Japan Was Already Beaten and Starving When We Dropped Nukes

Very good link Lou. Richard B. Frank is a respected historian, author and expert on the Pacific War. If MTG takes the time to read it (both parts), hopefully he'll re-evaluate his position and see the truth. I don't really think he will, but I've been wrong before. That one time

 

Please show me the quote in "Japan's Decision to Surrender" where the Council vote was 6-0 in favor of surrendering....

Using your convoluted logic, you could say that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor led to the Japanese surrender and it would be correct.

Read it...Debunked it.

Name the Japanese that "Officially" supported it.

Show me where the contacted the US government to offer their surrender.

I am arguing not just with a Flat Earther...But a Flat Hollow Earther, who refuses to believe the evidence presented to him that the Earth is round.

Well, let's see...A non-military target should have 0 military deaths...And Hiroshima had 20,000+...So, yes, I would say that is quite high for a non-military target. Or maybe, just maybe, Hiroshima was a military target.

What were the military deaths in the Tokyo fire raid? So we can compare.

 

Japanese resistance to a US invasion would yield a high number of US casualties. Only the academics who insist the bomb was BAD use artificially low casualty projections.

In over 50 books and many more websites, I have never seen this claim, nor have I made this claim.

Another windmill for Don Quixote to knock down.

 

LOL! Uh, the U.S. Government officially claimed that Lincoln was killed by a conspiracy, a conspiracy that included John Wilkes Booth, and the government prosecuted and hung several of the alleged conspirators! Were you not raised in this country?

I take it your unaware that four different audio experts have determined via computer analysis of the recording of RFK's shooting that the recording contains more gunshot impulses than Sirhan could have fired from his gun? And that your unaware that released FBI and LAPD files and crime-scene photos document that there were more bullet holes in the pantry where RFK was shot than Sirhan could have fired from his gun?

This evidence has been documented in major documentaries on the case, including the very good A&E and Discovery documentaries. But this is all news to you, right?

LOL! Again, who are you people? I guess your part of the shrinking minority in the western world that still believes in the 1964 Warren Commission version of the assassination. I take it your unaware that the U.S. House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) reinvestigated the JFK assassination from 1977 to 1979 and formally concluded that JFK was killed by a conspiracy, that someone was impersonating Oswald at the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico City shortly before the assassination, that Jack Ruby (contrary to the syrup put out by the Warren Commission) had extensive Mafia ties and was in frequent contact with key Mafia figures in the weeks before he shot Oswald, etc., etc. This is all news to you?

Ah, so your a Russian bot! Well, that might explain your apparent ignorance of basic American history, as well as your bad grammar.

And if we're going to nitpick over typos, perhaps I should nitpick over your poor English. Articles are not "entitled"; they are "titled." It's not an "article" anyway; it's a website. Do you understand the difference? Or do "article" and "website" mean the same thing in Russian?

In any case, nowhere on my Keep Ukraine Free site do I advocate for war with Russia. I am not opposed to war with Russia to keep Ukraine free, but I say nothing about the issue on the site. FYI, polls show that the vast majority of Americans support keeping Ukraine free.

What a hoot. So after showing yourself to be poorly educated on the issues you discuss, you engage in condescending posturing.

If your going to posture as being better educated than your opponent, you might at least try to avoid committing basic English grammar errors.

 

Michael Timothy Griffith has become referred to as MTG on this forum. The initials, MTG are most commonly use in popular culture to refer to "Magic: The Gathering."
In WWII, "Magic" intercepts referred to/was the name given to United States efforts to break Japanese military and diplomatic codes. Japan and the United States fought in the Pacific. The Pacific is the largest body of water in the world. All people that suffer from cancer have drunk water. Therefore, Michael Timothy Griffith causes cancer.

See I understand how this Conspiracy Theory stuff works.

When I attended the 300F1 Special Operations Medical Sergeants Course at Ft. Sam Houston in San Antonio, TX, we were given our "Nutritional" block of instruction and "Introduction to Medical Didactics" at Baylor University Medical School in Houston. Several things we were taught there have stuck with me through the years. One of things I always remember from that instruction is the mnemonic, All Dogs Eat Kids, to remember your fat-soluble vitamins (A,D,E,K). You can overdose on fat-soluble vitamins because they can be stored in the body, whereas it is virtually impossible to overdose on water-soluble vitamins because any excess is secreted/eliminated by the kidneys. Your body naturally produces vitamin D when your body is exposed to sunlight, so in northern climes and during winter vitamin D deficiency can become endemic. Vitamin D is required for your body to utilize calcium (also important for boosting the immune system), you also require dietary fat to utilize vitamin D (fat soluble), milk is high in calcium. At the turn of the century a large proportion of children in the US were suffering from Rickets, resulting in weak and soft bones, stunted growth and sometimes skeletal deformities. In one study up to 80% of the children in Boston were afflicted. So, the government decided to fortify milk with vitamin D. Milk had the calcium that vitamin D was required for your body to assimilate, and the fat allowed the vitamin D to be utilized. Win/win and childhood Rickets was greatly reduced, virtually eliminated.
Same/same with the iodizing of salt. Lack of the micronutrient iodine is one of the leading causes of intellectual and developmental disabilities in the world. It is also a primary cause of thyroid disorders including Endemic Goiters. At the turn of the 20th century scientists realized that these disorders were rare in coastal populations where seafood is a good source of dietary iodine. Scientists and medical professionals pushed for the iodizing of salt because salt is widely and regularly used. Introduced in 1924 iodized salt virtually eliminated Cretinism, a birth defect caused by iodine deficiency and the source of the pejorative term cretin, meaning a stupid person. In fact, studies have shown that IQ levels in the US population as a whole showed a significant increase (greater than one standard deviation) after the adoption of iodized salt.
We must have had a class there on disease vectors as well because I remember that rodenticides that are anti-coagulant based are counter-acted if the rodent had access to dry dog foods because they are high in vitamin K and vitamin K is an antidote for anti-coagulant poisons. BTW, rodents are second only to mosquitos as the most important disease vector in the world.

Now to reason for this off topic diatribe, the doctor teaching the class was illustrating cause and effect in relation to scientific inquiry and/or the differential diagnosis of disease.
You have ten patients, and all have cancer. Eight are omnivores and two are vegetarians, so are meat eaters 400% more likely to develop cancer or is the variance related to the distribution of omnivores/vegetarians in the population? Eight of the patients also have a history of eating carrots, seven of the omnivores and one of the vegetarians, so can the consumption of carrots be the causative agent in developing cancer? Carrot eating was present in 80% of the patients. All of the patients are human, and all have a history of consuming water, so therefore humans drinking water is the cause of cancer. (the source of my comment above, "All people that suffer from cancer have drunk water"). Obviously, a false hypothesis.
Most situations are the confluence of diverse factors both large and small. Most often superficial similarities are just that and focusing on them can lead to incorrect assumptions. All data is not created equal, know what information is important and what is unimportant or superfluous. Always test your assumptions.

Having said all that, I've found MTG's next conspiracy theory!

 

As I’d mentioned, the best book available on Emperor Hirohito, the workings of the WW II-era Japanese government, and the struggles between the moderates and the militarists over starting and ending the war is Dr. Noriko Kawamura’s book Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War (University of Washington Press, 2015). Dr. Kawamura, a professor of history at Washington State University, draws on previously unavailable primary sources to trace Hirohito's actions from the late 1920s to the end of the war, and in the process she debunks the slanted portrayals of Hirohito and the Japanese government painted by scholars like Herbert Bix, Wiliam Craig, Richard Frank, and Robert Maddox.

Here are some key points from Dr. Kawamura’s book (citations are by “loc.” for “location” because I’m using the Kindle version of the book). I’m going to start with points that relate to Japan’s surrender and then proceed from there:

* On 8 June, two months before Hiroshima, Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Hirohito’s closest adviser, drafted, with the emperor’s approval, “A Working Plan to Terminate the War.” (loc. 3124)

* When the moderates learned of Hiroshima, they attempted to use it as a reason to call the Supreme War Council, but the militarists refused. No Supreme War Council (aka Big Six) meeting could be held unless the militarists agreed to hold one. However, when news of the Soviet invasion reached Tokyo, the militarists quickly agreed to convene the Supreme War Council. Foreign Minister Togo, the most forceful surrender advocate among the moderates, explained that Prime Minister Suzuki responded to the emperor’s request to call a Big Six meeting in response to the news about Hiroshima but that he was unable to convene a meeting until news of the Soviet invasion arrived:

“Suzuki hastily started preparing for a Big Six meeting, but it failed to be convened on August 8. What finally brought it about was the Soviet entry into the war.” (loc. 3282)

* General Anami, one of the three militarists on the Bix Six, agreed to support surrender with only one condition (preservation of the emperor) after the emperor expressed his desire for it:

“Once the emperor expressed his desire on August 9 to accept the Potsdam Proclamation with one condition, Anami faithfully explained the emperor’s wish to officers in the War Ministry. On the afternoon of August 13, while the Suzuki cabinet was engaged in intense debate over the Byrnes Note, Cabinet Chief Secretary Sakomizu witnessed Anami’s act of haragei (the art of the hidden psychological technique) [i.e., leading the radical militarists to believe that he was on their side when he was actually willing to support the emperor’s surrender decision], which the general employed to accomplish his unspoken objective of complying with the emperor’s wishes and surrendering with no military insubordination.” (loc. 3594)

General Anami could have blocked any meeting of the Big Six by refusing his consent, and he could have blocked the 9 August imperial conference by resigning.

In fact, if any of the three Big Six militarists had resigned, this would have made it impossible to convene either the Big Six or an imperial conference, because it would have brought down the government and would have forced the formation of a new government; furthermore, no new government could be formed if either the army or the navy declined to nominate a minister for the cabinet and the Big Six (the army and navy ministers on the Big Six were also cabinet members). Thus, they could have indefinitely stalled surrender by resigning and then refusing to form a new government, but they chose not to do so, and they also forcefully resisted the coup attempt staged by radical militarists.

* At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to establish the League of Nations, Japan proposed a clause supporting racial equality to be included in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The U.S. and England opposed the clause (loc. 357).

* From a young age Hirohito was deeply interested in Western political and military history (loc. 364).

* During the first nine years of his reign, which began in 1926, Hirohito’s closest adviser was Nobuaki Makino, who was known for his support of international cooperation and maintaining good relations with the U.S. and England (locs. 416-433). Another close adviser was Kinmochi Saionji, who, like Makino, was a moderate and favored international cooperation and good relations with the West (locs. 417-433).

* In 1921, Hirohito went on a six-month tour of Europe, met many European leaders, and came away with deeply impressed with England’s version of monarchy (locs. 434, 511-531).

* Among the busts that Hirohito kept in his office were busts of Napoleon Bonaparte and Abraham Lincoln (loc. 549).

* Under Japan’s form of government, Hirohito, far from being a dictator, was bound to ratify the decisions of the prime minister and the cabinet as long as they were unanimous decisions. Only under extraordinary circumstances could the emperor seek to impose a policy or military decision, and even then there was no guarantee that he would get his way (locs. 603-621).

* The Japanese army in Korea invaded Manchuria and attacked China without Hirohito’s knowledge or approval (locs. 629-664, 701-707). In fact, when the leaders of Japan’s Kwangtung Army in Korea decided to invade Manchuria, the prime minister, Reijiro Wakatsuki, did not know about it and did not approve of it (locs. 704-707).

* Fanatical elements in the Japanese army assassinated a number of moderate civilian and military leaders in the years leading up to the Pacific War (locs. 631-664, 670-683, 785-871).

* As the Kwangtung Army’s operations continued to expand in Manchuria, and especially after the army’s bombing of Jinzhou on October 4, 1931, “the emperor asked General Nara if there was any way to restrict the military’s actions” (loc. 767).

* “Throughout the 1930s, the emperor continued to warn military officials, in vain, that they should not take reckless and aggressive action in China; he believed that international accommodation was in Japan’s best interest, and he was genuinely afraid of confrontation with Anglo-American powers and the Soviet Union. (locs. 772-777)

* Hirohito and his fellow moderates faced the very real possibility of assassination by radical militarists:

“One important aspect of the emperor’s reluctance to assert his will (hence his “self-induced neutrality”) lay in his fear of a military coup or military assassination attempts. The emperor’s critics dismiss his fear as merely an excuse for condoning the military’s aggressive behavior. However, it is known that Hirohito was genuinely fearful of assassins, and for good reasons. Radical militarists had killed some of his friends. Hirohito was also painfully aware of recent history: from the outset of his reign, Emperor Showa had been plagued by a series of assassinations that removed some of Japan’s most influential and moderate political leaders, such as Prime Minister Hara in 1921. At the time of the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, the assassination of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi (Yuko) in 1930—the man who had authorized Japan’s signing of the London Naval Treaty despite the military’s objections—was still fresh in the nation’s memory.

"It is also likely that the disquieting news about potential military coups in 1931 had prevented the emperor and his court advisers from initially taking a firm stance against the Kwangtung Army’s actions in Manchuria.” (locs. 785-789)

* “In the meantime, the Wakatsuki cabinet, which had been unable to control Kwangtung Army’s actions in Manchuria, tendered its resignation, and Inukai Tsuyoshi, the president of the opposition party (Seiyukai), who was known for his constitutionalism, succeeded to the premiership on December 13, 1931. On the previous day, the emperor had asked Saionji to convey a message to the new prime minister: “The current military’s insubordination and violence—namely, the fact that the military interferes with domestic politics and diplomacy and insists on having its own way to this extent—is truly a grave situation for the nation. I cannot stop thinking about it. Keep my concerns on your mind.” (locs. 842-846)

 

"and in the process she debunks the slanted portrayals of Hirohito and the Japanese government painted by scholars like Herbert Bix, Wiliam Craig, Richard Frank, and Robert Maddox."

Did you even read the article by Frank on the National WWII Museums website? He makes many of the same points so how is he debunked?

"* On 8 June, two months before Hiroshima, Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Hirohito’s closest adviser, drafted, with the emperor’s approval, “A Working Plan to Terminate the War.” (loc. 3124)"

From Lou's article:
"Marquis Kido, Hirohito’s principal adviser, presented to him a memorandum proposing a path to peace in June 1945. Rejecting any direct approach to the United States, Kido urged a negotiated settlement achieved by Soviet mediation. As for settlement terms, Kido’s conjured up a copy of the Treaty of Versailles. Japan might have to give up her overseas conquests and endure a period of disarmament. But there would be no occupation of Japanese soil, thus assuring continuance of the imperial system and Hirohito’s seat on the throne. In view of Germany’s renewed war after the Treaty of Versailles, there is zero chance US leaders would have accepted that framework to end the war.

Based on Kido’s memorandum, the emperor met with the inner cabinet, termed the Big Six for its membership. He secured their agreement to approach the Soviets. As noted in another part of this series, this effort remained stillborn."

How is this materially different, except that Frank's tells why the proposal was a no-go?


"* When the moderates learned of Hiroshima, they attempted to use it as a reason to call the Supreme War Council, but the militarists refused. No Supreme War Council (aka Big Six) meeting could be held unless the militarists agreed to hold one. However, when news of the Soviet invasion reached Tokyo, the militarists quickly agreed to convene the Supreme War Council. Foreign Minister Togo, the most forceful surrender advocate among the moderates, explained that Prime Minister Suzuki responded to the emperor’s request to call a Big Six meeting in response to the news about Hiroshima but that he was unable to convene a meeting until news of the Soviet invasion arrived:"

From Frank's article posted by Lou;
"Tokyo received news of a devastating but mysterious event in Hiroshima on August 6, but only the next day learned President Truman maintained it was an atomic bomb. The reaction by Japanese armed forces to Truman’s claim is extremely important. The Imperial Army declared they would only concede it was an atomic bomb after an investigation. But the stance of the Imperial Navy was much more ominous. Top naval leaders allowed that the Americans might have used an atomic bomb, but even so, they could not possess more atomic bombs, or if they did, they would not be that powerful.

This unfazed, immediate reaction stemmed from Japan’s own atomic bomb program. It produced no actual bomb, but it educated top officials that the production of fissionable material to make an atomic bomb was stupendously difficult. Hence, these top uniformed leaders refused to concede that the United States possessed more than one bomb, or perhaps a few, but not an arsenal of powerful atomic weapons. Given this reaction, it’s obvious that a one-bomb demonstration never would have convinced Japanese leaders to capitulate. The one thing the news of Hiroshima did do was to provide the warrant for a meeting of the Big Six. But military members forced postponement of the meeting to the morning of August 9."

Basically, the same but differing in a conclusion.

 

Perhaps a few socio-political backgrounds on this. I have tried to keep the summary as concise as possible. Any errors in the content are therefore exclusively at my expense.

From the mid-1930s, the Japanese tenno legally assumed the absolute position as the sole ground of the Japanese people's aspirations and the sole purpose of being a nation in Japan. Thus, the first paragraph of the Meiji Constitution determined that Japan and the Japanese people belonged to the Tenno.
The Kokutai ideology and the Tenno system are not separable. The Kokutai attitude as the absolutism of the state is based on the backlash against the threat of the Western colonial powers and the imitation of the Western modern form of government. By placing the tenno at the center of the state of Japan, he could be portrayed as the unique incarnation of the state of Japan. Therefore, the Japanese emperor himself was the raison d'être of the Japanese people.

Japanese society never overcame the feudal form of order "tenno - representative - subject" until the end of World War II. Thus, the military was able to occupy a decisive position in the state apparatus as the tenno's representative without much resistance.
Hideki, Chimoto : Tennosei no shinyaku sekinin to sengo sekinin (The monarchy's responsibility for the war of aggression and dealing with the past after the war), Tokyo, 1990. pp. 144-159.

The Japanese military's rise to power was based not only on the reinforcement of the "kokutai ideology and the tenno system," but also on the Japanese leadership's direct interest in the German as well as the Italian political system. Already in the 1930s, a monograph entitled "Present State of Fascism in Japan (日本 ファッショ の 現在 - Nihon fassho no gensei)" had been published.

In fact, the Nazi and fascist political systems were considered modern by many Japanese politicians and scholars in early Showa-era Japan (1926-1945). In particular, the German nationalist movement from the Prussian period, as well as even those after Hitler's "seizure of power," directly exerted a great influence on Japanese enlighteners and on Japanese elites.
Patricia G. Steinhoff, Death by Defeatism and Other Fables: The Social Dynamics of the Rengo Sekigun Purge. In Japanese Social Organization. Edited by Takie Sugiyama Lebra, Hawaii, 1992, pp. 171-187.

Thus, in the 1930s, the state reform program, which had been in continuous operation since the Meiji Restoration, changed completely, without much resistance, as a guiding state policy toward military dictatorship, eventually strengthening the authority of the tenno as well. This enabled the Japanese military, as representatives of the tenno, to mobilize all sectors of society.
Maruyama Masao, Chokokkashugi no ronri to shinri (Logic and psyche of Japanese far-right nationalism), Sekai, 1946, pp. 46-47.

This fascist transformation within the Japanese leadership circle, in close connection with the "Shin- Kokukaki(new nation) movement " already introduced by the Japanese rulers since the Meiji Restoration, provided a basis for the political and ideological Gleichschaltung. Thus, especially from 1932 onward, society and political parties merged in the course of Kokka shakai shugi (state socialism). The resulting strong link between society and parties was later directly transferred to the military dictatorship through the expansion of the war into mainland China.

At the center of the effort to establish a fascist order in Japan was Prime Minister Konoe as head of the Showa-kenkyukai (Showa Research Group). On October 4, 1940, on the occasion of the founding of the mass organization Tasei yokusankai, the latter announced that the basic tone of the New System (Shintaisai) originated from the ideological image of National Socialism.
Maruyama Masao, Gedai nihon seiji shisou koudo ('The Movements of Modern Japanese Ideology'), Tokyo, 1956, p. 119.

In any case, he did not have to fear a military coup and as Japan became already a de facto military dictatorship since 1932 where he was the center of power of the Meiji elites.
Whether and how the Tenno participated in this political development is a question I leave to the readers.

 

...Continued

"but that he was unable to convene a meeting until news of the Soviet invasion arrived:"
“Suzuki hastily started preparing for a Big Six meeting, but it failed to be convened on August 8. What finally brought it about was the Soviet entry into the war.” (loc. 3282)

Is this in fact what happened?
Frank addresses it here:
"The Big Six finally gathered for the meeting reacting to Hiroshima on the morning of August 9. By then, they had learned of Soviet intervention into the war during the night. During the meeting news arrived of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. For the first time, they worked on terms to end the war. Before them was the Potsdam Declaration setting forth Allied conditions for ending the war. Three members advocated that Japan accept the Potsdam Declaration with the proviso that the imperial institution be retained: Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki and Navy Minister Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai.

Three members held out for three additional terms: Army Minister General Korechika Anami and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, General Yoshijiro Umezu, and Navy, Admiral Soemu Toyoda. These additional terms included: 1) Japan would disarm her own forces; 2) Japan would conduct any “so-called” war crimes trials of her own nationals; and 3) there would be no occupation of Japan. This last term would assure the continuance of the Imperial system and Hirohito’s seat on the throne. These positions would be referred to as the “one condition” and the “four condition” Japanese peace terms. Under the Japanese governing system, however, the Big Six could only act when unanimous. With a three to three split, they were deadlocked."

So, they arrived for the meeting and overnight learned of the Soviet intervention, so logically the Soviet intervention was not the event that triggered the meeting. It was during the meeting that news of Nagasaki arrived and still they were split three to three. So, logically the Soviet intervention was not what led directly to the decision to surrender, or that would have led to an agreement prior to the Nagasaki news.

Frank further elaborates:
"Prime Minister Suzuki reported to Kido, the emperor’s key adviser, that the Big Six had agreed on the “four conditions” offer. Suzuki presumably chose this characterization as the lowest common denominator of unanimous agreement. This triggered a counterattack by other participants in the leadership, including former Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoe and the former Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu. They prevailed on Hirohito that the Allies would treat the “four condition” offer as a rejection of peace. It was agreed to summon an Imperial Conference, one held in the emperor’s presence. There the split of the Big Six could be laid out and then the emperor invited to break the deadlock—an unprecedented action.

The Imperial conference convened just before midnight, August 9-10. Joining the Big Six was Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma (president of the Privy Council.) The divided Big Six and Hiranuma spoke. Notably, Army Chief of Staff Umezu characterized Soviet entry as “unfavorable,” but insisted it did not invalidate Ketsu Go, in which he still reposed confidence. His point was valid. The Soviets possessed immense ground power and tactical airpower, but their sealift was tiny, and hence their threat to reach the Home Islands was small. Hiranuma spoke pointedly of the deterioration of the “domestic situation,” particularly food supplies."

So, the three military holdouts were not so cooncerned with Soviet intervention because they (the Soviets) lacked the sealift to invade Japan. Even a cursory look at the situation reveals this to be a logistical fact. They had their hopes married to the Ketsu Go plan where they would initiate Armageddon upon the American invaders when they attacked the Home Islands. They only intended to inflict "Okinawa scale casualties" according to you. For more information here's a link to an American Federation of Scientist article on Ketsu Go. OPERATION KETSU-GO (fas.org)

Finally, Hirohito broke the deadlock, made his wishes clear and Franks tells what led to his decision:

"At the end of the theatrical demonstration of the deadlock, the emperor spoke. He stated he had given serious consideration to the situation at home and aboard. He then announced his support of the “one condition” offer. He and Japan must “bear the unbearable.” The Big Six and later the full cabinet made Hirohito’s decision official government policy.

The American and Allied reply accepted the Japanese surrender offer, except that it stated clearly that the emperor would be subordinate to the occupation commander. This produced another dispute as to whether Japan could accept these terms. The emperor intervened again to announce he was satisfied with the American cable.

Why did the emperor decide to end the war? In his contemporary statements, he consistently cited three reasons. First, he had lost faith in Ketsu Go, referring to the long record of “discrepancy between plans and performance.” This statement delivered a crushing blow to the high command’s whole rationale to continue fighting. Second, the emperor cited the increasing devastation of conventional and nuclear bombing. Third, he referred to “the domestic situation”—the burgeoning fear of internal revolt. Later in a private letter to the Crown Prince he did not expect to be made public, the emperor stressed Japan’s deficiency in “science”—a euphemism that encompassed atomic weapons—and an underestimation of the United States and Great Britain. He did not mention Soviet entry into the war."


"* At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to establish the League of Nations, Japan proposed a clause supporting racial equality to be included in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The U.S. and England opposed the clause (loc. 357)."

Old news and widely written about. Why is it relevant here? It is more relevant when examining the decline of Japan-Britain relations prior to World War II. The initial resistance to Japan's racial equality clause was by Britain on behalf of its Dominions particularly Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, Canada and Australian's representative, Prime Minister Billy Hughes. The majority of the conference supported the proposal including France, Greece and Italy.
President Wilson, Chairman of the conference was indifferent to the clause, but western US politicians fearing unchecked immigration from Japan and China vehemently opposed it. Wilson used a procedural trick to avoid adopting the clause. Japan felt they'd been betrayed and the deFacto leader of the Japanese delegation, Makino Nobuaki, stating "We are not too proud to fight but we are too proud to accept a place of admitted inferiority in dealing with one or more of the associated nations. We want nothing but simple justice."
The quote you provided misses most of the nuance of what transpired.

"* From a young age Hirohito was deeply interested in Western political and military history (loc. 364).

* During the first nine years of his reign, which began in 1926, Hirohito’s closest adviser was Nobuaki Makino, who was known for his support of international cooperation and maintaining good relations with the U.S. and England (locs. 416-433).

* In 1921, Hirohito went on a six-month tour of Europe, met many European leaders, and came away with deeply impressed with England’s version of monarchy (locs. 434, 511-531)."

All true, widely written about and common knowledge, how is it relevant to the discussion?


"* Under Japan’s form of government, Hirohito, far from being a dictator, was bound to ratify the decisions of the prime minister and the cabinet as long as they were unanimous decisions. Only under extraordinary circumstances could the emperor seek to impose a policy or military decision, and even then there was no guarantee that he would get his way (locs. 603-621)."


Finally, Frank addresses this factor here:
"When word of the emperor’s decision reached General Toroshiro Kawabe, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Imperial Army, he noted in his diary that he concurred with another senior general in doubting that the overseas commanders would comply with the emperor’s order. That these officers correctly doubted even an order from the emperor would secure compliance with key parts of the armed forces, was swiftly confirmed by messages from the commanders in China and the Southern Area, declaring they would not comply with the surrender. Their commands mustered between a quarter and a third of all Japanese servicemen. It took Hirohito’s personal emissaries to persuade these commands to surrender. Also, the emperor broadcast a message on August 17 to the armed forces citing Soviet entry as a reason to surrender but not mentioning atomic bombs. The stress on Soviet entry reflected the reality that it was a real threat to commands on the Asian continent while atomic bombs were not. That is the key role played by Soviet entry into the war."

 

This is a perfect example of Frank's egregious, bald-faced distortion. If you read real scholars on Japan's surrender, such as Butow, Brooks, Alperovitz, Bird, Wilson, Hasegawa, Kawamura, Bernstein, Tree, Dower, Morris, etc., and read their discussions on the events surrounding the 9 August Big Six meeting, you will see that Frank has grossly distorted the record.

You'll also discover that when the news about Nagasaki reached the Big Six meeting, it was treated as a non-issue by the militarists, contrary to Frank's deceptive spin. In addition, you will discover that Hirohito had been totally serious about pushing for surrender long before the 9 August Big Six meeting, as had Kido, Togo, Konoe, Matsumoto, Sakomizu, etc. You will further discover that the evidence is irrefutable and indisputable that the Big Six militarists refused to convene the council in response to Hiroshima but that they quickly agreed to do so when they learned of the Soviet invasion.

This highlights the main problem with you folks: You don't know what your talking about because you've only read the writings of Truman apologists. I can tell that not one of you has read Butow's book, or Brooks' book, or Hasegawa's book, or Kawamura's book. (By the way, Hasegawa and Kawamura are both American citizens.)

 

Have you ever considered using Iodized salt?

 

With regrets, Butow, Brooks, Alperovitz, Bird, Wilson, Hasegawa, Kawamura, Bernstein, Tree, Dower, Morris, etc., grossly distort the facts to suit their on biases and agendas...Alperovitz, Bird, Wilson, and Hasegawa, are the biggest offenders in this area.

And yet, they did nothing of consequence to bring about the surrender during that time. No offers of surrender to the US, no contacts to the US government seeking terms...Nothing. Guess they did not want to surrender.

And the militarists promptly agreed not to surrender...Thus it was 3 surrender vs 3 no surrender, prompting Hirohito's intervention to split the tie. If the Soviet invasion was truly what caused the surrender, it would have been 6 - 0.

Read them all...None were fit to be even toilet paper.

Hasegawa & Kawamura are both American citizens...Well isn't that just peachy! It means that they have the Freedom to their opinions, and the freedom to publish their opinions...No mater how wrong or untruthful they may be...Just as you have so expressed your opinion and published, through some fly-by-night pdf publisher.

Isn't America grand!

 

Well, well, now this is curious indeed. Yes, I've read Japan's Longest Day. Have you??? I ask because the book, written by a team of 14 Japanese scholars, contradicts several myths peddled by Truman apologists, which is why I find it curious that you would cite it. The book is not as comprehensive and explanatory as Robert Butow's Japan's Decision to Surrender or Lester Brooks's Behind Japan's Surrender, but it is an excellent discussion, based on numerous primary sources, about the events of 15 August.

Here are some good online articles that lay out the facts about Japan's surrender, that document, among other things, that the Soviet invasion, not the atomic bomb, was the event that led to Japan's surrender:

"The Winning Weapon?" by Dr. Ward Wilson
untitled (belfercenter.org)
EXCERPT: Third, all summer long Japanese cities had been bombed at an average rate of one every other day. In the three-week period prior to the Hiroshima bombing, twenty-five cities were attacked (see Figure 1). Of these, eight, or nearly one-third, suffered greater damage than Hiroshima.

There is clear evidence that the campaign of city bombing [including Hiroshima and Nagasaki] did not loom large in the minds of Japan’s leaders. First, they did not act as if the bombing were decisive. As the attacks continued, they neither surrendered nor abandoned plans to seek better terms. Second, the things they said do not evince a sense of crisis or acute pressure. During the climactic meeting on the night of August 9–10, elder statesman Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma posed a question to the military representatives about measures the army planned to take against atomic bombs. Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu replied that “the army was taking appropriate action, but that they would never surrender as a result of air raids.”

When Japanese responses to the Hiroshima bombing are placed side by side with responses to the Soviet intervention, it is clear that the Soviet intervention touched off a crisis, while the Hiroshima bombing did not.

"What Role Did the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Soviet Entry into the War Play in Japan's Decision to Surrender? by Dr. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, author of the widely acclaimed and award-winning book Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. This article was published in the prestigious Asia-Pacific Journal.
ajpff.org/2019/18
EXCERPT: So what was the impact of the Hiroshima bomb? Of course, it was a tremendous shock. But it cannot be said to have been decisive and to have led to Japan’s immediate decision to surrender. Right after the Hiroshima bomb was dropped, later on the afternoon of August 6, Foreign Minister Togo sent an urgent dispatch to Ambassador Sato in Moscow, telling him that they were in a dire situation with the new bomb and urging Sato to meet Molotov immediately to inquire about Japan’s request for Soviet mediation. That meant that despite the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the Japanese government was still seeking to terminate the war through Soviet mediation. That was also the first response of the Japanese government to the bomb in Hiroshima. This is telling evidence that the Hiroshima bomb was not decisive.

And then, after midnight of August 8-9, Soviet Far East time, two in the morning Japan time, Soviet tanks rolled into Manchuria, and planes attacked Japanese forces. This surprise attack was totally unexpected. It was only then, on the morning of August 9, that the Supreme War Council was convened for the first time. It had not met following the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. But it was convened immediately after the Soviet attack.

During the heated debate at the Supreme War Council the first news of the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki was conveyed to the Japanese leaders. The original report said that the bomb caused minimal damage. The Imperial General Headquarters record of this meeting simply stated that the bombing had no impact on the group’s deliberations. There were altogether six reports on the impact of the atomic bomb on Nagasaki dispatched to the Imperial General Headquarters, each conveying progressively more alarming news of the damage. Nevertheless, there exists no record indicating that the second atomic bomb had an impact on the debate within the top echelons of the Japanese leaders. In other words, not only the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima but also the two bombs combined were not decisive, to use the terminology of boxing, they provided no “knock-out” punch, in terms of the Japanese decision to terminate the war.

"The Obliteration of Hiroshima," by Dr. Stephen Shalom.
obliteration.pdf (miketgriffith.com)
This is one of the best point-by-point refutations of the arguments made to justify the nuking of Japan.
EXCERPT: Defenders of the bomb have produced all sorts of other evidence to support higher casualty estimates for the invasion of Japan; none of it, however, is very convincing.

After the Hiroshima bomb, Prime Minister Suzuki was still waffling. When he heard the news of the Soviet entry, he asked the chief of the cabinet planning board whether Japanese forces could repulse the attack. Told no, Suzuki responded "Then the game is up."28 On August 13, one of Suzuki's naval aides asked him if he couldn't delay the peace effort as the army suggested. "Impossible," he replied. "If we don't act now, the Russians will penetrate not only Manchuria and Korea but northern Japan as well. If that happens, our country is finished. We must act now, while our chief adversary is still the United States."

Actually, if the Potsdam Declaration had included a warning about the coming Soviet entry into the war, Japan finding its hopes for a negotiated settlement dashed might have folded on the spot, obviating the need for military action at all. (This had been Churchill's view: that simply announcing Soviet adherence to the Allies in the Pacific "might be decisive.") Nevertheless, Truman decided without consulting Stalin not to have the Soviet Union sign the Potsdam Declaration, thus not warning Japan of Moscow's impending entry into the war.

There was a humane alternative: the Navy could have continued its blockade, with its crippling effect on Japan's war industries, while allowing food through. Better yet, the U.S. air force could have confined its bombs to military targets and dropped food on Japanese cities, along with messages saying "You are not our enemies; our enemies are the warlords." This, of course, is not the way World War II had been waged since its inception, but it is the only way consistent with democratic and just war aims. Would it have been right to ask a U.S. pilot to risk his life to feed Japanese civilians? By this time U.S. raids over Japan ran fewer casualties than training missions in the United States.

"Hiroshima: Who Disagreed with the Atomic Bombing?" by Doug Long.
Hiroshima: Quotes (doug-long.com)
This article presents statements made by some of the high-ranking military officers and senior government officials who believed that nuking Japan was wrong and unnecessary, including General Eisenhower, Admiral Leahy, General MacArthur, Joseph Grew (Under Secretary of State), John McCloy (Assistant Secretary of War), Ralph Bard (Under Secretary of the Navy), Paul Nitze (Vice Chairman, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey), Admiral Zacharias (Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence), General Spaatz (Commander of the Strategic Air Forces), and General Carter Clarke (the military intelligence officer who prepared MAGIC intercepts for Truman and other senior leaders).

"Harry Truman and the Atomic Bomb," by Ralph Raico
Harry Truman and the Atomic Bomb | Mises Wire
EXCERPT: Such reasoning will not impress anyone who fails to see how the brutality of the Japanese military could justify deadly retaliation against innocent men, women, and children. Truman doubtless was aware of this, so from time to time he advanced other pretexts. On August 9, 1945, he stated, "The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians."

This, however, is absurd. Pearl Harbor was a military base. Hiroshima was a city, inhabited by some three hundred thousand people, which contained military elements. In any case, since the harbor was mined and the US Navy and Air Force were in control of the waters around Japan, whatever troops were stationed in Hiroshima had been effectively neutralized.

I could cite many more scholarly articles, but I think this is enough for now.

 

MTG's real main problem is obviously that he confuses the right to his own opinion with the right to his own facts.
That he makes no distinction between ad rem and ad hominem in his almost grotesquely stubborn insistence on this basic error is not surprising in this context.
Compared to this attitude, one-dimensional seems almost multi-layered
I am therefore afraid that iodized salt will unfortunately not help here

 

Yep, today's models are the dumbe

So...The USSBS & Lemay lied? The Strategic bombing campaign did no harm to Japan whatsoever...Good to know.