Japans biggest mistakes?

There are lots of threads on why germany lost the war and what would have happaned if they did things different but i dont ever remember seeing one on japanese mistakes.

Besides pearl harbour,leaving bombs and fuel on the deck,not implementing a proper convoy system and banzai attacks what were japans biggest mistakes?what things cost them big time?

 

I believe that Japans biggest mistake was to start off the war by attacking China. Where they entitled to attack China? did China threaten them?

What were Japans motives to attack China? Hell they couldn't even forward a Polish corridor or Czechoslovak reason at all. They were pure warmongers out to conquer and exploit countries to their economic advantage.

Regards
Kruska

 

The history of modern Japan plays out like a Greek tragedy; practically everything they did since the Meiji period turned out to be a mistake. Their embrace of militarism and refusal to adopt a true republican form of government were perhaps the most damning, but even those errors have their roots in former centuries.

Japan's fundamental mistake was in misinterpreting what it saw in the modern world and applying it's own insular standards of conduct. Not all Japanese were this way, but unfortunately, the ones who were, prevailed and became the leaders. Pearl Harbor, China, Manchuria were just the endgames of the Japanese tragedy. The one thing the Japanese did right was to pick the US as it's primary designated enemy. Japan lost WW II simply because the laws of time and space foreordained it. No nation with the resources controlled by Japan had the slightest chance of defeating a nation which controlled the resources of the United States. Yet Japan emerged from it's defeat and occupation to become one of the most influential countries in the world and, arguably, the leading country in Asia. Japan had no chance of winning WW II, but in losing, it finally found a way to success in the modern world.

 

Kruska..how often do countries need to justify a war?as far as i know china never threatened anyone,prior to wwii at least.
Opanapointer..i was just reading up on the league of blood and the january 28 incident,i have a long way to go.
devilsadvocate..it funny how things have worked out for germany and japan since wwii,i dont see how japan could have ever have beaten the U.S.A.

Anyone know how japan saw themselves winning the war?i dont think a japanese invasion of america could ever have been on the cards.

 

Japan extended beyond what it could realistically conquer and control. It's main mistake was choosing to fight against counties whose industrial capabilities were far exceeding it's own. It also failed to progress it's technology and battle tactics as the war developed and the types of environments they were fighting in changed.

 

understatemnt of the centuary

 

How about Operation U-Go, which resulted in Japanese defeat in the battles of Imphal and Kohima and a huge loss men and material. There was no real reason to launch the offensive, apart from a commander's ego.

 

It has been suggested by a number of historians that Japan knew it could not defeat Britain and the US, but hoped to fight a very limited war designed to seize the natural resources it needed to build up it's industrial base and enhance it's economic power. Bluntly put, the intention was to grab all the territory it could and then put up such a stubborn defense that the Allies would lose the will to continue fighting, and negotiate a peace in which Japan would hold on to most of what it had captured.

That sounds like a reasonable and rational plan, but I have never been able to find a document that gives specific details of who in the Japanese leadership hierarchy formulated such a plan, or when it was formulated. Nor, does it seem, that either of the Japanese armed services were made aware of, or formally agreed with, such a strategy. Certainly, during the war, both the IJA and IJN do not seem to have given any thought to military operations which might have been conducive to negotiations with the Americans, with the single exception of the Ketsu-Go scheme at the very end of the war. And the Japanese government (essentially the millitarists and their civilian lapdogs) never seems to have had the slightest desire to open negotiations with the US, right up to the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It might be argued that the whole "decisive battle" doctrine was geared to forcing the enemy to the negotiating table, but the nature of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the general conduct of Japanese forces in battle, completely negated any inducements to negotiate. It would appear that the Japanese militarists saw the war, first, as a test of wills (which they, of course, would win), and then as an opportunity to demonstrate fighting prowess, and finally, as a theater in which to salve their personal egos and demonstrate their "honor". The one thing that does seem certain is that no realistic assessment of the almost inevitable outcome was ever performed by any level of the Japanese leadership, and in consideration of relative strengths and weaknesses, the application of cold logic seems to have been replaced by some mystical wishful thinking process.

Seldom in history have whole nations been able to delude themselves as thoroughly as the Japanese prior to, and during, WW II, and continue for such a long period in their delusioanal state, despite such overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

As for any significant Japanese invasion of the US, no, there never was any realistic potential for that.

 

Wasn't there some hope, admittedly misplaced, that an invasion of India might trigger an Indian uprising against their British masters, and incidentally, forestall the long anticipated British offensive to recapture Burma?

 

I would venture to say one mistake is the IJN did not grasp the concept (that they stumbled upon) of using all of their carriers in a single mass task force.

Case in point; the battle of the Coral Sea was fought by two carriers instead of all six. We all know what happened, two carriers knocked out without anything to show for it, and then the Midway force went to battle down to four carriers.

As the author Parshalls talked about this issue in his book "Shattered Sword", the IJN carriers were vital national assetts. There is safety in numbers and their experience up to May 1942 had shown that mass swarms of aircraft have both an offensive and defensive punch.

 

Another possible mistake would be Japan's treatment of native people. In the Phillipines especially guerrilla armies formed because of Japanese massacres. If the Japanese had treated the people well, provided them with necessities, and let them govern themselves, the natives might have rejected the U.S. and colonial powers and supported Japan. The prospect of self-government was very appealing to former territories.

 

The PI was already mostly independent prior to the war.

And full independence was already granted to them by 1946, so there was nothing the Japanese could offer the philipino's in self determination.

 

Allright, I just found out their biggest mistake.

- I just came across an US article from the early 30's were the Americans believed that due to the fact that the Japanese newborn's were carried on their mothers backs, they had no sense for orientation and balance - Therefore they were more or less disqualified from having pilots for the airforce.

Now that would be reason that I could follow up on

Regards
Kruska

 

U-Go was actually what prompted me to ask the question.
One percieved benifet was that the japanese hoped they could close the hump and cut china off from support.

About mistreating the natives japanese high command had learned lessons from china and japanese soldiers in burma were under strict instructions to be nice to the native burmese.
I would agree with the posters who suggested that always looking for decisive battles all the time was a mistake,

 

Guys keep this gentle, you have been warned and some of you please watch your spelling. An intelligent statement may look stupid if full of mistakes.

 

IMHO I think what doomed Japan was that the Japanese took the wrong lessons out of the Russo-Japanese war. A string of victories, followed by a decisive battle against a much larger foe only made the Japanese more and more bold. The Battles against Russia in 1904-05 created great unrest in Russia, eventually leading to revolution. Japan tried these tactics again in 1941-45, only now they underestimated the resolve of the US populace after Pearl Harbor, and the ability for the US to pull together to achieve victory.