Italy and Greece 1940-1941

Blunder in the Mountains

The Italian Invasion of Greece 1940

http://members.aol.com/_ht_a/balkandave/greece40.htm

Hitler's strategic plans required that the Balkans remain quiet. In the summer of 1940 German troops had secured the Rumanian oilfields, Bulgaria was pro-German and the Yugoslavian Prince Regent supported the axis. Even Turkish neutrality was being undermined. Yet it had been agreed that the Balkans would be in Mussolini's sphere of interest and the Italian dictator was jealous of Hitler's success.

The original Italian plan (known as Contingency G) was a limited territorial expansion into the Epirus region for which the nine Italian divisions in Albania were deemed sufficient. However, this was expanded in a second phase to the total occupation of Greece at a meeting only two weeks before the invasion at which the naval and air force chiefs were not even present. The Chief of the General Staff, Marshall Badoglio, who had previously indicated muted objections to the war, argued that 20 divisions would be required. Visconti Prasca asked for only three extra mountain divisions and some support units. Even these were to be fed in when the initial objectives had been achieved. His motives for refusing reinforcements can only be a matter for speculation. However, the fact that a more senior general might command a larger army, probably influenced his thinking.

For such a modest army to be successful required several favourable factors including; strategic and tactical surprise; a supporting invasion by Bulgarian forces; diversionary attacks on the poorly defended mainland; massive air support; and treachery in the Greek armed forces.

Unfortunately for the Italians the Greeks knew the approximate date of the invasion and King Boris of Bulgaria declined Mussolini's invitation to participate. This meant the Greek army was well established in the invasion area with the possibility of shifting reinforcements when Bulgarian neutrality became clear. No diversionary attacks were planned (even the island attacks were called off at the last moment) and a winter offensive coupled with negligible air planning minimised the value of Italian air superiority. Despite optimistic views expressed by commanders in Albania and substantial investment in bribes, there was no evidence that Greek forces would collapse due to internal dissent.

Order of Battle

There are conflicting sources on the precise OOB for this campaign and both sides had sound if different reasons to exaggerate the size of Italian forces. The Greeks to talk up the extent of their victory and Prasca to cover up his recklessness.

Italian Army (CinC Visconti Prasca)

Julia Alpini Division (Pindus Front)- 10800 men & 20 guns

Littoral Group (coast)(Two cavalry regs. and one reg. of Grenadiers) 4823 men & 32 guns

Arezzo Infantry Division (Yugoslav Front) - 12000 men & 32 guns

Venezia Infantry Division (Marching from Yugoslav front to XXVI Corps) 10000 men & 40 guns


Tsamouria Corps (General Carlo Rossi) (Epirus Front)

Ferrara Infantry Division - 12785 men & 60 guns +3500 Albanians

Siena Infantry Division - 9200 men & 50 guns

Centauro Armoured Division - 4037 men & 24 guns + 163 light tanks (90 serviceable)


XXVI Corps (General Gabriele Nasci) (Macedonian Front)

Parma Infantry Division - 12000 men & 60 guns

Piemonte Infantry Division - 9300 men & 32 guns


The Italian Corps were only established four days before the invasion


Greek Army (CinC General Papagos)

Epirus Front - 8th Division + Inf. Brig. - 15 battalions & 66 guns

Pindus Front - 3 reinforced battalions & 6 guns

Macedonian Front - 9th Division + 4th Inf. Brig. - 22 battalions & 90 guns

The Greek second line had a further seven battalions in position.

Italian 'standard' divisional organisation in 1940 was 2 (3 btn.) regiments usually with 2 Blackshirt battalions attached. Greek divisions had 3 (3 btn.) regiments. Artillery support was similar with 9 batteries. The Italians were better provided with light mortars and the Greeks had more MGs. Both the Italian and Greek divisions had limited AA and ATG provision. Supply services were poor on both sides although this was more vital to the Italians who had only 107 lorries in Albania out of an estimated requirement of 1,750.

In the air, the Italian Air force in Albania had 55 bombers and 107 fighters (more than half CR42 & 32's). They could also count on support from Brindisi in the form of 119 bombers, 20 JU87's and 54 fighters. The tiny Greek air force had only 27 bombers and 38 fighters serviceable. However, Italian air-ground co-operation was negligible with the Albania air commander, General Ranza being based in Tirana, many miles from army HQ. The supporting squadrons in Italy were not even in telephone contact.

Whilst exact comparisons are difficult even the Greek official history admitted local superiority on the Macedonian front. There was a modest Italian superiority on the Pindus and Epirus fronts. The main advantage on these fronts lay with tanks and aircraft, neither of which could be used to great effect. This meant that far from the two to one advantage Visconte Prasca thought he had, the opposing forces were fairly evenly balanced with around 150,000 Greeks facing 162,000 Italians. This was even before morale, supply and organisation are considered.

The Italian offensive was launched on 28 October in driving rain that deprived the army of air cover. Rapidly rising rivers and mud tracks resulted in slow progress with Greek screening forces falling back onto prepared positions.

On 6 November the Italian command was reorganised into two armies:

9th Army

Piemonte, Arezzo, Parma and Venezia Divisions in Western Macedonia.

Julia and Bari (diverted from cancelled Corfu attack) Divisions on the Pindus.

Tridentia Alpini Division in reserve.

11th Army

Ferrara, Centauro and Siena Divisions

To be reinforced by four divisions in preparation for an offensive after 5 December.

General Soddu subsequently replaced Visconte Prasca.


With the Italian offensive grinding to a halt Papagos shifted the 10th and 15th Divisions to the Macedonian front to join the 9th Division (III Corps). The Italians had dug in on the Devoli River with their backs to the Morava massif. 15th Division in the north made spectacular advances in freezing conditions around Mount Ivan whilst 9th & 10th Divisions pushed the Italians back off the mountains exposing the key valley town of Koritsa which was abandoned on the 21 November.

Italian reinforcements where thrown into the line piecemeal often without supporting arms and into a chaotic command structure. The loss of Koritisa and Erseke exposed the left flank of the 11th Army on the coast which was forced to retreat deep into Albania whilst being vigorously counterattacked by fresh Greek divisions. By 10 January the Klisura junction had been captured and Italian units only managed to stabilise the line south of the port of Vlone. Even this was due more to the lengthening Greek supply lines than effective Italian resistance. Marshall Cavallero replaced General Soddu.

The Greek strategy was now to capture Vlone then stabilise the line so that divisions could be redeployed to the Bulgarian front. It was becoming increasingly obvious that a German invasion was likely.


The Italians again reinforced up to a total of 28 divisions(4 Alpine, 1 Armoured and 23 Infantry) totalling 526,000 men. On 9 March their spring offensive used seven divisions in a limited attack between the Vijose River and Mount Tommorit. The 14 Greek divisions holding the Albanian front gave some ground until the attack was called off on 19 March after heavy casualties on both sides. This remained the position until April when the German invasion of the Balkans moved through the Pindus capturing Ioannina, sealing the Greek army in Albania.

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What If?

A Bulgarian invasion in conjunction with the Italian October offensive or later. King Boris would probably have agreed if Mussolini had made an earlier approach with Hitler's backing.

The involvement of Yugoslavia on either side.

The earlier arrival of Wilson Force (Two Commonwealth divisions and a tank brigade). The Greeks who were afraid of provoking Hitler refused this offer.

Conclusion

As Mario Cervi in his excellent account of the war put it "In the Greek campaign the Italian troops were, without any doubt whatever, the worst led troops in the world. They deserved better of their country."



http://members.aol.com/_ht_a/balkandave/frmcon.htm

 

http://2ndww.tripod.com/Balkans/ochi.htm

After the fall of France Mussolini immediately came back to the plans of the conquest of Balkans. First of all he was thinking about Yugoslavia, and then about Greece. Therefore in summer 1940 Italian troops had been concentrated on the Yugoslav border and their command was seeking co-operation with the Hungarians and German consent to use the territory of Austria during the possible campaign against Yugoslavia. However Ciano was thinking more realistically; after all he knew about the Berlin's negative attitude towards any military adventure in the Balkans. So he resolved, that to time it would be safer to limit his appetite to way weaker Greece only. By Ciano's initiative a number of provocations were staged, responsibility for which was shifted on the Greeks. It brought such an effect, that on 12 August Mussolini summoned Jacomoni and the commander-in-chief of the forces in Albania, Gen. Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, to Rome where he outlined a plan to seize the island of Corfu (Kerkyra) and the coasts of the Epirus. He also assumed, that if the Greeks gave in without a shot, he would make no more claims. In case of a resistance he foresaw further operations. A perspective of a hastily conceived military adventure actually scared both Jacomoni and Visconti Prasca, but they dared not to spell any other opinion, but that the operation could be successful and even easy if carried out quickly. Giving still a higher priority to the action against Yugoslavia, Mussolini considered an action against Greece not sooner than in the end of September. Meanwhile provocations against Greece gained momentum. The most spectacular one took place on 15 August, when an "unknown" submarine (actually it was Italian Delfino) torpedoed the Greek cruiser Elli off Tinos during a great religious feast.

Germany's position, as well as the policy of Yugoslavia and Greece, which did not surrender to the provocations, caused, that on 22 August Mussolini ordered to postpone the action against Greece till the end of September, and the action against Yugoslavia till the end of October. The concentration of troops on the Yugoslav frontier still lasted though. In mid-September as many as 37 divisions found themselves there, while only 3 new divisions were sent to Albania. The German position as well as the needs of the African front eventually forced il duce to abandon his plans towards Yugoslavia, but he did not give up Greece. On 12 October, when he learnt about the Germans' entry to Romania, he turned back to the plan of the war against Greece, known to the staffs as the plan G. This plan foresaw a limited operation, a police action rather, against Greece and in favourable circumstances like Greece's voluntary consent to the occupation, conflict with Bulgaria or domestic troubles. In case of a real war with Greece, there was prepared another plan, known as the plan PPG, which foresaw use of at least 20 divisions, which of course had to be concentrated beforehand in Albania.

On 14 October il duce summoned the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, and the deputy chief of staff of the army, Gen. Mario Roatta, and astonished them with the demand to occupy Greece. He also asked about the number of divisions needed and time when they could assume initial positions. The officers estimated, under provision that Bulgaria would take part in the invasion, that such an operation would require twelve divisions but the eight already deployed in Albania, and their concentration would require 3 months. If they thought that they had pleased Mussolini, they were wrong. Next day he summoned a conference of the supreme political and military authorities and declared a political necessity to occupy Greece. It came out from il duce's enunciations, that he wanted to occupy the whole Greece. As he spoke out his will, reactions of the audience varied. Badoglio and Roatta, who had already been sceptic about the whole enterprise, had spelled more objections. They argued, that they had thought only about a political action. But they were outnumbered by the supporters of il duce's opinion. Ciano said, that Greece had been ruled by a handful of pro-English plutocrats, who solely were determined to resist, but were in conflict with the people, who were indifferent to anything including an Italian invasion. Gen. Visconti Prasca, who had to command the operation against Greece, but according to the hitherto plans had just enough forces to seize Epirus, boasted, that he would take Athens without reinforcements. He also claimed, that the morale of the Italian troops had been high, and the reason for some insubordination, which occurred among soldiers and officers, was solely due to their desire to act and attack. As to the Greek soldiers, they did not belong to those, who would be willing to fight. For short - according to the general - the march on Athens would present no troubles.

Mussolini's decision was to be realized immediately. It meant, that the invasion of Greece had to be carried by the forces foreseen for a limited action and only in favourable circumstances. Meanwhile neither on 15 October nor within next thirteen days before the invasion (it was postponed till 28 October, the anniversary of the fascist March on Rome) occurred circumstances, which could give an impression, that it would be an easy action. Quite a contrary, the news from Greece were telling about the will to fight, while Bulgaria declined the Italian offer of a common action against Greece. Simultaneously Ciano, the author of the diplomatic note to Greece, by the very spirit of its text dismissed any chance of negotiations with the Greeks. Naturally it is a document, wrote Ciano in his diaries, that allows no way out for Greece. Either she accepts occupation or she will be attacked.

The theatrical season in Athens started that year with Giacomo Puccini's Madame Butterfly attended, according to the Italo-Greek cultural agreement, by the composer's son Antonio and his wife. After the show a party dedicated to the friendship between the two nations was given in the Italian embassy. The party was not over yet, when the Rome started to transmit the text of the Italian ultimatum to Greece. The Greek intelligence though failed to break the Italian code. But the night to 28 October 1940 revealed the secret. At 3:00 the Italian ambassador, Emmanuele Grazzi, arrived to Metaxas' home and handed over the text of the note prepared by Ciano. Apart from false accusations against the Greeks it also contained the demand, that Greece allowed the Italians to seize strategic points on the Greek territory. When Metaxas asked, what were those points, Grazzi had to admit, that he did not know. He added though, according to Ciano's instructions, that the Italian troops amassed to enter Greece would do it at 6:00. The Italian government, continued the envoy, expected that the Greek government ordered its forces to make way for the Italian troops. Greece's negative position though would not affect the decision to enter Greece. It would take place anyway. This was the aforementioned Ciano's "allowing no way out for Greece".

Metaxas stated, that Italy had not left a chance for negotiations, and as it had given only 3 hours to issue orders not to resist its troops, it had choosen war. Before Grazzi left Metaxas' home (at 3:15), the prime-minister started issuing orders and directives by phone. When early in the morning 28 October 1940 Italian air forces started attacking Greek cities, and Visconti Prasca's assault grouping crossed the Greco-Albanian border, the country was already alerted. The whole Greek nation, united in the will to fight, delivered the resistance, which surprised everybody. And the prime-minister's decision, shortened to one strong word "no" (in Greek - ochi), became a war cry and the symbol of that resistance.

 

Great map pics of troop movements and positions of defence lines:

http://www.keele.ac.uk/socs/ks26/28October/28October.html


Like...

 

Some pics....



Greek infantry advances up snow covered slopes in Albania,November 1940



Greek soldiers advance in Albania

And more on

http://polished-pixels.com/greece/set-1940.html

Second World War Medals from Greece

http://www.coincraft.com/medals/greekmedals.html

 

A site with pics on Greek and Italian armies etc.

http://www.netcomuk.co.uk/~dpohara/grk40.htm



A classical Greek soldier picture

 

Blast from the past....

 

This is topic interesting. I wonder if anyone on this forum has noticed that in the movie "Captain Corelli's Mandolin", a love story is somewhat based around the Italian-Greek conflict?

 

I think you mean Italian-German conflict 1944 mostly ??

 

No, I think he means the battles of Cephallonia, where the Italians attacked units of a German mountain division and defeated it, just to be betrayed by incompetent generals…

 

"In World War II, the island was occupied by Axis powers. Until late 1943, the force was predominantly Italian, but some troops from Nazi Germany were also present. The island was largely spared from the fighting until Italy surrendered and Benito Mussolini was removed from power in September of that year. Confusion followed on the island, as the Italians were hoping to return home, but the Germans did not want the Italians' munitions to eventually be used against them. The Italian forces were hesitant to turn over their weapons for similar reasons.


As German reinforcements were headed to the island, the Italians dug in and eventually fought against the new German invasion. Ultimately, the German forces prevailed in taking full control of the island. Most of the remaining Italian forces were rounded up and executed."

from Wikipedia

 

General der Infanterie Friedrich H. You are on the money. Captain Corelli's Mandolin was based off what you have just described in detail!
You're pretty perceptive. Thanx for clearing that up to others.

 

That's because I've watched the film and read the book!

 

...and got the T-shirt too, no doubt !

 

I may have… but it had Penélope Cruz and Nicholas Cage on it, and, as I can't stand any of them, I didn't buy it!

 

Found this. The Greek medal for the 1940-41 war against Italians and Germans.

 

Kai,

In your original post you ask a few hypothetical questions.

Bulgarian Intervention is interesting.

The British forces being available however cannot happen in November 1940. The 6 Australian Division was still training in Palestine, and O'Connor had it pencilled in to replace the 4 Indian Div after the attack at Sidi Barrani. It saw its first action at Baria late Dec 1940.
The New Zealand Division was still awaiting its 3rd Brigade to arrive from England, it was just in time to be sent of the Greece inn April 41.
The 3rd Armoured Bde was part of 2Armoured Div and it also arrived just in time to be sent to Greece in April 41.

The Commonwealth simply didnt have any troops to make it worthwhile to send to Greece in Nov 40.

 

28 October 1940

Italian forces invade Greece from Albania. By the end of December the Royal Air Force (RAF) have deployed three light bomber squadrons equipped with Bristol Blenheims (Nos. 30, 84 and 211 Squadrons) and two fighter squadrons equipped with Gloster Gladiators (No.80 and No.112 Squadrons) to Greece. The Gladiator squadrons succeed in achieving a degree of air superiority over the Italians.

http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/milestones-of-flight/british_military/1940_6.html

 

Praise the Gladiators! It's incredible that such outdated airplanes achieved such a feat. I really like those fragile airplanes. Too bad they were sacrificed at narvik.

 

The British contribution was minimal and was doomed from the very start. There was a New Zealand and an Australian division each and only a British brigade. No armour as the terrain was 'unsuitable' for armour. Yet the Germans under Balck proved them wrong. If I recall, there was only 7 Greek divisions facing the Germans whereas there were 21 embroiled with the Italians. I have to check my source again.

At the time, it seemed like Great Britain was attempting to defend everything with resources it could not afford to spare.

 

I believe alot was expected of the Serb army with some 1 million men. After having been to Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia I am surprised the German army could not be stopped as the few roads and hills all around could be used to stop the Germans by "one man and his rifle"....