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Japanese Naval Aviation Losses, 41-42

Discussion in 'War in the Pacific' started by Triple C, Nov 26, 2009.

  1. Triple C

    Triple C Ace

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    Well, discussions of all types of aircraft losses are welcome in this thread, as long as the poster makes it clear what he/she is talking about. I do remember from a couple of sources that early war Wildcat v. Zero kill ratio was barely over even. But what interested me was total aircraft losses. The Japanese seem to have done pretty well killing ships during this period but aircraft losses were, even taking into account sunk ships, at least equal to the Americans if not more.

    Interesting stuff, gents. Keep it civil... but I am very well intrigued.
     
  2. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    We will not get the Zero vs Wilcat figures from what I'm researching, cactus airforce and the other allied land based forces are out of scope as I don't have comparable data for the land based japanese units. But even comparing just carrier based planes during the battles may be intetresting.
     
  3. Glenn239

    Glenn239 Member

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    I checked Lundstrom to get a summary of US Navy intercepts at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. The data appears to suggest that the doctrine was a total failure during these battles, and that all of the defender's considerable air-to-air successes came not from distant interceptions, but from swirling air battles right over the carriers and on the deck after bomb runs were completed.

    53 F4F's were available for the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and the attempt was made for a deep interception (40+ miles). Only 10 Zeros escorted 27 Val dive bombers. Despite near perfect weather conditions and good radar contacts, the attacking wave was not intercepted until actually right over the carriers, or diving on them. Only about 6 Vals were shot down by F4F's before they released.

    37 F4F's constituted the defenses against the first Japanese wave at Santa Cruz. Radar coverage and direction during the battle was disasterous. 12 Zeros escorted 21 Vals and 22 Kates. Of the dive bombers, only 5 were shot down by fighters before release. Two Kates were shot down and one more damaged during their runs in.

    19 Vals and 5 Zeros of the second wave met 21 F4F's. Only 2 Vals were shot down before making their dives.

    17 Kates and 4 Zeros met 11 F4F's in the third wave. 2 Were shot down before dropping and 1 failed to attack.

    In no case were any of these bombers lost at a distance from the carriers. All kills were achieved near to the carriers.
     
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  4. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    The unescorted strike late on 7 May 1942 (Coral Sea) was interceped 100 miles from the carriers, suffered close to 50% losses and was aborted. So it worked at least once even in the early battles.
     
  5. Glenn239

    Glenn239 Member

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    The unescorted strike late on 7 May 1942 (Coral Sea) was intercepted 100 miles from the carriers, suffered close to 50% losses and was aborted. So it worked at least once even in the early battles.

    Good point, but in all fairness it didn't work the next day when Lexington was sunk, didn't save the Yorktown at Midway against tiny strikes, didn't work at Eastern Solomons and didn't work at Santa Cruz. In each of these later actions, all successes achieved by US CAP was owed to tactics that resembled those of the IJN. At Eastern Solomons, the attempt at a distant intercept actually wasted to no effect about half the CAP. By 1943 though, the tactic was becoming deadly.


    Here's the preliminary losses list, rapidly compiled from Lundstrom's First Team series (Ie, there may be errors or ommissions, but this is in the ballpark). It includes all fighter losses, and all ditchings and crash landings for known actions involving carrier attacks. This list includes all planes in the fighter role shot down, ditched, or crash landed beyond repair, but does not include fighters certainly lost to anti-aircraft or to bombers.

    Action....Battle....IJN.....USN
    Shoho......Coral.......3........0
    Shokaku...Coral.......2........4
    Lexington.Coral.......1........10
    Midway...Midway....1.........15
    Thach.....Midway....6..........3
    York(1)...Midway....3..........1
    York(2)...Midway....3..........4
    Aug 7th...Guad.......2..........9
    Aug 8th..Guad........1..........1
    Ryujo....E.Sol.........3..........3
    Enter....E.Sol.........6..........8
    AG10....Santa........2..........3
    Shok...Santa.........4..........4
    Horn...Santa.........5...........5
    Enr/Recov.Santa....0...........9
    Total...................42.........79

    The IJN lost 42 Zeros and Claudes against 79 F4F's, F2 Buffalo, and SBD in the CAP role.

    If the planes that are not Zeros or F4F's are deleted, the IJN lost 39 aircraft and the USN lost 61.

    If ditchings are omitted, then the IJN lost 32 Zeros and the USN lost 50 F4F's.

    So no, I do not think the data supports the theory that the light weight of the Zero fighter was a significant deteriment to IJN tactics in 1942. By 1943 yes, but not 1942. (I think the data shows that light construction was a serious problem for the Val and Kate bombers though.) In terms of performance as escorts and CAP in 1942, it appears that the Zero was superior to the Wildcat.
     
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  6. T. A. Gardner

    T. A. Gardner Genuine Chief

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    This misses the important concept here: The US had a system in place. It wasn't perfect but, it also ensured that virtually every strike the Japanese sent against US carriers did get attacked by the CAP at some point. It also meant the CAP was usually aware of the enemy and had some idea as to their location.

    The Japanese lacked such a system with their CAP. They relied on the sharp eyes of their pilots to spot the attackers and intercept them. They also had little control over the CAP in terms of recalling them or alerting them to another incoming strike.

    That the Zero was a better fighter than the F4F matters less than the lack of a system in which it was to be used. The US got better. The Japanese didn't. It would be like two sports teams one of which starts the season with good players and a decent set of plays. The other team starts off with decent players too but has some shortcomings in other areas. The first team simply relies on its in place abilities as the season progresses. The other team soon gets the measure of the first and modifies their plays and such becoming better and better. By the end of the season the first team has had a losing season even after they did very well in the opening couple of games.
     
  7. Glenn239

    Glenn239 Member

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    I wasn't commenting on the theoretical merits of each CAP system, but rather on the results actually seen in combat conditions during 1942.

    It is not clear, IMO, that in 1942 the intercept system was more important to success than the performance of the fighters early in the war. I see numerous references in Lundstrom whereby the F4F's poor characteristics contributed to blown interceptions. IMO, what was needed first of all was a higher performance aircraft and a radar that could reliably determine height information. Which was needed more, I have no idea.

    One gets the impression from these battles that early USN intercept doctrine actually might have been getting the carrier forces into trouble. On paper, the system looked like it could deliver massed fighters onto incoming strikes at distances of over 40 miles. That may have caused a certain degree of overconfidence, and may have contributed to faulty tactics such as splitting carrier groups (i.e., TF16 and TF17 at Midway).
     
  8. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    My sources don't always match yours, for example I have only 3 F4F claims by CAP during the coral Sea attack on Shokaku , but then I should check us losses with US sources :).Apart from that I agree with your conclusions that plane fraglity was more an issue for the attack planes, witness the losses to SBD "interceptors", than for fighters. Another possible cause is bad strike coordination, possibly due to bad comunication systems, despite the theoretically longer range it looks like the Japanese had lots of ditchings due of fuel problems which makes me suspect a greater "loiter time" to assemble the strikes.
     
  9. Totenkopf

    Totenkopf אוּרִיאֵל

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    The Japanese Pilots were among the worlds best in 1942. You must consider that they had been gaining experience during the Sino-Japanese war four and a half years earlier. Not to mention that like the USA and UK they had been operating carriers for a long time, and had built up well sized cadres of men who could find their way around in the pitch black.

    I for one would find it interesting to see a sort of modified Oscar making headway on Japanese Carriers.
     
  10. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    It's interesting that you chose to focus on the numbers of fighters shot down by opposing CAP formations in the carrier battles of 1942 to evaluate the relative efficiency of those formations.

    These numbers are probably the least relevant indicators of a CAP formation's relative efficiency since the purpose of the CAP is not to destroy enemy fighters per se, but to prevent enemy strike formations from reaching the carriers intact. . I don't think you are attempting to deliberately manipulate the numbers to support your preconceptions, but you must understand that the primary purpose of the CAP was to protect the carriers from attack by strike aircraft; fighters could not, by themselves, do significant damage to a carrier. Therefore the relevant numbers are the strike aircraft shot down by each side in each battle.

    Nobody in the USN (and probably not the IJN either) prior to 1942, expected the CAP to be able to prevent 100% of the enemy's strike aircraft from reaching the carrier. That is why both navies invested so heavily in shipborne AA in their carrier designs.

    In fact, I would surmise that provided you use the pertinent numbers, you would find that the USN's CAP doctrine was by far the more successful of the two. Of course, the USN required a learning curve to perfect it's carrier defense technique, but it was light-years ahead of Japanese carrier defense doctrine which was badly hampered by lagging technology, poor discipline, and unsuitable aircraft. The carrier battles which did take place in 1942 consistently demonstrated that USN doctrine and practice yielded a far better defense of it's carriers than that of the enemy. IJN doctrine failed more often, and failed catastrophically at Midway, while USN CAP doctrine failed only partially at times, and never failed completely.

    As for splitting carrier groups, I simply do not understand the persistent criticism of this practice early in the war, when it was far more important to preserve the carriers than concentrate air strikes. The practice of splitting carrier groups certainly worked at Coral Sea and Midway, while the Japanese attempt to mass carriers at Midway was partially responsible for the loss of the four carriers. Had the Hiryu not been, in effect, "split" from the other Japanese carriers, the US victory might have been attained at even less cost than historically.
     
  11. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    These numbers are the only ones that count when we are examining fighter kill ratios. I can find no trace of a 3:1 kill ratio there.
    We all know what the totals were, they are in the original post, other sources may differ slightly but it's not going to be by much, the JNAF lost more planes to interceps than the USN but on how much that was due to doctrine in 1942 the jury is still out. What we are looking into is what was the cause. Up to now the fragility of Jap planes looks a lot more important than doctrine, I've found plenty of episodes where SBD groups were successfully intercepted by Zeros but still managed to carry on the attack while we have lots of kills of Jap attack planes by single passes, sometmes by poorly armed SBDs. If we find that a different intercepts/kills ratio explains the difference in losses that has not got much to do with doctrine (better fighter direction can give an advantageous initial position but to be really effective it would require altitude data and that was not available in 1942). A better indicator than kills for relative doctrine efficiency would be how many passes (or intercepts) each side's interceptors did compared to available or launched planes.
     
  12. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    No, you are mistaken. They are not the only numbers that count in fighter kill ratios in 1942. Carrier versus carrier battles were only a fraction of the encounters between us and Japanese fighters in the Pacific and probably do NOT represent a statistically significant sample of aerial combat between Japanese and American aircraft.. Eric Bergerud specifically mentions this in his book "Fire In The Sky".

    First, I do not believe, even working from the official records of both sides, you would have enough hard data to determine the actual reason for all losses; that data just wasn't recorded in every instance and there is enough doubt to undermine any conclusion you might reach.

    As to the "fragility" theory, there is no doubt plenty of anecdotal evidence to support that but the Japanese also reported significant losses due to planes damaged beyond repair which nevertheless returned to their base.

    Your assumption that the SBD was "poorly armed" is questionable; My father flew SBD's in the Pacific during 1942 and has to his credit, at least three enemy planes shot down, and one probable. Many of his fellow SBD pilots also claimed enemy kills, not to mention kills by SBD gunners. Compare that to say, the D3A1-2 Val's record.

    I agree with T. A. Gardner, fleet defense doctrine was a far more important factor in the success of US carrier operations than the relative merits of the Wildcat versus the Zero. Compared to the IJN,The USN practiced a sophisticated and demanding Fleet defense doctrine, which, when fully mastered, proved very successful. Even as it was being developed, it proved superior to the essentially random method utilized by the Japanese CAP. I believe veteran USN pilots would agree that before you can shoot down enemy planes, or even make passes at them, you have to find them; waiting for them to appear over your carrier, as the Japanese were forced to do, is an invitation to disaster.
     
  13. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    So you suggest we base our discussion on second hand sources?
    If you look at my previous posts you will realize I am well aware that a number of jap planes returned despite damage, there's even a recoreded episode of a a Kate returning with a dead pilot. But we don't know how much firepower caused that damage, it's entirely possible (and from the descriptions of the engagements likely) that it was hits most other 1942 aircraft would have shrugged off.
    I said poorly armed not ineffective, I think all would agree that 2 x 12.7 MGs is not a powerful chase armament for 1942, more so for Brownings that reacted poorly to syncronisation. That they were effective as interceptors points to the existence of some very bad flaws in their opponents.
     
  14. Glenn239

    Glenn239 Member

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    I'm finding it almost impossible to open the posting field on this site. Anyone else having that trouble? Normally I'd break my post up into multi-posts, but I might not succeed in posting for another few days, so I'll bunch it all into one.



    3 x F4F were shot down over Shokaku. In the narrative, Lundstrom mentions that a 4th F4F ditched back at the fleet, which is why I posted ‘4’. This loss was probably weather related. The "1" listed as lost from the Japanese force attacking Lexington was also a ditching, and also may not have been linked to any battle damage. (No Japanese fighter was shot down over TF17 during the Battle of the Coral Sea).

    Another example would be Thach at Midway. "6" IJN losses is unconfirmed – it might have only been "4". However, six is a reasonable guess, so I went with six. For the "3" F4F’s lost, one was shot down over the Japanese fleet, one crashed aboard Hornet because of battle damage (about 5 KIA) and was immediately thrown overboard, and one crashed on Yorktown (flipped inverted on the deck) because of battle damage and went down with the ship.
    The info is so sketchy I concluded that either ditchings were all in as part of losses or all out. That’s why I totaled it both ways.



    To be polite, I don’t care about what you don’t think.

    I have never suggested that the primary purpose of fighters in 1942 carrier battles was to shoot down other fighters, nor would I imagine that anyone could possibly believe this. Why would you make the contrary assumption?



    No one argues otherwise. The problem - stated here on previous occasion - is that US doctrine in 1942 failed in practice, such that distant interceptions were not made, and whatever successes that were achieved occured, "over your carrier" – a situation that you agree was an invitation to disaster.

    The IJN doctrine was also faulty, especially with respect to medium altitude protection. I think, in fact, that only one US dive bomber formation was actually taken apart before tip-over (the Midway based SBD's, 16 bombers). At Coral Sea US bombers hovered overhead for some time without being seen.

    Your suggestion of failure at Midway is true, but lacks context. At Eastern Solomons the US cap came apart after one strike - its lucky the second IJN strike missed, because the CAP had shot its bolt. At Santa Cruz, the carriers were also without adequate fighter protection after just one attack. At Midway, the Zeros failed, but held together in a coherent sense for much longer than US fighters were ever able to achieve.

    The loss of Hiryu I think is a better example. Here, an unescorted US strike managed to evade a large IJN CAP looking for dive bombers, and Hiryu was finished as a result.



    It is not possible to conclude otherwise than that US CAP doctrine failed under pressure during all carrier battles in 1942. For example, there were four times that the IJN put torpedo bombers over a US carrier in 1942. Three times, the carrier went down. The fourth time (Zuikaku's strike at Santa Cruz), the carrier's survived despite the complete failure of the combat air patrol.

    US fighters had more success with IJN dive bombers, but in most cases shot these down either directly over the target carrier, or after the bomber had released its weapon. ie, under circumstances impossible to distinguish from standard Japanese tactics.



    I think the most important factors not related to US fighters were the light construction of Japanese planes, the inadequate number of escorts provided, and the strength of US anti-aircraft from August 1942 onwards. The tendency for IJN dive bombers to loiter awaiting their "turn" was also very important to the number of losses they took in the patterns over the US carriers. Where US fighters made an impact, it was almost always in the vicinity to the carriers, almost never at any appreciable distance.


    The fragility of Japanese planes is not an "anecdote", but rather is fact.
     
  15. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    Either you didn't read my post or you misunderstood it.

    What I'm saying is that NO sources have detailed and complete enough information to logically make the determination you are attempting.


    Correct, you "don't know how much firepower caused the damage", which is one big problem in your analysis. But the point is not how much firepower was involved, but that the planes proved "unfragile" enough to keep flying even after they were damaged beyond repair. That argues against your "fargility" theory.

    I fail to see how armament can be both "poor" and "effective".

    Of course, there were "flaws in their opponents", the question is, what were those flaws? I don't consider a bunch of stories about the "fragility" of Japanese aircraft to be conclusive proof of that being the only, or even the major, reason why the Japanese lost so many more aircraft than the Allies in the Pacific in 1942.
     
  16. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    If that's your idea of being polite, it's no wonder you receive so much sarcasm in return.By excluding strike aircraft destroyed and focusing on fighters destroyed by the CAP in the carrier versus carrier battles of 1942, that is exactly what you are implying; that shooting down fighters was all that mattered. I can only conclude you had some ulterior motive in using only the fighter numbers, or that you really don't understand the principles of fleet air defense.

    You are completely overstating the case. USN fleet air defense did, on occasion, fail in execution, but it also worked, as previously noted, on occasion. And it ultimately proved sound in 1943-44. There was a learning curve, as with all new tactics.

    In whatever context you want to use, Japanese CAP at Midway failed, and failed catastrophically. It was far worse than any failure of American CAP during the entire war. It's little comfort to the crews of the four Japanese carriers that were the victims of this failure that the CAP "held together". And it's certainly not true that they "held together" longer than any US fighters were able to achieve.


    An interesting statement, devoid of accuracy, but clarifying your biased views.

    The USN CAP failed only partially at Midway, and no US carriers were sunk solely by air attack at Midway; the Yorktown was retiring under tow when it was sunk by a submarine attack.

    Actually, USN CAP interceptions were consistently miles away from the carrier. Japanese CAP interceptions were never beyond visual distance of their carriers. The US strike planes also had some of the same problems in forming their attacks, so loiter time should be a wash.

    Of course, it's a fact, many pilots reported the same experience; one pass and their target explodes after absorbing a few dozen rounds of .50 caliber fire. But whether it was a statistically significant fact, and whether it can be proved to be so from existing records is another matter.
     
  17. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Now these are the types of informative exchanges that I enjoy reading in this forum. T.A., DA, TOS, and all that have posted here, keep up the good work. I agree that aircraft toughness and capability to take punishment would be a big factor in the numbers.

    Now for my two cents worth, does anyone have information on how fast replacements are being made for losses in Japanese pilots and what the quality of these replacements were?
    I've read Sakai's autobiography and if I remember correctly, he mentioned that standards for pilots were so high that very few qualified. The standards were later lowered but the losses were so high that not enough qualified replacements eventually ended up in the front.
    So I would add that this could be another factor in the the Japanese Naval Aviation losses.
     
  18. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    This illustrates rather clearly one problem in this sort of analysis. Indeed say an aircraft is intercepted on the way in takes some bullet damage from a fighter continues on to attack the ships and takes some more damage from AA and then crashes in bad weather or from lack of fuel on the way home. It's not at all clear who or what should get the credit even if all the factors are known but in many (most) all the factors will not be known making attribution extremly difficult.
     
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  19. TiredOldSoldier

    TiredOldSoldier Ace

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    Not sure I fully agree, we can probably attribute some 75% of losses to a specific cause for the carrier battles, and have at least some ideas about what happened to the remaining 25% (usually cumulative damage or non combat related). Ground based ops would be a lot harder to find info about but are out of scope for this thread.

    My goal was to collect the most complete possible data. The end result may or may not reveal that some theories are "inconsistent with available data", or just show we don't know enough. Interpretation is a lot more subjective than data collection, some may see a "pattern" where others only see "noise", that's the whole point of discussing about it.

    BTW I have no problem in defiing a weapon system both poor and effective at the same time, "poor" is relative to the current state of the art, "effective" is compared to the opponents it's historically facing. To make some examples a Gloster Gladiator is a "poor" fighter in 1940 but could be very "effective" when the opposition is Fiat CR 32s and 42s. Japanese 1942 tanks were nothing to write home about but against opponents that lacked AT weapons were extremely "effective" and so on ...
     
  20. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    Then please list the various divebombers operational in 1942 which had better a gun armament than the two .50 caliber, and two .30 caliber MG's of the SBD. A cursory examination of contemporary divebomber gun armament leads me to the conclusion that the SBD was among the best armed of divebombers in 1942.
     

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