2nd and 7th AD)and 3 times the losses of 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th and 10th AD.
A 100-200% turnover for Armoured Units were normal and German loss rates were roughly in line with Allied loss rates. It is undeniable that the Germans knocked out twice as many tanks as they themselves lost but they were facing 4 times as many as they fielded......

 

No. It says something about the US planners who failed to heed the advice of their much more experienced British comrades. The British allowed for a 50% replacement
rate and the US went for something like (I think) 10-15%. I am quite sure there are those waiting to pounce on this figure and highlight any error on my part!
Not that the British ever reached this 50% ceiling and they even transfered back some 300 Shermans to help alleviate the US shortages.

 

The heavy armored division had 38% more medium tanks than the light armored division. As a result you cannot compare their losses directly. Losses must be examined using a ratio of 1.38 to 1 to make sense of the comparisons.

Duckbill

 

Quite right. I do not know the exact British maintenance rates, but the War Department failed to heed British advice on the subject. And as a result did not plan for the probability of higher losses as the M4 medium tank encountered a densely populated battlefield in Normandy. Even as late as December 1944, the War Department was still questioning the maintenance requests of ETOUSA for medium tanks.

Duckbill