Discussion in 'Pearl Harbor' started by niima master, Oct 11, 2007.
1.what was some of faiure of Husband E. Kimmel at the attack on pearl harbour.
Google him, there is a lot of information out there about him
Here I did it for you-----> Husband Kimmel
Here's recent article on the 1995 attempt to award him a posthumous 4th Star.
I think you'll find that many of the failures were above him.
what was other failures at the attack on pearl harbour other than Husband E. Kimmel
hi i just wanted know several reasons for failure at pearl harbour other than the failure of Husband E. Kimmel
Lack of recon.
If you are really intersted in this try reading At Dawn We Slept.
thx tikilal, and can u tell me some of the reasons for failure of Husband E. Kimmel on the attack on pearl harbour
Maybe it was not " their fault" like slipdigit earlier mentioned. I think this has also been discussed in more detail so more info can be found in the forums by using "Kimmel" and the search function.
The Senate has reopened a long-closed page of American history. On May 25, it voted 52 to 47 in favor of legislation that would restore the ranks of Adm. Husband E. Kimmel and Gen. Walter C. Short, the two commanders at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.
Senate corrects injustice against Pearl Harbor Commanders Human Events - Find Articles
Negligence. They had what they needed to be ready and were not. They had recon planes and didnt use them. They had radar but used it poorly. End of story, they were suprised and it is the responsibility of a base comander to be ready for any type of attack at anytime.
That is very true. The base commander is always responsible.
But still check out how fast the Japanese developed the shallow water torpedoes...( use the search function ).
I have to disagree that Short was being negligent. Look at it from the General's point of view: based on what Short knew, the only possible way that his force could be attacked is through sabotage. Hence, that's the action he took.
Basically, Kimmel and Short acted based on their experience, on what they knew and their training. We're viewing events with the benefit of hindsight. These commanders didn't have the information that we take for granted. Orders from Washington were vague and the two were excluded from receiving critical intelligence reports. What's the use of getting such intel if the guys who actually needed to know weren't told?
On a personal note:
I tend to be less generous to Macarthur and his officers because they had no excuse for being caught by "surprise". They had an eight-hour warning time to act after Pearl Harbor was attacked. I think Admiral Hart acted appropriately to protect his fleet after Pearl, unlike his Army counterparts.
Short recieved and shared with Kimmel the war warning message. Short chose to protect against sabotage at a war warning. Short new vary well that the Japanese were capable of attacking in force the Hawaiian Islands. He war gamed it several times. What he didnt understand was that the fleet he was supposed to protect could have been the target of such a Japanese attack he always thought it would be the island itself. He also failed to reply to the message with the steps he had taken, had he done this he would have been corrected in his interpretation. It is also the fault of the pentagon for not haveing followed up when no response was sent from Short. The Japanese didn't see how Pearl Harbor couldn't be attacked but how it could be.
What information do you think that they didnt get that would have helped them? The winds execute that never came? The fact that Pearl Harbor was being watched? Also from the tie that messages were intercepted and when they were decoded was anywhere from 24 to 48 hours.
I agree with you on this. Any commander in the Pacific or Atlantic should have been ready for anything when embassies started closing.
Forgive me for combining two or more posts and not citing the posters, but this is something I know a wee bit about.
First, Yamamoto could guarantee to the Naval High Command that the Kido Butai would have a good bag because Lt. Yoshikawa had notified him that the PacFlt was in harbor every weekend. Bankers hours and a war footing don't mix. If Kimmel had not allowed the fleet to get into a routine the Japanese wouldn't have had the confidence to risk their fleet on an attack when they didn't know if the ships would be in port. It is thus possible to argue that Kimmel is directly responsible for the losses at Pearl.
Second, Short didn't just line up his planes into target practice bait, he got so focused on sabotage that he ignored the warnings of the Martin-Bellinger Report. The Army's mobile 5" AA guns didn't get into battery until 11 AM that day because the ammo was locked up in the Crater ammo dumps. NO ready ammo available. "Ready ammo" means ready to kick butts. We weren't. It was Short's duty to make sure we were. He didn't.
Finally (yeah!) the matter of the "4th" stars. Kimmel and Short were retired in "one star" status, like nearly every other general and admiral. There's no difference in pay between a one star and four star, just status. The four-star retirement status is awarded to those who did exceptionally well at their jobs. Kimmel and Short don't fit that bill. The very last exhibit in the Congressional Investigation into the Attack on Pearl Harbor is a pair of letters to Kimmel and Short asking them to hold off requesting a court-martial to clear their names until after the war because of national security issues. After the war they were invited to file for a C.M. if they wanted one. Neither chose that course. Why? Because they knew they'd do better in the court of public opinion, as Congress has since proved.
anti-torpedo nets around battleship row. although i read keeping those up makes port service a b|ich, like keeping your raincoat on even when it's not raining.
If you go to Separate Files, Indices, etc. you'll see letters regarding this issue.
Short answer: The Nevada couldn't have gotten underway as quick as she did if the torpedo nets were in place. One the other hand, one BB got NINE torpedo hits. (Make your eyes water. )
One other note I'd like to make regarding the previous posts:
The Pentagon didn't open until January 1942. I think it's "the War Department" that's meant rather than "the Pentagon."
MacArthur failed far more miserably in the Phillipines than Kimmel or Short at Pearl Harbor but managed to come out smelling like a rose.
The US needed a hero in the dark days of early 1942 and MacArthur fit the bill. For all of Kimmel's shortcomings, he did lay the foundations of the early US prosecution of the war by sending the aircraft carriers Lexington and Enterprise to ferry scout bombers to Midway Island and fighterplanes to Wake Island before the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.
She took a beating. I have a diagram that shows where all the hits occured. The Japanese were still dropping torps on her, even as the main deck postside was awash.
If Gen Short and Adm. Kimmel would have had their forces on a higher level of alert (not full, just anything higher than what they were at) the damage done by the IJN would have been far less, and their losses higher.
Think if the AAF had a couple dozen of the P40's dispersed and on alert.
In the end, both were absolutely at blame. They chose the wrong strategy to follow for defense, and didnt have their units ready.
I very rarely find cause to disagree with you, but - - -
Kimmel and Short were retired as a Rear Admiral and Major General, respectively.
Please let me to elaborate further. Before WW2, the highest permanent rank an officer could hold in US service was Major General or Rear Admiral. If one was placed in a three or four-star job, then he was, as they say, frocked, and could wear the rank and assume the privileges and prerogatives, and responsibilities and duties, of the higher rank. Usually, if one was placed in a four star job, he either retired from that job, or went to another four-star job before retirement. His retirement rank, for all practical, including pay, purposes, would be either Major General or Rear Admiral. By custom, he would be referred to by the highest rank held. It was not, though, entirely unheard of for an three or four star officer to revert back to his two star permanent rank and continue service, but it did not happen often. Admiral Bloch, for example, was a Rear Admiral and commander of the 14th Naval District on 7 Dec 1941; he had previously held the CinCUS job and had worn four stars.
Admiral Kimmel held a four-star job and Lieutenant General Short, a three. When the dust finally settled, after their relief’s, they were at their permanent ranks of Rear Admiral and Major General, respectively, and with no commands at a higher rank or even their permanent being offered. Note that since they were not transferred to billets with higher rank following their relief’s, they automatically reverted to their permanent ranks.
And I know, Larry, that you know the difference, but I am compelled to emphasize for any not familiar with the process that these reductions occurred automatically, not punitively, automatically.
No three or four-star assignment for either meant automatic reduction; that was the way it worked. With no assignments on the horizon, they had no choice but to retire. That’s the way its generally handled with flag and general officers; they are informed, unofficially, that they are scheduled to be relieved by such and such future date and there are no assignments envisioned in their future . . . they get the message and start the retirement process. Of course, in the cases of these gents, they had already been relieved of their commands. Whatever their assignment was called during the investigations, terminated with the investigations, and there were no further assignments on the horizon. Thus, with no commands in the offing, they retired.
Good to see you back in the saddle, Larry!