Italian Frogmen and WW2

Everyone has the jitters, seeing objects swimming about at night, and hearing movements on ships' bottoms. It must stop!" - Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Commander in Chief of Britain's Mediterranean Fleet.

http://www.wifteam.net/ItalianFrogmen.htm

From their first triumph in March of 1941 these units utilized Explosive Motor Boats, Torpedo Boats, Miniature submarines and the infamous Human Torpedos (Maiale). By the end of the war, these units would sink, or severely disable, 86,000 tons of Allied warships and 131,527 tons of merchant shipping.

The 10th Light Flotilla was responsbile for 28 ships sunk or damaged in World War Two. These ships include the battleships HMS Queen Elizabeth, HMS Valiant, cruiser HMS York and 111, 527 tons of merchant shipping.

A partial listing of ships sunk or crippled by the 10th Light Flotilla is noted below.


Durham 10,900 tons Gibraltar Sep, 1941
Queen Elizabeth 32,000 tons Alexandria Dec, 1941
Valiant 31,000 tons Alexandria Dec, 1941
Jervis 1,700 tons Alexandria Dec, 1941
Baron Douglas 3,900 tons Gibraltar July, 1942
Raven's Point 1,900 tons Gibraltar July, 1942
Meta 1,600 tons Gibraltar July, 1942
Harmattan 4,600 tons Algiers Dec, 1942
Empire Centaur 7,000 tons Algiers Dec, 1942
Camerata 4,900 tons Gibraltar May, 1943
Mahsud 7,500 tons Gibraltar May, 1943
Kaituna 10,000 tons Mersin July, 1943
Fernplant 7,000 tons Iskenderun Aug, 1943
Stanridge 6,000 tons Gibraltar Aug, 1943

1942 Italian frogmen were not only deadly, but also very ingenious in their methods of attack. Known as the "Floating Trojan Horse of Gibraltar", Italian frogmen used an imaginative method of destroying enemy ships.

Gibraltar was very tempting to the Italians for their safe shelter of British warships and allied merchant shipping. The Italian frogmen originally used a Spanish villa that was locateed 2 miles from Gibraltar. It was owned by an Italian officer married to a Spanish woman named Conchita Ramognino. This villa held the frogmen who would sneak out into the harbor and attack unsuspecting British warships. But this proved very difficult and costly. The harbor was very well protected by netting, patrol boats and search lights. Because of this difficulty, the Italians decided to use a battered Italian merchant ship docked across the bay of Gibraltar. It was the 4,995 ton Olterra. Italian frogmen secretly replaced the crew with divers and technicians and built a workshop to house, build and maintain human torpedos. A door was then cut 6 feet below the surface to allow these 2-man human torpedos to come and go undetected. Replacement torpedos were shipped from Italy disguised as boiler tubes. When the Italian frogmen commenced their attacks on British warships from this location, it proved just as costly. Five out of six frogmen never returned. But when the Italians decided to attack the merchant shipping, which was less protected, they were rewarded with easy prey. Italian frogmen sank or damaged a total of 42,000 tons of Allied shipping. The British never did find out where these frogmen came from or where they gone.



-------------

Despite early disappointments the Italians persevered, and scored major successes in Gibraltar Harbour in September 1941 and more significantly, in Alexandria Harbour in December. It was this attack that personified the strength of the submarine/swimmer delivery vehicle combination - bold in concept; brilliant in execution; highly effective in result - when six Italian frogmen, led by Cdr Count Luigi de la Penne, on three chariots landed from the Italian submarine Sirce penetrated into Alexandria Harbour and placed explosives on the British battleships Valiant and the Queen Elizabeth, and a nearby tanker. All six charioteers were captured, but they put a significant element of the British Mediterranean Fleet on the bottom. Fortunately for the British the bottom was not far away, and the upperworks of both ships remained well clear of the surface. To fool Italian reconnaissance aircraft into thinking that the raid had failed, apparently normal operations were conducted on a day to day basis. Smoke came out of funnels, guns were trained, and all the routine ceremonial rituals performed as if nothing had happened. In fact below the waterline frantic repair efforts were being made which lasted several weeks. Had the Axis realised the truth then Admiral Cunningham, with only a few operational ships at his disposal, could have been driven out of the Mediterranean, with potentially disastrous consequences for the Allies.



http://www.rnsubmus.co.uk/tour/x24.htm

http://www.regiamarina.net/xa_mas/alexandria/alexandria_us.htm

 

Very interesting Kai! Seems that you've found a new interest in the Italian aspect of the war (well done!)

The Italian Frogmen are, at least in my opinion, one of the lesser known facts about Italy during the war. Books mention them here and there, but I have never seen that much information all at once.

Thanks for the interesting site!

DUCE

 

Very interesting Kai!

I knew that the Italians used frogmen to sink ships, but I didn't knew that on a such big scale this happened.

The list of sunken ships is impressive. Also the story of Gibraltar is very interesting.

 

Thanx guys!

Yes, interesting to see that the Italians were successfull in some war maneuvres. Even so that even Mr Skorzeny was amazed...

 

The fact that the Italians did actually something good in the war, shocked me.

 

Principal operations of the 10th light flotilla

http://www.regiamarina.net/xa_mas/actions_us.htm

 

Erwin at least you're admitting your ignorance,(WINK) it would be fair to say that 95% of whats been written in English concerning the Italians performance in WW2 was largely based on anti Italian propaganda that has been swallowed up too willingly by the gullible and dare I say ignorant.

Careful and accurate examination of the actual battles fought against the Italians (an intellectual quality that has been so sadly lacking in the English speaking armchair historian community) shows without a doubt that time and time again the Italians were as brave as they come....in the face of battle....whether they lost or not( if you know anything about Italians then you should realise that without needing to be told, Italians are not cowardly at all).

The question you should ask is ...why has so much of the Italians participation in these battles been intentionally left out of English War history books ...after all there are sooo many eyewitness accounts from Aussies, Kiwi and Brit soldiers that bely the commonly generated myth of the Italians not being able to fight..the answer is easy to find PROPAGANDA,propaganda, propaganda...all for the sake of propaganda...

I interviewed over 60 ww2 vets from NZ.. many years ago in the 1990's and twice that number of AUSSIES that fought from el alamain to Anzio who stated that although the Italians were using archaic and often ineffective strategies in that modern war(ww2) 'they were stubborn and proud fighters' many also said that It was lucky that Italy's Army was inundated with African Natives(in Africa) who swelled their ranks so much as to actually diminish their fighting effectiveness by causing so much disorder and confusion in times when deployment and manuering into positions was vital during actual battles..

hopefully soon more of these events and stories from ex ww2 allied troops as well as ex ww2 Italian troops will find their way into Books written in English, so we all can get educated on what so far has been the blind acceptance of tooo much trashy propaganda and childlike ridicule aimed at the Italians of ww2.

Happy reading!

P.S.
There two fairly good books written in English by U.S servicemen I think about the famed Italian Frogmen 'the 10th Flotilla' called.
Sea devils and the other called Frogmen first battles which can be both bought fro amazon.com

 

I am assuming you will put all of your posted interviews of these gents into print ? hope so. The German Kriegsmarine S-booten vets had nothing but admiration for the Italien small boats and their crews which did come to aid of the small amount of Schnellboote operating in the Med......

~E

 

I was not saying that the were arrogant, just saying that they didn't win as many battles as they should have.

Like the attack on the Brittish in 1940 - or was it 1941 . They had triple the number of men, tanks, etc.

 

Yes! I've been working on getting these interviews put out in CD audio format I have a publisher that will most likely put this work into print sometime in 2004.

 

Yes well thats where the many armchair historians fail in their conclusions about the Italians in ww2.

On paper Italy in 1940 had over 256,000 men however 182,000 of these were indigionous africans who did not receive adequate training for a modern day desert war.Even the better Italian African units had been fighting for 5 years without adequate rest or home leave since 1936 and were war weary.This army was mainly Infantry and had very little modern equipment.

European units consisted of the Premier division the elte 'granatieri di savoia' (grenadiers of savoy)which would later receive honors from the British at the battle of Keren, and white colonist volunteers which formed the MSVN blackshirt Legions.

These units arrived in Africa without heavy artillery support or antitank/air units as these were still making their way by sea.

They had 22 tanks mostly the too lightly armored m13 and L tanks which had riveted armour that was so light it would often crack when hit even by rifle fire.

The two principal areas in which Italian armored vehicles fell short of their German and Allied counterparts were in the quality of their armor plate (steel) and in their horsepower-to-weight ratio. The armor plate was prone to crack or split when hit, and generally speaking, the deficiency in the quality of the steel was not compensated for by added thickness. This was probably due to a high sulfur content in the steel. Brittle steel was the same problem that plagued the ocean liner Titanic. Italian tank crews tried sandbagging and affixing track links to vital areas in order to improve their chances of survival, but to infer that this practice was an Italian monopoly would be totally misleading. Both Allied and German tankers resorted to the same type of field expedients. The principal difference was that Italian tanks, without improvised protection, would not stand up against those weapons which most Allied and German armor could withstand.

even though their 47mm gun was an excellent weapon the tanks themselves were not able to withstand much heavy combat due to their tiny armour.

They were also prone to catching fire easily and the rivets holding the plates together would shear off often causing more than a little strife for the tank crew inside. All in all one would have had to have been very brave indeed to ride into battle in one of these deathtraps.

The lack of radios in the Italian Army lead to all sorts of logistical problems and coordinating troop movements was a long slow and tedious process ue to this.

Often vital information from scouts about allied positions didnt reach Italian high command until it was way too late and this is also the reason that the Italians overestimated the size of the British force set to face them.

The lack of adequate antiair guns increased their vulnerability when on the move.

However in 1940 the Italians invade British somaliland and take control over it with little resistance from the allies.

In January 1941 the tables are turned, Italian supply lines are broken by the allies and remaining supplies are first distributed to german troops (due to Rommels interference)Rommel who had been captured in WWI by the Italians always resented the Italians for that and
genius as he was often made crucial tactical blunders in the African campaign often due to bias(not alowing the Italians access to fully resupply) was one of the worst examples.

Yet He used the Italians at the front of many of the battles,the Italians were left fighting in the front with small amounts of german troops in support allowing the bulk of the Germans korps to slip away with Rommel.

General gazzeras force and gen. Nasis forces were particularly stout fighting units giving the allies a very hard fight for many months, finally low on supplies and virtually without water for 4 days the Italians final force of Gen.Nasi at Gondar which were surrounde by Ethiopean Guerillas as well as British African forces surrenders after a long stubborn resistance on 27the nov 1941 and recieve full honours from the British 'Kings Africans Rifles'.

So really if we examine historical texts (without bias)and hear from war veterans which belonged to the Axis as well as the common allied soldier we can clearly see that the Italian troops fought bravely and determinedly on the African front in rather unfavourable conditions with inadequate weapons..and many a time without proper leadership too.

One of the biggest injustices to all the war vets that served in the Italian forces is being branded with the undeserved label of 'cowardice' which' if one analyses the African wars and the Italian forces actions carefully and intelligently one finds the opposite to be true.

They were brave troops that fought very diligently and I hope that access to records ,documents that detail these real stories about Italian fighting units and their heroic actions make it to print in the English language.

As so far we have too much fictinal based nonsense that was put out by the British propanda machine of the 1940's being quoted by too many amateur war historians who seem to know no better and lack the ability or just are incapable of conducting proper indepth research to bring to light the real events and actions of the Italian forces in WW2.

[ 24. April 2003, 12:47 AM: Message edited by: fenicerosso ]

 

Yep, when looking at the Italians the tale passed down over the years, and one I think the British are top of the guilty chart, is that the Italians were not a formidable force.

Others may put it differently. We have all heared the tales of tanks with 4 reverse gears and one foreward, could tell their position by smell of perfume etc etc etc.

We then go on to look at a number of campaigns where by again we degenerate the Italians, but not just the Italians...By constanly reminding ourselves that Italy could not even get past the Greeks we also degenerate the fight fought and the capabilities of the Greek army too.

On looking at initial Mid East battles before DAK came along, our mindset looks at purely numbers involved and puts the British engagements against the Italians in the realms of super Brits.

My own personal view, and its purely personal, is that we the Brits should compare these initial engagements to our own ineptitudes in Early Malaya and Singapore theatre against the Japanese...The Japanese mindset at the time may well have looked at the British fight, in much the same way as we remember the Italians in early days of Middle East and Abysinnia theatres?

The armchair general, which most of us ok..persoal again...me...though is not borne through, when so books and writers support the vision of the Italians in many ways.

Charles Messenger as one example...doesnt degenerate the Italians as such, but bases some of his writing quite heavily on numbers, giving some who may not wish to read further, the impression the Italians were suprisingly inept.

Such as following:

In June 1940 it seemed on paper at least, that Mussolini had a relatively straightforward task. Britain herself was now on her own and under immenent threat of invasion. She could hardly be in a position therefore, to reinforce the Mediterranean Theatre. The British Meediterranean fleet had its main base at Malta, which was within easy air striking distance from Sicily. Force it to wihdraw and the Royal Navy woud be confined to the periphery, being reuced to operating from Gibraltar or Alexandria, while Italy controlled the central Mediterranean.

On land the picture looked even brighter for Italy. The British commander in chief Middle East,General sir Archbald Wavell had 63,000 troops in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq. These had not only to defend those territories against external threat, which now included Vichy French Syria, but also to police them. Indeed, in Palestine the Arabs had resorted to violence in their protest at the influx of Jewish refugees and the situation had only been brought under control on the very eve of war after a three year counter insurgency campaign. In contrast, in Libya alone there were 250,000 Italian and indegenous troops. To the south Italy could field a further 300,000 troops in the Horn of Africa, while the British garrisons in Sudan, British Somaliland and Northern Kenya numbered a mere 20,000. In the air the situation was the same. The Italians had nearly 500 aircraft based in Africa, with a further 1,200 which could be deployed from Italy. The RAF, on the other hand had a total of a mere 370 in Egypt,Palestine and East Africa and almost all of those were obsolecent types.

The above does not take into account training, leadership or state of equipment or resupply methods and dangers etc...But still on paper would to any new students to the intial theatre of operations look like a comparatively simple task with the numbers involved to eject the British from their possesions and not the other way around.

Leadership is mentioed in an earlier post, and together with the above figures... if correct...would bring many to ask ....why the British were so successful against the Italians. That does not in any way degenerate the individual Italian solder, but the question can not be pushed to one side regarding the seemingly relatively easy..to us armchair officianados...victories the British made against the Italians, and must surely bring into question the Italin fighting abilities in that theatre at that time.

Then I think of Singapore too...

 

Maybe??? Check the site on troop and vehicle movements.

Italian Priorities in 1940-1941: Africa vs the Balkans

Looking at the tables it's clear that the Italians placed greater emphasis on their war in Greece and Albania than that in Africa. Some other examples are the shipment of 2500 vehicles to Libya versus over 10,000 to Albania. The Trieste Motorized Division was intended for Albania, but the Albanian port of Durazzo couldn't handle its vehicles and it was sent to Africa instead.
Between Benghazi and Sidi el Barrani Graziani had only 2700 vehicles to tow 1100 guns and to transport 104,500 men on the eve of the British attack. By late February 1941 the Italians in Albania had two-thirds as many vehicles as Libya (9132 to 5270) and two and a half times as many motorcycles (4170 to 1714).

If Graziani's forces had been motorized and given the support of an armored division or two, Operation Compass would have had a far different result. The British would undoubtedly have been far less successful in their attack and the Italians wouldn't have lost Cyrenica very quickly, if at all.

http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/italpriorities.html

As well a site for Italian tanks in WW2

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/1975/g_itawna.htm

 

Yep Kai, I agree with your summisation.

This furthers the point made by Francessco...sp..that we shouldnt taint the Italian soldier to the degree he has been tainted by history, well especially British ww2 history.

I still though look at the paper figures for the inital Mideast battles and think on a personal view of my own, that even with localy raised troops etc the battle field was weighted in favour of the Italians.

The British too were not exactly tip top, point of the sword stuff at that time in that region.
Had our own fair share of indignious forces too.

The additional force you quote if had been available to Italians in Mid East, may have swung the fight in their favour and is an interesting point.

At end of the day we will end up getting into what ifs on a scale with previous Arnhem threads.

The fact is both sides had their individual problems and numbers involved look decidedly advantagious to one side over the other, however as we all know on here, numbers are not the be all and end all...I just think the whole structure of the Italian force in the Mideast was wrong at that time. Including command and control, rather than the individual Italian soldier who has been unfairly maligned over this side of the channel for too many years.

 

Italian June 1940 army OB

http://www.geocities.com/kumbayaaa/itroyobarmy10vi1940.html

North Africa Command - Air Marshall Italo Balbo

5th Army - Gen. Italo Gariboldi

10th Corps - Gen. Aldo Barbieri
25th Inf.Div. "Bologna" - Gen. Roberto Lerici
60th Inf.Div. "Sabratha" - Gen. Giulio della Bona

20th Corps - Gen. Federico Cona
17th Inf.Div. "Pavia" - Gen. Pietro Zaglio
27th Inf.Div. "Brescia" - Gen. Giuseppe Cremaschi
51st Inf.Div. "Sirte" - Gen. Vincenzo della Mura

23rd Corps - Gen. Annibale Bergonzoli
1st CCNN Div. "XXIII Marzo"- Gen. Francesco Armellini
2nd CCNNDiv. "XXVIII Ottobre" - Gen. Francesco Argentino

Army Reserve
2nd Lybian Div.

10th Army - Gen.Mario Berti

21st Corps - Gen. Lorenzo Dalmazzo
52nd Inf.Div. "Marmarica" - Gen. Ruggero Tracchia
63rd Inf.Div. "Cirene" - Gen. Carlo Spatocco

22nd Corps - Gen. Enrico Pitassi Mannella
64th Inf.Div. "Catanzaro" - Gen. Giuseppe Stefanelli
4th CCNN Div. "III Gennaio" - Gen. Fabio Merzari

Italian East Africa Command - HRH Amedeo of Savoy, Duke of Aosta
Grenadiers Div. "Granatieri di Savoia" - Gen.Amedeo Liberati
Inf.Div. "Africa" - Giovanni Verda

Albania Command and 26th Corps - Gen.Sebastiano Visconti Prasca
19th Inf.Div. "Venezia" - Gen. Silvio Bonini
23rd Inf.Div. "Ferrara" - Gen. Licurgo Zanini
53rd Inf.Div. "Arezzo" - Gen. Michele Molinari
131st Armoured Div. "Centauro" - Gen. Giovanni Magli
3rd Alpini Div. "Julia" - Gen. Fedele de Giorgis

---------

http://www.expage.com/army14

The Italian Army in 1940 consisted in theory of 73 divisions, but could mobilize only 42; and it did so only by reducing the number of units within each. Some of the divisions had been active in peacetime, including a number found in Italy's African possessions and formed of local residents bother settler and native, but most were reserve formations, activated by inducting reservists. In addition to the regular Army, a Fascist militia existed (Milizia Volontaria Sicurezza Nazionale or Blackshirts) which supplied several full divisions to the Army and a number of Legions or Cohorts (regiments or battalions) to regular formations. The bulk of the Army was infantry, but it included three armoured divisions (Ariete, Littorio, Centauro), three Celere or light armoured divisions, two motorized divisions (Trento and Trieste), two parachute divisions (Nembo and Folgore) and six alpine divisions. The infantry of the armoured, light, and motorized divisions was provided by the Bersglieri (light infantry) regiments. Formations above divisions were corps and army.
A division contained two infantry regiments of three battalions each, an artillery regiment of nine batteries of four field guns each, an anti-aircraft and an anti-tank battery and an engineer company; many divisions also incorporated a Blackshirt legion of two battalions, a Bersglieri regiment of two battalions and a small self-propelled artillery regiment. The infantry divisions had little or no mechanical transport.
Italian equipment was old and poor, and in many cases lacking. Standard infantry weapons were the Mannlicher 6.5mm rifle, Hotchkiss 6.5 light machine gun and Schwarzlose 7.92 machine gun. Italian artillery was mostly of World War I design and the armoured vehicles were all notoriously under-armoured, -powered, and -gunned. The L/3, a three-ton carrier, served as the 'tank' in many armoured units until well on in the war. The M/ll, a true tank, had only a hull-mounted 37mm gun and the M/13, a useful vehicule with a 47mm turret gun, joined the Army only in 1941 and even then in small numbers.
Some Italian formations were excellent, particularly the alpine and Bersaglieri regiments, but the bulk of the infantry, who were badly paid, fed, and cared for, had no heart in the war, which they did not see as serving the country's interests. Those sent to Russia in 1942 were quite unacclimatized. Equally, the Italian High Command (Commando Supremo) contained numbers of officers whose enthusiasm for Mussolini and Fascism was less than absolute. The guiding principle of the officer corps was loyalty to the Royal House of Savoy, which Mussolini had eclipsed.

 

At risk of going off and having to start another thread....

Indigneous forces raised by armies of ww2..

Yes the Italians had many such forces, an indigneous force should not though be looked on as an incapable force. Yes many before ww2 were used mainly in a local policing role and certainly would not have received armaments on a par with the Occupying countries force.

But all were capable of putting up a good fight as long as not used as cannon fodder and had good leaderships and yes once engaged an armanent policy fit to do the job.

The French African forces in Italy for example.

The British raised many such forces some good some bad, but if bad more likely to be so becuase of the leadership and command structure involved or the weaponary allowed to have etc...Burmese Rifles comes to mind..Some good elements some not so good, depending on the British commmand and training of each unit.

So numbers do count in my view even if Indignously raised. If they were not up to the job then that is the fault of the Force they are fighting for and becomes part of the problem. Their numbers cannot be ignored....If they are part of the national fighting force then they are the responsibility of that nation to arm and train to an acceptable structure. Saying that I risk contradicting myself here, as I know the British as stated treated each indigneously raised force differently.

The Italians had a large number of troops of this sort in their armies at that time and in that region, as such they cannot just be dismissed as oh well they were locally raised. They were part of the force structure and if they were no up to the job then this raises issues on the Italian higher echelons.

Yep I know just like it does on the British in Burma....

 

The Italian Army 1914-1942

The Italians possessed the same doctrine as the Germans, but failed to create an officer corps that could execute it.
Italian officers clung to aristocratic notions about leadership into World War II. They were not united by a tradition focusing on professional matters: Officers were selected from the aristocratic class and the separation between them and the enlisted ranks was considerable.
Professional measures such as examinations were not used to determine Italian promotions. were based on a centralized selection board in Rome, usually with considerable influence.
An excess of either “cleverness” (intelligence) or zeal was bad form.

Italian combat experience and lessons learned came from combat with a range of militarily backward colonial adversaries, and were under no pressure to develop a high level of proficiency.

Lessons Learned:

The Italian Army in its 1939 cultural state was simply unready for maneuver warfare.
They professed speed and initiative in their doctrine, but in reality they practiced centralized control.
The reasons were a hierarchical, stand-offish relationship presented both the commander and subordinate with layer and layer of bureaucracy.
Courtiership and stringent requirements of protocol stifled communications.
Freedom of action was curtailed by self-indulgent officers, protective of their careers.

http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/vandergriff/cohesion_7.htm

Of Italy's more than 70 combat-effective divisions during the war, only four were armored - the 13Ist Centauro, 132nd Ariete, and 133rd Littorio. A resurrected Ariete was organized in April 1943 and designated as the 135th Ariete Armored Cavalry Division. Plans to convert a cavalry division, the 2nd Emanuele Filiberto Testa di Ferro, to an armored division designated as the 134th Freccia Division were never implemented. The 136th Giovani Fascisti Division was at times referred to as an armored division, but it was nothing more than an infantry division with some of its artillery mounted on trucks.

Centauro was stationed in Albania in 1940 and took part in the Italian actions against Greece, Yugoslavia, and North Africa. The division was being resurrected in Italy in mid 1943, with German equipment and SS instructors, when the armistice between Italy and the Allies was announced. German equipment assigned to Centauro included the Sturmgeschutz III assault gun and the PzKpfw V Panther. The division was disbanded on 12 September, and the Germans put the equipment to their own use.

Littorio participated in action on the Alpine front during the short campaign waged, by Italy against France in June 1940. In 1941, along with Centauro, it campaigned in Yugoslavia. From 1942 to 1943 it was engaged in North Africa, operating with Ariete and the German armored elements of Afrika Korps (]5th and 2]st Panzer Divisions). In November 1942, after having been nearly destroyed at the battle of El Alamein, what was left of the division was absorbed into the Ariete Tactical Group.

Ariete was probably the most notable of all Italian armored divisions. Ariete fought in North Africa from January 1941 until November 1942, at which time its remaining elements, along with remnants of Littorio and of the Trieste Motorized Division, were formed into the Ariete Tactical Group, which fought into Tunisia. Throughout the period of its activity in North Africa, Ariete fought in conjunction with, or subordinate to, the German forces in the desert and was praised by Field Marshal Rommel himself, who recognized the division as, having outstanding fighting qualities. A resurrected Ariete division was constituted in Italy in 1943, and fought against the Germans on the outskirts of Rome immediately after the declaration of the armistice in September. It was disbanded by the Germans after its surrender

http://mailer.fsu.edu/~akirk/tanks/Italy/italy.html

 

Good interesting articles Kai.

 

Well, this wasting time and let the other one attack seems to work both ways quite nicely...

http://www.geocities.com/kkh_khan/TheComming.html

"On September 1940 the Italian army under the command of Graziani left the Bardia area and moved across the Egyptian frontier at Sollum and than along the cost to Sidi Barrani. The weak British defending force fell back to the east in the face of Graziani's army as the British lacked the ability to fight a decisive battle. After reaching Sidi Barrani, Graziani did not continue his advance, but chose to fortify his position and from this base of operations, to advance further to the east.
The British bid their time, building up supplies for an offense during the weeks and then months in which Graziani did nothing . Finally, on 9 Decemeber, General Wavell launched a surprise attack...

 

Numbers do not count towards anything if the troops themselves are disorganised and using weapons from a stagnant war. No matter how many Infantry soldiers fight in Africa, you wont win a decisive battle without Armor and Air Power. A desert War can not be fought by infantry - esp. Infantry fighting a mobile war with stagnant war (WWI) weapons. WWII was of war of mobility - look at the vast area it covered - and the methods of war (like the Blitzkreig) required infantry in more of a clean up role then being the prime factor.

Just my thoughts on the matter.