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If the 1 PM Message did not suggest a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor, why is it in the Knox Investigati

Discussion in 'Pearl Harbor' started by DogFather, Jul 15, 2011.

  1. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington, through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in
    which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock Sunday.

    (Source, (SECRET) REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO THE PRESIDENT)

    Here Knox is saying the 1 PM Message was a clear indicator, of a surprise Japanese action of some kind.
    Shouldn't have this intel been sent to PH asap. Besides the Army's 10,000-Kilowatt radio station, the Navyhad a 25,000-kilowatt station, FBI radio was also available, along with Scamble Telephones, Gen Short
    has a secret phone with connestions right to Army Chief of Staff's office (source Short testimony p39).

    Telephones were not as safe as code, but considered reasonably safe. An operator could get a connection in 10 mins, often even less. I have never seen a rational explanation for this, other than
    Marshall fiddled while Rome was about to burn. Stark was a little slow too, to grasp the enormity of
    the situation.


     
  2. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    Well DogFather, aka "Pearl Harbor cover-up reality explainer"

    The reality is that the transmitters were not near as powerful as you have stated. They were in the kilowatt range, but they were 10 kilowatts & 20-25 kilowatts, not your "Besides the Army's 10,000-Kilowatt radio station, the Navy had a 25,000-kilowatt station,..."

    As for your
    This could not be further from the truth. The U.S. Army did not consider the radio telephones then in use to be secure, and NEVER used them to transmit classified information.

    This was my response in another forum to a poster going by the name "Big Dog" who brought up the phones.
    For more information on this matter, you can read the Congressional Pearl Harbor Investigation - Vol. 22, pages 243-245, the Clausen Investigation, or read Clausen's book "Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement"


    For your lack of "reality explanation", you are hereby demoted to "Pearl Harbor cover-up reality confuser" aka Confusion Theorist.
     
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  3. ULITHI

    ULITHI Ace

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    Dogfather, for the love of Pete, move on to the Roswell Crash, 9-11, or Bigfoot!
     
  4. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    Why then do the NCI and APHB, suggest the use of a telephone?

    Pg 318 NCI
    Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information could
    have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began.
    Even in this event, however, there was no action open, nor means
    available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or
    which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome.
    There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to
    the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl
    Harbor Naval Base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu.

    Clausen wrote a book, but that does not mean he is right, nor does it mean you are right. Kimmel and Short could have been told to expect an attack very soon, load all guns, warm-up the planes etc. This would not necessarily alerted
    the Japanese, when had broke their codes. If you don't use intel, what good is it.

    It's good to hear from you Takao, but I don't think you have grown any, since we last locked horns. There is a growing
    body of info, about this period. I suggest you do the following reading: Adm J O Richardson Memoirs, Adm Kimmels book,
    Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy, by Percy L Greaves Jr, along with "And I was there" Pearl Harbor and Midway, by Edwin T Layton. These will help your understanding of the era and perhaps your understanding of FDR.
     
  5. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    Dear Confusion Theorist DogFather,

    Could you please clarify where you came up with your statement
    Since Pg. 318 of the Naval Court of Inquiry concerns Admiral Bloch's testimony on the anti-aircraft defense of Pearl Harbor, and in no way, shape, or form, has the quote you have attributed to it.

    However on Pg. 314 of the same Admiral Bloch clearly states that his phone was not equipped with a voice scrambler.

    Is this quote real or something you imagined you read somewhere?

    Volume 22 pg 244-45 reads differently:

    Huh? What do the words "This despatch is to be consider a war warning." mean to you? If the Navy was still under the impression of peace, then why was Halsey behaving so aggressively?

    I also see you have not grown any either, your poor research ability adding to the confusion is still a telling mark.

    Growing body of info about this period? Richardson's, Kimmel's, and Layton's memoirs are decades old, yet you treat them as "new info"? What gives?

    The only book I have not read is "Seeds". My impressions of Richardson's book, I have stated before, he appears, IMHO, as McClellan to FDR's Lincoln, always complying about how he is short of this and that without actually formulating any plans to fight with what he had. Kimmel's book gave me the impression of self-justification and the typical "poor me" syndrome. Layton's book goes even further into self-justification and self-delusion. Neither Kimmel, nor Layton admit to any mistakes that they did make in the events leading to Pearl Harbor, as such I find it hard to take either seriously.

    Perhaps, if you could read any ONE UNBIASED SOURCE on the subject of Pearl Harbor, then perhaps you too would have a better understanding of the era and FDR.
     
  6. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member Patron   WW2|ORG Editor

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    I've posted on this at least six times. Use the search function.
     
  7. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    From the Navy Court of Inquiry.

    http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/navy/navy_0.html

    Under Finding of Facts

    down the page after the Roman Numeral: XVIII

    page 318

    (italics mine)
    In the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time, the War and Navy
    Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in
    diplomatic relations was imminent and, by inference and deduction that
    an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. This information
    was embodied in a dispatch by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, who, after
    consulting with the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone, had it
    encoded and sent to the Commanding Generals in Panama, Manila, and
    Hawaii, with instructions that the naval authorities in those areas be
    informed of its contents.

    [1200] The dispatch to Hawaii left Washington at 12:17 p. m. Washington
    time (6:47 a. m., Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's RCA office at
    7:33 a. m. (Honolulu time) . Thus there remained but 22 minutes before
    the attack began for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action.
    Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the
    afternoon of 7 December, several hour after the attacking force had
    departed.

    Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information could
    have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began.
    Even in this event, however, there was no action open, nor means
    available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or
    which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome.
    There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to
    the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl
    Harbor Naval Base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu.

    Nothing confusing about it. It is right there on OP's web site. This is not my opinion, it is a NCI opinion.
    Info that strongly suggested a dawn attack on PH, was in Washington, but not sent out to Kimmel & Short
    in a timely manner.

    Takao, after suggesting an analogy between Gen McCellan and Adm Richardson, which has absolutely
    no basis and this "if you want a good PH CT, you should look at the Kimmel-Layton relationship". I realized you just make stuff up and post it.

    Halsey and Kimmel were not acting differently. They were both operating under a war plan. Recon fights
    from Enterprize, were ordered by Halsey, but this was consistant with the war plan. The fleet in port was
    depanding on US Army air power for protection. Ships need go into port for R & R , in order to do
    this they need to be safe in port. A carrier can't launch planes in port, without wind over the deck.

    So Kimmel had to depend on army air cover. The patrol planes he did have were needed to sweep fleet
    operating areas, for subs and other dangers, so the fleet could train in a safe area. Kimmel had a training mission, it was not just some routine training, it was to prepare for war. The army AWS also
    should have given some advance notice of the attack, but failed in this regard.

    The only mistake Kimmel made, is predictably being in port on the weekends.

    The National Security Agency, was created by President Harry Truman, to coordinate codebraking and intel gathering, being done by both US Navy and Army, into one entity. So this kind of fumbling of intel
    would not happen again and it would get out to the commanders that needed it.

    Here is what the NSA has to say about FDR's Roberts Commission:

    The Roberts Commission, 18 December 1941-23 December 1942:
    This commission, set by presidential executive order, and chaired by Owen Roberts, a justice of the Supreme Court, was charged to determine the facts of the Japanese attack and establish if any dereliction of duty had occurred. MAGIC was discussed, but who received it and the details of the reports were not covered. Not surprisingly, the hearings were hostile to the area commanders, General Walter Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel. The major political and military figures in Washington were exonerated.

    It's clear, this commission was not objective. It was designed to blame Kimmel and Short and protect people in Washington DC. Phrased another way, it was part of the cover-up. The NCI and the APHB,
    ended with different conclusions, because they were much more objective. Their conclusions were
    surpressed until after the 1944 election. But some of their findings began to leak out. Why? Because
    Roberts had been an attempt to cover-up and prevent blame for the disaster, falling on FDR & his admin, Marshall, Stark and others. Leaks tend to happen when someone is trying to cover something up.

    Then more investigations were ordered to further confuse the whole issue. Finally after the war ended
    Turman released all he could, but congress wanted to get to the bottem of the mess, so the JCC was
    ordered. It was obvious, people like Gen Marshall, had not been telling the truth. Marshall could claim he
    was trying to protect Magic, but he was still very evasive after the war ended, when testifing before the JCC.

    I think a rational person can quickly see, the NCI and APHB, were the most objective. Even the Dorn
    report to congress in 1995, is still not clear about what happened.
     
  8. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member Patron   WW2|ORG Editor

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    Read the whole thing.
     
  9. formerjughead

    formerjughead The Cooler King

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    It's not like the message said: "We are going to attack Pearl Harbor at 0755, Sunday, December 7th, 1941 with carrier launched fighters and torpedo bombers".

    The thing to keep in mind is that the US was scattered accross the Pacific from the Aleutians to the Phillipines in 1941. So, there were many targets that seemed more likely to be attacked than Pearl Harbor.

    The moral of the story is that Japan pulled off a very successful raid against an unlikely target using inovative means. They did what they did and they did it well.
     
  10. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    I read the Knox report and the NCI, both twice and took notes along the way, a while ago now. Recently, I read Pearl Harbor: Fruits and Seeds of Imfamy, it was a very good book and very well documented.
    I even checked some footnotes, such as the Purple Intercepts, against this web site December 1941.

    The footnotes are correct. I'm now working on Adm Richardson's Memoirs. It's a little like a Naval Academy text book. You really need at least some naval knowledge, to understand the book well.

    I have also read Pearl Harbor Countdown: Admiral James O. Richardson, by Skipper Steely. This book is more designed for the general public. More entertaining and has no naval technical material.

    Anyway, what document should I read yet again and could you be more specfic as to what I don't get?

    I read parts of ADWS a long time ago. Gathering material for the book was Prange's life work.

    Prange accumulated 3,500 pages of material, when he died, it was condensed down to about 900 pages and published. ADWS claims Kimmel failed to order long distance recon, from the Pearl Harbor base and this is the reason Kimmel was relieved of command. After the attack, the best interest of our nation and the war effert, were more important than the reputation of the Kimmel and Short. So, this makes sense.

    However, I don't agree with the opinion Kimmel should have ordered more or different long-range recon.

    Nither does the NCI:

    Page 319 (italics mine)

    Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of
    the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine,
    long-range reconnaissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of
    Fleet patrol planes for daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was
    not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available, and
    was not justified in the absence of any information indicating that an
    attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of
    time.

    Think about it a little, long-range recon was done, before the Battle of Midway. Because intel suggested an attack was coming and within narrow time limits. Constant long range flights, just use up to many resources. Then planes and crews would not be avaliable when intel suggested an attack was coming
    and long-range recon would be effective, like it was before the Battle of Midway.
     
  11. syscom3

    syscom3 Member

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    There were enough planes and ships to do "something". Even if it meant sending destroyer out a couple hundred miles and cruise around for a few days. If they were in the wrong position, at least Kimmel could claim "something" rather than "nothing" was done.
     
  12. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member Patron   WW2|ORG Editor

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    RFLMAO.
     
  13. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member Patron   WW2|ORG Editor

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    I think we need a "Fiction" subforum to this subforum.
     
  14. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    The only mistake Kimmel made, is predictably being in port on the weekends.

    I guess even this statement I made is not correct. Kimmel didn't even make this mistake. Not according to the NCI.

    [1158] Task Force One included the preponderance of the battleship
    strength of the Fleet. The three battleships of Task Force Two had been
    left behind in Pearl Harbor because their slow speed did not permit them
    to accompany the ENTERPRISE to Wake. It was purely a coincidence that
    all battleships of the Pacific Fleet, except one undergoing overhaul at
    the Puget Sound Navy Yard, were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December.
     
  15. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    Dear Confusion Theorist DogFather,

    Your quote IS NOT FROM page 318 of the Naval Court of Inquiry. IT IS FROM "Part 39 - Reports, Findings, and Conclusions From the Roberts Commission, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Hewitt Inquiry, with Endorsements." Hence, when I looked in Parts 32 & 33 - The Naval Court of Inquiry, your quote was nowhere to be found. Please correctly cite your sources the next time. As to
    I wonder, was the US Navy in the habit of sending TOP SECRET information by way of unsecured and uncoded radio-telephone transmissions. Somehow, I really doubt it.
    Really, I see FDR making a Lincolnesque quip such as "If Admiral Richardson isn't going to use his fleet, I'd like to borrow it for a time. Seems to me that Admiral Richardson wasted an awful lot of time complaining about what the fleet lacked, where it was based, what needed to be modernized, etc. When he should have been spending his time adapting to the changing situation and overcoming any obstacles. As to the Kimmel-Layton relationship, why are most of his criticisms concerning naval intelligence, not well evidenced in his testimony? Why does he not admit to the several mistakes both he and Kimmel made in his book "I Was There."
    Really? From Halsey's BATTLE ORDER NUMBER ONE, while the USS Enterprise is at sea on November 28, 1941.
    Meanwhile, Kimmel debates the meaning of "This is to be considered a war warning." message. Kimmel also fails to take any meaningful actions to put the fleet on a war footing or take any meaningful actions for it's defense in Pearl. Halsey is operating under a "war plan", while Kimmel is ignorant to the fact that war is almost at hand.
    Seeing as Halsey already considered the war to have begun, and was expecting possible contact with the Japanese ships or aircraft. Recon, is not simply "consistant with the war plan", it is good old-fashioned common sense when contact with the enemy is expected. Unfortunately, Kimmel seems to have been devoid of this common sense. He is more worried about what could happen in the future, and not worried enough about the present.
    Yes, that is correct. However, you don't mention the flip-side: The US Army is dependent on the US Navy to provide reconnaissance. Here, the US Navy let the Army down. Not only was the US Navy not providing the necessary reconnaissance, they did not even bother to inform the Army that the needed reconnaissnce was not being flown.
    Really? You know, I was wondering why an aircraft carrier flew off her airgroup to airfields on land before entering a harbor. Certainly, I think carrier aircraft can take off from those airfields while the carrier is safely docked in the harbor...
    And the Army had to depend on nonexistant Navy aerial reconnaissance.
    Were not the battleships, heavy cruisers, and the Brooklyn class light cruisers equipped with floatplanes that could have provided these "sweeps"? I'm fairly certain that they were. I mean, the battleships were fitted with catapults on the stern and the third main gun turret for a REASON, right?
    There is a difference? Please explain the difference between "routine training" and training to prepare for war. I would think that flying long range reconnaissance missions would be ideal training for PBYs expected to undertake long range reconnaissance missions in times of war.
    Well, let's see. According to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the advance warning that the Army iis expected to provide is insignificant since
    So any warning provided by the Army will be understandably brief, so as to have almost no effect on any defensive measures to be taken. Thus, it is the US Navy which has the primary responsibility for being the "eyes and ears" for the defense of Pearl Harbor, a job for which they failed miserably.
     
  16. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    Come now, DogFather, you're a self proclaimed "Pearl Harbor cover-up reality explainer." YOU DON'T BELIEVE IN COINCIDENCES!!!!!!!!!
     
  17. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member Patron   WW2|ORG Editor

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    Coincidence? No. Brown and Halsey didn't want them along. (That's both carrier groups, not just Enterprise.) And, as I have pointed out before, Yamamoto expected and promised a big bag by attacking on a weekend because Yoshikawa Takao had observed that the highest concentrations of warships were routinely on Saturday and Sunday. Kimmel's routine operations paradigm made the attack plausible to the Imperial High Command. If Kimmel had remembered the rule "Don't be predictable" the attack would have in all likelihood have occurred.
     
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  18. rkline56

    rkline56 USS Oklahoma City CG5

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    "Don't be predictable" That should be the First General Order. Thanks for bringing up this interesting aspect of the intel used for the attack.

    D.F. Your resilience is commendable man. This debate is going to rage for a good long while and you'll never win. But it does make for interesting reading.

    From an old salt.
     
  19. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member Patron   WW2|ORG Editor

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    Dogfather is useful for illustrating the utter stupidity of the conspiracy theories surrounding this event. The only possible reason for holding onto such a theory is either ignorance or willful refusal to accept the facts of the matter. After some forty-five years of dealing with CTers I am no longer capable of being surprised by them.
     
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  20. DogFather

    DogFather Member

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    Takao what you are not grasping in some of the things you have said. Is for one thing, Kimmel and Short were never told
    about the 5 Nov, 1941 joint memo, by Marshall & Stark to FDR, not to give the Japanese an ultimatum, because this would insult them and mean war. Ambassador Grew and SecState Hull agreed on this and told, FDR & his admin, along with Marshall & Stark. So, it was clear when the ultimatum was given, it would mean war fairly soon with Japan.

    None of this info about the ultimatum, or its implacations was given to Kimmel and Short. It was no longer a matter
    of Japan getting the raw materials she needed, Japan wanted to punish the US for the insult. The Japanese adittude
    reminds me of dueling that once took place in the US and Europe. Where an verbel insult could mean a duel where some
    one dies. No longer made sense to people in the America, but Japan was like that. That info was known and not given
    to Kimmel and Short. They needed to understand Japan might not act very rationally and seek to concor the SW Pacific
    to get the raw materials, the US, British and Dutch had stopped sellin to Japan. Although she did still try to get those
    raw materials, she also wanted to punish us for slapping her around a little with that ultimatum.

    There simply was a mountain of evidence from all those Magic messages, that war was coming soon. Such as Japan asking her Axis partners, if they would join her in war against the US and GB. Telling her emmbassies around the world
    to burn code books and destroy cipher machine. Discussion of code words, to be put in a radio weather message, to
    indicate war, to her emmbassies around the world, that no longer had code books and other things as well. Like I said
    a mountain of stuff suggesting war and soon.

    A lot of people knew all this had been going on and on Dec 6th were waiting for Japan's reply to the ultimatum, we had
    given them. We all know about the 14 part message and the 1 pm message, but none of this was given to Kimmel and Short. They had no way to find this out, if people like Stark, Marshall, Knox, Stimson or FDR in Washinton did not tell them. The intel from HYPO and CAST did not help them at this time, to any great extent. Other things should been told
    to Kimmel and Short as well. On Dec 6th, SecWar Stimson asked for inventory of US ships from around the world, to get
    ready for war. Also on the 6th, Adm Wilkinson, Chief of Navy Intel set-up a 24-hr watch on the Far Eastern Section.

    There was just a lot of activity in Washington, because of the Magic messages and what they suggested. None of this
    was sent ot Hawaii. Had Kimmel had even some of this other info, like about the ultimatum and its implacations. It might
    have well changed some of there thinking. It may have been clear to Kimmel, time for training was over and this time we
    are really going to get attacked. The 1 PM message is yet another issue.

    I have a feeling Takao, I caused you to lose face when I suggested you do some reading and your analogy did not make
    sense. So, you put a lot of effert into picking apart my post. That's okay, I am use to it and the name calling. As I read
    more I will tell you more about the cover-up, even though some of you just don't want to see that reality.
     

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