Most Massive Artillery Bombardment in History

Sami, you have a valid point in regard to the amount of days that past between the climaxes of the Soviet and Finnish artillery fires, and as to what therefore the battle(s)/chain of battles ought to be correctly called. Yet, an artillery battle isn’t a full one, nor complete, not even a ‘battle’ in the word’s true meaning, unless you take to count the actions and responses from both battling parties, in this instance the main bombardment from both artilleries (not that there wouldn’t have been a lot of other action going on).

It is the Soviet artillery fire of June -44 aimed at the Finnish targets (accompanied with the all out Soviet attack) which wins the title for the sheer ‘massiveness’ in artillery bombardments. It is this fire which Sjöblom refers to in the earlier message displayed when he states that “the artillery fire aimed at Finnish targets has been described by some researchers as the most massive in world military history …”.

It is the Finnish artillery fire, however, that did the job in the end in Ihantala. It is this fire that Sjöblom discusses when he says that “there the Finnish concentration of artillery fire was the heaviest in the country's military history. It has been described as even heavier than the Soviet fire in the siege of Berlin.”

I do sympathize with Sjöblom in regard to the heaviness of the Finnish fire as well, which he quotes being “described as even heavier than the Soviet fire in the siege of Berlin”.

What does make artillery fire heavy, or “heavier” than the Soviet fire in the siege of Berlin ? Is it the sheer Soviet mass aimed at the Finnish Targets in June of 1944, or is it the massive and pinpointively accurate and victorious Finnish fire aimed at the Soviet spearhead in Ihantala a bit later ? Many would say, both !

In the end it was the very heavy and accurate artillery fire of the Finns in Ihantala that for a large part helped to keep Finland the only unoccupied European nation west from the Soviet Union, besides England, out of all the countries that participated in WW2.

The exact quote from that additional website I offered to you in my last message is: “The final Finnish victory against the largest artillery bombardment in history becomes to be known as the 'Miracle of Ihantala'”. - The multimedia production ‘The Miracle of Ihantala’ was compiled a few years ago and can be seen (must be seen) at the premises of the Hämeenlinna Castle in the town of Hämeenlinna in southern Finland.

Again, I agree that we must be careful as to what names we call battles by, even when this type of chain of events is in question, and even when the battles in question fit the same time frame and/or general geographical area. That, in part, is why in my first message I did not offer a name for the “most massive artillery bombardment in history’, although I described it. Please excuse my later blooper in this regard.

 

I would keep them separated, as them two (the opening bombardment of the Soviet offensive vs. the artillery bombardments of Tali-Ihantala) didn't take place close to each other and there was ample time between them. They are distinct "artillery battles" with every measurement you can think of. The fact that they take place in the same geographical area (Karelian Isthmus) shouldn't be considered or else one could consider the whole Siege of Leningrad as an "artillery battle" which would in terms of guns & shells fired surpass the Karelian Isthmus battles of 1944.

It was indeed heavy. At 6:45 AM, 9 June, the Soviet artillery opened up firing in the first 5 minutes some 17,000 shells into the frontline of the Finnish IVth Corps. After this, the bombardment shifted to individual targets, surveyed during the weeks of preparation. The bombardment lasted the whole day, the heavy guns of the Soviet Baltic Navy adding to the inferno by firing some 2,000 heavy and coarse caliber shells.

10 June at 5 AM, the 3,000 guns opened up again, firing a deafening 2 hour 20 minute barrage, totalling 200,000 shells into the already battered field fortifications of the Finnish IVth Corps, supported by over 1,000 air sorties against targets in and near the frontline.

Eg. the Finnish 1st Regiment, with 3 infantry battalions deployed along 4 kilometers of front, was attacked by no less than 18 battalions of Guards infantry (the bulk of 30th Guard Corps) supported by 2 tank regiments and 2 assault gun regiments and the stupendous fire of 1,200 guns.

Needless to say, the Finnish defense was shattered. The Finnish IVth Corps had a meager 180 guns which managed to fire just 3,000 shells before the withdrawal began. The Finnish 10th Division lost ALL of its field guns.


Addition:
If memory serves, the thunder of the 9 & 10 June bombardment was heard all the way up to Vyborg (a distance of some 100 km)!

That depends on your viewpoint. It is true, that the target "boxes" (usually ranging 3-6 hectares in size) that the Finnish artillery fired upon in Ihantala may have received heavier fire than any place (of similar size) in Berlin, as the fire of 10-15 artillery battalions were concentrated against the same target "box", firing 0,5 - 2 minute barrages in rapid fire (any Soviet formation caught in the "box" pretty much ceased to exist).
However, I find Sjöbloms' comparison lacking, as both the number of shells fired in Berlin dwarfs the number of shells fired in Tali-Ihantala as well as the number of guns employed.

I've seen the multimedia several times, a few times in the Artillery Museum in Hämeenlinna (which you refer to) as well as at home where I have in on tape. The multimedia does not claim such a thing, don't know who's done the english translation of the website you linked. Its an error, plain and simple.

Already addressed above.


Cheers,
Sami

[ 13. January 2004, 08:54 AM: Message edited by: Sami ]

 

I had a hunch that you had seen the multimedia show in question, Sami. Of course, it would be a bit out of character for a Finnish show, or Finns in general, to make any claims of the sort discussed here. That of course has not been the aim of this show, either. I brought it up only as an example of a quite recent positive development in reporting the battles in question, and their results, to the general public. Also, this might be one interesting show to see for any participant in this forum perhaps visiting Finland in the future.

To a large part, it is precisely due to the Finnish quietness about matters like this, why these battles in question are so unknown and so little spoken about worldwide. The roots for the Finns being not-so-talkative about these matters lay perhaps in part in the post WW2 Finnish-Soviet relations, the Finnish post WW2 diplomacy and the Finlandization that followed, even the Finnish Civil War of 1918 and the Finnish history proceeding that.

“That depends on your viewpoint”, as you say, Sami, in regard to the statements by Sjöblom about the ‘massiveness’ of the artillery battles in question. As I stated in one of my earlier messages, ”I agree that there is always more than one way to analyze or categorize a battle”.

By simply bringing up and discussing these events, we’re helping to promote the correct course of events and history, as they took place. We are helping the cause of Mr. Sjöblom (past on in 1995) and the former Finnish President Mauno Koivisto, among others. It seems quite clear to me that “the ignorance of even the best-informed observers in the West about Finland's part in World War II is astounding”, as Sjöblom put it in 1995 (see link below). That still seems to stand to a certain extend today.

I find especially interesting the statements by history Professor Kennedy of Stanford University (leading university in Nobel prizes today ?), who in his much-used textbook dealing with U.S. foreign policy gives Finland a passing mention as having been “flattened” by the Red Army (“In quite a recent edition of the book, this gross distortion of historical fact remained uncorrected”), and British Major-General H.M. Tillotson, who in his book ‘Finland at Peace & War--1918-1993’ “fails to recognize the momentous significance of the Finnish victories in the battles of Tali-Ihantala and Vuosalmi” (In its 354 pages, Tillotson’s “book has room for only one sentence about the single most important battle, perhaps, fought in Finland's Continuation War, Tali-Ihantala”:

http://www.kaiku.com/notcapitulate.html

Is it due to Finlandization (the Soviet Cold War period pressure on Finland) which helped to ensure that Tillotson’s book came out as it did, despite Tillotson’s close cooperation with many of Finland’s highest authorities in the field ? Hasn’t it been a bit hard, to say the least, for anyone to study and research the battles in question, when even the “best-informed observers” and authorities worldwide have been reporting these events in question the way described above ?

In case someone wonders what was ‘Finlandization’ (some say we’re still getting writ of it), here are two current keyword winners from Google:

http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Finlandization
http://www.helsinki-hs.net/news.asp?id=20020205IE19

As the largest and the most respected newspaper in Finland declares in the link above: “After a clear ideological knock-out it is natural that the winners also want to rewrite history. This also happened after the Second World War, when the history between the wars was manipulated so as to look as if tiny Finland had attacked the big peace-loving Soviet Union, regardless of the teddy bear's efforts to gently guide Finland toward good behavior. Now history is being written differently”

 

On Pekka Kantakoski´s excellent book "Red tanks " ( =Punaiset panssarit ) it is also mentioned that the Russians started the attack on 9.6.1944 on 06:00 by hundreds of planes by 13th Air army.

On 10.6.1944 the Red Army, according to Kantakoski, used both planes and artillery simultaneously for the first time to break enemy ( =Finnish ) defence. According to Kantakoski on different parts of the front some 125-186 tons of bombs were dropped per square kilometer on 9th and 10th June. ( p426-427 ).

 

Yep, couldn't find the number of sorties (except the 1,000 sorties on 10 June) for 9 June from Russian sources. There were 'hundreds' of them, but couldn't find how many exactly.

Considering that the Finnish defenses consisted almost totally of field fortifications, the bombardment was an overkill (95% of intended targets destroyed)... but then again if one can afford it, it would be a crime not to use it.


Cheers,
Sami

 

"Most massive artillery bombardment in history"

Should we even be discussing World War II when considering this? Depends on if we talk heaviest fire for a short amount of time, or total accumulated weight of fire. Dunno, but here is a contender from World War I. Research indicates the artillery barrages of the World War were partly responsible for the miserable weather that caused much trouble for the men in the trenches on the Western Fron. So heavy and prolonged were the barrages that they actually changed the weather patterns over Belgium and France.

Some results at Ypres 1917:

 

Thank you for your replies gentlemen. My message below has to do with Simo Häyhä, and thus may be moved under a more relevant subject matter.

As I was reading a few of the older messages in this forum, I was happy to come across some interesting information by Kai-Petri about Simo Häyhä, the master sniper. Yet, I’d respectfully like to suggest a correction to the time period for Häyhä’s sniper killings reported in one message. Kai-Petri wrote:

“A member of the 34th Infantry Regiment and a farmer by trade, Simo Häyhä became a most feared sniper during the 1939-40 (30 November 1939 14 March 1940) Winter invasion of Finland by the Soviet Union. Using nothing more than an iron sighted Mosin-Nagant Model 28, Simo is credited with killing 505 Russians during a nine month period”.

This must be an unintentional blooper, as Häyhä’s famous sniper kills are said to have been accomplished - not in nine months, but - in less than 90 days, as the Finnish and American websites teach in the links below. Häyhä was shot to his face towards the end of the 105 days’ Winter War. He is still said to have managed to kill the perpetrator.

Many quote Häyhä’s total ‘known’ sniper kills at about 542, which number is displayed in the diagram in Kai-Petri’s past message. The sites below reveal, that Häyhä had already been sniping for weeks before the ‘official’ counting of the sniper kills, clearly to be credited to Häyhä, began. In comparison, world’s No. 2 sniper, Soviet Nikolai Iljin, did his kills over a period of over 1300 days, not including the time between wars. What makes Häyhä’s accomplishment even more remarkable is the fact that besides his famous sniper kills Häyhä is also known to have made a high number of kills with ‘konepistooli’ and ‘pikakivääri’. The American site below states the following:

“The accomplishments of this man in battle are such that he deserves the title of warrior. While he was not a man given to hostility, Simo Häyhä was indeed one the Soviet soldiers came to fear and tell stories of. Häyhä was to many Red Army soldiers’ their nightmare, their ghost, their shadow, and for over 500 he was their "The White Death". His skillful hunting in the Winter War ranks as the all time highest kill total for a sniper, although many of his adversaries fell to the K31 Suomi-Konepistooli he operated with imposing proficiency. The most astounding fact of Häyhä’s deeds is the time frame of these events was only 90 days. The total number of "kills" by this man is truly remarkable and an accurate description of his talent as a stalker and a marksman. The conduct of Simo Häyhä and his results during the Winter War will never be matched by any other. Simo Häyhä was in a warrior class of which only a select few heroes can claim membership in.”

http://www.mosin-nagant.net/simohayha.htm
http://guns.connect.fi/gow/hayha.html

 

Just thought putting it here:

In a documentary it was mentioned that the artillery phase of operation Veritable Feb 1945 was the heaviest in the western front ( so far ).

I did not find any good figures for this. Anyone else knows these?

 

Iwo Jima

Beginning in August 1944, U.S. Army aircraft in the Marianas subjected Iwo Jima to air strikes, and from 8 December, the island came under daily attack. Three heavy cruisers bombarded Iwo Jima three times in December and twice in January. Then, for two weeks beginning in late January, Seventh Air Force bombed Iwo Jima day and night, and B-29s struck it twice. In all, U.S. forces dropped 6,800 tons of bombs and fired 22,000 rounds of 5-inch to 16-inch shells prior to the invasion, the heaviest bombardment of the Pacific war. Still, the naval bombardment of the island, begun on 16 February 1945, lasted only three days, a far shorter period than V Marine Amphibious Corps commander Lieutenant General Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith had requested.

THE WAR . Search & Explore . Themes & Topics | PBS

-----------

Must admit, not bad. Unfortunately not enough.

 

Responding to this old question, Kai, I have a multi-post reply using quotes from a book and one official Canadian military historical document.

Excerpts on Operation Veritable as recorded in George Blackburn’s book The Guns of Victory the 3rd in his trilogy as a Forward Observation Officer in the Royal Canadian Artillery. His books are well researched.

Pages 232 and 233 “Some idea of the size and complications of the upcoming operations can be gained from the fact that half a million air photos and three-quarters of a million maps have been produced.

But to the gunners, the size and importance of an operation is best indicated by the build-up of ammunition, and no one has seen such mountainous deliveries of shells since Normandy. All of it has to be on gun positions before dawn February 3 so that the roads will be free for guns, tanks, and troops to move up on the last four nights before the attack. And it seems the deadline is met.

In less than two weeks more than three-quarters of a million shells have been accumulated at gun positions – 633,160 of them just to take care of the opening tasks by 1, 034 guns and howitzers ranging from 20-poun missiles to 360-pound monsters.

And a further 120 lorry-loads of ammunition have been brought up for 446 more weapons (40-mm Bofors, 75-mm tank guns, 17-pounder anti-tank guns, 4.2-inch mortars, and medium machine guns) assigned to “Pepperpot” concentrations to beat on enemy infantry and gun positions with such intensity and duration as to convince the enemy that to move above ground would be suicide.

During recent weeks only the normal traffic of 2nd Canadian Corps has been allowed to move on roads in this part of the salient in daytime. All other vehicles require special passes. But when darkness falls, many thousands of vehicles come out of hiding, filling the roads almost nose to tail as they work their loads to designated dumps.

Space has become precious, and so jammed together are the new gun positions, they encroach on each other and on existing gun positions. The Regiment [the 4th Field Regiment, 2nd Canadian Division] will share its position with a British field regiment – 48 guns in an area no more than 600 yards wide and less than that deep. And directly behind a medium outfit will deploy.”

In Blackburn’s’ footnote p 233, he refers to statistics from General Brian Horrock’s book Corps Commander which states “25,000 vehicles and 1,300,000 gallons of petrol were required to bring up the equipment and supplies. To carry this traffic, most of it moving to the extremities of the salient in the area behind Groesbeek, fifty companies of Royal Engineers, twenty-nine companies of Pioneers, and three Road Construction Units built five new bridges of the Maas and improved or replaced one hundred miles of roads. Intricate scheduling was needed to prevent traffic jams, and because all moves were carried out within the hours of darkness, with vehicles required to be off the roads and hidden by dawn, strict traffic was enforced by 1,600 military police. Among mountains of Compo rations and other essentials accumulated in the salient were 8,000 miles of cable wire and 10,000 gallons of fog oil for smoke screens.”

continued

 

Page 238-239 “About 10:30 P.M. the pulsating roar of the first wave is heard passing over on its way to bomb the first major town in the path of the attack – historic Cleve….The southeastern sky is first lit by flares, then sparkling ack-ack, as great flashes begin along the horizon. For a time there is only the sound of the planes growling overhead, but then comes the ground-shuddering string of crumps you’ve learned to associate with aerial bombing. Cleve is at least ten miles away, but the violence of the flashing explosions at times light up the whole cloudy dome of sky; and soon the reddish glow of fires, mounting higher and higher like an early sunrise along the eastern horizon, made it appear much closer. Not since Normandy have you seen such heavy bombing, and in your mind’s eye you see the awful tumble of rubble in Caen and other Norman towns. Cleve and the Rhineland targets will look like that.” The footnote, again referring to stats in Sir Brian Horrock's, book Corps Commander “Cleve was almost wiped out by 1,384 tons of high explosives.”

Pages 240 - “Shortly before 5:00 A.M., when the great concentration of guns are to open up, you go out from Rusthuis into the dismal darkness and head across the scrubby bushland for 2nd Battery Command Post, on the rim of the deep railway cutting about a kilometre away.

“It’s now drizzling rain, cold and miserable – a rotten morning for the gun crews, all of whom have been at their guns for some time now completing the preparation of ammo for the big shoot, taking shells out of their cases, removing safety caps, and stacking them in piles handy to the guns. And as you slosh through mud and stumble up and down over incredibly deep water-filled ruts left by trucks and quads pulling and winching guns into position around here during the night, you feel for the poor late-arriving British gunners, and most especially for their command post staffs. It must be wicked trying to set up under such wretched conditions for a shoot of such magnitude…

Silhouettes of gun muzzles poke up against the night sky where previously there were only scrubby pines. Unseen hordes of gunners, dripping with rain, are now standing to their guns as they carry out last-minute tasks. By the time you make it to 2nd Battery ghostly faint voices from Tannoy speakers in gun pits are calling ‘Take Post,’ an order presently being given on scores of positions. You try to visualize 9,000 gunners arranging themselves in customary gun-drill positions behind their weapons awaiting H-hour, five minutes away….

He [Gunner H. Buck] says that just before you came, he and fellow ack Dick Tanner were speculating on just how badly the Reichswald will be chewed up by the guns and he calculates the 25-pounders alone will dump more than 5,000 tons of H.E. on the Germans in the forest and round about…..

“One faint, distant voice yells, “Fire!” And for a split second there’s a rising chorus of urgent voices on all sides yelling “Fire!” before the night is overwhelmed by furious, flashing, roaring waves of sound and concussion, rending and tearing the darkness with monstrous, theatrical effects such as only 1,500 guns, mortars, and rockets can unleash when deployed in overlapping concentrations on a narrow front – a dreadful stimulant that causes you to shiver as with a chill, even as you begin to perspire.

Most of the 1,034 guns and 12 rocket-projectors firing off the prearranged fire-plan, along with the additional 466 weapons engaged on “Pepperpot” targets, have been crowded into confined clearings in the immediate area – a narrow strip of scrubby pine plantations, about six miles long and two wide, running south from Nijmegen to Mook. The exceptions are the three AGRAs and the 3rd Super-Heavy Regiment now roaring and flashing over on the right from south of Maas.

No fewer than forth “Heavies,” 7.2-inch howitzers on their great rubber tires, are belching 200-pound shells up to 16,000 yards. Two 8-inch guns, with a range of 18,000 yards, are unloading 240-pound shells on the Reich; while the strongest concrete emplacements on the Siegfried Line are receiving the attention of four superheavy 240-mm (9.5-inch) howitzers capable of throwing their howling 360-pound missiles up to 25, 225 yards (14.3 miles). During the course of the firing this morning each of these great monsters will get off 80 rounds for a total of 320 rounds – adding more than 57 tons of high explosive to the hellish cauldron the guns are creating in enemy-held territory.

What enemy outposts and first-line troops are going through is almost inconceivable. You try to imagine the stunning effects of the airbursts alone, 50,000 from ninety-six 3.7-inch heavy anti-aircraft guns firing on flat trajectories, filling the air with savage showers of shell fragments.

continued

 

While unable to distinguish in the thunderous cacophony the swooshing rush of sound that marks their passage, you know the first wave of rockets, of the fifteen waves scheduled by the 1st Canadian Rocket Battery, must by now be descending on the Reich – about three hundred missiles in each wave, each missile carrying a 29-pound warhead packing the destructive power of a medium shell….

The 248 mediums are now booming their 100-pound shells onto their prearranged tasks at the awesome scale of 450 rounds per gun, while thirty-two 4.5-inch guns are getting off 15,000 rounds.

Of course the greatest number of shells – 433,000 on the opening concentrations alone – are being fired by the 576 Canadian and British field guns accumulated here.

Adding to the awesome din are the 466 weapons assigned to the Pepperpot concentrations, weapons not required for other tasks: 114 Bofors (40-mm) ack-ack guns, 24 17-pounder anti-tank guns, 60 75-mm Sherman tank guns, 80 4.2-inch mortars, and 188 medium machine-guns. Unequipped for precise and rapid switching on targets not visible to them, and since all the firing is ‘indirect,’ Pepperpot weapons have been given the task of beating continuously one or two areas only…..

And so you return to Rusthuis where you pass the time working out a breakdown of 13,000 tons of H.E. being fired on prearranged tasks:

Weapon Rounds Shell Weight Tons

25-pounder 433,104 25-pounds 5,413.80
5.5-inch 111,712 100-pounds 5,585.60
3.7-inch 48,420 20-pounds 484.20
17-pounder 5,400 17-pounds 45.90
4.5-inch 14,825 50-pounds 370.60
155-mm 4,688 95-pounds 222.68
7.2-inch 8,640 200-pounds 864.00
8-inch 292 240-pounds 34.80
240-mm 320 360-pounds 57.60
Rockets 5,760 29-pounds 83.52

For the next four hours and forty-five minutes (until 9:45 A.M.), except for one pause, all known enemy localities, headquarters, and communication centres are pounded by weapons of various calibres, so arranged as to ensure at least six tons of H.E. land on each.
Concrete personnel bunkers at Materborn, southwest of Cleve, received the attention of superheavy 8-inch and 240-mm guns, while mediums concentrate on enemy batteries. The first three ‘flying mattresses’ of the Rocket Battery are aimed at open trenches.
Field guns, in concert with mediums, heavy ack-ack, and rockets, work over a list of ten targets at various times and rates of fire, until 7:30 A.M., when a smokescreen is fired across the whole front and all guns cease firing for then minutes. As the silence descends it is hoped the Germans will believe the attack has begun behind the smoke, and that all their surviving guns and mortars will come alive, allowing the counter-battery people…to get a fix on them for even more precise concentrations before H-hour at 10:30 A.M.”….

“Smoke shells mixed with high explosive provide a frightful screen behind with the assaulting units form up. The barrage starts at a thin rate, gradually thickening until it reaches the full power at 10:30, when yellow smoke is fired to indicate the barrage is moving forward…The barrage is fired on behalf of the assaulting troops of XXX Corps in the centre only, the 51st Highland Division on the right having chosen to use prearranged concentrations on known target areas.
It is a ‘block barrage’ designed to consume more than 160,000 shells. The ‘block’ or depth of the concentrated shelling on each lift is 500 yards….

Still, steady progress is reported against little resistance. And the long lines of prisoners, escorted back through the gun positions during the afternoon, offer clear evidence of the effectiveness of the stunning preliminary bombardments and the fierce barrage that rolled over them, snuffing out their will to resist. Many of the prisoners are youngsters no more than sixteen years old. Terribly shaken, they report that of thirty-six guns in their locality, thirty-two were knocked out. Their bewildered eyes and strained faces tell the story. Clearly they are still demoralized by the memory of the bombardment. Seemingly they survived because they were able to shelter in well-constructed bunkers. Those in the open were slaughtered. For the first time ever you hear a German soldier say, “Alles kaput.” As in Normandy some ask to see the ‘automatic 25-pounders’!...

The intensity of the fire from the Pepperpot weapons, including the Bofors of the 3rd [my Dad’s Regiment] and 4th Light Ack Ack Regiments, will only be known by those subjected to it, but you get some indication when you learn that eleven barrels of the twenty-four Bofors guns of 38th Battery overheated and bulged from firing their allotment of 800 rounds each, which a Bofors can do at the rate of 110 rounds a minute…

At 5:00 P.M. the guns join in another heavy fire-plan by 2nd Corps’ artillery, lasting and hour and a half, on behalf of the 3rd Canadian division, attacking across a now deeply-flooded plain dotted with ‘islands’ of farmhouses and hamlets, stretching from the Rhine on the left to the Kranenburg-to-Cleve road now under a foot and a half of water in some places and rising.….By late afternoon the British units have limbered up for positions farther forward. By next morning, February 9, only a small stretch of the battlefield in front of 3rd Division on the left and an area south of the Reichswald towards Gaennep remain in enemy hands within range of the guns. Nevertheless, this afternoon 4th Field guns are required to join in an Uncle target that calls for thirteen rounds from each of the divisions 72 guns; and this evening they contribute to a Victor target requiring six rounds from each of the 216 field guns in 2nd Canadian Corps, drenching some desperate spot in the fluid battle in Germany with 1,296 rounds of high explosive….

“Your are told that with comparatively low casualties to the attackers, six battalions of the German 84th Division were destroyed, and that of the more than half million rounds fired by the guns on opening day, not a single one fell short among the attacking troops. This is to the eternal credit of gun-layers and command post staffs who prepared the gun programs, and the last-minute ‘corrections of the moment’…- not forgetting the accuracy of the raw material in the ‘meteor telegram’ produced by the Meteorological Section.”

continued

 

Also, on Operation Veritable:


R E P O R T N O. 185
HISTORICAL SECTION
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

…If the ammunition allotments for the operation, which consists of 350
types, were stacked side by side and five feet high, it would line a
road for 30 miles. The total ammunition tonnage, provided for the
supporting artillery from "D" Day, to D plus 3, would be the equivalent
in weight to the bomb-drop of 25,000 medium bombers…

…61. The preliminary artillery bombardment began at 0500 hours. Targets
included enemy forward positions, headquarters and communications, with a minimum of six tons directed on each target. The success of the assault was later attributed largely to this fire support. Prisoners declared that it had a shattering effect on their morale, the intensity being such that crews were unable to man their guns until the barrage had ceased; communications were totally disrupted. The Germans had "the impression of overwhelming force opposed to them, which, in their isolated state, with no communications, it was useless to resist". On the other hand, prisoners generally agreed that casualties from the bombardment were not high, on a rough average only five per cent. Equipment suffered more than personnel. (First Cdn Army Int
Summary, 11 Feb 45). Counter-battery fire seems to have prevented very much enemy shelling during the attack. During the day well over half a million rounds were fired without a single case being reported of a round falling short. (21 Army Gp Report, paras 153-174).

62. The diapason was augmented by the firing of thirteen "land mattresses" - the saturation of targets by batteries of the newly created 1st Canadian Rocket Unit, which took part in major operations for the first time. The grouping of such miscellaneous weapons as medium machine guns, light antiaircraft and anti-tank guns for the purposes of co-ordinated fire was another 61 Report No. 185
device employed, and in this battle these "pepper pots" were organized by 2 Cdn Inf Div on the left and 51 (H.) Div on the right. In addition to the 4.2-inch mortars and the medium machine guns of the support battalions of all the divisions, the resources of two armoured regiments, approximately two light anti-aircraft regiments and two batteries of 17-pounder anti-tank guns were utilized. Since these miscellaneous weapons were fired continuously through-out the day, the ammunition expenditure and tremendous. The group organized by 2 Cdn Inf Div artillery alone fired 1,300,000 rounds of medium machine gun ammunition, 69,000 40-millimetre shells, 14,000 4.2-inch mortar
bombs and 12,000 17-pounder shells. This great weight of metal was hurled against the enemy by 156 guns (including 24 tank guns), 48 4.2-inch mortars and 96 medium machine guns. (Ibid: Account by Brigadier F.N. Lace; AEF: 45/30 Corps/C/I: Op Instr 45, "Pepper Pot", 27 Jan 45; 21 Army Gp Report, para 52) (See Appx "D").

I have this document at other sources, but took these excerpt from the entire document on Operation Veritabel on http://cap.estevan.sk.ca/SSR/Photos/ptmaule/2006/cmhq185.pdf

 

Thanx alot Macrusk!

I got my answer here!

 

I've read this thread with interest as I also have a small interest in the Great War and have on another forum been contributing to a similar debate......this must be a difficult question to answer but I'll add that for the preliminiary bombardment for Messines in June 1917 over 3 million shells were fired and for the opening bombardment for Passchendaele which started on 31st July 1917 over 4 million.....then we'd have to add in those fired after the battle started......anyone any ideas on shells fired by the Russians for Berlin?

 

Scanning through this thread, I see no mention of the artillery bombardments by both sides during the opening of Barbarossa.

How would the Russian and German barrages on that morning compare?

tom

 

I have to throw my hat into the ring here and offer some possible contenders.
1. Siege of Sevastopol. ( included the most massive heavy siege howitzers and mortars such as the infamous Karl-Gerat et al.
2. The bombing of Dresden.
3. Opening barrages of both Soviet and German batteries prior to Citadelle.
4. Opening barrages of Operation Bagration.
5. The roughly 900 days of continuous bombardment of Leningrad - '41-'44.