Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington, through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock Sunday. (Source, (SECRET) REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO THE PRESIDENT) Here Knox is saying the 1 PM Message was a clear indicator, of a surprise Japanese action of some kind. Shouldn't have this intel been sent to PH asap. Besides the Army's 10,000-Kilowatt radio station, the Navyhad a 25,000-kilowatt station, FBI radio was also available, along with Scamble Telephones, Gen Short has a secret phone with connestions right to Army Chief of Staff's office (source Short testimony p39). Telephones were not as safe as code, but considered reasonably safe. An operator could get a connection in 10 mins, often even less. I have never seen a rational explanation for this, other than Marshall fiddled while Rome was about to burn. Stark was a little slow too, to grasp the enormity of the situation.