Logistics. Pacific Theater.

In a few other threads I had brought up the important part that Logistics played in the European Theater. Specifically the US and German. I have just recieved the book "The War in the Pacific,From Pearl Harbor to Okinawa 1941-1945" By Jonathan Gawne. On page #7 it states that because of the "Germany First" policy that "Because of this policy,there were no bakery,bath,salvage or graves registrations companies in the Pacific for the first two years of the war. These functions were essential,so men had to betaken off the frontline to perform such duties,which drained the combat units of strength. There were a severe shortage of all kinds of equipment in the Pacific, from bread ovens to landing craft,that was not dealt with until mid-1943." Also the climate was so harsh that it presented other problems for supply not including delivery. It was so harsh that most food containers rotted away or just disintegrated. C-rats stood up very well but the menu was very limited at first. The standard service shoe would only last approx. 10 days before rotting away. And it wasn't untill 1944 that the Army started to treat with chemicals all canvas item to make them rot proof. It would seem that the Pacific and CBI posed some very interesting problems completely different from the Med and Europe.

 

Anyone who studies the Pacific War soon comes to realize it was simply on a vastly different scale than the war in Europe, and that no one comprehended the difference or was prepared to expend the effort required to fight it successfully. Eric Bergerud, in "Fire in The Sky" touches on some of the logistical problems associated with Pacific air war. The distances dwarfed those in the European war, and complicated everything, especially logistics. The climate, terrain, and huge oceanic expanses were bad enough, but everything was simply more difficult in the Pacific, because no one realized how empty of every resource it was. The US Navy didn't begin to realize this and take steps to cope with it until after Operation Watchtower (Shoestring) was under way.

Of course, part of the problem was that this vastly larger theater received only a small fraction of the material which was lavished on the European theater (approximately 15-20 %). I remember reading the diary of an American sailor serving on a light cruiser during the first few years of the war. He constantly complained of not having enough to eat despite the best efforts of the USN's service squadrons. The ships suffered from inadequate maintenance due to lack of spare parts and immense distances between repair and refit facilities. Servicing and maintaining aircraft was a constant struggle due to the harsh climate and oceanic environment, as well as a lack of spare parts.

If things were bad for US troops in the Pacific, they were immeasureably worse for the Japanese, who expected their troops to compensate for totally inadequate logistics with "superior fighting spirit". I have read that probably as many as 80% of all Japanese fighting men in the Pacific suffered from serious to severe malnutrition because Japan had inadequate logistical shipping resources. One historian estimates that more Japanese troops died from starvation than from enemy action in the Pacific. Many became so desperate that cannibalism was not an uncommon occurrence.

In the case of both the US and Japan, the problem often wasn't having the required materials, but having the necessary shipping to get the materials/equipment to the places where it was needed on a timely basis.

 

Early Logistics Issues

Along with our unpreparedness, the central role that logistics would play throughout World War II was probably poorly understood by many of the key players. Regarding the Pacific Theater, Samuel Eliot Morison wrote that ". . . logistics problems were so vast and so novel that the story of how they were solved is of surpassing interest."[SIZE=-1]25[/SIZE]

In the Pacific Theater, there were two major problems: first, getting there; and once there, sustaining forces at great distances from the United States and its possessions. The two most critical needs in this regard were shipping and advance bases.
Shipping
The Joint Army-Navy War Plans of 1941 assigned the Navy the responsibility for sea transportation in the event of war. Specifically WPI-46 of May 1941 tasked the Navy to "provide sea transportation for the initial movement and continued support of Army and Navy forces overseas. Man and operate the Army Transport Service."[SIZE=-1]26[/SIZE]

This tasking was unfortunately based upon the experience of World War I where a one-theater war was waged and the British merchant marine was the primary shipping resource for the allies. The requirements for World War II shipping would be vastly different. The requirements of U.S. Merchant shipping in World War II have been described as:

1. Logistic support for Armed Forces overseas
2. Lend-Lease shipments to the allies

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1. Shipments to sustain allied civilian populations
2. Imports of raw materials to the United States
3. Normal Western Hemisphere sea trade[SIZE=-1]27[/SIZE]

By December 1941, it was discovered that the Navy was ill-prepared for this transportation role. The Naval Transportation Service, an organization under the Chief of Naval Operations, was small, understaffed, and existed largely on paper. Further, the transport ships owned by the Navy were largely assigned to fleet support, and the Navy did not have available personnel to man the Army Transport Service ships. (The Navy was reportedly also reluctant to man these ships because of their poor condition.) The Navy had begun to address this problem as early as September 1939 with the establishment of Port Directors in the principal U.S. ports to procure merchant shipping (in conjunction with the Maritime Commission) to fill emergency Navy needs. Immediately after December 7, 1941, efforts were made by the Port Director of San Francisco and the Maritime Administration to solve Pacific shipping problems. This was an ad-hoc arrangement and the lack of any centralized control led to the establishment of the War Shipping Administration in February 1942, which placed control of all U.S. merchant shipping under a single authority. Ships were allocated to claimants (Army and Navy) on a voyage basis.[SIZE=-1]28[/SIZE]
Advance Bases As stated above, the need for advance bases was recognized well before the beginning of World War II and our entry into it. Fortunately the U.S. had some experience in establishing overseas advance bases in the Caribbean, Atlantic, and Canada as a result of the 1940 "Destroyer for Bases Deal" with the United Kingdom. Additionally, as part of the 1941 Lend-Lease Act, we were planning to build bases in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Plans were also being prepared for a base in the Galapagos Islands off Ecuador. In December 1941, a site for a fueling station was selected on Bora Bora, in the French Society Islands to the southeast of Samoa. This was a joint Army-
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Navy undertaking to be manned by 3,900 Army personnel for the garrison and 500 Navy personnel to construct the base and operate the fueling facility. The expedition sailed in January in spite of problems with shipping and cargo-handling equipment. Equipment to establish the base was taken from stocks destined for British bases. Considerable problems were encountered with Bora Bora. Proper maps were not available and much of the equipment was unsuitable. Further the Navy Construction Battalions (Seabees) were not fully trained.[SIZE=-1]29[/SIZE] In spite of these problems, there were many important lessons learned and soon bases were being established in the South Pacific in Samoa, the New Hebrides as well as New Caledonia. These early bases were critical in order to contain the Japanese in the Central Pacific and protect the lifeline to Australia. (See maps at Figures 1 and 3.)
As the war progressed, the bases took on different meanings to the services. In the very beginning they were critical to the Navy, as fueling and supply depots for the fleet. As the Navy developed an afloat mobile logistics system fleet, units became less dependent upon the advance bases. However, as the U.S. offensive moved across the Pacific, advance bases remained critical staging areas for subsequent operations. As we moved closer to the Japanese home islands, these bases enabled long-range, land-based bombers to launch a bombing campaign against the home islands and other key Japanese held areas. They also enabled our Submarine Force to move its primary logistic support forward from Pearl Harbor to Guam. No matter what anybody's perception is of the purpose of the advance bases, the bottom line is that they gave us strategic reach and enabled the U.S. military to penetrate and destroy Japan's interior lines of communication. Fleet Admiral King described the role of advance bases to the Secretary of the Navy as follows:

As we progressed across the Pacific, islands captured in one amphibious operation were converted into bases which became spring boards for the next advance. These bases were set up for various purposes depending upon the next operation. At first they were mainly air bases for the support of bombers and for the
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use of protective fighters. This gradually changed to the establishment of staging bases for the anchoring, fueling and refitting of armadas of transports and cargo ships, and for replenishing mobile support squadrons which actually accompanied the combat forces and serviced them at sea. Further advances made necessary the development of repair and refitting bases for large amphibious forces. As we progressed further and further across the Pacific, it became necessary to set up main repair bases for the maintenance, repair and servicing of larger fleet units.[SIZE=-1]30[/SIZE]
Joint Logistics Situation/Organization at the Outset of the War

According to Logistics in World War II: Final Report of the Army Service Forces, at the beginning of the war the Navy and War Departments had little in common in logistics, and real cooperation had not yet begun. Each service had its own separate logistics system even to the extent of separate ports of embarkation for overseas movement.[SIZE=-1]31[/SIZE] The Army, as noted above, had its own shipping. Logistics were further complicated by the fact that both the Army Air Corps and Naval Aviation had their own systems of procurement and supply. Some progress had been made in the area of munitions. The Army had begun to procure small arms ammunition for both services, and the Army and Navy Munitions Board had been established to prepare plans for industrial mobilization. In general, however there was no effort between the two services to coordinate their logistics efforts in order to eliminate waste and avoid duplication. The Army Service Forces Report further states that nearly 3 years, of the war passed before real coordination of logistics was realized.[SIZE=-1]32[/SIZE]

Service Logistics Service logistics organizations were vastly different. Although logistics organizations were established for each service, a significant

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amount of logistics planning remained with the War Plans Divisions of the Service Staffs.
Army Logistics Organization
Shortly after Pearl Harbor it became apparent that not only was there no semblance of joint logistics, but within the Army:

Lack of effective top level coordination and the dispersion of procurement and supply activities among the supply activities again threatened to delay the service and supply of the Army as mobilization measures quickened after Pearl Harbor. As had been the case in 1917, the demands of war revealed serious weaknesses in the organizational machinery. There was, in fact no machinery for the close coordination of the whole logistics area anywhere below the Secretary of War himself.[SIZE=-1]33[/SIZE]
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The situation was further complicated by pressures from the Army Air Corps for a greater degree of autonomy. Accordingly, in March 1942 the War Department underwent a major reorganization which included the establishment of the Army Service Forces under General Brehon Somervell, and was based upon General Pershing's World War I logistics organization for the American Expeditionary Force. The establishment of the Army Services Forces resulted in ". . . authoritative direction over the supply services. . . . ," however it also reportedly resulted in confusion in the Army Logistics System, because the individual supply services continued to function as they formerly did. Further, the Service Forces taking most of the functions of the G-4 led to the logistics planning function being subsequently assumed by the War Plans Division of the Army Staff.[SIZE=-1]34[/SIZE]
Navy Logistics Organization During World War I much of the Navy's logistics planning was done by the Technical Bureaus under the control of the Secretary of the Navy, and in fact the position of Chief of Naval Operations was not established until 1915. Logistics planning and the determination
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of requirements did not become firmly established under a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics until World War II. Initially, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations oversaw the logistics functions. The logistics staff however relied heavily upon the Technical Bureaus for much of the determination of logistics requirements in close coordination with the strategic plans division.[SIZE=-1]35[/SIZE]
The foregoing notwithstanding, early on in the war the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King and General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army recognized the need for logistics cooperation. Marshall redesignated the Army Supply and Services Command as the Army Service Forces with the greatly expanded duties discussed above under General Somervell. Admiral King charged his Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral Frederick Home, with the responsibility for the Navy's logistics planning, procurement, and distribution. Horne and Somervell worked closely throughout the war.[SIZE=-1]36[/SIZE] Also throughout the war the issue of a unified logistics system was repeatedly addressed at the Joint Chiefs level, at the service level and the theater and sub-theater level. As can be seen from the following, what evolved were agreements at the top level which in their implementation at the operational level reflected the unique situations in each theater and sub-theater. Theater Logistics

Pacific Theater Admiral Nimitz' principal logistics organizations after late 1943 were the J4 section of the CINCPAC Staff, and the Service Force Pacific Fleet. The Service Force was responsible for implementing all Navy logistics plans except for Naval air and Marine Corps who had their own logistics organizations. Army plans were implemented by the component Army Service Forces Command. During 1942 and much of 1943, however, joint logistics and supply matters were handled on an ad hoc basis by logistics committees at the CINCPAC level. The initial inter-service logistics issues arose in the Central and
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South Pacific areas relative to the establishment and reinforcement of advance bases. The problems were both administrative and logistic. The Navy exercised operational control but administrative and supply support were the responsibilities of the services, consequently problems arose at bases garrisoned by the Army. Administration of the Army elements was a shared responsibility of the War Department, the San Francisco Port, the Hawaiian Department, and even in part by USAFIA. The only well-established Army command in the Pacific in the initial months of the war was the Hawaiian Department, commanded by General Emmons. He was therefore assigned a large degree of the responsibility for the island bases by the War Department. However, this responsibility was assigned on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis. The situation was further complicated by the fact that until June 1942 no South Pacific Area Commander was on the scene. In July 1942 the Army established a separate Army component command for the South Pacific under Major General Harmon who was also the Chief of the Air Staff under Vice Admiral Ghormley. As Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces South Pacific Area (USAFISPA) he was responsible to the War Department for administration and supply of Army forces in the area. He exercised no operational control but assisted Commander South Pacific (COMSOPAC) with Army force planning. The establishment of this separate Army command separated these forces from the Central Pacific and USAFIA.[SIZE=-1]37[/SIZE] As is so often the case the issues of joint logistics and supply were worked out initially and informally at the tactical level. As early as April 1942 the Joint Chiefs were examining the issue of a joint supply system for the Pacific. Joint purchasing boards were created at the newly established Navy supply point in Auckland, New Zealand, as well as in Australia in order to take advantage of local resources and eliminate duplication. The Joint Chiefs also posed the question to the theater CINCs as to the desirability of a joint supply system and the pooling of shipping resources for distribution to the advance bases. Nimitz favored a joint supply system for the SOPAC area under the command of COMSOPAC as part of the Service Squadron South Pacific, and with a joint supply center in Auckland. His proposal included joint usage of shipping and storage facilities.
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Purchasing would be under joint agreement with interservice coordination. General Emmons supported the Nimitz proposal. The Army planners, however, rejected the proposal on the grounds that the Army controlled its own shipping and supplies and did not wish to go to divided responsibility. The Army Service Forces had just been established, and the Army was concerned over the capability of the Navy's logistics system. This issue was revisited at the end of 1942.[SIZE=-1]38[/SIZE]

The agreement ultimately worked out between Gen. Somervell and Admiral Horne was the Joint Logistical Plan for the Support of United States Bases in the South Pacific Area and directed:

1. The Army to supply rations to shore based personnel (except in Samoa) which could not be obtained through the Joint Purchasing Board.
2. The Navy to provide all fuel.
3. The Navy to provide all local purchase items through the Joint Purchasing Board including clothing, construction materials, and rations.
4. All Services to request items not available from the above sources from their parent services.

The agreement generally followed the recommendations made by Admiral Nimitz. However, as far as the Army and Navy supply organizations in the United States were concerned, each service retained its own supply system.[SIZE=-1]39[/SIZE]
Southwest Pacific Theater Since this theater was an Army dominated area with a preponderance of Army personnel, joint logistics, at least in the first 2 years of the war, did not become a major issue. Due to his personality and influence, General MacArthur dictated priorities. Although he had a Joint/Combined staff, in effect it was an Army staff: Additionally, early in the war the majority of Army forces flowing into the Pacific were going to Australia, and MacArthur was charged with that country's defense as well as building a military infrastructure to support
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subsequent operations in the Southwest Pacific. Although the Army Service Forces established a major Services of Supply Command for the theater, in practice it had much less authority in the area than initially envisioned, and much of its supply activities were devoted to operating bases in Australia and New Guinea. Because Gen. MacArthur controlled shipping and determined logistics priorities, confusion reportedly existed between the supply services command and the CINC's staff regarding functions.[SIZE=-1]40[/SIZE]
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HyperWar: The Big 'L'--American Logistics in World War II [Chapter 6]
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beat me to it.
Asia was devoid of any real resource extraction, but also, more importantly, the supply centers. Japan controlled all the Chinese ports. Its a LONG trip to India. Island hopping is not ideal.

Europe? How long is the English Channel? 20 miles? 30?

Even the hardest supply headaches of the ETO, probably in the desert, were relatively simple. Lugging supplies across sand is immeasureably simpler than lugging it up and down the Himalayas. Remember the brutality of the Alps campaign in WWI?

At least, the Japanese had relatively simple time with transports early on. They controlled all the ports. Eventually a lack of things to transports and an active American sub campaign ended even that.

One more thing. If Patton ran out of oil in Normandy, then what the hell did the Navy use?

 

the underestimation of the importance of logistics: same reason as the underrating of the air force-army cooperation.

The reason? Mobile warfare was a new thing. Only the ground troops had been trained in the interwar period. Logistics is never a problem in training. Only when war began did many realize; umm...we dont have supplies; our mules are still miles behind us.

 

Patton did not run out of oil in Normandy.

 

oops, let me try again. In Western Europe?

 

http://www.ww2f.com/wwii-general/24214-quest-fuel-world-war-ii.html

The main reason was not lack of fuel but of his forces outstripping the means to move the fuel forward.

 

Logistics Problems on Attu
by Major Robert E. Burks

The World War II attack on Attu in the Aleutian Islands would have been easier if logistics planners had anticipated
the effects of weather and terrain.

"The battle of Alaska has ended, and it may be reasonably contended that the Japanese won it." This statement, spoken over five decades ago by the Governor of the Territory of Alaska, expressed the sentiment of many who were involved in the World War II Aleutians campaign from June 1942 until August 1943. The Aleutian Islands extend southwest from
the Alaska mainland 1,000 miles into the North
Pacific.

The campaign was of virtually no strategic value to either combatant and was fought as much to maintain national honor as for any other reason. The Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands chain was the first occupation of American soil by a foreign army since the War of 1812. By the campaign's conclusion in 1943, 8,500 Japanese soldiers had engaged over 144,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen and vast amounts of U.S. materiel and equipment and had embroiled the Americans in one of the costliest assaults in the Pacific theater, on the island of Attu. The attack on Attu was a force-projection operation that provided logisticians with many lessons on the effects of terrain and weather on military operations and on soldiers and their equipment.
A Matter of Honor
The Japanese attack at Midway Atoll, in the Central Pacific, in June 1942 was a disastrous setback after a long string of victories across East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Their only opportunity to save face at home rested on the success of what originally had been planned as a diversion from the attack on Midway. The Japanese High Command had assigned a small task force the mission of attacking several islands in the Aleutians, more than 2,000 miles to the north of Midway, to deflect American attention from the main effort at Midway. The original plan did not call for the permanent occupation of any of the Aleutians, only a harassing threat to draw off American strength. However, with the major loss at Midway, the Japanese Government decided to occupy two islands, Kiska and Attu, at the western end of the Aleutians and then declare victory back home.
This decision put in motion the beginning of the U.S. Aleutian campaign to expel the Japanese invaders from American soil. The primary objective of the campaign was to erase the psychological blot of having the Japanese occupy U.S. territory. The entire campaign lasted over a year and was conducted across 4 million square miles of ocean and land. At its zenith, it employed over 144,000 men working together to expel the Japanese. These men would establish 13 bases in the Aleutians, from supply dumps to airfields; construct over 1 million square feet of runways; complete the Alcan Highway through Canada to Alaska; and conduct four amphibious landings, including the assault landing on Attu.
A Forbidding Battlefield
The Aleutians, in the North Pacific, form a chain of approximately 120 islands stretching about 1,000 miles from east to west. They are primarily volcanic in origin and generally rugged and mountainous. The island of Attu measures only 35 miles by 15 miles and is a most inhospitable location on which to conduct military operations. The island is uniformly rocky and barren of trees, brush, or any other cover. The land rises steeply from the water's edge to heights of over 3,000 feet. The lowlands of the island are blanketed with muskeg, a type of bog up to 3 feet deep with a hard crust on top. Attu is stark, barren, cold, and windswept, with steep slopes and boggy flats.

Attu is shrouded year round with fog that varies in density and can cover the island from the bays to the mountains, creating extreme overcast conditions that limit sunshine to a few days a year. The island normally receives 40 to 50 inches of rain a year, but that rain total accumulates from a constant misting rain that falls 5 or 6 days a week. The temperature during the assault on Attu averaged 25 to 37 degrees Fahrenheit, depending on elevation.
These were the conditions that awaited American soldiers when they arrived to drive the Japanese from the island.
A Joint Operation
The operation for reducing and occupying Attu was a joint exercise featuring personnel from four commands. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, designated Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, the Commander North Pacific, as the supreme commander of the operation and as the commander of Task Force King, the invasion covering fleet. Rear Admiral Francis W. Rockwell, the Commander Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet, was designated as the commander of Task Force Roger, the attack force, until landing operations were completed. The Western Defense Command provided the 7th Infantry Division, under the command of Major General Albert E. Brown, as the assault and reserve afloat force. The Alaska Defense Command provided the 11th Air Force as the air component of the operation and the 4th Infantry Regiment as the operational reserve.
Despite this impressive assembly of forces, the Aleutian campaign and the Northern Pacific Theater ranked as Admiral Nimitz's third priority in the overall Pacific Theater for receiving materiel and support. As a result, only attack transport (APA) ships were assigned for the assault, instead of the more desirable attack cargo (AKA) ships. This created extreme logistics burdens for the invasion force because it resulted in considerable overloading of the transports with both men and equipment. To compound problems, these forces were not able to assemble or train together before executing the Aleutian invasion on 11 May 1943. Lack of equipment and training subsequently resulted in confusion during the landings on Attu.
The 7th Infantry Division was not experienced at conducting amphibious operations. In fact, it was originally designated for service in North Africa. Due to prioritization requirements, the division never had sufficient resources to conduct full-scale loading and landing operations. This may help explain some of the confusion that reigned during the loading process at the San Francisco docks in mid-April 1943. The division placed too much emphasis on loading supplies required for an army of occupation instead of loading only requirements for combat. Cargo was loaded without regard for consequences, explosives were loaded in the same hold with fuel, and items that were not requested kept arriving and were loaded wherever there was space. The result was overcrowded ships with no identifiable load plans.
Admiral Rockwell, upon witnessing the loading, commented, "The time has come for combat troop organizations to realize that landing on territory occupied by the enemy means a campaign and not an occupation." Unfortunately, loading conditions could not be changed in time for the planned invasion on 7 May. The transports departed San Francisco in their overcrowded conditions on 24 April to link up with Admiral Kinkaid and Task Force King at Cold Harbor, Alaska, on 1 May.
A Confident Plan
The invasion plan called for simultaneous amphibious landings at Holtz Bay on the north side of Attu and Massacre Bay on the south side. The forces then would link up in the center of the island at the Massacre Valley passes and turn east to drive the Japanese out of the mountains and seize Chichagof Harbor.
The northern force landing at Holtz Bay consisted of the 17-1st Battalion Combat Team, which was loaded on one assault transport, the Zeilin. The southern force, going ashore at Massacre Bay, consisted of the 17th Regiment (-) and the 32-1st Battalion Combat Team under General Brown, and it was loaded on three assault transports, the Heywood, Harris, and J. Franklin Bell. The reserve afloat force consisted of the 32d Regiment (-), which was loaded on the Grant and Chirikof. The 4th Infantry Regiment, as the operational reserve, was located on the island of Adak, approximately a 10-hour sail from Attu. Landing craft headed for two landing beaches on Attu.

The planners realized from the beginning that the troops would suffer from the weather, but they reasoned that the entire operation to clear the 1,500 to 2,500 Japanese off Attu would take only 36 hours. This reasoning proved fatal during the course of the invasion. Attu's weather and terrain had a profound impact on the invasion's reception, medical, and combat operations.
A Testing Environment
The amphibious invasion started off on the wrong foot, and the only saving grace was that the Japanese did not challenge the 7th Infantry Division on the beach. On the day of the invasion, the island was socked in by heavy fog, and it was difficult even to see the island from offshore. Massacre Bay turned out to be rockier than expected and had many underwater shoals that posed a problem for navigation. In fact, the assault ship Predia ran across a shoal on the first day and resources were diverted to beach the ship in an effort to save her cargo. The small landing craft bringing men and supplies from ship to shore took a beating from the shoals and rocks, with many suffering severe damage. By the second day, 10 percent of the landing craft fleet had been lost, primarily because of a failure to position repair parts forward to fix them.
The reception operations at the northern landing site in Holtz Bay fared no better. The landing zone was restricted to receiving only two landing craft at a time. This created huge delays in throughput of both men and supplies. The delays in unloading the ships were so extreme that by 13 May—the day planners expected to conclude operations—the four assault ships were only half unloaded. It took another 3 days to complete the process.

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Combat troops were needed to break down supplies on the beaches (left) and then manually move them inland when vehicles could not navigate across the muskeg (right).
As expected, the lack of rehearsals resulted in uncoordinated efforts in unloading supplies from the ships to the landing craft. The system used to establish supply points along the beach broke down, and a jumbled set of supplies began to build up along the beaches.
The vehicles brought ashore to clear the beaches and provide logistics support to combat troops inland could not operate over the terrain. Either the ground was too steep for the vehicles to traverse, or the vehicles proved too heavy for the top crust of the muskeg to support. Once the crust was broken, vehicles sank beyond their axles in the bog. The unexpected loss of these vehicles forced logisticians to unload landing craft and clear the beaches by hand. This created a drain on manpower, as large formations of combat troops were drafted to clear the beach manually and deliver supplies forward to their units. It was a common site to see a team of six to eight men pushing and pulling a wooden sled up the hill to deliver artillery ammunition.
The diversion of combat solders to perform logistics functions, coupled with the stubbornness of the Japanese defenders, forced General Brown to call for the reserve afloat troops to land on 12 May. However, the crowded conditions and inadequate throughput ability at the reception sites slowed the unloading operations, so that only 25 percent of the reserve force was ashore by 14 May.
Attu's terrain and weather also had an unanticipated impact on the medical evacuation plan. The medical evacuation of casualties became a second major reason for diverting combat soldiers. Much like the cargo vehicles, the medical transport vehicles brought ashore could not operate over the muskeg or the steep slopes of the island. The division had to resort to four-man litters to move casualties to the shore hospital. The terrain conditions were so bad that litters took hours to move the injured and sick to aid that was only a few miles away.
The real logistics failure of the campaign began as early as 12 May, when the first seven casualties from cold-weather injury arrived at the shore hospital. The hospital continued to receive additional cold-weather casualties every day until the conclusion of operations on
30 May. Four days after the anticipated conclusion of operations called for by the planners, the shore hospital received 191 cold-weather casualties. These casualties were the result of logistics failures. Logisticians failed to ensure that soldiers were equipped with appropriate cold-weather equipment. Most soldiers were issued only normal field jackets, not parkas, and leather boots, not footwear suitable for snow. The island's snow and constant rain, coupled with freezing temperatures, ensured that the soldiers were never dry.

Small teams of soldiers delivered ammunition on wooden sleds they pushed and pulled up Attu's snowy slopes.


Many soldiers went ashore without their sleeping bags, since the plan was for the bags to follow in a day. Unfortunately, the logistics problems on the beaches ensured that only those supplies critical to the warfight, such as ammunition, flowed from the beaches. Supplies soldiers needed to warm or dry themselves stayed on the beaches. The result was many cases of frostbite and trenchfoot. Cold-weather injuries would account for 31 percent, or 1,200, of the 3,829 total casualties suffered on Attu.
An Uphill Struggle
The extreme fog and rugged terrain of Attu also limited the effectiveness of artillery and naval supporting fire. The invasion of Attu demonstrated that indirect fire was useful primarily for neutralization and not for the intended destruction of enemy forces. The Japanese soldiers remained above the fog line, denying the shore fire-control parties the ability to provide accurate gunfire. The result of these factors was a higher expenditure of ammunition than anticipated by the logistics planners. By 17 May, the division was running low on 105-millimeter artillery ammunition and requested a resupply from Adak. The naval forces providing supporting fire also had expended all available 14-inch ammunition. It was fortunate that the Japanese did not pose a naval threat to the American forces.
Strategically, the U.S. attack on Attu was not decisive to the war effort, but it did provide some key lessons for logisticians in areas that still are overlooked today. A clear understanding of the operational environment's impact on a campaign is critical to ensuring uninterrupted logistics. Weather and terrain can pose a deadlier threat to the combatant than the enemy does if planners fail to factor them into the operation. The presence of appropriate cold-weather gear in the hands of the soldiers on Attu would have reduced their casualties significantly.
The logistician who plans for equipment to operate as advertised, without regard to limitations imposed by terrain, is falling into a common trap. The failure of planners to anticipate that their tractors might not operate over the frozen muskeg of Attu resulted in large diversions of combat troops to carry supplies forward. The true impact of this on the battle will never be known, but combat troops were required to deliver bullets instead of firing them at the enemy.
A final area often overlooked by today's logistician is the effect that terrain and weather can have on the warfighter's ability to execute the mission. The planners knew that Attu usually was covered in fog, but they failed to make the connection between the fog and the inability of spotters to call for effective indirect fire. A planner who made this connection would have realized that the operation would experience higher than normal expenditures of ammunition and would develop contingency plans accordingly.
The terrain and weather conditions on Attu placed the logisticians in a reactive instead of an anticipative mode throughout most of the operation. This is a failure that often must be paid for with soldiers' lives. ALOG Major Robert E. Burks is a recruiting operations analyst with the Army Recruiting Command at Fort Knox, Kentucky. He has a B.S. degree in aerospace engineering from the U.S. Military Academy and a master of operations research degree from Florida Institute of Technology. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the Army Command and General Staff College.

Logistics Problems on ATTU

 

Sorry Dupe post.

 

While looking for something else I found this, here is a really interesting article from an "Aussie" source:

Quartermasters of WW2

I just noticed you got a double post here JC, I had that happen a couple of days ago and I KNOW I didn't click "post" twice.

 

I noticed that too. Its happened a few times in the past month or so. Thanks for the link. Ill check it out .

 

Mobile Logistics
The major carrier and amphibious operations in the Pacific could not have been carried out without a highly developed system of mobile logistics. By means of this system ships of the Pacific Fleet were able not only to remain indefinitely in forward areas adjacent to enemy territory, but also to cruise at sea for long periods in readiness for combat. Such mobile logistics enabled combat ships to receive fuel and other needs from service ships either while under way or at anchorages near operating areas. Advanced base facilities were maintained afloat at all times, and techniques were developed for transferring fuel, ammunition, stores, and personnel at sea, thus freeing combat ships from the necessity of returning to port at frequent intervals.
The maintenance of logistics afloat had two advantages in addition to keeping combat ships at sea: (1) Service craft could move forward relatively easily either under their own power or by towing. (2) Better storage and handling facilities and more accurate inventory control were available than in primitive shore areas. The disadvantage was the great demand for ships.
The primary requirement of a floating base is a large anchorage affording good holding ground and capable of being protected from submarine attack. Adjacent land is required only for fighter strips, recreation areas, and those naval facilities that can perform their functions better on shore. The atolls and islands of the Central Pacific provided such areas, and in the advance across the ocean United States naval forces used the anchorages at Majuro, Eniwetok, and Ulithi. Earlier in the war floating bases were established in conjunction with shore facilities at Noumea in New Caledonia, Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, and Manus in the Admiralty Islands. Afloat bases were later located at Samar in the Philippines and the Kerama-retto near Okinawa.
From its beginning the United States Navy had a tradition of operating with afloat logistics, since historically it was a navy without proper bases even in its own country. Nevertheless, the immensity of the logistic problem in a cross-Pacific war had not been realized in prewar planning. Various reasons may be advanced for this failure, the most logical being the discontinuance of the study of logistics at the Naval War College and the fact that fleet problems could not be made broad enough for the impact of logistics to be felt. As a result, major problems had to be solved just before or during the war. A logistic structure had to be improvised, and the reason that it was done so quickly and so well was that abundance could cover mistakes.
The first conception for providing logistics for the fleet was the establishment of advanced base units on shore. Such units were specially organized in the United States with equipment packaged for erection in forward areas. Designated as Lions (major bases), Cubs (minor bases), and Acorns (aviation bases), they included construction battalions, boat pools, harbor defense units, repair facilities, and other functional components. These had to be set up in advanced areas and could not readily be moved forward as the war advanced. Cubs were established at Espiritu Santo and Guadalcanal, and a Lion was set up at Manus. As the war moved closer and more rapidly toward Japan, this conception was largely abandoned.
With the capture of the Marshall Islands in February 1944, the practice of afloat logistics came into its own. Most of the service ships at Pearl Harbor were transferred to Majuro to form Service Squadron 10. This force was a medley of floating equipment, including repair ships, floating dry docks, tenders, provision ships, ammunition ships, hospital ships, station tankers, lighters, tugs, floating cranes, distilling ships, survey ships, cold storage ships, and floating barracks. The largest piece of floating equipment used during the war was the ABSD (advanced base sectional dock), capable of lifting 90,000 tons and docking any ship in the Pacific. Any of its sections (a maximum of 10) could be towed forward separately and be docked by the others.
The second element in mobile logistics during the war was afloat replenishment, which enabled ships to remain at sea longer than steam vessels had ever done before. The continuing requirement was fuel oil, of which a combat ship always required sufficient for battle. The practice in the Pacific therefore was to fuel at sea every three to five days. The technique of such fueling, which had been developed in the United States Navy before World War I, did not change essentially thereafter. Two ships would steam alongside each other, one at a slightly greater speed so as barely to tow the other, and both under rudder control. Fuel would be delivered through flexible hoses that were kept suspended and out of the water between the two ships by booms and running gear. The British Navy, having operated through two world wars largely in the North Sea and with bases elsewhere in the world, had not developed an efficient technique of fueling at sea, and the Royal Navy carrier force that joined the Pacific Fleet in 1945 had to fuel by the slow method of towing in tandem with a floating hose between the two ships. The major replenishment need after fuel was ammunition, for magazine space in combat ships was limited. In the later stages of the war provisions and special stores, replacement aircraft, and even personnel also were transferred at sea.
The replenishment force operated as Service Squadron 6 during the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns. While its composition varied with conditions, it was generally composed of a light cruiser flagship, about 16 tankers, 4 ammunition ships, 4 fleet tugs or salvage ships for towing crippled ships from the battle area, 2 aircraft transports, provision ships as required, and protective escort carriers and destroyer types.
The realization of the importance of mobile logistics was illustrated in the Okinawa campaign by the seizure before the assault landing date of the Kerama-retto, an island group west of Okinawa that had a good anchorage. Mobile logistics was not nearly as essential for ground forces and land-based forces in the Pacific as for naval forces, but it was found that, where sufficient shipping was available, it was preferable to retain supplies afloat until they were needed ashore. The transfer forward of army bases from the New Guinea coast after the recapture of the Philippines necessitated the withdrawal of a large number of LST's from combat operations. To move men and materials across two oceans required a complete reorganization of the American merchant marine and a tremendous shipbuilding program. In February 1942, the War Shipping Administration (WSA) was established to provide shipping needs for the war economy and the armed services. Two standard types of cargo ships were built rapidly and in quantity by the American shipbuilding industry: the 10-knot Liberty ship and, later, the 15-knot Victory ship. These ships were then outfitted and manned by shipping companies but were operated by the WSA.

GI -- World War II Commemoration

 

Dang it!! Double post again LOL

 

Great article there Clint. I found this very informative on just one aspect of the Logistics problems encountered.

"Long Supply Lines. The huge size of the Pacific Theatre, which had to be subdivided into three separate spheres – the South Pacific, Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific commands, respectively – made for unprecedented long lines of communication. Roughly 3,000 miles separated the New York port of embarkation, the Quartermaster Corps’ main shipping centre on the East Coast, from England and France. Yet more than twice that amount of ocean (6,200 miles) lay between San Francisco on the West Coast, and Brisbane, Australia, where most Quartermaster supplies in the Southwest Pacific were sent and received. Instead of the usual 55 to 60 days for a supply ship to go from New York to Liverpool, the trip from San Francisco to Brisbane often lasted four or five months – nearly two to three times longer. When items had to be moved from point to point within theatre, the journey could be extended to upwards of 8,000 miles."

 

Thanks for looking at that link, and I too was rather flumoxed when I started to think about "how" would a transport command of the QM corp manage to fill the needs on a front before the front was established? If what was needed in, say January, couldn't get there until April or May, would you ship socks along with the ammo and rations? Which rations would you ship? Must have been a management head-scratcher of the migraine level, every day in the PTO.

Some things the QM knew was going to be needed, somethings had to be adapted for as the war progressed. Amazing accomplishment in my eyes.

 

I just never really thought about the distances that had to be traveled and the amount of time it took to get the supplies to their destinations. Months to the Pacific as opposed to weeks to Europe. The amount of time it took just to get newer weapons and other materiels must have had everyone tearing thier hair out.

 

This might be a useful referance but it looks like you need to know someone in the service to get some of them:
United States Army Logistics, 1775-1992: An Anthology
THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS: OPERATIONS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 1941-September 1944
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II: September 1944-May 1945
Logistics in World War II: Final Report of the Army Services Forces
All from:
CMH Publications Catalog

Lots of other interesting books there some available to the general public for purchase.

 

"Lessons Learned. Finally, the Quartermaster Corps also demonstrated a remarkable ability to learn from recent past experience. Throughout the war, the Office of the Quartermaster General sent observers to gather data on how effective supply operations were being carried out. They then used this information to effect needed changes. Lessons learned from previous assaults were compiled, analysed in detail and applied to the planning of future operations. The result was more or less steady improvements, and an accumulated air of proficiency in virtually all areas of supply.
Quartermasters learned from after action reports, for example, that most individual duffel bags and interchangeable pouches (which held all the soldiers’ personal goods) deteriorated in almost no time when dumped on beaches without proper storage. Or quickly got lost, or mixed up in the mayhem. Or were shamelessly pilfered there on the beach, or while en route to unit dumps, due to lax security. After witnessing this experience, supply personnel gradually moved away from the use of individual bags and came up with new methods of storing personal clothing and equipment in easier to control and protect squad-size bags. This was only one of many lessons – big and small – learned by Quartermasters during the war."

 

Thanks for the links lwd. One of my favorite sites i like to visit .