The island hopping campaign, though, is so often portrayed as a province solely governed by the US Marine Corps. No doubt, they deserve a hard-won credit. It was a joint effort from the Aleutians to Burma. In terms of raw numbers the US Army had man more troops in the theaters and conducted more amphibious and airborne operations. The Army insisted on using hardened, experienced troops time and again for their amphibious assaults where the Marine Corps mostly conducted their operations with newer, fresher troops; however, all gained so much more experience after each operation. Each service had its own doctrine, tactics, and equipment and masterminded by different theater commanders to include both Buckner and Geiger. Unfortunately all branches of the US services had leaders more concerned with their own interests, prerogatives and goals. The Army of the Central Pacific Theater was different than the Army organizations in the SWPA. Problems with Army and Marine discord continued, and probably more noticeable on the Island of Saipan. So much acrimony that there will probably never be an accurate comparison drawn from the strategic goals and tactics. Having the opportunity to sift through some of MacArthur's own memoranda and planning documents it seems to me that he was really focused on the endstate and utilized the troop formations in his area quite well. He even insisted on some of the early strikes against the Japanese that fell simultaneously with Doolittle's raid against the mainland of Japan. I couldn't imagine taking on that magnitude of a fight. The Asia-Pacific region is just so immense. More study is needed and more items brought to the public forum.