Kursk (by popular demand!)

To be honest I liiked the Lodieu book most. Lots of maps, photos of people, and daily situation reports.

 

Personally, I liked this the most:
The Battle of Kursk

 

Essentially, I believe that the Germans threw away a victory at Kursk, particularly in the southern pincer of Operation Citadel. And I think the main reason the Soviets "won" and the Germans "lost" are the consequences of Operation Husky. I actually wrote some sort of essay trying to explain "my" (Sean Mcmeekin's, George M. Nipe's, John Mosier's) thesis, but since it has more than 20.000 characters I cannot post it here in the forums. I'll still upload the file if anyone is interested in reading it.

 

What were the "consequences of Operation HUSKY"? Exactly which German forces were diverted from HG-S in the Soviet Union to HG-C in Italy?

By 13 July, the forces of 9. Armee and 4. Panzerarmee could no longer advance. How were they supposed to secure a victory?

 

The main consequence of Operation Husky (regarding this topic) was that Hitler cancelled Operation Citadel in a moment were the Germans were close to a breakthrough of Soviet lines, at a moment were the Soviets had no more reserves (admitted by Nikita Kruschev). The Germans still had plenty of steam to exploit a breakthrough, as Sean Mcmeekin's statistics reveal and George M. Nipe explains (I actually added those statistics and Nipe's explanation to the essay, so you can go read them).

 

Okay...so then you can quote Hitler's order referencing the landings on Sicily as a excuse to cancel ZITADELLE?

So why would he do that days after he had already resolved to give up Sicily (and Sardinia) and fall back onto the Italian mainland? What did one decision have to do with the other?

The Soviets had no more reserves? Really? On the southern front on 18 July they had over 100,000 uncommitted personnel, about five times what the Germans had. On 18 July, the Soviets had nearly 40 percent of their armor strength in reserve, the Germans virtually none.

106, Infanterie-Division had suffered 3,120 casualties, 167. 2,126 casualties and from a lower starting strength, 168. 2,530 casualties, 320. 3,111, 332. 3,182. Only 57., 198., and 255. had any significant strength left, the others were essentially abgekampft.

The Panzer divisions, starting with a lower personnel strength, were hit that much more. 11. Panzer lost 1,801, 19. 2,181, 3. 1,341, 6. 1,761, 7., 1,628, DR 2,730, GD 2,798, LSSAH 3,271, and T 2,914. Those are not insignificant.

McMeekin is fond of selective quoting to "prove" his point and his top-down view of Kursk is odd to put it charitably. Nipe is better, and at least uses primary sources, but that analysis simply ignores that as of 18 July, the Soviets had more theater reserves in place and more uncommitted reserves on the battlefield...and the Germans were incapable of a further advance in the south, made worse by the complete absence of any real advance in the north and the critical situation of 2. Panzerarmee.

 

You think Hitler used the landings in Sicily as an excuse to cancel Citadel? I think it was the actual reason why he cancelled Citadel. I mean, why wouldn't it be? Well, I respect your opinion.

"So why would he do that days after he had already resolved to give up Sicily (and Sardinia) and fall back onto the Italian mainland? What did one decision have to do with the other?"

I'm not sure I understand what you mean by this... Hitler cancelled Citadel to send reinforcements to Italy (which as you know takes months), regardless of where he was planning to mount a defense against the allies. But again, I'm not sure if I'm answering what you are asking...

Please keep in mind (as I state in the essay) that we are dealing with a "what if", which means alternate history, which means it never happened. It just COULD have happened. The point being that there's no actual way for me to prove that a German victory could be achieved or for you that no victory was possible at all. We can just speculate.

My opinion is that, had Hitler attacked earlier hitting the Soviets before the allies hit Europe, or had the allies delayed Operation Husky, or had Hitler just ignored Italy for a few more days, a major victory could have been achieved. Not decisive, of course, but one that would have forced the Soviets on the defensive and would have inevitably postponed their already planned (or already ongoing) counter-operations, such as "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev".

Regarding the Soviet reserves:

Nipe claims (based on Kruschev's comments to other officers) that the last reserve the Soviets had was Rotmistrov's 5th Guard Tank Army, and as we know this force was committed on 11 July. He claims (regarding July 12): "All of the available Soviet armor in the south was committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the Soviet defenses".

Mosier states as well the Soviets had no reserves:

"Curiously enough, despite the usual claims, the disposition of forces revealed by the map in the Soviet official history suggests that von Manstein’s armored columns had nothing much standing between them and Voronezh; Khrushchev, generally the most realistic of the senior Soviet leaders, was convinced that was the case" (See Map 65 in Institute für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitte der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion).

I haven't seen the aforementioned map, but the author obviously did.

The point being: If the Soviets had no reserves left, and the Germans still had much fighting capability, it's obvious (again, this is just a "what if") that the Germans would have broke through the Soviet defenses (you can tell by the casualty ratios that "too many russians" is not a very convincing factor to claim victory was not possible).

I conclude the same as Sean Mcmeekin:

"Kursk was a decisive battle, to be sure, marking the failure of the last major German offensive on the eastern front in the war. But the victory was, even more than Stalingrad, an Allied one, won as much by the material contribution of lend-lease aid and the complementary US-British landings in Sicily as by Soviet generalship and Russian blood and grit. For neither the first nor the last time, Stalin’s faltering fortunes had turned around because of a timely intervention by his Western allies"

 

Okay, then we are back to my earlier question. You say "Hitler cancelled Citadel to send reinforcements to Italy"...so name them. Which army, corps, or divisions were sent from the Ostfront to Italy?

Please don't explain alternate history to me. I have been doing alternate history for over fifty years.

No, you cannot prove your alternative. but you can improve it by looking at the correct historical background.

Or, or, or...Yes, you can keep on churning out "or this" but that does not make them likely or reasonable. Hitler could not attack earlier, for many reasons. No, the Allies were not going to relinquish the initiative they had just gained in the Mediterranean and so on.

If he had said most of the Soviet armor in the south I could accept that, but there were a number of Soviet formations uncommitted or still effective. And it does not take into account 3rd Guards Tank Army or 4th Tank Army, which were busy chewing up 2. Panzerarmee and threatening the rear of 9. Armee. Nor does it change that the Germans were going no where, with or without Soviet tank reserves in the south.

Mosier is a fantasist rather than a historian. You might as well quote Harry Turtledove.

The point being, the Soviets had reserves, they had more reserves than the Germans, and they had an offensive against 2. Panzerarmee that was suceeding, which neither of the German thrusts were doing.

If you or McMeekin can show me what army, corps, and divisions left the Ostfront because of HUSKY, I might change my mind, but I don't need to, because none did.

 

Rich - in response to your question, on page 449 Von Manstein in Lost Victories wrote:

"On 13th July, when the battle was at its climax and the issue apparently at hand, the commanders of the two army groups concerned were summoned to Hitler. He opened the conference by announcing that the Western Allies had landed in Sicily that day and that the situation there had taken an extremely serious turn. The Italians were not even attempting to fight, and the island was likely to be lost. Since the next step might well be a landing in the Balkans or Lower Italy, it ws necessary to form new armies in Italy and the Western Balkans. These forces must be found from the Eastern Front, so 'Citadel' would have to be discontinued.... Nonetheless Hitler ruled that 'Citadel' was to be called off on account of the situation in the Mediterranean and the state of affairs in Central Army Group."

Von Manstein neither states nor identifies what units were to be transferred.

Von Mellethin elaborates and on page 229 of Panzer Battles he wrote:

"On 13 July, Field Marshals von Manstein and Kluge were summoned to East Prussia, and Hitler informed them at Citadel must be called off immediately as the Allies had landed in Sicily; troops must be transferred from the Eastern Front to deal with the invasion."

He continues:

"Fourth Panzer Army was informed that the S. S. Panzer Corps would be withdrawn for operations in Italy, while the 48th Panzer Corps was told to release "Gross Deutschland" and send it to the assistance of Field Marshal von Kluge's Army Group Center."

Don't ask me what divisions constituted the SS Panzer Corps that was part of the Fourth Panzer Army. HTH.

 

I don't know exatcly which units were taken from Manstein, nor the date. According to what I've read in Stalin's War:

"True to his word, Hitler ordered Manstein to cough up several of his best armored divisions, including the Adolf Hitler Leibstandarte, which was sent to Italy, the first of a dozen first-line German divisions transferred from the Soviet to the Italian fronts over the next four months. Any further German offensives in the Kursk sector were ruled out"

Mcmeekin does not give a date, so he perhaps gave those orders on 13 July (the day of the meeting) or the following day.

I also read in "Scorched Earth", that the reinforcements to Army Group Center were ordered on the 17th: "He also ordered that, in view of the critical situation in Orel, two more panzer divisions were to be transferred to Army Group Center"

This coincides with what the previous reply from Riter mentions from the book "Panzer Battles". Ironically, by the 17th the Germans had trapped the Soviet 69th army and 2 more Tank corps in a pocket between Rzhavets, Belenikhino and Gostishchevo, but they couldn't finish these forces because Hitler ordered an immediate disengagement that same day.

May I ask why do you consider relevant which exact units were taken from Manstein? I mean, I think we are getting lost in details. I care more about the big picture. it doesn't matter which exact units were send to Italy, because it was obviously due to the consequences of Husky, as Hitler himself expressly put it:

"Considering the lousy way the Italians are waging the war, the loss of Sicily is as good as certain. For all I know, Eisenhower may land on the Italian mainland or in the Balkans tomorrow. This would be a direct threat to our whole southern flank in Europe. That's what I've got to prevent. And that's why I need divisions for Italy and the Balkans. Now that I've moved 1st Panzer Division from France to the Peleponnese I've nowhere alse to draw on, and that's why they have to be pulled out of the Kursk front. I'm therefore obliged to suspend Citadel"

The point being: regardless of which unit/s were taken from Manstein and when did this happen, it doesn't change the fact that Hitler stopped Citadel due to the situation in Italy.

So you are aware we are just speculating, you and I (and anyone else in the debate). I think a major victory was possible had Hitler not delayed the attack.

What are you talking about? Hitler could have attacked earlier. The allies could have decided to land in Sicily not in July but on August (or maybe in June?). You are forgetting how alt history works. Nothing that historically happened hapenned inevitably. It could have happened very differently. Don't let hindsight blind you (if that is what's happening. No offense intended).

If they were busy chewing up German units in the Orel salient, then they could not have been used to stop a German breakthrough in the south without halting or severly weakening Operation Kutuzov. That's why a victory in the south was so important, as it may have released the pressure on the Orel salient. And if Operation Kutuzov was doing well, then Manstein could have break throught the Soviet defenses.

I don't know if he's a fantasist or not. I only read his book "Deathride: Hitler Vs. Stalin". It seems very well-written and narrated to me. He has some ideas I agree with and others that not. For example he claims that what happend between 28 June 1942 and March 1943 in the eastern front was a huge and bloody draw between Germany and the Soviet Union. I agree with that. But he also claims Stalingrad was an isolated phyrrhic victory. I do not agree with that. Regardless, he still clearly saw that map he is talking about and, according to it, there was no much left the Soviet held in reserve. If they did, well, we know how effective Germans are against the "russian hordes". I don't think he's a fantasist. He just looks at the same stuff with different eyes, that's all. Each historian has their own interpretation of the very same event becasue they focus on this, while others focus on that.

According to Rotmistrov, Vatutin and Kruschev (and historians Paul Carell, Sean Mcmeekin, George M. Nipe and John Mosier) no, the Soviets did not have more reserves (or perhaps they had very few ones).

Well I hope you change your mind. Just kidding. I'm not trying to colonize your mind. Feel free to think as you please.

 

If Wiki is to be believed:

• II SS Panzer Corps (Paul Hausser)
  • 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler
  • 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich
  • 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf

I don't trust Wiki but don't have any print sources on the components of the SS Panzer Corps at Kursk.

I know Das Reich went to France where they massacred a French village while e/r to Nomandy. Leibstandarte AH did go to Italy but wound in Normandy where they for a time held up Monty.

 

Sorry, just lost my post and its not worth reposting since it obviously won't change your mind. Stop reading pop history and crap history. "Paul Carell" was a Nazi propagandist. Mosier makes things up. Kruschev? Vatutin died during the war. Rotmistrov was so competent he destroyed two Tank Armies single-handedly. McMeekin is unimpressive to be kind.

Try reading better history.

No German division that participated in Kursk went to Italy because of HUSKY. LSSAH went to northern Italy to rebuild eleven days after it was ordered to withdraw from the Prokhorovka bulge. It left almost all of its tanks and most other vehicles behind. It did not fight in Italy, although it did commit some atrocities to keep its hand in.

 

I don't know if you noticed but all you have done since you started to replying me is criticizing my sources. First Sean Mcmeekin and Nipe, then Mosier, now Paul Carrell and the actual commanders who were there. I've read David Glantz and Johnathan House too, will you criticize them as well? And Why? Is it because you don't like their point of view? In war (as with everything in life) there’s no just one correct point of view. There are many points of view, all of them correct in one way or another.

I didn't know Paul Carrell was a nazi propagandist. However, you seem to assume that makes his book biased? That's a faulty logic. You can have a political or economic leaning and still be objective when writing a book or giving an opinion. I mean, look at me, I'm a socialist (and I mean a Soviet/marxist-leninist one) yet here I am defending the idea the Germans may have achieved a major victory at Kursk because I firmly believe the Soviets kinda s**ked at war. I'm not blindly defending the USSR because of my political leaning towards it.

A shame you lost your post.

You should not be trying to convince me of anything, just giving me your point of view (which you have and I respect). I gave my point of view as well. It's not a competition on who is right.

 

Sorry, but understanding sources and making proper use of them is a primary requirement for understanding history. Glantz and House are good for the Soviet side, since they utilize mostly primary Soviet sources for the Soviet point of view. Glantz also uses some German sources, more so now since we briefed him back in 1998 (I think it was) on the Kursk Data Base and pointed out all of the German primary sources he was not using.

Chris Lawrence, who still runs the Dupuy Institute, managed the Kursk Data Base and has written extensively on our findings. His work on the battle is probably the sine qua non on the subject currently.

I am not trying to be insulting, but you need to know your sources. What are they: primary or secondary. Who are they? Do they have a potential bias? What access do they have? What references do they use? When were they written?

Paul Karl Schmidt, AKA "Paul Carell", was a Nazi propagandist with the rank of SS-Obersturmbannführer, working for the German Foreign Ministry during the war. His books romanticize Nazi aggression while whitewashing the Holocaust. His work is unsupported by any sources. No references to primary or secondary sources. They are simply his recollection and opinion rather than fact-based history. They are in the same vein as other Nazi apologists that write similar claptrap like Franz Kurowski.

How is Vatutin supposed to have written much history of the battle? He was killed by Ukrainian partisans in April 1944. There was a report on the battle, supposedly written by him, but more likely his staff, which we referred to, but it is not very detailed, while the actual reports of the armies, corps, divisions, and brigades are pretty detailed.

Please understand, I am a historian and military analyst. I know fantasists masquerading as historians when I see them. Carell, Kurowski, Mosier, are all of a familiar ilk. I have not read McMeekin, but I see the signs.

The late George Nipe was a distant acquaintance through other authors. Sad to say I think he was seduced by the mythos.

BTW, to be fair, there are bad authors writing on the Allied perspective too - think Charles Whiting, Robin Neillands, Stephen Ambrose, and others. Max Hastings leaves me cold, because he cannot resist telling a story like a good journalist, even if his source is suspect. Ditto Antony Beevor.

But you are not pretending that your idea - your alternate history - is in fact history.

BTW, sorry to hear you still believe in the miserable failure that was Marxist-Leninist-Soviet socialism.

They keep working on our internet here for some reason so it keeps cutting in and out. Bit of pain in the ass and it makes me grumpy.

My POV is that if you believe that Hitler sent units to Italy because of HUSKY you need to be able to prove it. Which ones? When?

So far you have mentioned 1. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler..except as I pointed out, it did not got to Italy to oppose the Allied landings, it went there to be rebuilt as 1. SS-Panzer-Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. It did not suddenly depart the Kursk battlefield and go to Sicily. On 16 July it was ordered to Oboyan. It stayed there for nearly two weeks until 29 July when it was ordered to the area Verona - Reggio - Piacenza - Bergamo. It did participate in the disarmament of the Italian forces in the region on 8/9 September, but it was not in combat. It then participated in five major atrocities through 3 November 1943, when it was sent back to the Ostfront.

How about 2. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Das Reich? Stayed on the Ostfront.
How about 3. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division Toetenkopf? Stayed on the Ostfront.
How about Panzergrenadier-Division Großdeutschland? Stayed on the Ostfront.
How about 3. Panzer-Division? Stayed on the Ostfront.
How about 6. Panzer-Division? Stayed on the Ostfront.
How about 7. Panzer-Division? Stayed on the Ostfront.
How about 11. Panzer-Division? Stayed on the Ostfront.
How about 19. Panzer-Division? Guess what? Do you notice a pattern?

You mentioned the 1. Panzer-Division, but it was not on the Ostfront. It was in France, where it had moved 30 December 1942 to rebuild. On 31 May, in reaction to the Allied deception operations, it moved to Greece, where it continued to rebuild and train. It was never considered for ZITADELLE and did not return to the Ostfront until 29 October 1943. It was never in Italy.

Then there are the rebuilt Stalingrad and North Africa divisions. Rebuilt in the west in the spring of 1943, never considered for Kursk, but some of those went to Italy.

Panzer-Division Hermann Göring? It was in Sicily where it was built from the remnants of Division Hermann Göring, which was destroyed in Tunsia and was later renamed Fallschirm-Panzer-Division Hermann Göring. It fought the Allies in Sicily and Salerno and Anzio and then went to the Ostfront in Sptember 1944.
15. Panzergrenadier-Division (formerly 15. Panzer-Division) - rebuilt on Sicily from Division-Sizilien, fought the Allied landings on Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, before going north in the fall of 1944.
3. Panzergrenadier-Division - destroyed in Stalingrad, rebuilt starting 1 March 1943 in the Pyrenees, then to Lyon on 23 June, then to Chiusi-Bolsano at the end of July, then Rome in late August.
14. Panzer-Divission - destroyed in Stalingrad, rebuilt starting 1 March 1943 in the area Angers - Nantes - Chôlet - Montaigue. Sent to the Ostfront 17 October 1943.
16. Panzer-Division - destroyed at Stalingrad, rebuilt starting ? March 1943 in Brittany. Sent to Tuscany at the end of May 1943, fought at Salerno until sent to the Ostfront at the end of November 1943.
24. Panzer-Division - destroyed at Stalingrad, rebuilt starting in April at Lisieux, France. Went to north Italy on 16 August 1943, then to the Ostfront in mid-October 1943.

There was also 26. Panzer-Division, which was organizing in Belgium since 14 September 1942, but suffered from lack of equipment and personnel, so had a very extended organizational period. It moved to Amiens in October 1942 and then Calabria in August 1943. As late as 31 August 1943, its Panzer-Regiment was still organizing and equipping the II. Abteilung, while the I. Abteilung was equipping with Panthers and never served with the division.

So what else? What Panzer divisions or Panzer-Grenadier divisions were serving on the Ostfront in July 1943 that were sent to Italy to oppose the Allies? What Infanterie-Divisionen were?

 

Let;s go on...

2. Panzer-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront until 15 January 1944 when it went to Belgium to rebuild.
4. Panzer-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
5. Panzer-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
8. Panzer-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
9. Panzer-Division - nope, sent west on 3 January 1944 to rebuild,
10. Panzer-Division - nope, destroyed in Tunisia and never rebuilt.
12. Panzer-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
13. Panzer-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
17. Panzer-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
18. Panzer-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront and reorganized as the 18. Artillerie-Division on 29 September 1943.
20. Panzer-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
21. Panzer-Division - nope, destroyed in Tunisia and rebuilding in France.
22. Panzer-Division - nope, disbanded and remnants incorporated into 23. Panzer-Division on 7 April 1943.
23. Panzer-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
25. Panzer-Division - nope, sent from Norway to France at the end of August 1943, were it completed organizing until the end of October when it went to the Ostfront.
27. Panzer-Division - nope, disbanded before it completed organization 15 February 1943.

10. Panzergrenadier-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
16. Panzergrenadier-Division - nope, went west in March 1944 to rebuild as 116. Panzer-Division.
18. Panzergrenadier-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
20. Panzergrenadier-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
25. Panzergrenadier-Division - nope, stayed on the Ostfront for the entire war.
29. Panzergrenadier-Division - nope, destroyed in Stalingrad, rebuilt in France 11 February 1943, went to Sicily 10 July 1943.
90. Panzergreandier-Division - nope, destroyed in Tunisia, rebuilt in Sardinia, sent to Corsica and then Elba in August, then to northern Italy in September. Stayed in Italy.

 

Suppose I might as well do the rest of the SS too.

SS-Polizei-Division - at Leningrad, never considered for ZITADELLE. Elements were sent to northern Italy in July-September to refit, conduct anti-partisan atrocities, and then disarm the Italians. The division was concentrated in the area of Salonika, Greece in the fall to reorganize and refit as a Panzergrenadier-Division. Returned to the Ostfront at the end of August 1944.
SS-Panzergrenadier-Division "Wiking" - 18 March 1943 shed Regiment-Nordland to form Panzergrenadier-Division "Nordland". Reorganizing and refitting from mid-April through mid-May. For ZITADELLE it was in reserve for potential employment with AG-Kempf but was very weak, with just 4 Pz II, 24 Pz III, 17 Pz IV, and 6 StuG operational. It and 17. Panzer (4 Pz II, 29 Pz III, 32 Pz IV, and 2 T-34, of which 84% operational) and 23. Panzer (17 Panzer III and 33 Panzer IV, of which probably 85% operational) were the sole operational reserves available to ZITADELLE.
SS-Division "Nord" - in Finland.
SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgs-Division "Prinz Eugen" - in Croatia
SS-Kavallerie-Division - Ostfront.
SS-Panzergrenadier-Division "Hohenstaufen" - organizing and training in Belgium. Not operational.
SS-Panzergrenadier-Division "Karl der Große" - organizing and training in Bordeaux. Not operational.
SS-Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier-Division "Nordland" - organizing and training at Grafenwöhr. Not operational.
SS-Panzergrenadier-Division "Hitlerjugend" - organization not ordered until 20 July 1943.
Kroatische SS-Freiwilligen-Division.- organizing and training in Croatia. Not operational.

 

The problem with "reserves".

As of 2 July 1943, the Ostheer had 3,263 Panzer and StuG, of which 2,611 were with the 2. Panazerarmee (191), 9. Armee (920), 4. Panzerarmee (1,089), and AG-Kempf (419), so about 80% of the Ostheer armored force was committed to ZITADELLE. Of the overall on hand total, 2,840 were operational, about 87%.

All, except the three divisions of XXIV Panzerkorps (c. 176 Panzer and StuG on hand) were committed to the battle.

As of 21 July 1943, the Ostheer had 3,610 Panzer and StuG on hand, after losses (88 in HG-M through 14 July and 190 in HG-S through 17 July), but including replacements. So a growth of 347. But only 2,398 were operational, a decrease of 442.

Possibly the biggest problem was that 2. Panzerarmee, with 31 Panzer and StuG on hand and probably 27 operational, faced 1,785 Soviet tanks and assault guns of the Central Front as of 2 July. Worse, 5. and 8. Panzer-Division were committed to stem the Soviet Central Front counteroffensive, which was chewing therough 2. Panzerarmee, and they lost 96 tanks in the process, almost exactly half their stating strength of 191.

Meanwhile, the Soviet tank and assault gun strength of Voronezh Front was 1,704, and of Steppe Front was 1,639 as of 1 July, for a total of 5,128 opposed to ZITADELLE. Out of 10,196 tanks and assault guns in the Red Army...so just over 50% of the Red Army tank and assault gun strength faced ZITADELLE. Their losses were severe, much higher than the German, but they also had nearly double the strength in the area of the offensive...and a like number uncommitted on the Ostfront, about eight times the number of uncommitted Germans on the Ostfront.

 

So, because of the many counter arguments presented in the debate (by historian RichTO90), I decided to do more research with other sources (except Soviet ones because they are usually fairy tales), and after a few days of carefuly reading articles and watching videos about the Battle of Kursk, I can conclude now that I was wrong: Hitler didn’t cancel Operation Citadel because of Operation Husky (this was the strategic-level excuse he gave Manstein to avoid arguing with him). At first when I read about this argument in a couple of articles I was very skeptical, since how could anyone possibly know what was going on in Hitler’s mind, but then I found a YouTube channel called "Military History Visualized" featuring many videos interviewing historian Roman Toppel, author of "Kursk 1943: The greatest battle of WW2", and he basically confirms in these interviews that Husky had no impact on Citadel (it was not cancelled because of it) and that Hitler didn’t send reinforcements to Italy (only the SS Leibstandarte on July 26th because of Mussolini's deposition in the 24th, and only for political reasons, to "overawe" the Italians, not for actual fighting). I'm totally reading his book.

He explains it in this short video: (Kursk offensive stopped due to Sicily invasion? - I was wrong)



Another related and mainstream myth he debunks is that Hitler kept postponing Citadel because he was waiting for new Tiger and Panther tanks. This was actually a minor reason. The main reason was that around the time of the disaster of "Tunisgrad" (20 April-13 May), Hitler was afraid that the Allies would attempt a landing on Sicily, Italy proper, or the Balkans, and so he didn’t want to attack the Soviets (launch the already proposed Operation Citadel) because it might coincide with this landing (ironically, because he waited and postponed it, it did coincide). He DID strenghthen Italy with German divisions, but this was way before Operation Citadel. By the time of the allied landing, no reinforcements were needed (for the time being, at least) and none were send.

The whole essay I wrote relating this topic needs to be scrapped.

(Did Hitler delay Kursk because of Tigers and Panthers?)



It's important to note, though, that while Husky per se didn’t have any effect on Citadel, the mere threat of "Husky" not only weakened Citadel (as Hitler was forced to deviate resources and troops to Italy and the Balkans in expectation of the attack, preventing him from using these units in Citadel, thus weakening the operation) but also made him commit the mistake of postponing the attack, which allowed the Soviets to build up their defenses and forces.

With the benefit of hindsight, and for all previously said, since Hitler’s fears of an allied landing were (for the time being) unfounded and only manifested on the night of 9-10 July, he should have either attacked the Soviets in May or June, or not attack at all and remain in the strategic defense. Toppel also claims that Hitler might have actually been waiting for the Soviets to attack first, and since this didn’t happen and they got stronger day after day he finally decided to launch Citadel.

Had Hitler attacked earlier and with more forces (the forces that were in Italy and the Balkans), I think the efficiency of the German army alone would have sufficed to achieve a major victory. The casualty ratios compared to the forces available to each side simply can't be ignored. In May/June the Soviets would have been less prepared, and while this is true for the Germans as well, the Germans didn’t need to be as prepared as the Soviets due to the quality of their personnel (according to Toppel, in 12th July, the Soviets suffered 196 tank losses, while the Germans 5 (Leibstandarte: 4 Panzer IV. DasReich: 1 Panzer III). This pretty much says it all).

(Phrojorovka: Chances of breakthrough? - Essentially, no)



So I still kinda share Mcmeekin's conclusion: Kursk was an allied victory, because without lend lease, and without the division of German forces due to the threats of allied landings, Citadel would have most likely succeded.

A little off topic but the narrative given by this historian fits perfectly with another essay I wrote (which is very close to become a book) which essentially shows that in a one-vs-one scenario (without lend-lease to the Soviets, without the opening of other fronts), Germany would have won its war against the USSR (confirmed in public and private by Stalin, Kruschev, Zhukov and historians like Sokolov). Concerning this topic, I show that even in 1943, had Britain and the US "stopped all military activity" at that moment leaving Germany in a one-vs-one scenario against the Soviet Union, Germany had still much more chances of winning in the east than the Soviets:

-They had a much larger economy, including much more production of coal, iron, steel and aluminium.
-Much more military efficiency (as always revealed by the casualty ratios) and better quality equipment.
-They were still holding 80% of the territory occupied after Barbarossa (including the most industrialized and populated area of the Soviet Union).
-They were in the zenith of their forces in the east (3.9 million personnel, more than in any previous year).

 

Very good and a very good choice on Toppel, but try to avoid watching YouTube or other videos for history if possible - there are a lot of very bad ones out there, especially anything by Mark Felton - it is simply too much like the "Mythtry Channel".

Very good again.

Don't be too hard on yourself, rewritten with better sources should work.

Yes, the potential threat in the Mediterranean had a very real effect on German decision-making, but not in the simplistic way that many authors will have you believe. It was a second or even third-order effect on German planning rather than a direct first-order effect as many incorrectly put it.

Yes that is all possible, but unlikely for the reasons we are exploring. Hitler instead of being bold, as he was in Norway, France, the Balkans, and BARBAROSSA, took counsel of his fears as he did with SEELOEWE. However, the problem with exchange ratios and tactical competence is that while overall the Germans had about a 2.2:1 advantage in exchange ratios overall, the Soviets had up to a 3 or even 4:1 advantage in strength, ebcaise they could focus nearly 100% on the Ostfront, whereas the Germans could only put about 75% of their strength there initially and then watch it steadily decrease over time. The need for the Germans to disperse their strength to other theaters was critical and did not require a single event like HUSKY to make it so.

That starts getting into the effects, both real and imagined, of Lend-Lease, which is a highly complex subject.

Quite likely if the Germans did not have first Britain and then the United States among its foes, the Soviets would have lost. The Soviets lost a huge proportion of their population base in BARBAROSSA and key parts of their chemical industry. Lend-Lease supplemented the production of toluene and in finished propellants and explosives. At Kursk, a significant portion of the Soviet tank inventory was Lend-Lease. The widespread belief that Lend-Lease motor vehicles made Soviet mobility possible is exaggerated, but is a fundamental factor just the same.

However, it is untrue that anytime in 1943 was the "zenith of their forces in the east". In July 1943, strength of the Ostheer was 3,138.000, including the allied contingents still present. In June 1941, it was 3,206,000, plus 325,685 Romanian allied troops. There was never 3.9 million personnel in the Ostheer.

 

duplicate, I reposted instead of edited